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Abstract in English  
 
In East African countries drought-related famine has been a number one risk. Ethiopia is among those 
countries that are repeatedly stricken by recurrent famine. Agricultural and pastoral households have 
increasingly become vulnerable to famine. The successive Ethiopian governments attributed the 
recurring famine and hunger to natural events, particularly to droughts. However, though drought 
triggers famines, it does not necessarily lead to famine disaster in every context. This is the current 
tone of literature in disaster causation. Each famine has its own specific causes in each context and 
this requires exploring the causal factors thereof. This study in the Afar region, in north-east Ethiopia, 
attempts to explain the root causes of vulnerability to famine, and assess the local and external 
responses. 
 
The central argument of the research is that pastoralists’ vulnerability to famine and food crisis has 
increased overtime because of the complex interplay of multiple factors such as environmental or 
ecological degradation, socio-economic destabilization, and political processes. It is also stated that 
despite efforts of internal and external actors, vulnerability of the pastoral groups to famine has 
increased over time. In that respect the study attempts to explain how these factors have led to an 
increase of vulnerability and livelihood insecurity among the Afar pastoralists. Three specific 
arguments are addressed through analyzing both secondary and primary data. These are: 
(i) The Afar pastoralists’ vulnerability to famine has increased over the past decades because 
of the combined effects of drought, ecological crisis and external pressures 
(encroachments, loss of key pastoral resources, violent conflict and political instability). 
(ii) Pastoral households/communities are currently less able to cope with stresses through 
their traditional coping and adaptive strategies. 
(iii) Consequently, pastoral households/communities have become more dependent on public 
transfer (food aid) to cope with recurring food crisis.         
  
The empirical research used both qualitative and quantitative data in addressing the basic research 
questions. The outline of the research is structured to suit an approach of presenting discussions at 
macro and micro levels. An assessment of factors both, at macro (regional/national) and micro 
(community) levels, is made on the basis of secondary and primary data respectively. Accordingly, 
factors related to ecological degradation, socio-political processes and recurrent droughts, etc. are 
examined. The extent of these problems at the macro level is assessed mainly based on secondary 
data, while the magnitude of these problems at micro (community) level is assessed on the basis of 
primary data gathered through a household survey, and individual and focus group interviews.  
 
The main focus of the analysis at the community level is on the local people’s perception about 
livelihood resources, well-being trends and risk factors which affect their traditional subsistence. This 
research has also dealt with the examination of traditional early warning systems, indigenous 
responses, and risk communication among local people and to external actors. In this respect an 
attempt is made to identify indigenous early warning systems and to assess external interventions and 
disaster responses with emphasis on the local people’s view on state responses in times of food crisis. 
Moreover, an attempt is made to show how the local people have shaped and reshaped their adaptive 
responses and coping mechanisms over time. In this connection analyses of traditional adaptive 
responses to the variable environment, ecological changes and of coping mechanisms to food crisis are 
made using mainly the primary data gathered from the local pastoral community.  
 
Based on the analyses of both primary and secondary data the research attempts to answer the question 
why the Afar pastoralists’ vulnerability to famine has increased over time and how the local and 
external actors have responded to recurring famine. The search for explanations of vulnerability to 
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famine focuses on highlighting the interplay of multiple causal factors at different levels within 
historical socio-political and economic processes overlapping with ecological crisis and recurrent 
drought. Accordingly the research highlights the major factors that have created vulnerability to 
famine.  These include: 
(i) External pressures which include state intervention, land alienation, encroachment by 
cultivators, loss of dry season/drought retreats, curtailment of mobility and unfavourable 
terms of trade.  
(ii) Stresses which include frequent drought, conflicts, political instability, weakening mutual 
support systems, lack of trust in formal government institutions due to non-participatory, 
lack of commitment, patron-client relationship, and corruption.  
(iii) Ecological/environmental crises which are reflected in terms of loss of key pastoral 
resources (grass, natural fodder vegetation, and water).  
 
The research also attempts to assess the local and external responses to famine. The local people are 
highly aware of the drought-related famine, degradation of rangelands and mounting conflicts. Thus 
pastoral households gradually began to incorporate into their livelihood activity some response 
strategies such as trade, wage labour and growing food crops. There are further adaptive responses 
stimulated by drought consequences and ecological crisis. These include adjustment in the 
composition of stocks, forging stock alliance, enhanced mobility and seeking external support, etc. 
These responses constitute risk management strategies. However, the extreme dryness and prolonged 
drought periods combined with external pressures, conflict and political destabilizations have 
undermined pastoralists’ adaptive strategies (mobility) and weakened traditional coping mechanisms. 
Therefore, prolonged and frequent droughts and their consequences within the context of political and 
economic marginalization, conflict and political instability have put pastoralists at risk of famine 
disaster. In this respect famine can be understood as a peak point to the long-term process of 
marginalization that has led to the failure of traditional coping mechanisms. This goes with perception 
of local people who often referred to the inability of their traditional strategies to overcome recurrent 
severe food crisis. Consequently, external support has been vital to save life, whenever pastoral 
communities are hit by a drought, as it often triggers food crisis that may lead into famine disaster. 
 
Government representatives usually attribute famines to drought and/or failure of rainfall that have led 
to crop failure and livestock mortality. Therefore, famine disaster has been theorized mainly as failure 
of food availability because of natural events (drought, pest). Accordingly, the government’s and 
NGOs response to the famines has been emergency response (food aid) to save the lives of victims. 
Inappropriate theorization of famine causation and insufficient studies have resulted in ineffective 
external interventions or responses which so far mainly focus on emergency food aid without 
considering livelihood protection. Therefore, the recovery and development aspects, and livelihood 
protection are missing. There was no single year, when there was no food crisis in the last two 
decades. At the country level every year about 5-6 million people were in need of food assistance. 
This indicates the structural vulnerability of rural households to food crisis. Therefore, external actors 
have so far not addressed the root causes of vulnerability to famine.  
 
The conclusion of the research is that famine and the increase of vulnerability are not primarily the 
consequences of drought, but of external domination and uneven development. This suggests that the 
genesis of food crisis (famine) must be understood as an interaction of institutional, economic and 
political variables. Natural events like droughts don’t necessarily lead to famine in all contexts. It is 
only when livelihood assets are eroded, opportunities are constrained and people are not well-prepared 
that the consequences of natural events develop into famine or food crisis. This suggests that 
production or yield failures caused by drought do not become famines unless other conditions are 
propitious. Therefore, the current approach in social science research with regard to disaster causation 
is to look at the interrelationship between natural risks and social vulnerability. 
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Zusammenfassung in Deutsch (Abstract in German)   
 
In Ostafrikanischen Ländern sind mit Dürre einhergehende Hungersnöte ein großer Risikofaktor. 
Äthiopien gehört dabei zu denjenigen Ländern, die wiederholt von periodischen Hungersnöten 
betroffen sind. Auf Landesebene benötigten jedes Jahr etwas 5-6 Millionen Menschen 
Nahrungsmittelhilfe. Landwirtschaftliche und pastorale Haushalte sind stärker verwundbar gegenüber 
Dürren, was zu Hungersnöten führt. Mehrere äthiopische Regierungen haben für die wiederkehrenden 
Hungersnöte natürliche Ursachen verantwortlich gemacht, insbesondere Dürren. Jedoch führt 
dürreinduzierter Hunger nicht notwendig zu einer Hungerkatastrophe. Jede Hungersnot hat ihre 
spezifischen Ursachen und die Gründe dafür müssen jeweils untersucht werden. Diese Studie der 
Afar-Region im Nordosten Äthiopiens versucht die grundsätzlichen Ursachen der Vulnerabilität für 
Hunger zu erklären, und möchte die lokalen und externen Reaktionen auf Hungersnöte aufdecken.  
 
Das zentrale Argument der Forschung ist, dass die Vulnerabilität von Pastoralisten gegenüber 
Hungersnöten und Nahrungsmittelkrisen als Folge des komplexen Zusammenspiels von multiplen 
Faktoren wie Umweltzerstörung oder ökologischer Degradation, sozio-ökonomischer Destabilisierung 
und politischer Prozesse zugenommen hat. Zudem wird dargelegt, dass diese Zunahme trotz 
Anstrengungen internationaler und externer Akteure stattgefunden hat. Die Studie versucht zu 
erklären, wie diese Faktoren zu einem Anstieg von Vulnerabilität und Livelihood-Unsicherheit bei den 
Afar-Pastoralisten geführt haben. Drei spezifische Argumente werden durch die Analyse sekundärer 
und primärer Daten angesprochen. Das sind:  
 
(i) Die Vulnerabilität der Afar Pastoralisten gegenüber Hungersnöten hat in den letzten 
Jahren durch die kombinierten Folgen von Dürren, ökologischer Krise (Verlust von 
pastoralen Schlüsselressourcen) externem Druck und Stressfaktoren (Übergriffe, 
gewaltsame Konflikte, politische Instabilität u.a.) zugenommen. 
(ii) Parstorale Haushalte/Gesellschaften sind gegenwärtig schlechter in der Lage anhand 
ihrer traditionellen Bewältigungs- und Anpassungsstrategien mit Stressfaktoren 
umzugehen.  
(iii) Infolgedessen sind pastorale Haushalte/Gesellschaften stärker von externer 
Unterstützung (Nahrungsmittelhilfe) abhängig geworden, um der immer 
wiederkehrenden Nahrungsmittelkrise zu begegnen.  
 
Die empirische Arbeit basiert auf qualitativen sowie quantitativen Daten und zielt darauf ab, 
Diskussionen auf der Mikro- und Makroebene zu erfassen. Weiterhin werden zentrale Faktoren der 
ökologischen Degradation, Dürren und damit in Verbindung stehende sozio-politische Prozesse auf 
nationaler, regionaler und kommunaler Ebene anhand von Primär- und Sekundärdaten analysiert. 
Wohingegen zur Analyse der Makroebene vor allem Sekundärdaten verwendet wurden, wurde die 
Mikroebene (Kommunen) insbesondere anhand einer Haushaltsumfrage, individuellen Interviews und 
Fokusgruppen untersucht. 
 
Das zentrale Anliegen der empirischen Untersuchung auf kommunaler Ebene ist die Wahrnehmung 
der lokalen Bevölkerung hinsichtlich der vorhandenen livelihood-Ressourcen, 
Wohlstandsveränderungen (well-being trends) und den Risikofaktoren, die ihre traditionelle 
Subsistenzwirtschaft beeinflussen. Darüber hinaus setzt sich die Arbeit mit traditionellen 
Frühwarnsystemen, indigenen Antworten darauf und der Risikokommunikation zwischen lokalen und 
externen Akteuren auseinander. In diesem Zusammenhang wird versucht, indigene Frühwarnsysteme 
zu identifizieren, sowie externe Interventionen als Reaktion auf Katastrophen zu bewerten. Im 
Zentrum steht dabei die Perspektive der lokalen Bevölkerung auf die staatlichen Eingriffe in Zeiten 
von Nahrungsmittelknappheit. Weiterhin werden die unterschiedlichen und sich im Laufe der Zeit 
verändernden Strategien der lokalen Bevölkerung im Umgang mit Katastrophen und ihre 
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Bewältigungsmechanismen untersucht. Dabei werden die Anpassungsmechanismen an eine sich 
verändernde Umwelt, der ökologischen Wandel und die Bewältigungsmechanismen von 
Nahrungsmittelkrisen auf Basis der empirischen Ergebnisse aus der lokalen pastoralen Gesellschaft 
miteinander in Verbindung gestellt.  
 
Auf Grundlage der primären und sekundären Daten, beschäftigt sich diese Arbeit mit der Frage, 
warum die Vulnerabilität der Afar Pastoralisten bezüglich Hungerkatastrophen mit der Zeit 
zugenommen hat und wie die lokale Bevölkerung sowie externe Akteure auf wiederkehrende 
Hungerkatastrophen reagiert haben. Die Suche nach der Erklärung von Vulnerabilität konzentriert sich 
dabei vorrangig darauf, das Zusammenspiel zahlreicher Kausalfaktoren auf unterschiedlichen Ebenen 
im Kontext von historischen, sozio-politischen und wirtschaftlichen Prozessen aufzuzeigen, und in 
Verbindung mit ökologischen Krisen und Dürreereignissen zu stellen. Entsprechend werden 
wesentliche Faktoren, die die Vulnerabilität gegenüber Hungerkrisen beeinflussen, hervorgehoben.  
 
(i) Externer Druck bestehend aus staatlichen Interventionen, Landumverteilungen, 
Beeinträchtigungen durch sesshafte Bauern, Verlust von Rückzugsräumen bei 
Trockenheit, Mobilitätseinschränkungen und nachteilige Handelsbedingungen. 
(ii) Stressfaktoren bestehend aus häufigen Dürren, gewaltsamen Konflikten, politischer 
Instabilität, der Schwächung lokaler Solidaritätssysteme, Vertrauensverlust in 
Regierungsinstitutionen, Patron-Klient-Beziehungen und Korruption 
(iii) Ökologische Umweltprobleme, die sich in dem Verlust von pastoralen 
Schlüsselressourcen wie Weidefläche und Wasser ausdrücken 
 
Im Rahmen der Auseinandersetzung mit den lokalen und externen Reaktionen auf Hungerkrisen ist 
festzustellen, dass die lokale Bevölkerung sich des Zusammenhangs zwischen Dürre, Hungerkrise, der 
Degradation von Weideland und den Nutzungskonflikten bewusst ist. Im Laufe der Zeit wurden daher 
Anpassungsstrategien, wie der Einstieg in Handel, Lohnarbeit und  der Anbau von Nahrungsmitteln in 
die Aktivitäten  zur Sicherung des Lebensunterhalts integriert. Darüber hinaus können die Anlage von 
Lagern, zunehmende Mobilität und die Suche nach externer Unterstützung u.a. als weitere Strategien 
des Risikomanagements gesehen werden, mit Hilfe derer versucht wird, sich auf Dürreereignisse 
einzustellen. 
 
Jedoch haben extreme Trockenheit und anhaltende Dürreperioden in Kombination u.a. mit externem 
Druck, Konflikten und politischer Destabilisierung pastorale Anpassungsstrategien (Mobilität) 
untergraben und damit traditionelle Bewältigungsmechanismen geschwächt. In dieser Hinsicht kann 
Hungersnot als der Höhepunkt eines langfristigen Marginalisierungsprozesses verstanden werden der 
letztlich zum Zusammenbruch traditioneller Bewältigungsstrategien geführt hat. Dies geht auch mit 
der lokalen Wahrnehmung einher, welche oft auf die Unfähigkeit ihrer traditionalen Strategien 
verweisen, die immer wiederkehrenden Nahrungsmittelkrisen zu überwinden. Infolgedessen wurde 
externe Unterstützung unerlässlich zur Überlebenssicherung wenn pastorale Gemeinschaften von einer 
Dürre betroffen sind, da diese oft Nahrungsmittelkrisen auslösen, die zu Hungerkatastrophen führen.  
 
Regierungsvertreter führen Hungersnöte oft auf Dürren und/oder das Ausbleiben von Regen zurück, 
die zu Ernteausfall und hoher Viehsterblichkeit führen. Deshalb wurden Hungerkatastrophen 
hauptsächlich als Zusammenbruch von Nahrungsmittelverfügbarkeit als Folge von natürlichen 
Ereignissen (Dürre, Schädlinge) gesehen. Dementsprechend war die Reaktion von Regierungen und 
NGOs auf Hungersnöte Nothilfe zu geben, um das Leben der Opfer zu retten. Unangemessene 
Theoretisierung der Ursachen von Hungersnöten und unzureichende Studien haben ineffektive externe 
Interventionen zur Folge gehabt, die sich hauptsächlich auf Nothilfe konzentrierten, ohne den Schutz 
von Livelihoods in Betracht zu ziehen. Deshalb fehlen Aspekte von Wiederherstellung (recovery) und 
Entwicklung, sowie der Schutz von Lebenshaltungssystemen (livelihoods) bei Interventionen. In den 
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letzten zwei Jahrzehnten kam es jedes Jahr zu Nahrungsmittelkrisen und dazu, dass Menschen auf 
Nahrungsmittelhilfe angewiesen waren. Dies weist auf die strukturelle Vulnerabilität ländlicher 
Haushalte in Bezug auf Nahrungsmittelkrisen hin. Externe Akteure haben bisher die grundlegenden 
Ursachen der Vulnerabilität gegenüber Hungersnöten nicht berücksichtigt.  
 
Zusammenfassend ist das Ergebnis der Forschung, dass Hungersnöte und eine Zunahme von 
Vulnerabilität nicht in erster Linie die Konsequenzen von Dürren sind, sondern von externer 
Vorherrschaft und ungleicher Entwicklung. Nahrungsmittelkrisen (Hungersnöte) müssen somit als das 
Zusammenspiel von institutionellen, ökonomischen und politischen Variablen gesehen werden. 
Naturereignisse wie Dürren führen nicht notwendiger Weise zu einer Hungersnot. Nur wenn 
“livelihood assets“  erodiert sind, sind die Möglichkeiten eingeschränkt und die Menschen schlecht 
vorbereitet, so dass sich als Konsequenz von Naturereignissen Hungersnöte oder Nahrungsmittelkrisen 
entwickeln können. Ernteeinbrüche durch Dürren werden nicht zu einer Hungersnot, so lange die 
anderen Gegebenheiten günstig sind. Deshalb muss sich ein sozialwissenschaftlicher Ansatz zur 
Untersuchung von Katastrophenursachen mit dem Zusammenhang von Naturrisiken und sozialer 
Vulnerabilität befassen.  
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Chapter One 
 
Introduction 
1.1 Overview 
 
Countries of East Africa have been faced with hunger and recurrent food crises (famines) 
since the 1970s. The failure of these countries to feed their population is attributed to a 
number of factors such as drought, disease epidemics, ecological crisis, land degradation, 
poor governance, inappropriate national policies, civil unrest, political instabilities, etc. 
Ethiopia is one of the countries that has been facing most of these problems, of which 
drought-related famines, hunger (food insecurity), increased poverty, population pressure, 
conflicts and civil unrest remain the most prevalent ones since the 1960s (Webb et al., 1994; 
1992; Markos, 1997; Mesfin, 1999; Degefa, 2005; Fassil, 2005).  
 
The most severe and well-documented famine1 years included the 1829, 1888-1892, 1958, 
1965-1967, 1973-1974, 1984-1985, 2002-2003 (Fassil, 2005, Lautze et al., 2003; Webb et al., 
1994; Pankhurst, 1985). Some of these famine years indicated that the history of drought and 
famine goes back to 19th century. But it is mainly in the past three to four decades that the 
country has tragically been trapped by recurrent famines (Fassil, 2005:19, 25; Pankhurst, 
1985). The 1984-85 famine alone killed about 800,000 people2 (Hareide, 1991).  
 
The 20th century has gone with severe famine memories, and the 21st century has greeted 
Ethiopia with alarming food crisis. Famine persists, and just at the dawn of the new century 
(i.e. 1999-2000) more than ten million people received relief assistance (Fassil, 2005:28; 
Maxwell, 2002:48). In general, cycles of drought, famine and pestilence have always 
characterized Ethiopia’s past and present (Lautze et al., 2003, Dereveux, 2004).  
 
In spite of all the efforts made by the government, international agencies and NGOs3 since the 
1973-74 famine, the recurrent famines have been debilitating the country’s natural resource 
base, economy, and human resource (Fassil, 2005:32-45, Degefa, 2005; Markos, 1997). These 
problems coupled with a myriad of social, political, economic and ecological crises have 
made the country dependent on foreign relief food aid and development assistance since the 
1980s (World Bank, 1999 as quoted by Stephen, 2004:104).  
 
In recent decades the number of rural population affected by drought-related famines or food 
crisis has increased. Various researchers indicated that vulnerability to famine and chronic 
food insecurity in the country is increasing from time to time especially in severely degraded 
localities of highlands and peripheral lowlands (Mesfin, 1991:192, Lautze et al., 2003; 
Markos, 1997, Sharp et al., 2003; Hareide, 1991; Degefa, 2005). There is evidence that the 
level of destitution in rural Ethiopia has increased in recent decades (Sharp et al., 2003).  
                                                 
1For the details and chronology of earlier droughts and famines see Webb et al., 1992:20; Fassil, 2005:18-24. 
2 According to some sources, number of deaths ranges from 590,000 to 1 million (e.g. cited in Dereveux, 
2000:6). 
3 Instances of such efforts included Food Security Programs, Rural Development Programs, and other income 
generating activities (FFW/CFW, EGS, etc).  
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The Ethiopian government, NGOs and international agencies/donors have long recognized 
the problem and taken some measures in response to this crisis. At various times huge 
resources, particularly in the form of relief assistance have been transferred to the country. 
However, both the past and the current intervention strategies have remained insufficient to 
avoid recurrent food crisis among the rural communities. The external interventions were 
mainly short-term transfers (i.e. relief assistance) during crisis. Thus they lacked 
comprehensive conceptualization of the causes of the problem and often focused on curing 
symptoms rather than addressing the root causes of food crisis (Devereux et al., 2002:10; 
Mesfin, 1991).  
 
Moreover, approaches used to study and explain famine disasters were more of subject-
centred searching for a single factor in natural resources or economic sector (Hogg, 
1997a:17). Thus, previous studies have not fully addressed the multifaceted nature of famine 
causation (i.e. socio-cultural factors, entitlement and political economy)4 and prevention. In 
other words the vulnerability situation of the people (social groups) and their livelihood 
systems have not been adequately addressed. Consequently, they were unable to come up 
with context-specific disaster prevention strategies.  
 
In the current literature, the term vulnerability appears as a catch-all concept in disaster-
related studies (Blaikie et al., 2004; Bankoff et al., 2004; Alwang et al., 2001; Moser, 1997; 
Ribot et al., 1996). It has emerged from researches on natural disaster and famine (hunger) 
putting emphasis on the social dimension of disasters, and trying to explain the socially 
differentiated impacts of disaster (Davis, 2004:128-144). There is also a shift from ‘impact 
analysis’ to ‘vulnerability analysis’, which provides a basis for tracing social causality. While 
the former is a way of looking at a range of the consequences of an event, the later examines 
the multiple causes and critical outcomes rather than the multiple outcome of a single event 
(Ribot et al., 1996). Regarding disaster response, the current direction is from the ‘culture of 
reaction’ to ‘prevention’ (Annan, 1999). In this case, vulnerability analysis is the first step for 
moving towards potential responses and durable policy, since it enables us to trace the root 
causes of climate-related crises in social and political-economic relations and processes 
(Ribot et al., 1996).        
 
The means of risk reduction or coping with crisis are material stocks, assets as well as formal 
and informal safety nets which can be mobilized by individuals, groups or communities. 
Therefore, households’ or communities’ capacity to buffer against shocks or disasters is 
highly dependent on availability of and access to productive resources and informal/formal 
safety nets. The resulting distribution of material stocks and of access to income 
opportunities, assets as well to formal and informal social security arrangements spells out the 
material and social conditions circumscribing vulnerability for some households/communities 
and security for others (Ribot et al., 1996:12). This also suggests the importance of capacity 
(resilience) and livelihood strategies where the livelihood approach fits in. 
 
In general the main argument in the literature is that the underlying causes of famine are 
primarily rooted in social and political-economic relations and processes, but not in weather 
                                                 
4Some works (e.g. Abdul-Mejidi, 1976:9; Mesfin, 1986:129-143; 1991:192; 2004:1-7; Degefa; 2005:351) looked 
at some aspects of political economy of famine/food crisis in Ethiopia.   
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extreme events (e.g. droughts). Weather extreme events (droughts) can trigger subsistence 
crises. But such crises come at the confluence of historical processes as well as actions and 
events that make households and communities vulnerable (Ribot et al., 1996:12). The concept 
of vulnerability is used to understand the social, political and economic events that make 
agricultural and pastoral households vulnerable to recurrent food crisis/ famine. 
 
Vulnerability to hunger/famine results from the dynamics of the social system in which 
agricultural and pastoral households are located. Therefore, vulnerability is shaped by 
historical and ongoing processes of social differentiation and marginalization, within a 
specific social history of access to productive resources (assets), formal and informal safety 
nets; state development policies; conflicts, etc. (Ribot et al, 1996:12). Accordingly this 
research is guided by the theoretical orientations drawn from political economy and livelihood 
framework.   
 
1.2 The Study Area   
 
Between 250 BC and 1994, about 40 periods of famine were identified in Ethiopia. Most of 
these crises occurred within the past 200 years (the period for which most detailed records 
exist), some lasted just a year or two and others apparently persisted for more than a decade 
(Webb et al, 1994). Areas that were hit hardest by famines during these periods included the 
central and north-eastern highlands, which stretch from northern Shewa through Wello up to 
Tigray. Although the most known area for its drought and famine history is the north-eastern 
highland of Ethiopia (i.e. the present southern and central Tigray zones; Waghemira zone; 
south and north Wello zones), famine crisis has expanded its horizon and has been affecting 
nearly many parts of the country, particularly since the 1980s.  
 
The most often affected areas include the severely degraded highland areas and the lowlands 
that are inhabited by farm and pastoral populations respectively. Following the 1970s and 
1980s famines, the Ethiopian Government, international agencies and NGOs have been 
striving to provide food aid to prevent drought-related famine crises. At the same time, both 
the problem of recurrent famine and the efforts to tackle it have attracted many studies on 
famines, public response and indigenous coping mechanisms (Dessalegn, 1991; Hareide, 
1991; Markos, 1997; Webb et al., 1994; Fassil, 2005; Mesfin, 1986). Most of the studies, 
however, have largely focused on highland areas and peasant households, although the 
peripheral lowlands and pastoralists are equally affected by recurrent famines. Therefore, 
historical famines that have swept through pastoral communities have remained hidden, 
except some incomplete records of impacts of rinderpests in pastoral areas (Pankhurst, 1985 
cited in Lautze et al., 2003).     
 
Moreover, pastoral areas have been neglected in terms of development/investment and are 
characterized by different types of conflicts which have influences on peoples’ mobility and 
their livelihoods, natural resource base and access to resources (Gamaledin, 1992, 1993; Ali, 
1996, 1997; Getachew; 1997, 2000a; 2001a; Ayalew, 1997, 2001). Besides, the formal early 
warning systems have remained inactive in pastoral areas. Especially, pastoral traditional 
early warning systems providing early indications of crisis have been overlooked and/or 
ignored by a range of formal early warning and surveillance systems (Lautze et al., 2003; 
Maxwell, 2002:53).  
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The Afar Region is one of the pastoral areas that has been threatened by drought-related 
famines, marginalization, negative impacts of development schemes, environmental crisis, 
ethnic and resource conflicts and political instability (Getachew, 2001a; Ayalew, 1997, 2001; 
Ali, 1996, 1997; Gamaledin, 1992, 1993; Bekele, 2006). Given the above-stated lacuna, the 
selection of the Afar pastoralists as subject of the study merits priority and is relevant to study 
vulnerability to famine crises; adaptive responses and coping strategies that have evolved in 
shaping Afar pastoralists’ livelihood system.  
 
The case study area is located in the interface zone between pastoral area and sedentary area 
where pastoralists and cultivators interact. The study has taken up one sub-clan group of Afar 
called Aghini for in-depth study. The Aghini clan has its own traditional territory and 
historical relation with the neighbouring Oromo, Amhara and Argoba ethnic groups. 
Therefore, this makes possible to discern the economic and social relations of the Afar with 
their neighbours as well as inter-ethnic cooperation and conflict at the buffer zone. In general 
this community has been selected at least for four reasons:  
 
i. The clan group is one cohesive community residing in the interface of highland and 
lowland where pastoralists/agro-pastoralists and crop cultivators interact for various 
reasons. This has given an opportunity to elucidate relations between these livelihood 
systems. 
ii. Since it is difficult to cover large area in terms of cost and time, taking one clan has an 
advantage to make an in-depth study of changes emanated from internal factors and 
external inferences. 
iii. The Aghini clan has its own district administration which is established on the bases 
of clan and clan territory. Administrative units and social units have overlapped in 
space. This has made easier the collection and organization of both primary and 
secondary data. 
iv. The last reason, but not the least, is that the clan group is a transhumance pastoral 
community which the researcher is interested to study.       
 
1.3 The Research Problem in Context 
 
1.3.1 Background to the Problem 
Ethiopia is frequently threatened by drought-related famines. The rural people suffer from 
chronic hunger and undernutrition5. Both peasants and pastoralists have been stricken mainly 
by recurrent droughts, which in many cases triggered famines and chronic hunger. In response 
to these crises, the government, international agencies, and NGOs have been striving not only 
to save lives, but also to prevent famine disaster. However, external responses have been 
                                                 
5 The terms like famine, hunger and undernutrition might be defined in many ways by various authors. In this 
study relevant definitions given by Webb et al. (1992, 1994) are adopted:- (i) Famine is a widespread and 
extreme hunger that results for individuals in a drastic loss of body weight and increase in morbidity, and at the 
community level in a rise in death rate and massive social dysfunctions and dislocation; (ii) hunger is defined as 
the condition resulting from an individual’s inability to eat sufficient food, to lead a healthy and active life; and 
(iii) undernutrition is defined as measurable nutrient deficiencies in a diet that can lead to illness (lack of energy, 
retardation, blindness). 
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limited mainly to short-term transfers (e.g. emergency relief assistance) when crises are 
apparent. Furthermore, no significant effort has been made to investigate the underlying 
causes of vulnerability to famine disasters and the preventions thereof. In fact there is 
progress in terms of preparedness to avert famine since the 1990s. And yet the structural 
vulnerability of the rural households to chronic food insecurity is not addressed.  
 
Furthermore peoples’ assets and coping mechanisms have not received adequate attention 
(Maxwel, 2005:53). This suggests the need to understand people’s capacity or resilience. 
Communities and households have their own methods of crisis anticipation, risk management 
and coping strategies (Dessalegn, 1991; Ahmed et al., 2002:30) which vary from household 
to household and community to community over time (Yared, 1999). Despite these, very few 
area-specific studies have been conducted on coping strategies especially in crop dependent 
areas (Yared, 1999, Dessalegn, 1991). Particularly, studies on the underlying cause of 
vulnerability to famines; local peoples’ perception of risk; coping strategies; and social capital 
are few with regard to pastoral areas.  
 
Both policy makers and researchers have given minimal attention to people’s risk perception, 
local/traditional early warning systems and coping strategies. As a result, development 
policies and strategies failed to consider local level crisis forecasting and coping mechanisms 
and people’s capacity. Such gaps, therefore, generate the need to know about sources of 
pastoral vulnerabilities, local indicators of impending stress, social capital, indigenous support 
systems, and alternative sources of subsistence during crises. Because improved 
understanding of these issues help for risk reduction and for mitigating effects of drought 
through strengthening local capacity.   
 
Nowadays, the direction in famine disaster studies has been to view famine primarily as social 
rather than natural phenomenon (Blaikie et al., 2004:11,119). However, in Ethiopia the state 
and practitioners alike hold the view that famine is caused by climatic events (e.g. drought)6. 
But more than three decades have elapsed since such a view has been challenged (Abdul-
Mejidi, 1976; Sen, 1981; Mesfin, 1986, 1991; Webb et al., 1994). There are ample situations 
where the occurrence of drought does not necessarily lead to famine. Rather, it is the failure 
of social and economic organizations to absorb the shock that leads to famine and chronic 
hunger. The sources of disasters are more related to social, economic, political and 
environmental processes than the vagaries of nature (Blaikie et al., 2004).      
 
In Ethiopia the resource poor farming and pastoral communities are forced to live under 
constant vulnerability to famine, chronic hunger, dislocation and material losses. Their 
vulnerability to famine is not caused primarily by climatic events, but by various forces that 
shape the ability of peasants and pastoralists to produce and develop. For instance, the 1973-
1974 famine was notable in the north-eastern and southern parts of Ethiopia. According to 
                                                 
6 In fact the role of drought in Ethiopian famines is high, but mainly as triggering factor. The underlying factors 
for persistent famines are rooted in socio-political processes (political systems, ‘exploitation’) in which silence 
or late action was envisaged be it either due to lack of information/competency or deliberate action of the then 
governments. There are some evidences (especially about 1984 famine politics, see Clay, 1991:160&169; Watts, 
1991:48-49; Mesfin, 1986:25, and 115-116; Devereux, 2000: 22; Devereux et al., 2002:4) that the two severe 
famines of 1973/74 and 1984/85 occurred primary due to silence or inaction of the then Ethiopian governments 
and very late international community action, both of which actions were driven by political considerations. 
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Sen, famine occurred then regardless of reduction of food production and no/little price 
increase (Sen, 1981). Thus Sen related the 1973-74 famine to excessive entitlement failures of 
various farm and pastoral populations.  
 
Regarding pastoralists that were stricken by famine, Sen and other authors further argued that 
the pastoral communities of the north-east and southern parts of the country were not merely 
affected by drought but also by expansion of commercial agriculture, dislocation from 
traditional dry season grazing lands and unfavourable terms of trade of animals for grains 
(Sen, 1981; Ali, 1997). These factors that had been induced mainly by external forces 
heightened the impacts of drought by threatening the capacity of pastoral community to cope 
with consequences of the drought. This implies that vulnerability can be created by various 
factors, and natural risks are reinforced and lead to a disaster at the end.   
 
While looking at the history of droughts in lowland areas of Ethiopia, climatic extremes or 
shocks have been the expected features of arid and semi-arid areas. The local people also 
learn from past events and current situations about the frequency and the likely consequences 
of various shocks, notably drought. Thus, the local people do not sit and wait for death to 
come. Rather they tend to reshape their livelihood systems to buffer against potential 
catastrophic events. They prepare themselves with all means at their disposal and with 
whatever any external opportunity is available.  
 
However, livelihood systems, and communities/socio-economic groups vary in their capacity 
to prepare, and cope or recover from the aftermath. Therefore, in the current literature (e.g. 
Ribot et al., 1996:1) various questions have been raised: Why are some livelihood systems 
and socio-economic groups more vulnerable than others? Why are they less able to prepare 
for or recover from? What shapes their exposure to disasters and resilience? What shapes their 
vulnerability in the face of recurrent crises? In the light of the aforementioned general 
questions, this study tries to investigate the relationships between recurrent famine (food 
crisis) and Afar pastoralists’ vulnerability, and the evolving coping strategies and adaptation 
systems they have pursued.  
 
 
1.3.2. Statement of the Problem 
 
Studies on pastoralists’ vulnerability to famine have been very limited in Ethiopia, and even 
the existing ones focused on either climatic events or adaptation or on external responses. 
Apart from lack of adequate treatment of vulnerability analysis in the face of recurrent crisis, 
previous studies failed to integrate the three issues together (i.e. process of vulnerability, 
indigenous adaptations and external responses). The author argues that the problem of 
recurrent famine/chronic hunger, which has taken up permanent residence in Ethiopia since 
the 1980s persists, and the vulnerability of pastoral societies is increasing over time. Thus 
improved understanding of the underlying factors for persistence of food crisis is significant 
for strengthening public action in risk reduction. Moreover, given the recurrent nature of 
drought-related famines (food crises), it is imperative to investigate indigenous responses or 
adaptive mechanisms that are adopted by pastoralists. While this is related to local adaptive 
mechanisms, it is also equally crucial to look at the external responses and assess the degree 
to which they are based on local specific situations, indigenous knowledge system, and their 
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responsiveness to local needs. In brief, the basic issues of pastoral areas worth investigating 
include trends and changes in livelihood systems of pastoralists; historical process of 
pastoralists’ vulnerability and their resilience to shocks; and external responses to persistent 
famines and food crises.   
 
1.3.3. Hypotheses  
 
This study is not primarily focusing on theoretical aspects. Rather it is an empirical study but 
grounded on the current theoretical debates focusing on social vulnerability factors, which 
have not been given adequate attention in disaster studies. Given the background to the 
research problem, the present research is guided by the following working hypotheses: 
 
i. The severity and frequency of drought is increasing in the pastoral community. In 
spite of efforts made so far, vulnerability to food crisis/famine has increased 
primarily caused by changes in the natural environment and by external pressures 
namely social, economic and political processes and conflicts. 
 
ii. The frequency and the likely consequences of extreme events are not new 
phenomena to the pastoralists who experienced them in the past four to five 
decades. Thus pastoral communities have been constantly reshaping their 
livelihood systems, modes of adaptation and coping strategies to buffer against 
risks or survive crises. 
 
iii. Though pastoral communities and households have their own risk perceptions, and 
indigenous adaptive and coping strategies that have evolved in the face of 
environmental changes, extreme events and livelihood shocks, external actors have 
not yet incorporated or utilized or anchored in the indigenous early warning 
systems and coping strategies due to communication barriers between them and 
the local actors.  
 
1.4 Scope and Objective of the study  
 
Previous studies took up aspects of pastoralism as their main focus. This study draws on 
comprehensive framework or perspective of social vulnerability whereby underlying 
vulnerability factors, modes of adaptation, and coping strategies or communities’ resilience 
can be better captured. The central tenet of this study is that the pastoral communities’ 
vulnerability has been increasing primarily due to socio-political processes, mounting 
resource and ethnic conflicts, environmental pressures and external encroachments. 
Consequently pastoralists have been responding by reshaping their livelihood systems, 
adaptive responses and strategies. These modes of adaptation in turn have led to changes in 
resource management systems; pastoral mobility, way of life and settlement patterns, social 
institutions, etc. Therefore, this study aims at understanding and explaining such changes 
which have resulted from multiple causes and processes taking place at different levels.  
 
The time framework for the study covers the past four to five decades and present. This is 
because it has been during these decades and now that the Afar pastoralists have been 
experiencing more external pressures and extreme natural events. Accordingly the study 
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attempts to record and analyze historical processes, and events (disasters, conflicts, disease 
outbreaks, external interventions, environmental changes, etc.) that have occurred in the study 
community.  
 
Based on the research problem stated in section 1.3.2, this study has the following specific 
objectives: 
 
i. To investigate the livelihood systems of the study community. 
ii. To explore the root causes of vulnerability to famine/food crises, and examining how 
they are perceived at local level. 
iii. To identify local peoples’ adaptive responses and coping strategies and investigate 
their trends. 
iv. To explore traditional early warning systems and risk communication in the study 
community. 
v. To analyze vulnerability factors, and responses of communities to extreme events and 
external pressures.  
vi. To discern ideas that could serve for improving risk reduction strategies.   
 
1.5 Definitions of Concepts, Conceptual Framework /Approach of the Study 
 
1.5.1 Conceptual Framework /Approach 
 
In Chapter 2, a general review of theories, theoretical concepts and frameworks used in 
disaster studies and vulnerability researches has been provided. Drawing on this literature 
review, this section presents the approach to the present study and the operational definitions 
of concepts. 
 
In Chapter 2, I have also discussed the existing “theories” of famine causation and other 
related frameworks/models. These include neo-Malthusian, environmental ‘supply side’ 
explanations, economic theories and the political-economy approach. Each of these 
approaches is described in section 2.4 of Chapter 2. In the light of arguments established in 
the research problem in section 1.3 above, this study has adopted a broad theoretical 
orientation (i.e. political economy) which considers socio-political processes in its arguments 
for vulnerability of societies or social groups. Therefore, this research has attempted to 
examine social, political, and environmental processes and extreme events that create 
vulnerability to famines/food crisis in the study community. At the centre of the discussion 
are also natural risk (drought) and conflict; livelihoods; local resources and access; social 
structure (relation between individuals and groups); social capitals (networks, trust, transfers); 
state-society relations (government views, attitudes and policy to towards pastoralists); 
perspectives of external interventions towards pastoralists and their livelihoods; local people’s 
attitudes towards external actors and local formal leadership (governance).  Key concepts 
used in this study are defined in section below.   
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1.5.2 Definitions of Concepts  
 
i. Vulnerability: As indicated in section 1.1, the concept of vulnerability has been an 
important analytical tool to understand underlying causes leading to disaster. It has emerged 
from researches on disasters, with a view of putting emphasis on social dimension of disasters 
and trying to explain the socially differentiated vulnerability to disaster. In the area of disaster 
response, the current direction is also from the ‘culture of reaction’ to ‘prevention’. Thus the 
first step for moving towards potential responses and durable policy has to be analysis of 
vulnerability which helps trace the root causes of disasters. Accordingly, in this study the 
concept of vulnerability is used to understand pastoral communities’ vulnerability to famine 
crisis and their responses.  
 
Various writers and users have defined vulnerability in very many ways by focusing on 
households’ or groups’ or social systems’ proneness to a certain shock or crisis (see box 2.3 in 
Chapter 2). For the purpose of the current research vulnerability is defined in terms of 
households’ and communities’ exposure to famine crisis, and insufficient capability to avoid 
drought risk or rebound from the consequences of the crisis. 
 
ii. Coping strategy: People/social groups at risk or ‘disaster victims’ act within the limits of 
their resources (capacity) to cope with adverse events; and resources can be both physical and 
social means of gaining livelihoods and access to safety (Blaikie et al., 2004). Resources may 
include labour, land, tools, livestock, cash, jewellery, market, skills, entitlement rights, 
claims, networks, etc. Within the limits of their resources people employ a range of strategies 
to avoid disasters or survive adverse events. In general terms all coping strategies for adverse 
events often consist of actions before, during and after the event. In relation to this Davies 
(1996) makes distinction between these actions: as ‘coping strategies’ and ‘adaptive 
strategies’. The former are “the bundle of producers’ responses to declining food availability 
and entitlements in abnormal seasons or years”, the later means “a permanent change in the 
mix of ways in which food is acquired irrespective of the year in question” (Davies, 1996:45; 
55). Elabourated theoretical discussion on coping and adaptive strategies is given in section 
3.2.3.1 (Chapter 3). In this research coping strategies are defined as local people’s responses 
to survive famine or food crisis. 
 
iii. Adaptive capacity/Resilience: Adaptive capacity/response is equivalent to resilience. The 
concept of resilience is central to the understating of vulnerability (IISD, 2003:6), as it 
considers not only the capacity to respond or to absorb the impacts, but also essential and 
non-essential elements of community systems able to adapt and survive the shocks. 
Vulnerable people are not simply passive, and they “possess significant capacity as well” 
(Blaikie et al., 2004:14; Morrow, 1999 cited in Wisner, 2004:188). The concept of resilience 
is an important tool to understand community’s capacity to adapt and survive shocks. 
Resilience varies from one social group to the other, and is determined by assets that 
communities possess, and services provided by external infrastructures and institutions. 
Assets embrace knowledge and labour in a household; physical and financial capital; social 
relations and access to natural resources. Services comprise infrastructure, transport and 
communication, credit services, markets, emergency relief systems, etc (IISD, 2003). This 
indicates that resilience is the characteristics of local asset base and external services or 
supports. Social capital and collective action are also property of resilience. In this research 
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emphasis is given to social capitals/networks which are characteristics of social resilience. For 
the purpose of this research resilience/adaptive capacity is defined as ability of social groups 
to adapt to trends and shocks absorbing them while maintaining function.  
 
iv. Livelihood: When it comes to the understanding of vulnerability and resilience, the 
concept of livelihood7 is central and can be subjected to various interpretations. A livelihood 
“comprises the capabilities, assets (including both material and social resources) and activities 
required for a means of living. It is sustainable when it can cope with and recover from 
stresses and shocks and maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets both now and in future, 
while not undermining the natural resource base” (Carney 1998:4). In this definition of 
livelihood, assets are central and determine household resilience. Assets are the basis on 
which individuals/households and communities can build their livelihoods or use them in 
their livelihood activities. In the context of this study livelihood is defined as a means or a 
series of activities through which households or groups gain income and meet their basic 
needs and it includes the ability to exploit common resources for pastoralism or to farm for 
crop cultivation.  
 
1.6 Methodology and Data Collection Instruments 
 
1.6.1 The Study Approach and Units of Data Collection 
 
Communities and households are basic units of study and analysis for development works and 
researches. Though communities and households vary enormously according to the 
relationships, economic and political factors, they are often used as study units and analytical 
tools. This study is mainly a micro level research that considers a pastoral community and 
households as sampling units8. It has used both quantitative and qualitative data. 
 
i. Household: Household or family is the basic production and management unit in the study 
community. Decision making, labour division, household resource management and 
allocation are made at household level. Therefore, information obtained from households is 
essential to understand individual and/or group vulnerability, access and control over 
productive assets, livelihood strategies and coping mechanisms pursued by pastoral 
households. In order to obtain household level information structured household survey was 
conducted in selected villages (for data collection questionnaire see appendix 4).  
 
ii. Villages (sub-clan groups)9: They are the next unit in social structure of the study 
community. It is a major part of the Afar social and political structure. It is through this 
structure that collective action is pursued. Clan group and clan territory are important to 
individual members, households and groups in different social, economic and political 
                                                 
7 The livelihood concept, depending on its usage, may embrace the assets mentioned as characteristics of 
resilience. But here it is used mainly to elucidate the livelihood systems of households and groups in the study 
community, and how the local people view the viability of existing livelihood system in the future given the 
environmental changes, and external pressures.      
8 While simple random sampling is applied for selecting household survey interviewees; purposive or judgment 
sampling is used for selecting participants of individual and group interviews. Informants were chosen on the 
basis of their knowledge, social positions and roles in their community.  
9 Villages or settlements are mainly organized on the basis of lineage and kinship relations. 
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contexts. Therefore, sub-clan groups and villages/settlements are used as unit of data 
collection and analysis.  
 
iii. The local formal leadership and staffs of sector offices: Data collection was also made 
through group and individual interviews with local leaders and staffs from the sector offices.  
These groups and individual informants responded to questions relating to local level 
problems, development activities, early warning system, physical infrastructures and services, 
clan leadership, inter and intra-clan conflicts, relation with neighbouring ethnic groups, etc.  
 
1.6.2 Data Type and Collection Process  
 
In this research data sources involve both secondary and primary information. While 
secondary data are extracted from study reports, government documents, journals and books, 
the primary data have been generated through qualitative and quantitative data collection 
methods. The primary data are collected at households, community and formal institutions 
levels. Household and community are used as the main units of data collection and analysis. 
The process of data collection is described in the following paragraphs. 
 
i. Secondary data: This body of data is of two types and provided by government and non-
government organizations, international organizations and research institutes. The first type of 
data material on Afar society was obtained from government and non-government agencies. 
This body of material included project documents, technical study reports, periodic evaluation 
reports, and situations assessment reports, regulations and policies pertinent to pastoral sector 
(see ANRS, 2004a, 2004b; World Bank, 2001; MCE, 2002; USAID, 2003; Sharp et al, 2003; 
Melaku, 2000; Tafesse, 2001; Mohammed, 2003; Beruk, 2003; FDRE, 2002a, 2002b). The 
second type of data was obtained from empirical researches (sociological and anthropological 
ones) done by various scholars on pastoral areas and communities. These materials are 
available in published journals and books, theses, and proceedings (see Ayalew, 1997, 2000, 
2004; Getachew, 1997, 1999, 2000, 2001a, 2001b, 2004; Ali, 1996, 1997; Assefa 1995; 
Kelemework, 2000; Mitiku et al., 1999; Ayele, 1986; Fekadu et al., 1984; Voelkner, 1974).  
 
The secondary sources were found useful for gaining knowledge on pastoral societies; 
grasping theoretical knowledge and acquaintance with debates on pastoralism and pastoral 
societies; understand government views and attitudes towards pastoral sector; identifying 
research gaps with regard pastoralists’ vulnerabilities; designing the study and the data-
collecting instruments; and supplementing the primary data in addressing research questions. 
In general the survey of secondary sources and literatures has provided essential information 
on theoretical perspectives and for designing the study. (See references for general 
literatures).  
 
ii. Primary data collection: Before launching the actual fieldwork, the researcher made two 
types of field visits. The first was made at regional level focusing on the potential research 
localities which experienced extreme events (drought, flooding) and socio-economic and 
political process (external development interventions and encroachments, conflict, political 
instability, militarization, etc). The objective was to have an overview of Afar pastoral 
communities in the Afar Regional State. During the first fieldwork regional officials, experts 
from sector offices and research institute, and some district administrators were consulted. In 
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general the first trip was an environmental assessment whereby issues like socio-economic 
development issues, commercial farms, food insecurity, pastoral mobility, settlement pattern, 
environmental issues, conflict areas, were looked into. Combining the preliminary knowledge 
extracted from secondary sources and the regional level assessment, the second round 
fieldwork, which focused on limited areas, was conducted from 25th August to 8th September 
2004. The second round fieldwork covered some parts of zone 3 of the region that has a long 
history for commercial farm development, and zone 5 that is located at along the interface 
zone between pastoral areas and peasant area. During this fieldwork more time was spent in 
zone 5 from which the case study Woreda10 (district) called Telalak was selected and this 
study was pursued latter. Then I held five rounds of fieldworks in order to generate both 
qualitative and quantitative data from the case study community. In total the data collection 
process took six months. While the qualitative data were organized into notes (protocols) 11, 
the quantitative data were coded and fed into the computer and processed using SPSS 
software.    
 
1.6.3 Data collection Instruments 
 
In data collecting, combining several methods and data sources, which some authors called it 
“triangulation” (Patton 1990, Babbie, 2001) is crucial as it yields many advantages than single 
method could have provided. ‘Triangulation’ refers to “asking different questions, seeking 
different sources and using different methods” (Babbie, 2001:277). In this research both 
qualitative and quantitative methods and data sources are employed to address the research 
problem. The data gathering instruments include focus group interviews, individual interviews 
(key informant interviews), household history/life stories, observation and survey interview. 
Focus group interviews and individual interviews12 were iterative, i.e. in most rounds of the 
fieldwork the “basic process of data gathering, analyzing it, winnowing it and testing” 
(Babbie, 2001) has been repeated to come to clear understanding of issues. In the following, a 
brief description of the data collection instruments is given.   
 
i. Focus Group Interview: This method has been widely used in generating data. Authors like 
Patton (1990) suggest it as advantageous for generating data in homogenous groups of 
participants. Therefore, focus group interview was found appropriate as the subjects of study 
are homogenous - clan group residing in one district. Clan and sub-clan leaders and individual 
clan members were interviewed in various villages or clan settlements. They were asked to 
respond to questions relating to causes of famine/food crisis; risks and constraints to 
livelihood; coping strategies; traditional early warning systems; local problems, needs and 
preferences, priorities, etc. Each group interview was guided by structured checklist, of course 
allowing some flexibility in raising questions. Since I used an interpreter13, I conducted as 
                                                 
10Woreda is a local government administration next to Peasant or Pastoral Administration.   
11The qualitative data are organised into seven protocols. (pro-1 with 7 pages; pro-2 with 63 pages; pro-3 with 53 
pages; pro-4 with 51 pages; pro-5 with 151 pages; pro-6 with 17 pages and pro-7 with 61 pages). Likewise the 
quantitative data is organized and converted into descriptive statistics (frequency, percentages, averages, etc).      
12 Focus group and individual interviews were also conducted in neighbouring non-Afar communities in order to 
investigate their social, cultural and economic relations and inter-ethnic conflicts. The result of these interviews 
have been analyzed and incorporated in the relevant chapter (see Chapter 6). 
13 The interpreter, Mussa, was involved not only in interpreting but also as research assistant and key informant 
particularly in investigations of socio-cultural issues.  
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many as group interviews to triangulate responses of the same questions and to avoid the 
danger of distortions and misinterpretations. The group interview was found more 
appropriate, since the clan group exhibit more homogeneity and members tend to reflect their 
ideas in group.14 It also allowed group dynamics and some quality control since they hear 
each other’s responses and stimulate one another. Note taking and tape recording15 were used 
during focus group interviews.     
 
ii. Depth Interview of individual Informants: This method was conducted in two settings and 
in two ways. One is guided by general interview guide (checklist questions) in prearranged 
locations, and the second is informal conversational interview conducted spontaneously and 
in informal setting. In the first case checklist questions were used and the topics treated 
include, individual’s life history, challenges and experiences, inter-household relations, 
mutual-support networks, trends in livestock population, grazing land, resource management, 
changes in the environment, disaster history, recurrent drought and consequences. The kinds 
of informants include elders, religious leaders, clan leaders, widows, youths, animal traders, 
migrant workers, shop keepers, etc.  
 
Individual informants were also interviewed in informal settings and spontaneously. This 
method became very easy once I established good rapport and relation with local people and 
sub-clan leaders in the pastoral settlements. As I repeatedly visited their locality with a native 
interpreter, they have developed confidence and shown willingness to discuss various issues. 
Moreover in the local community, there is a traditional information communication method 
called Dagu. This practice has helped me to meet individual informants spontaneously in 
informal settings. While walking to settlements or anywhere in the locality, I was mostly 
accompanied by my interpreter. According to the traditional information exchange system 
(Dagu)16 anyone who comes across with another person on his/her way has to greet and 
converse about what he/she has observed on his/her way, about his/her community, grazing 
land, health conditions, local problems, any encounters, etc. This is a common way of 
exchanging information among the Afar. Therefore, my interpreter as an Afar member has to 
conduct Dagu whenever we met anyone in our way.  This allowed me to conduct informal 
conversational interviews in many informal settings. Most of the individual interviews were 
also recorded with tape-recorder and latter transcribed into notes.  
 
                                                 
14 As I observed many occasions during many rounds of my fieldwork visits, deliberation, debate, consensus and 
collective action/decision are the common ways of handling cases and issues in the study community. I had one 
encounter which goes with this idea.  “While I was filling the survey questionnaire, a 60 year old man was 
listening to what I was asking my interviewee through my interpreter. He was one of my individual interviewee 
in my previous field visit. When I finished interviewing, he asked through my interpreter, if I am willing to hear 
his suggestion. Then I agreed to hear. He said “You asked me last time and I also saw you many times in our 
area and in the town (Woreda capital) asking many people.  Still you keep on asking many persons. Why are 
endeavouring so much for which you can not get any different responses. Afar is Afar; his word is one and same. 
If you get answers for your questions from one Afar or two Afar, that is enough.  If you go from one corner to 
the other, you will get the same answer. Even it is not our culture for that matter. And yet we are hospitable, feel 
free and continue until you feel tired through this harsh environment”.  
15 Tape-recording was made with full consent of the participants.  
16  A detail about Dagu is given in the chapter 6.   
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iii. In-depth interviews with local officials, sector experts17 and non-Afar migrants: Local 
level officials and experts who lived and served longer in the locality, and seasonal migrants 
(daily labourers) were interviewed in order to generate data on local level development 
problems, intervention programmes; inter-and intra clan relations; development of settlement, 
services and physical infrastructures, food crisis, and conflicts, local peoples relation with 
non-Afars, livestock mobility, businesses, etc. The informants include district administrators, 
heads of sector offices (e.g. agriculture and livestock, health, education), traders, non-Afar 
migrants, etc.          
 
iv. Life history narrative: Case histories of selected individuals that are typical and/or 
representative were recorded. The case study individuals were heads of households which 
included both men and women. They were given the opportunity to recount their personal 
histories, experiences, challenges (the ups and downs) that they have encountered in their life 
particularly during crisis times. They were also asked to narrate about their households, 
relations with other households, mutual support networks, coping strategies, etc.  
 
v. Observation: The author gathered general information through observation on marketing, 
settlement patterns, division of labour, cultivation practices, grazing land, water points, 
natural resources, social and economic services, various occasions and rituals relating to 
beliefs and traditions (feasts, wedding, funeral ceremonies, reconciliation meetings), and Afar 
and non-Afar individual encounters, etc.   
 
vi. Structured Questionnaire Interview of Household Heads: As the fieldwork progressed, I 
became familiar with different pastoral settlements and neighbourhoods in the study 
community. This also enabled me to probe into some of the questions intended to be 
incorporated into the structured questionnaire interviews. Then I proceeded to the designing 
of a structured questionnaire to conduct household heads interviews into two settings: in 
selected pastoral villages and in the large settlement which is regarded as town18. I conducted 
the household survey at the 5th round of my fieldwork, before I completed the ongoing 
qualitative data collecting process. It was done with intention for triangulating some the 
qualitative data to quantitative ones; for standardizing some quantitative questions and for 
identifying data gapes. Therefore, I was able to fill data gaps during the final round of my 
fieldwork.  
 
The household survey was conducted in five pastoral villages19, and in the Nemelifen 
settlement which is considered as town by the local people. (For the location of sites see 
appendix 1). In total 60 households were randomly selected and interviewed. Care was taken 
in selecting settlements to represent the two sub-clans (Megenta Aghini and Bahire-Aghini) 
residing in the pastoral villages. With regard to Nemelifen settlement, the residents are mix of 
                                                 
17 Local officials and experts from neighbouring non-Afar districts (i.e. Bati, and Dawa Cheffa Woredas) were 
interviewed in order to understand inter-ethnic cooperation and conflict along the interface zone. 
18 Household survey was conducted at the 5th round of my fieldwork (i.e. before I completed the qualitative data 
gathering). I did this with intention of triangulating some the qualitative data to quantitative ones before I 
finished the whole data colleting process.  
19 The household survey schedule coincided with the period where the local people faced fodder problem due to 
inadequate rainfall and began moving their livestock to Cheffa. Thus I had to conduct the survey in 
neighbourhoods where permanent villages or settlements are available. 
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the two sub-clans and samples were taken from the total households residing in the town. In 
both settlements (villages), fresh list was established so that simple random sampling 
technique was applied to select samples. 
 
Structured questionnaire interview was employed to generate baseline information on the 
general socio-economic conditions of the study community, assets, trends in resources and 
food security. The specific topics include household livelihoods/activities; asset (livestock 
holding and access to land); risks and livelihood constraints; changes in livestock number; 
grazing land  and herd movement; crop cultivation; human and social capital; informal and 
formal transfers; current food security and consumption, self assessment of households’ well-
being  in the past three decades, etc.  
 
1.6.4 Data Analysis and Presentation  
 
Initially at each round of data collecting, notebooks and tape recorder were used. A checklist 
with broad and specific topics was used as a guide. This guide has facilitated the recording of 
information systematically and then for transcribing the information into English using word 
processing.  
 
The information collected through various instruments was recorded and analyzed separately. 
Then the whole data was grouped into qualitative and quantitative data sets. Finally the 
perspectives and insights from the interpretations of qualitative and quantitative data are 
integrated to handle the research problem. In the following, the process of data recording and 
analysis are briefly described.  
 
i. Qualitative data: The information collected through focus-group and individual interviews; 
case history narratives and observation were recorded into notebooks and/or tape recorders. 
All the notes taken were translated into English. Tape recorded data were first transcribed and 
then entered into the computer.  All the qualitative information gathered during each rounds 
of fieldwork was transcribed, and written down in English and then entered into the computer 
using word processing. Finally a protocol or a note, which amounted to 408 pages, was 
produced, and reorganized under broad and specific themes20 or headings for analytical 
convenience. Finally the entire qualitative information is interpreted and analyzed separately.  
 
ii. Quantitative data: This data set acquired through structured questionnaire interview was 
processed and analyzed in different way. In the survey questionnaire most of responses were 
pre-coded, and very few open-ended questions were reorganized and coded latter. Then the 
responses were fed into the computer using SPSS software. The analysis and presentation 
involves descriptive statistics like averages, percentage and mean. The analysis results are 
frequency distributions and percentages depicted in tables and logical arguments in relation to 
hypotheses developed in the research.  
                                                 
20 The themes in fact were mainly headings of interview-guides and categories that emerged from the 
interviewing processes themselves.   
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Chapter Two 
 
Review of Concepts, Theories and Approaches 
 
Introduction 
 
Societies of the world are vulnerable to different types of hazards or disasters which, 
depending on time and space, include natural, technological, and wilful events. Some 
societies face single risk and others 2-3 types of hazards and still others face multiple risks. 
The number and impacts of disasters is increasing overtime. For instance the total of number 
of reported disasters in the world has risen from 368 in 1992 to 712 in 2001. In the same 
period, the number of affected population has doubled, rising from 78,292,000 to 170, 
478,000 (Walter, 2002, quoted in Bankoff, 2003:18). Moreover, the patterns and landscapes 
of hazards and disasters can change over time and space, and new ones21 could also emerge as 
a result of demographic trends and settlement patterns, technological changes, environmental 
crisis or degradation, etc.  
 
On the other hand the capacity of societies to mitigate hazards or to absorb and cope with 
disasters and recover from their impacts also greatly varies depending on the degree of 
exposure, and variations in societies’ or groups’ resilience/capacity. In spite of advances in 
technological and institutional capacities, people, however, continue to suffer from increasing 
disasters and their impacts. As a result, today more than ever in the past, the need for 
understanding the root causes of specific disasters and designing risk reduction strategies 
have been the main concern of various actors.  
 
Accordingly various stakeholders or actors (disaster researchers, academics, and disaster 
response agencies) have developed various approaches in order to explain or understand 
causes of disaster and to design mitigation measures, emergency response and recovery.  
Countries of the world which are prone to specific disaster risks are also making various 
efforts to prevent societal hazards, and risk associated disasters. Social sciences (such fields 
as geography, sociology, political science, psychology, economics, anthropology, public 
health) have made continuing contributions to the development of knowledge about societal 
responses to hazards and disasters. Researchers are engaged in a continued production of new 
theories, models, explanatory themes and analytical tools to explain better the root causes of 
specific disasters.  
 
This chapter deals with the review of the literature on some relevant concepts, conceptual 
frameworks and theories (approaches) developed to understand disaster causation. Key 
concepts used in disaster study and management and vulnerability research; and approaches 
or theories developed to understand disaster causes are in the center of this review.  
 
First, attempt is made to survey the definitions of key concepts that are present in the 
literature. This is followed by discussions on debates about conceptual clarification of key 
                                                 
21 Biological hazards, biogenetic engineering mishaps, toxic chemicals, ozone depletion, climate change, 
terrorism and HIV-AIDS are being regarded as emerging hazards/risks since the second half of 20th century 
(Oliver-Smith, 2004:21; Quarantelli, 1995:225).   
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concepts (e.g. disaster, hazard and risk). Secondly, the main famines theories (explanations) 
given from the perspective of various disciplines are presented. Thirdly, relevant disaster 
research frameworks and theories (approaches) are treated. Finally, analytical tools (e.g. 
vulnerability, resilience/adaptive capacity) and how these conceptual tools being utilized in 
the general literature are discussed.  
 
2.1 Theoretical Definitions of Concepts 
 
In undertaking disaster and hazard studies and vulnerability researches a number of terms and 
concepts are used by various disciplinary fields which give their own definitions to the 
concepts. Concepts that appear widely in various disaster research literatures and disciplinary 
fields include disaster, hazard, risk, vulnerability, resilience, adaptation, coping, capacity, 
crisis/catastrophe, mitigation, marginality, poverty, entitlement, coupled human-environment 
systems, etc. Indeed this work does not intend to apply to all these concepts. Rather it 
attempts to apply selected concepts which are most relevant to the present study. 
 
In this section the definitions of and debates on terms like disaster, hazard, risk, vulnerability, 
coping, resilience and adaptation are reviewed. These terms are used across various 
disciplines and have been a conjecture of many sciences. As a result, there are differences as 
well as some overlaps and even confusion in definitions of the concepts22. Most, if not all, 
theoretical concepts are defined in many ways in which they are handled. In the following I 
present theoretical definitions of some selected concepts drawing on the review of literature.   
 
i. Disaster: A range of meanings from various contexts and perspectives are given to the term 
disaster. There is no general consensus on definition of disaster due to the complexity and 
relativeness of processes. In this case Qaurantelli (1998) made this remark:  “I cannot define 
disaster, but I know it when I see it”. Despite more than half a century tradition and 
experience in hazard and disaster researches, there is no universal definition of disaster as 
various criteria are used for definition of disaster. Researchers define disaster in a way that 
best fits their purposes or objectives. In this section only some examples of definitions of 
disaster are given in Box 2.1 below. Obviously the concept of disaster depends on the 
perspective of the person (academics, institutions, practitioners).  
 
The definitions given in Box 2.1 below indicate the conceptual development and various 
conceptualization of disaster. Earlier works in disaster studies applied the concept of disaster 
to major physical disturbances (i.e. earthquake and flood) which were traditionally considered 
as ‘Acts of God’23. Then gradually disasters came to be viewed as physical agents and their 
effects as outside attacks to social systems. At that time thus disasters were blamed on 
                                                 
22 For instance differentiating risk from hazard; vulnerability from capacity/adaptive capacity; vulnerability from 
sensitivity, resilience and resistance (Kelly and Adger, 2000; Füssel, 2005 cited in Ifejika Speranza, 2006:13), 
and differentiating crisis, disaster, catastrophe (Alexander, 1993; Quarantelli, 1998 cited in Ifejika Speranza, 
2006:13).   
23 The word etymologically entered the English language from a French word (desastre), which in turn was a 
derivation from two Latin words (dis, astro) which combined meant, roughly, formed on a star. So in its early 
usage, the word disaster had reference to unfavourable or negative effects, usually of a personal nature, resulting 
from a star or planet. In time, the word disaster was applied more to major physically disturbances such as 
earthquakes and floods, or what came to be traditionally as ‘Acts of God’ (Quarantelli, 1987:8). 
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processes of physical world, and ‘root causes’ to destructions were attributed to extremes of 
nature. As researchers’ understanding has increased, they have seen greater complexity in 
natural hazards. Then they tended to seek causes in human social organizations than in nature. 
As a result, disasters came to be seen as social constructs (i.e. understanding disasters in terms 
of social action).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
According to some writers (e.g. Dombrowsky, 1998; Gilbert, 1998), works which have first 
contributed to this shift in thinking included the works of Carr (1932), Quarantelli (1985, 
1987) and Hewitt (1983)24. Although there is such shift in perspective, there is no universal 
                                                 
24 Carr’s conclusion signifies that disasters are the results of human activities, not of natural or supernatural 
forces (as quoted by Dombrowsky 1998: 24-25); Quarantelli first brought about a change in thinking about 
Box 2.1. Some Academic and Organizational Definitions of Disaster  
 
1. Disaster: any event “concentrated in time and space, in which a society of a relatively self-sufficient 
subdivision of society, undergoes severe danger and incurs such losses to its members and physical 
appurtenances that the social structure is disrupted and the fulfillment of all or some of the essential 
functions of the society is prevented” (Fritz, 1961:655). 
2. Disasters: “are unmanaged phenomena. They are the unexpected, the unprecedented. They derive from 
natural processes of events that are highly uncertain. Unawareness and unreadiness are said to typify the 
condition of their human victims” (Hewitt, 1983: 10).  
3. A disaster: “proceeds from an event …when (i) it is extreme in magnitude, (ii) the population is very great, 
or (iii) the human-use system is particularly vulnerable” (Burton et al., 1993:232). 
4. “A disaster is…an event associated with the impact of a natural hazard, which leads to increased mortality, 
illness and/or injury, and destroys or disrupts livelihoods, affecting the people or an area such that they 
(and/or outsiders) perceive it as being exceptional and requiring external assistance for recovery” (Cannon, 
1994: 29). 
5. “Disasters are…rare events and, for most people, their only source of information is likely to be the media. 
The media are, therefore, in a very powerful position to influence what events are regarded as disasters” 
(Horlick-Jones, 1995, 310). 
6. “Disasters are non-routine events in societies or their larger subdivisions (e.g. regions, communities) that 
involve social disruption and physical harm.  Among the key defining properties of such events are (i) 
length of forewarning, (ii) magnitude of impact, (iii) scope of impact, and (iv) duration of impact” (Kreps, 
1998: 34). 
7. Disaster:  “…a process/event involving the combination of a potentially destructive agent(s) from the 
natural, modified and/or constructed environment and a population in a socially and economically produced 
condition of vulnerability, resulting in a perceived disruption of the customary relative satisfactions of 
individual and social needs for physical survival, social order and meaning” (Oliver-Smith, 1998: 186). 
8. “A disaster: occurs when a significant number of vulnerable people experience a hazard and suffer severe 
damage and/or disruption of their livelihood system in such a way that recovery is unlikely without external 
aid” (Blaikie et al., 2004:50).   
9. A disaster: is “an event in which a community undergoes severe losses to persons and/or property that the 
resources available within the community are severely taxed” (Drabek, 2005:3).  
10. “The German Red Cross…defines disaster as an “extraordinary situation in which the everyday lives of 
people are suddenly interrupted and thus protection, nutrition, clothing, housing, medical and social aid or 
other vital necessities are requested” (Katastrophen-Vorschrift 1988 as quoted by Dombrowsky, 1995:241).
11. Disaster: is “a serious disruption of the functioning of society, causing widespread human, material, or 
environmental losses, which exceed the ability of affected society to cope using only its own resources” 
(UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, 1992; and European Environmental Agency/EEA/, 2006). 
12. Disaster:  is defined as “an occurrence of a natural catastrophe, technological accident, or human-caused 
event that has resulted in severe property damage, deaths, and/or multiple injuries” (US Federal Emergency 
Management Agency /FEMA/, 1996).  
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definition of disaster as the varied definitions given in box 2.1 illustrate. And yet, debates for 
the need of an agreed definition are going on. Some discussions on the lack of conceptual 
clarity in disaster research are presented in section 2.3 below. 
 
ii. Hazard: Hazard includes both natural and technological processes/events which may 
threaten human life, property, activity and the environment. The concept of hazard is also 
defined by different users in various ways. Some examples of definitions of hazard given in 
box 2.2 illustrate this.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iii. Risk: The term risk is used in many ways to convey different senses (i.e. in terms of 
probability of loss, source of danger, actual loss or consequences, perception of sources of 
risk). These applications suggest that risk can be objectively defined in terms of probabilities 
and loss quantification, or subjectively in terms of perception, capacities and loss25 (Ifejika 
Speranza, 2006:16). Thus risk does not only arise from physical processes but it is also 
socially constructed to help human beings understand and cope with the dangers and 
uncertainties of life (Slovic and Weber, 2001:4; Ifejika Speranza, 2006:16).  
 
These multiple uses of the term imply the existence of various definitions, and sometimes 
overlap with that of hazard. Risk sometimes is considered to be synonymous with hazard, and 
                                                                                                                                                        
disasters, by removing the focus from the event to its intersection with society and its effects (as quoted by 
Gilbert, 1998.13); and Hewitt (1983) castigated hazard researchers for the overwhelming attention given to 
geophysical processes and neglect of social forces.  
25 Blaikie et al.,(2004:18-19) noted that “the writings on risk are distributed along the continuum of 
epistemological positions”, (i) at one end, a realist approach that takes risk as an objective hazard that can exist 
and can be measured independently of social and cultural processes and theories and methods associated with 
this approach are techno-scientific, statistical and actuarial; (ii) moving across the continuum, there are what 
could be termed ‘weak constructionist’ approaches, where risk is an objective hazard but is  always mediated 
through social and cultural process; (iii) the strong constructionist approach where nothing is a risk in itself but it 
is a contingent product of historically, socially and politically created ‘ways of seeing’.     
Box 2.2  Some definitions of Hazard 
 
1. Hazard: “A condition with the potential for harm to the community or environment” (Drabek, 1986).
2. Hazard: is “the probability that in a given period in a given area, an extreme potentially damaging 
natural phenomenon occurs that induces air, earth or water movements, which affect a given zone” 
(Maskrey, 1989:1).   
3. Hazard: “a threatening event, or the probability of occurrence of a potentially damaging 
phenomenon with a given time period and area” (UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, 1992). 
4. Hazard: “a naturally occurring or human-induced process or event with the potential to create losses, 
i.e. general source of danger” (Smith, 1996:5). 
5. Hazard: “refers to an extreme natural event that poses risks to human settlements” (Deyle et al.,
1998:121).  
6. Hazards are defined “as threats to a system, comprised of perturbations and stress (and stressors), 
and the consequences they produce” (Turner et al., 2003:1) 
7. Hazards are defined “as a potentially damaging physical event, phenomenon or human activity that 
may cause the loss of life or injury, property damage, social and economic disruption or 
environmental degradation” (Yamin et al., 2005:4). 
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thus “hazard (or cause) may be defined as potential threat to humans and their welfare, and 
risks (or consequences) as the probability of a specific hazard occurrence” (Smith, 1996:5).  
 
Hazard is the potential threat to human welfare, while risk is the probability of a hazard 
occurrence, its severity and consequences. Hazard also relates to the harm (actual or potential) 
which depends also on the vulnerability/sensitivity of exposed unit and its capacity/resilience 
(Ifejika Speranza, 2006:16). These various meanings of risk often cause problems in 
communication and have led to some confusion (Slovic and Weber, 2001:4). 
 
However, regardless of definitions, some writers suggested that “the probabilities and 
consequences of adverse events and hence the “risks” are typically assumed to be objectively 
quantified”26 (Slovic and Weber, 2001:4). On the other hand, many social analyses reject such 
notion claiming that it is incomplete and misleading27 (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982 cited in 
Henry, 2005:4). Instead such social science approaches focus on effects that risk outcome 
distributions have on the people who have experienced them (Sandman, 1987, cited in 
Douglas, 1999:2). In other words risk is seen inherently as subjective28. Thus risks are viewed 
according to their perceived threat to familiar social relationships and practices, and not 
simply by numbers alone (Douglas, 1999:1). Smith (1996:5) also noted that, people and what 
they value are the essential point of reference for all risk assessment and for all disasters.   
 
Risk is also a function of perception. This is to say that actors in societies make decisions and 
take action on the basis of their perception of risk than on some objectively derived measures 
of threat. Many actors perceive the quantitative aspects of risk as less important than the 
qualitative attributes of that risk (UNDP/DHA, 1994 noted in Ifejika Speranza, 2006:17). 
Perception of risk can vary among groups based on individual characteristics and knowledge 
about hazard. Factors that affect perception of risk include individual interests; level of 
exposure and frequency of hazard occurrence; knowledge, education and personal experience; 
availability of and access to information; verbal folklore, oral history, etc. According to the 
“cultural theory of risk”29 the characteristics of the perceiver, rather than the risk itself, is 
central to the understanding of risk perception (Douglas, 1999:1). Increased access to factual 
information can increase perception of risk thereby activating actions for vulnerability 
reduction. High levels of perceived risk are usually associated with desires or actions to 
reduce risk (Ifejika Speranza, 2006:17). Therefore, perception of risks is crucial for 
understanding peoples’ action or inaction to reduce their vulnerability. This suggests the need 
for not only theoretical clarity at conceptual level but also actor’s level perception of risk.   
 
                                                 
26 This is meant “the nature of harm that may occur, the probability that it will occur, and the number of people 
who may be affected” (Groth, 1991 quoted by Douglas1999:2)  
27 Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) noted that scientific ratios that assess levels of risk are incomplete measures of 
the human approach to danger, since they explicitly try to exclude culturally constructed ideas about living “the 
good life” (as quoted by Henry, 2005:4). 
28 This is to say subject to value judgment i.e. “more concern for broader, qualitative attributes such as whether 
risk is voluntary assumed;  risks and benefits are fairly distributed; risk is controllable; risk is a necessary or 
avoidable; risk is a familiar or exotic; risk is the natural or technological in origin” (Sandman, 1987 quoted by 
Douglas, 1999:2). 
29 It is one “theory of Risk Communication which is an interactive process of exchange of information and 
opinion among individuals, groups and institutions” (Douglas, 1999:1).  
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iv. Vulnerability: The vulnerability concept is used in human ecology, development studies, 
and in research on hazard, disaster, environmental and climate changes. In these fields and 
across other disciplinary fields the term is also defined in different ways (i.e. in terms of 
physical exposure; as measure of socio-economic status (endowment and entitlement); in 
terms of differential ability to cope; and in terms of regions at risk. As with disaster, 
vulnerability has no common definition. Various users define it in the way that best fits to 
their usual practice. Some definitions of vulnerability extracted from various sources are 
given in box 2.3 to show these contexts.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These wider uses of the concept imply the existence of many definitions of vulnerability in 
various contexts. This raises a concern that the concept of vulnerability is losing its meaning, 
as it is being used for different analytical contexts (Ifejika Speranza, 2006:21). Some writers 
argued that its application across many disciplines enlarges it; or its broad use is meant 
everything. In this case, Timmerman had indicated earlier that “vulnerability is a term of such 
broad use is to be almost useless for careful description at the present, except as a rhetorical 
indicator of areas of greatest concern” (Timmerman, 1981:17). And yet, the increased use of 
the concept of vulnerability has spread across various disciplinary fields, development 
Box 2.3  Some Definitions of Vulnerability  
 
1. Vulnerability is defined as “the degree to which a system or part of a system may react adversely 
to the occurrence of a hazardous event” (Timmerman, 1981:21). 
2. Vulnerability is described as “defencelessness, insecurity, and exposure to risk, shock, and stress” 
(Chambers, 1989).  
3. Vulnerability is defined as “risk that household’s entitlements failure to buffer against hunger, famine, 
dislocation or other losses” (Downing, 1991). 
4. Vulnerability is defined as “multi-layered and multi-dimensional social space, which centers on the 
determinate political, economic and institutional capabilities of people in specific places at specific 
times” (Watts and Bohle, 1993). 
5. Vulnerability is defined as “an aggregate measure of human welfare that integrates environmental, 
social, economic, and political exposure to a range of harmful perturbations” (Bohle et al., 
1994:37-38). 
6. Vulnerability is “the condition of susceptibility shaped by exposure, sensitivity and resilience” 
(Kasperson, et al., 1996 quoted in IISD/IUCN/SEI, 2003:6).   
7. Vulnerability is defined as “the extent to which a natural or social system is susceptible to 
sustaining damage from climate change” (IPCC, 1997:1). 
8. Vulnerability is “the degree to which a system, subsystem, or system component is likely to 
experience harm due to exposure to hazard, either a perturbation or stress/stressor” (Turner et al., 
2003:1) 
9. ‘Vulnerability may be defined “as an internal risk factor of the subject or system that is exposed to 
a hazard and corresponds to its intrinsic predisposition to be affected or to be susceptible to 
damage... [or]… Vulnerability represents the physical, economic, political or social susceptibility 
or predisposition of community to damage in the case of a destabilizing phenomenon of natural or 
anthropogenic origin” (Cardona, 2004:37).  
10. Vulnerability is defined as “the characteristics of a person or group and their situation that 
influence their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from the impact of a natural 
hazard- an extreme natural event or process” (Blaikie et al., 2004:11). 
11. Vulnerability is defined “as exposure of communities or social systems to hazards” (Ifejika 
Speranza, 2006:17). 
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studies, disaster researches, and risk assessment. In relation to this some authors remarked 
that definitional diversity must be welcomed. Firstly, it represents the divergent realities and 
interests in society. Secondly, the notion of vulnerability holds a certain promise by providing 
a much-needed conceptual and practical focus that could direct and improve ongoing efforts 
at disaster prevention, mitigation and reduction (Frerks and Bender, 2004:205)30. This 
suggests that the definition of vulnerability depends on the user and its role in society. 
 
At practical level, the concept of vulnerability is considered as a key for interpreting and 
mitigating disaster31. At the conceptual level it is seen as essential link in the nexus between 
the environment, society and culture, (under)development and poverty,32 and disaster (Frerks 
and Bender, 2004:195). The emphasis on vulnerability is associated with a shift from seeing 
disaster as an event caused by an external agent to a more sociologically (as well as 
politically, environmental and economically) constructed process. Thus vulnerability analysis 
encompasses different relationships, disciplines, time frames and geographical and 
institutional levels. Heterogeneity is caused by differential patterns of vulnerability linked to 
household, gender, socio-economic and local or regional variations (Frerks and Bender, 
2004:194). In fact this in turn results in complexity of vulnerability that defies attempts at 
formulating a general theory or reaching simple solution. And yet the social vulnerability 
approach has wider space in theoretical and practical terms. The evolution of social 
vulnerability approach and its various uses are further elabourated in sections 2.6.1 
 
v. Coping, Resilience and Adaptation: The analysis of various definitions of vulnerability 
also indicates that most definitions share two common elements - ‘negative impact or loss’ 
which systems or social groups suffer, and ‘capacity’ that help recover or cope with effects. 
Vulnerability is dynamic in space and time, and it involves the conjecture of physical and 
social processes; exposure to coping, collapse of livelihoods, and dependency on external 
support. However, the affected or exposed systems or groups are not passive recipients of 
impacts or losses. They have also some degree of ‘capacity’ to be mobilized in order to cope 
with and mitigate risk, to recover or/and adapt via learning from the experiences and past 
practices and living with changes and uncertainties, and using the existing opportunities 
created. In other words the other side of vulnerability is “adaptive capacity- the ability to 
absorb stresses and disasters and avoid unacceptable consequences (Thomalla et al., 2006:46). 
Therefore, a holistic vulnerability analysis draws also on resilience, coping and adaptation. 
Thus these concepts are also important in disaster research and vulnerability analysis. They 
are related to the concept of vulnerability and are used in different ways by different 
disciplines and policy communities. How they are theoretically related to vulnerability is 
discussed in section 2.6.3. In this section only some of the definitions are provided in box 2.4 
to illustrate the various contextual definitions of the concepts.  
 
                                                 
30 The same authors, in fact, noted the need to opt for a more limited focus and scope in practice, since not all 
potential factors are relevant from an action perspective (Frerks and Bender, 2004:205).  
31 The growing use of vulnerability assessment tools such as VCAs (Vulnerability and Capacity Assessments; 
Hazard Mapping and Profiling during the 1990s have transformed vulnerability reduction from a concept into a 
practice (OAS, 1990; IFRC, 1993; Anderson and Woodrow, 1993 cited in Frerks and Bender, 2004:195)  
32 Poverty is not the same as vulnerability, though the two concepts have some relations. Vulnerability doesn’t 
mean lack of want, but defencelessness, insecurity, and exposure to risk, shocks and stress (Chambers, 1989).   
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In this section attempt is made to review some sample definitions of selected concepts in 
order to illustrate their contextual applications, meanings and uses in the literature. As can be 
seen in box 2.1 to box 2.4 above, the concepts of disaster, hazard, risk, vulnerability, 
resilience, coping and adaptation are defined in many ways by different writers and users. The 
implication is that the existence of various definitions and undifferentiated uses of the 
Box 2.4  Some Definitions of Resilience, Coping and Adaptation 
1. Resilience: “the measure of a system’s, or part of a system’s capacity to absorb and recover from the 
occurrence of a hazardous event” (Timmerman, 1981:21). 
2. Resilience is defined “as a property that allows a system to absorb or utilize (or even benefit from) 
change” (Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987, quoted in Davies, 1996:25). 
3. Resilience is “the buffer capacity or ability of a system to absorb perturbations, or the magnitude of 
disturbance that can be absorbed before a system changes its structure by changing the variables and 
processes that control behaviour” (Holling et al., 1995, quoted in Adger, 2000:349). 
4. Social (resilience) is defined “as the ability of groups or communities to cope with external stresses 
and disturbances as a result of social, political and environmental change” (Adger, 2000:347). 
5. Resilience: is “the ability of an actor to cope with or adapt to hazard stress” (Pelling, 2003).  
6. Resilience is defined as “the amount of change a system can undergo and still retain the same 
control on function and structure; the degree to which the system is capable of self-organization; and 
the degree to which the system expresses capacity for learning and adaptation” (Walker, B. 2003:12).
7. Resilience: is defined as “the measure of the rate of recovery from a stressful experience, reflecting 
the social capacity to absorb and recover from the occurrence of a hazardous event” (Smith, 1992:25 
cited in Blaikie et al., 2004:85). 
8. Resilience refers to “the capacity of a system, community or society potentially exposed to hazards to 
adapt by resisting or changing in order to reach and maintain an acceptable level of functioning and 
structure” (Yamin et al., 2005). 
9. Resilience: “is the capacity of a system, community or society potentially exposed to hazards to 
adapt, by resisting or changing in order to reach and maintain an acceptable level of functioning and 
structure. This is determined by the degree to which the social system is capable of organizing itself 
to increase this capacity for learning from past disasters for better future protection and to improve 
risk reduction measures” (UNISDR, 2005). 
*** 
10. Coping: refers to “the potential of a system to forestall (prevent) and reduce the impacts from 
stresses or perturbations” (Ifejika Speranza C., 2006:26). 
11. Coping: is “the manner in which people act within the limits of existing resources and range of 
expectations to achieve various ends…. Coping can include defence mechanisms, active ways of 
solving problems and methods for handling stress” (Blaikie et al., 2004:113).  
12. Coping (strategies): are “the bundle of producers’ responses to declining food availability and 
entitlements in abnormal reasons or years” (Davies, 1996:45). 
*** 
13. Adapting: “means a permanent change in the mix of ways in which food is acquired” (Davies, 
1996:55). 
14. Adaptation: is “the degree to which adjustments in practices, processes or structures can moderate or 
offset the potential for damage or take advantage of opportunities created, due to a given change in 
climate” (IPCC, 1997:1). 
15. Adaptation:  is “the ability to respond and adjust to actual or potential impacts of changing climate 
conditions in ways that moderate harm or takes advantage of any positive opportunities that climate 
may afford” (IISD/IUCN/SEI, 2003:5). 
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concepts may lead to confusion and create a problem for data analysis. Clarification of 
concepts and definitions are crucial as they determine framework and methodology of a study. 
The diversity of definitions comes from the multitude of theories and perspectives involved. 
Therefore, one first needs to gain clarity about the theory one finds appropriate for the 
questions to be studied. The usages and the perspectives of each concept have to be clarified 
in each work. Accordingly the definitions concepts used in this research are given in Chapter 
one.  
 
2.2 Discussion on Conceptualization of Disaster, Risk and Hazard 
 
Debate over what is a disaster has been both energetic and heated, and definitions vary 
considerably (Quarantelli 1985, 1995 quoted in Bankoff, 2003:22). As stated above 
conceptual clarity helps grasp the premises (debates) of various paradigms and perspectives 
advanced to explain disaster causations. Especially in endeavour for defining the concept of 
‘disaster’, some writers like Quarantelli (1995:224) argue for greater clarity and the need for 
minimum rough consensus on the central referent of the term ‘disaster’.   
 
As shown in box 2.1 above various writers and users define the term disaster in their own way 
and in terms of role they want to attach to the term33. But the debates on conceptual clarity are 
focused on the need for obtaining minimum consensus on defining features i.e. characteristics 
of the phenomena, the conditions that lead to them and the consequences that result 
(Quarantelli, 1995:225). Quarantelli noted that conceptual clarification is also required either 
to include or exclude new social happenings from the rubric of disaster, given a wide range of 
stresses or crises looming in societies over time and space.  
 
In general, some writers argue for general consensus in defining disaster (e.g. Quarantelli 
1998), while others acknowledge the diversity of definitions noting that lack of consensus on 
definition of concepts or having a diversified definition is not different to the concept of 
disaster34. The later groups of writers are not bothered by this lack of consensus claiming that it 
should not be too surprising or too alarming. Lack of common definition of some terms exists 
in various disciplinary fields.  For instance on the terms like ‘community’, ‘alienation’, and of 
course ‘disaster’ among sociologists; the meaning of ‘power’ among political scientists; 
definition of ‘culture’ among anthropologists; the meaning of ‘memory’ among psychologist, 
etc (Kroll-Smith and Gunter 1998:163). And yet Quarantelli (1987:22) argues that “what is 
important is not consensus on one definition - an impossible goal - but clarity of the term 
‘disaster’ and its referent on the part of various users”. 
 
The following description35 of the concept, disaster, can be relevant to point out debates 
centered on the conceptual clarity and perspectives for hazard and disaster researches. The 
                                                 
33 See for instance Burton et al., 1993:232; Cannon, 1994:29; Kreps, 1998:34; Oliver-Smith, 1998:186; Hewitt, 
1983:10; EEA, 2006,  etc. in Box 2.1.  
34 In this case NRC (2006) notes that definitions of core subject matter necessarily are matters of intellectual 
discussion and debate within any science, thus studies of hazards and disasters are no different. Another author 
(Perry, 1998, 2005 cited in NRC, 2006) stated that there is more agreement than disagreement on definitional 
fundamentals.   
35 This description draws on the historically rich tradition of hazard and disaster studies within social sciences, 
most notably since the post  World War II era ( for detail citation  of sources, see NRC, 2006:13). 
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description provides heuristic tool for examining a wide range of environmental, 
technological and willful events. 
 
“Disasters are non-routine events in societies or their larger subsystems (e.g. 
regions, communities) that involve conjunctions of physical conditions with social 
definitions of human harm and social disruptions. ….the phrase “non-routine 
events” distinguishes disasters as unusual and dramatic happenings from everyday 
issues and concerns. The dual reference to “physical conditions” and social 
definitions means that each is individually necessary and both are collectively 
sufficient for disasters to occur in social time and space. The designation “societies 
or their larger subsystems” means that human harm and social disruption must have 
relevance for larger social systems…. Poverty, hunger, disease, and social conflict 
are chronic societal concerns. Economic depressions, famines, epidemics and wars 
are disasters as defined above.  Global warming and ozone depletion have become 
defined objectively and subjectively as environmental hazards or risk. The possible 
disastrous consequences of these hazards…remain matters of scientific and public 
debate….” (Kreps, 2001:3718 quoted in NRC, 2006:14)  
 
The above definition of disaster draws on rich works of social scientists that have been 
engaging in disaster research in the last half of the past century. Hazard and disaster research 
communities embrace scholars and experts from a wide range of disciplines of social and 
natural sciences. For instance disciplines from social and behavioural sciences, which are 
actively involved in disaster and hazard researches/studies, include geography, sociology, 
anthropology, political science, psychology, economics, regional science and planning, 
management, etc. This disciplinary background suggests that various perspectives and 
meanings of disaster, hazard and risk are to be expected. This is mainly because “social 
sciences are not homogenous disciplines either theoretically or empirically; and these 
constructs are of interest to scholars nationally and internationally” (NRC, 2006:15).  
 
Rather the need for making clear distinction between hazard, risk, and disaster has been 
emphasized. In this case, Cutter underlines the importance of making distinctions among the 
three terms as follows: 
 
The distinction between hazard, risk, and disaster is important because it illustrates 
the diversity of perspectives on how we recognize and assess environmental threats 
(risks), what we do about them (hazards), and how we respond to them after they 
occur (disasters). The emphasis on hazard, risk and disaster is also reflective of 
different disciplinary orientations of researchers and practitioners (Cutter, 2001:3 
quoted in NRC, 2006:14).  
 
In addition, Cutter acknowledges the complex nature of hazards, risks and disasters, and the 
integration of hazard researches and management. He, thus notes that 
 
 …as the nature of hazards, risks and disasters became more complex and 
intertwined and the fields of hazards research and management more integrated, 
these distinctions …[among these concepts]… became blurred as did the 
differentiation between origins as “natural”, “technological” or “environmental” 
(Cutter, 2001:3 quoted in NRC, 2006:14). 
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Indeed Cutter’s emphasis on the importance of distinctions has contributed to breaking down 
of historical barriers between hazard research and disaster research36. And this positive 
development has been affirmed by works of sociologists (Tierney and Perry) and social 
Psychologist (Lindell), who called for broader perspective to address the issue of complexity 
(NRC, 2006:12). In this case Tierney et al. (2001) suggest that,   
 
… more compressive perspectives are needed that consider both events and the 
broader structural and contextual factors that contribute to disaster victimization and 
loss. While functionalist approach that characterized classical disaster research 
mainly addressed the fact of disaster, not the sources of disaster vulnerability, other 
work has sought to better understand the societal processes that create vulnerability; 
how vulnerability is distributed unequally across societies, communities, and social 
groups; how vulnerability changes over time, and how and why these changes come 
about (Tierney et al., 2001:22 cited in NRC, 2006:14-15). 
 
The above quotation indicates that disaster risks are the product of disaster events (hazards) 
and the degree of vulnerability of human community. The destructive power of events is 
influenced by physical characteristics and the degree of exposures to impacts. However, the 
physical force of a disaster event is insufficient to explain risk, as communities experienced 
equivalent levels of physical forces of a given event have varying levels of risks. It is the 
concept of vulnerability that explains why, with the equivalent of force of disaster event, 
people and property are at different levels of risk (NRC, 2006:217). This occurs due to 
unequal vulnerabilities in human communities. And the difference is rooted in social and 
economic entitlements. Therefore, vulnerability consists of various social, economic, and 
natural and environmental indicators of societal development that represent the capability of 
communities to adapt to shocks and/ or cope with disaster events. 
 
The discussions over the conceptual clarity and the need for adoption of broader perspective 
are aimed at searching for better explanation of disaster causation, societies’ vulnerability and 
disaster responses. In this case it is useful to briefly review the evolution of approaches of 
disaster in the past half a century. Since the nature of disasters, as mentioned above, is 
complex and various disciplinary fields are involved in studying hazards and disasters, the 
diversity of approaches is expected. This review of approaches considers those perspectives 
falling under the arena of social sciences. The following sections present a brief account of 
the history of the ‘social theory of disaster’ and ‘disciplinary perspectives of disaster’.  
 
2.3 Approach of Social Sciences to Disaster  
 
2.3.1 The History of Social theory of Disaster  
 
The issue of disaster in the arena of social sciences gained attention at mid-20th century during 
which the US government showed interest in understanding the behaviour of the population in 
case of war (Quarantelli, 1988, quoted in Cardona, 2004:42). Then a “social theory of 
disasters”37 came to life, and this approach involves a series of studies about reactions, and 
                                                 
36 While the core topics of “hazard research” embrace mainly “hazard vulnerability and mitigation”, “disaster 
research” focuses on “emergency response and recovery” (NRC, 2006).   
37 Gilbert, C. (1995:232-234) named this approach “patterns of war approach”.  In this approach disasters were 
viewed as situations likely to elicit the reactions of human beings to aggressions and to allow an adequate test of 
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individual and collective perceptions. The focus of social sciences studies and research has 
been on responses/reactions of the people in case of emergency, and not strictly on the study 
of risk. However, this “paradigm of war pattern approach” has been challenged by writers like 
Quarantelli (1970 quoted in Gilbert, 1995:232-234) who argued against “the unnecessary 
linkage between destructive factor and the community as it emerged from the notion of 
panic”. In relation to this Quarantelli pointed out that “there was no mechanical relation 
between these two factors, and thus there was greater autonomy in reactions of people to 
panic”. Thus Quarantelli’s work contributed to the emergence of new modes of approaching 
disaster. And the relevance of social factors within communities for the understanding 
disasters has been recognized. By the 1970s social science researchers in USA had made shift 
in conceptualizing disaster, and they have recognized that “disaster has to be studied within 
the human group involved in it, and not as the result of an exclusive external factor” (Gilbert, 
1995:234). This critical analysis, in fact, rigorously pursued and enhanced by European 
scientists. This has led to emergence of new approach to disaster which Gilbert calls it 
“disaster as social vulnerability”. 
 
Contributions from geography and “ecologist school” from the 1930s had also led to the 
conception of social-environmental perspective that subsequently inspired the approach of 
applied sciences. Its emphasis on the notion that “disaster is not synonymous of natural events 
and the need to consider the capacity for adaptation or adjustment of a community when faced 
with natural or technological events was the springboard for vulnerability concept” (Cardona, 
2004:42). 
 
Since 1980s and especially in the 1990s, in Europe and in certain developing countries (Latin 
America and Asia), social science researchers have critically discussed natural and applied 
science approaches, and “their approach suggests that vulnerability has a social character and 
is not limited to potential physical damages or to demographic determinants” (Cardona, 
2004:42). 
 
Initially disaster or hazard studies were dominated by disaster-centered interest and by 
searching for technological responses. In the 1950s and before this period, disaster studies 
were dominated by two paradigms - the behavioural and structural paradigms. The former 
combined hazard-centered interest with the idea that people had to be taught to anticipate it. 
Therefore, this approach emphasized monitoring and predicting hazards; explaining people’s 
behaviour in response to risks and disasters; and developing early warning systems and 
disaster preparedness schemes. In general, this approach is technocratic and hazard-centered 
approach to disasters (Hilhorst, 2004: 53). Some authors remarked that this perspective, 
referred as “dominant approach”, is based on Western science which considered nature and 
society as separate. The premise was that natural hazards can be controlled, and disasters be 
avoided through technology and modern administration. This suggested that less-developed 
countries suffered disasters than developed ones, since they lacked that necessary 
technologies and the required modern administration.  
                                                                                                                                                        
them.  War has long been the subject of exploration by social scientists and social analyses have easily found 
war patterns. The paradigm of “war patterns” strongly reflects the circumstance and the place where it first 
emerged (i.e. in USA at the height of cold war). At the time government institutions provided research funds 
primarily for studies relevant to understanding the reactions of people to possible air strike.  
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However, in the 1970s and especially in the 1980s, social scientists began to question the 
explanatory power of such “dominant approach”. During these periods the relationship 
between human actions and the effects of disaster (socio-economic dimensions of 
vulnerability) was increasingly documented and argued by many writers. For instance Hiwett 
came up with a landmark work called “Interpretations of calamity from the view points of 
human ecology”, and argued that “disasters were not primarily the outcome of geographical 
processes. Especially in developing countries, structural factors such as increasing poverty 
and related social processes accounted for peoples’ and societies’ vulnerability to disaster” 
(Hewitt, 1983 quoted in Hilhorst, 2004:53). This has been a new development over the 
“dominant paradigm” and brings better conceptualization of disaster through connecting 
hazards and vulnerability where their interaction leads to disaster. This relation is portrayed 
by the formula of risk = hazard X vulnerability (Blaikie et al., 2004:49). The scrutiny of the 
approaches, and further empirical work have inspired the development of subsequent 
perspectives which give attention to environmental processes and impacts of anthropogenic 
activities.  Therefore, an alternative view, described as “social vulnerability approach” has got 
space in different disciplines and policy communities. This approach will be elabourated in 
section 2.6.2. The following section presents a brief assessment of relevant disciplinary 
perspectives on disaster.        
 
2.3.2 Disciplinary Perspectives on Disaster   
 
In the past half a century social sciences researchers from fields such geography, sociology, 
anthropology, economics, public health, regional planning , etc have made contributions to 
the development of knowledge and understanding in disaster study and research. In doing so, 
they have advanced their own disciplinary perspectives to understand disaster causes and 
peoples’ perceptions and responses to disaster impacts. This section presents the main 
disciplinary perspectives on disaster study. 
 
Having reviewed the general literature on disaster, Alexander (1993) identified six schools of 
thought on natural hazards and disaster studies (Alexander, 1993 cited in Nasreen, 2004). 
These include the geographical, anthropological, sociological, the development studies, the 
disaster medicine and the technical approaches.  In the following the main focuses and the 
substantive areas of each disciplinary approach are briefly described.  
 
i. The Geographic Approach: This approach is represented initially by the works of 
geographers like Barrows (1923) and White (1945) (cited by Nasreen, 2004; Bankoff, 2003). 
It deals with the human ecological adaptation to the environment. It focuses on the “spatial-
temporal” distribution of hazard impacts, vulnerability and people’s choice and adjustment to 
natural hazards. Geographers perceive disasters to be the product of natural phenomena that 
are rendered hazardous precisely because human societies have failed to sufficiently adapt to 
them (Smith, 1996; Chapman, 1994; and Alexander, 1993, quoted in Bankoff, 2003:23). Thus 
population are subsequently assessed as to whether they are “at risk”, a notion determined by 
the degree of hazards and their level of vulnerability (Alexander, 1997:291, quoted in 
Bankoff, 2003:23). 
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iii. Anthropological Approach38: In this approach the works of Oliver-Smith (1979, 1986, 
1994, 1996); Hansen and Oliver-Smith (1982) are worth mentioning (cited by Henry, 2005; 
Nasreen, 2004). This approach emphasizes the role of disasters in guiding the socio-economic 
evolution of populations and it searches for reasons why communities, especially in ‘third 
world’ fail to provide basic requirements for their people’s survival. It also expounds on 
marginalization of disadvantaged groups in developing countries. Henry (2005) summarized 
the main concerns of anthropological approach to disasters as follows:  
 
…in studying disasters, […anthropology…] calls attention to how risks and 
disasters both influence and are products of human systems, rather than representing 
simply isolated, spontaneous, or unpredictable events. [...the special concern…] is 
how cultural systems (the beliefs, behaviours, and institutions, characteristic of a 
particular society or group) figure at the centre of that society’s disaster 
vulnerability, preparedness, mobilization, and prevention. Understanding these 
cultural systems, then, figures at the centre of understanding both the contributing 
causes to disasters as well as the collective responses to them (Henry, 2005:1). 
 
Oliver-Smith (1996:303) developed three general topical areas as major trends in 
anthropological research on disaster: (i) a behavioural and organizational response approach; 
(ii) a social change approach; and (ii) a political economic/environmental approach focusing 
on the historical-structural dimensions of vulnerability to hazards, particularly in the 
developing world. Oliver-Smith contends that disaster in the developing world occurs at the 
interface of society, technology, and environment and is fundamentally the outcomes of the 
interactions of these characteristics. Anthropological approach attempts to focus on the 
complex interrelationships between humans, culture, and their environment, and examines 
human actions that may cause or influence the severity of disaster.  
 
iii. Sociological Approach: Disasters have long been objects of study by sociologists (Dynes, 
1970; Quarantelli, 1978; Mileti, Drabek and Haas, 1975; Drabek and Boggs, 1968; Drabek, 
1986, as cited in Drabek, 2005). Indeed prior to the 1980s the research literature was 
dominated by sociologically oriented analyses, followed by geographers (Drabek, 2005:2). 
The sociological approach focuses on impacts of disasters upon the patterns of human 
behaviour and the effects of disaster upon community functions and organization.  
 
For many years sociologists have studied mainly community responses to and impacts of 
disasters (Quarantelli and Dynes, 1972, 1977; Quarantelli, 1978, 1984; Dynes et al., 1987, 
Drabek et al., 1983 quoted in Blaikie et al., 2004:114 and in Drabek, 2005). Sociologists have 
argued that disasters may expose the key values and structures that define communities and 
the societies they comprise. Thus core behaviour patterns and social factors are considered in 
the study of disasters. And cultural differences are found to be associated to substantial 
variation in responses.  But studies examining ‘root causes of disaster’ have been very limited 
as compared to post event assessments (Drabek, 2005).  Sociologists are concerned almost 
exclusively with the structures, functions and activities of formal human organizations and the 
                                                 
38 Within anthropological approach, Henry (2005) also identified two approaches from the works of other 
authors: (i) a typological approach, categorizing disasters by their logical type, such as drought, flood, cyclone, 
earthquake, chemical disaster, etc. (Franke 2004), and (ii) a “processual” approach, which highlights that pre-
disasters, disasters, and relief are continuous events which serve as instigators of social interactions, 
transformations, and reorganization (Hoffman and Lubkemann 2005) (as cited in Henry, 2005:1)  .    
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impact of disasters upon them; and generally accorded the environment only a minor role 
(Quarantelli and Dynes, 1977 quoted in Bankoff, 2003:23). They eschew the idea of 
vulnerability and favour instead definitions that frame disasters in terms of human behaviour 
at a spatially specific moment and location (Bankoff, 2003:23). In this context disasters are 
often reduced to “an array of socially derived effects” (Oliver-Smith, 1999:4 quoted in 
Bankoff, 2003:23).   
 
Some writers (Nasreen, 2004:1; Quarantelli, 1994:5) argued that application of sociological 
approach to disaster research is very limited, even though the current sociological paradigm is 
that disasters are inherently social phenomena, and that the source of disaster is rooted in the 
social structure or social systems. Quarantelli (1994:6-13) added that these notions are not 
taken as seriously as sociologist should, because: 
 
i. in looking at the temporal and spatial aspects of disaster, the concepts of social 
time and social space39 are not used,  
ii. lack of conceptual clarity ( e.g. disaster), 
iii. failure to take larger social context into account (despite massive social changes in 
political, economic, familial, cultural, educational and scientific areas),  
iv. the dysfunctional assumptions (i.e. belief in the “badness” of disasters is very 
widespread);  
v. the ignoring the relevant basic theoretical orientations. Despite many theoretical 
models and frameworks, sociologists in disaster study area have used very few of 
them (e.g. symbolic interactionism).  
 
In general despite this rich and expansive legacy, it is noted that sociologists have done little 
in theorization of disaster, conceptual clarification, application of existing theories and scope 
of coverage. Citing such scholars as Pelanda (1982) and Gilbert (1992), Dombrowsky 
(1995:242) also noted that “from European perspective there is still lack of sociology in 
sociological disaster research”.   
 
Therefore, in recent works some authors (Stallings, 2002; Quarantelli, 1994) suggest the 
suitability of some sociological theories for guiding sociologists engaged in contemporary 
disaster studies. These include “Weber’s political sociology”, “symbolic interaction”, 
“construction theory of social problems” (Stallings, 2002:300); “attribution theory”40, 
“diffusion theory” “chaos theory” (Quarantelli, 1994: 14-15); “social capital theory” (Dynes, 
2002). For instance Stallings suggests that Weber’s work, in particular political sociology can 
                                                 
39 This is to say (i) instead of talking about chronological time space and geographic space, to use sociology of 
time framework in order to explore how past events surrounding a disaster were reconstructed to have meaning 
and utility for the present. Disaster recovery will be better informed if we take the general notion that it is not the 
passing of chronological time or the placement in geographic space crucial in the process, but that of social time 
and social space; (ii) in linking disasters to development processes (or disasters rooted in social changes) and to 
better explain the sources and locus of resistances to disaster mitigation measures,… the social dynamics and 
processes of communities/societies are where answers should be sought, rather than looking at the psychological 
make-up or attitudes of  realtors, community planners or policy makers (Quarantelli, 1994:5-6). 
40 This theory says that practically everyone commits the "fundamental attribution error," that is, explaining the 
behaviour of others on the grounds of personal disposition to behaviour in particular ways across a variety of 
situations, rather than - as we interpret our own behaviour - as a response to circumstantial and contextual 
pressures Quarantelli (1994:3). 
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be relevant for guiding sociological researches on disaster as it represents: (i) the core concern 
of the discipline, (ii) a complement to traditional research approaches, and (iii) compatible 
with recent emphasis on inequality and its consequences (Stallings, 2002:299).  
 
In summary the key issues confronting sociologists who are studying disaster pertain to 
conceptual clarification of the concept ‘disaster’ (i.e. what it constitutes and what to include 
or exclude under the rubric of disaster concept) and to the paradigm shift or adoption of 
appropriate theory for sociological disaster research. Most sociologists do not elabourate the 
theoretical perspectives that might be guiding their fieldwork, although elements of 
functionalism, structuralism, and symbolic interactionism frameworks can be identified. This 
calls for more work in the disciplinary perspective41 with regard to concepts, models and 
theories to take sociology as scientific enterprise (Quarantelli, 1994). Moreover, in disaster 
studies some authors have proposed a paradigm shift reflecting a focus on the concept of 
vulnerability (Blaikie et al., 2004). Some reasons for this shift include, (i) we have control 
over vulnerability, not natural hazard; (ii) vulnerability occurs at the intersection of the 
physical and social environment, (iii) variables of vulnerability exhibit distinct patterns 
(Mileti, 1999; Geis, 2003 quoted in Drabek, 2005:5). This suggests that there seems 
consensus on ‘social vulnerability approach’ or paradigm which differs from “the dominant 
view” of disasters, and social vulnerability perspective focuses on socio-economic and 
political factors rather than the physical processes of hazard and the goal is to reduce 
vulnerability rather than damage. The key notion of this approach is that “social systems 
generate unequal exposure to risks by making some people more prone to disaster than others 
and that these inequalities in risk and opportunities are largely a function of the power 
relations operative in every society” (Bankoff, 2003:6). The premise of this approach is 
compatible with Weber’s political sociology42, as Stallings (2002:300) suggested, it can be 
anchored in the future disaster research. 
 
iv. Development Studies Approach: It has been concerned with the problems of distributing 
aid and relief resources particularly to developing or “third world” countries. The approach 
focuses on such activities like refugee management, health care and avoidance of starvation 
(Nasreen, 2004:3).  
 
v. The Disaster medicine and Epidemiological Approach: This approach focuses on the 
management of mass causalities. It entails the treatment of severe physical traumas and other 
diseases which may occur after disaster (Nasreen, 2004:3). 
 
vi. The Technical Approach: This is mainly dominated by natural sciences such as 
seismology, geomorphology and volcanology. It focuses on geophysical approaches to 
                                                 
41 Quarantelli (1994:3) noted that some researchers from fields of anthropology, geography and public 
administration are bringing their disciplinary perspectives to bear on their studies.  Quarantelli remarked that it is 
not to say that maintaining territorial boundaries or claiming for supremacy of some disciplinary, or 
downgrading what sociologists have done so far. Rather disciplinary perspective allows one to see much and 
brings with it a depth of understanding.  
42 Stallings (2002) notes that Weber’s political sociology offers sociologists a framework for investigating how 
inequalities in class, status, and power (Bendix and Lipset, 1966) affect disaster victimization and recovery that 
avoids both the reductionism of Marx and the tendency toward tautology in newer frameworks such as 
vulnerability analysis (e.g., see the cautionary reminders in Blaikie et al., 1994:12–13). 
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disaster and seeks engineering or technical solutions. This approach seeks structural remedial 
measures (e.g. building embankments for flood and, for earthquakes and seismic events 
introducing building codes and standards) to cope with disasters (Nasreen, 2004:3). 
 
As can be seen in above section each disciplinary field focuses on its area of concern. 
However, the fact that the concepts of ‘disaster’ and ‘vulnerability’ are too complex, their 
understanding goes beyond the disciplinary focuses and perspectives. Moreover, disasters are 
the conjuncture of social and environmental processes or natural events. This calls for holistic 
approach that considers social and natural systems to explain disasters. Oliver-Smith 
described the complexity of disaster as follows: 
 
Considering the multiple use of the terms vulnerability and disaster, and the 
multidimensionality of their expression, today it has been become ever more 
challenging to develop theory that has application or relevance to the ever 
expanding concerns they encompass. The occurrence of interactions between natural 
and technological hazards increases, making disasters more complex. The 
multidimensionality of disasters is at the crux of the problem. Disasters exist as 
complex material events and, at the same time, as a multiplicity of interwoven, often 
conflicting, social constructions. Both materially and socially constructed effects of 
disasters are channelled and distributed in the form of risk within society according 
to political, social, and economic practices and institutions (Oliver-Smith, 2004:10-
11). 
 
Oliver-Smith’s description suggests that disasters are complex and integral parts of both 
environmental and human systems. Thus disasters are viewed as the consequence of a process 
that involves a potentially destructive agent (risk) and a population in a socially produced 
condition of vulnerability (Hoffman and Oliver-Smith, 1999 quoted in Bankoff, 2003). 
Therefore, Oliver-Smith states that vulnerability is fundamentally a “political ecological 
concept” or “conceptual nexus that links the relationship that people have with their 
environment to social forces and the institutions and the cultural values that sustain or contest 
them” (Oliver-Smith, 2004:10). Oliver-Smith suggests that vulnerability provides a 
theoretical framework, since it encompasses the multidimensionality of disasters and 
translates that multidimensionality into the concert circumstances of life that account for a 
disaster.  
 
Citing  Oliver-Smith’s  works (1996, 1999), Bankoff (2003:23) noted that “as distinct from 
geographers and sociologists, anthropologists regard disasters as embedded in the daily 
human conditions and define them in terms of a seamless web of relations that link society to 
environment to culture”. In recent years, thus, “the interplay between environmental and 
social systems has been widely accepted by practitioners from all disciplinary backgrounds”; 
and the debate is more often to do with the relative weight accorded to the various key social 
and environmental factors rather than to substantive divergence over what constitutes the 
definitional nature of disasters (Oliver-Smith, 1999 quoted in Bankoff, 2003:23). 
 
Oliver-Smith (2004:12) stated that disasters come into existence in both the material and the 
social worlds and, perhaps in some hybrid space between them. Thus according Oliver-Smith, 
to have way of theorizing that hybridity is a “theoretical challenge” to researchers in disaster 
study. Then Oliver-Smith suggests that the concept of vulnerability may prove to be a key in 
this effort for meeting that challenge.    
 33
 
In the preceding section attempt has been made to discuss theoretical concepts, general 
disaster theories and disciplinary perspectives based on literature survey. The review of 
literature has revealed that concepts are defined in numerous ways by different users, and 
various approaches/perspectives have been developed to understand disasters in general 
terms. As indicated earlier disasters vary in type and pattern both spatially and temporally, 
and their causal factors as well.  Therefore, the current direction is to apply the “theory of 
social vulnerability” for explaining disasters and preventing risks.      
 
The present research is concerned with vulnerability to famine/food crisis in drought prone 
pastoral community. Thus it is important to review “famine theories” present in literature. The 
subsequent sections discuss relevant famine theories, disaster study frameworks and (social) 
vulnerability approach.  
 
2.4 Famine Theories  
 
Famine, the most damaging of all disaster types, has a long record in human history43. It can 
be stated that no aspects of social, economic and political lives are untouched, when a famine 
occurs (Blaikie et al., 2004:127). Apart from death tolls, it brings livelihood insecurity, 
impoverishment of natural-resource base, destitution, displacement, trauma, social 
disorganization, political instability, which may endure for post-famine periods (Davies, 
1996:8; Blaikie et al., 2004:127). The nature, degree or severity and causes of specific famine 
disasters vary over time and from one context to another. Whereas there is general 
understanding on types of its direct impacts and consequences, there have been various 
debates about its causes. Accordingly various perspectives have been developed in searching 
of explanatory factors. 
 
The current literatures show that famines persist, and affect severely some regions of the 
world, particularly the African countries. Location of famines has shifted, and in fact the 
supposed causes have changed overtime, and famines have become more complex (Devereux, 
2000:3; Devereux et al., 2002:2-3; Blaikie et al., 2004:127-128). Traditionally famines have 
been attributed to drought, and sometimes to flood or epidemics. But as it is stated earlier 
attributing famines to natural factors has been challenged since the 1980s claiming that 
drought and sudden-onset ‘natural causes’  are less capable of acting as causes of famines. 
This notion has stimulated more academic debates on famine causation and led to 
development of various disciplinary perspectives to explain famine causes.   
 
As it is mentioned above this study focuses on investigating vulnerability to famine in the 
study community. Thus it is relevant here to review the main famine theories which have been 
developed in the past four decades. Some authors (Blaikie et al., 2004:133-134) have 
categorized famine theories into four main strands:44 (i) neo-Malthusian; (ii) environmental 
                                                 
43 If we turn back only 200 years back, famine was a threat to nearly every country in the world (Hareide, 1991),  
and in the last two decades of  20th century it remains firmly entrenched in some regions of the world for 
instance  the Horn of Africa and some Asian countries (Devereux, 2002).    
44 Other writers have grouped famines theories or perspectives in different ways [e.g., neo-Malthusians 
(demography); ‘entitlement failure’ (economics); Complex emergencies (politics), Devereux, 2002].  In deed all 
these theories are contributions from various social sciences’ perspectives, mainly from demography, economics, 
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supply-side explanations; (iii) economic theories of famine; and (iv) political-economy and 
human right. In the following each of these theories are briefly discussed.  
 
2.4.1 Neo-Malthusian 
 
This theory gets its root in Malthus’s thesis (i.e. ‘Essay on Principle of Population, 1798). 
Malthus’s principle of population was based on the idea that population, if unchecked, 
increases at geometric rate whereas food supply grows at arithmetical rate.  Malthus’s thesis 
suggests that population grows at exponential rate, while food production increases at 
arithmetic rate which would lead to food shortage, and ultimately resulting in hunger. In its 
simplest form, the thesis demonstrated that population could not continue growing 
indefinitely in a world of fixed natural resources (Devereux, 2002:17). Malthus assumed 
famine as “natural check” on population growth. According to Malthus famine would act as 
natural check on population growth, equilibrating the demand for food with supplies. 
 
In general terms, Malthus’s thesis has been criticized and rejected on many grounds. First, 
viewing famine as ‘natural check’ on population growth control is abhorrent. Secondly 
Malthus failed to “foresee the ‘fertility transition’ to small families as living standard rose” 
and the “exponential increases in agricultural productivity” owing to technological advances 
which “pushes production beyond the consumption needs of the global population” 
(Devereux, 2002:17). 
 
And yet Malthus’s line of argument is still pursued by neo-Malthusians. These days, a 
relatively rapid population growth as principal cause of famine lingers among the neo-
Malthusians (Fassil, 2005:51). The neo-Malthusian approach is “focused on potential famine-
inducing consequences of rapid population growth outstripping the limits of global and 
regional food production” (Blaikie et al., 2004:133). This approach emphasizes the supply 
side and rapid population growth which exceeds the means of subsistence. In other worlds 
population growth exceeds the capacity of natural resources which provide means of 
subsistence (i.e. carrying capacity) 45. Thus in the light of ‘carrying capacity’ debate, 
demographers and environmentalists blame the persistent of famine on ‘overgrazing’  in 
Africa and on ‘overpopulation’ in Asia (Devereux, 2002:17). 
 
However, neo-Malthusian approach is also criticized heavily. Like Malthus’s crude argument, 
neo-Malthusians failed to take into account the role of technology in increasing food 
production. Moreover, ‘mass mortality famines’ (‘natural check’) does not act as population 
control. Rather fast population growth has been witnessed in countries which were afflicted 
by various famine episodes in the past (Devereux, 2002:18). There is also evidence that 
                                                                                                                                                        
and political sciences. Therefore it is for convenience of presentation that they are categorized in way presented 
in this work.     
 
45 Some writers argue that rapid population growth as cause of famine is more pronounced in areas where severe 
environmental degradation prevail, and the mere population growth may not result in famine. For instance Salih 
(1997:206) noted that “in societies where technology, and where land and labour productivity has not kept pace 
with population, carrying capacity analysts can not be absolutely right nor absolutely wrong either”. Most likely 
what these arguments remind us is that the contextual importance of factors in famine causation or food 
insecurity explanation.  
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“excessively low population densities increase vulnerability to famine by inhibiting 
investment in basic economic infrastructure and agricultural technologies” (Boserup, 1983, 
quoted in Devereux, 2002:17). 
 
Though Malthusians perspective is implicitly indicated in some contemporary analysis of 
famine, its theoretical foundation has been challenged. Firstly, technological progress has 
allowed enormous increase in food production outstripping population growth. Secondly, 
famine has not acted as the ultimate and powerful check of population growth (Fassil, 
2005:57). Therefore, neo-Malthusians perspective has remained inadequate to explain famine 
causation. 
 
2.4.2 The Environmental ‘Supply-side’ Explanations 
 
This approach considers drought (sometimes floods) and recently climate change factors in 
the explanation of disruption or reduction of food output. This approach focuses on 
environmental limitations on food output, mainly through drought. It looks primarily at 
supposed ‘natural causes’ which reduce the capacity of the natural resources to provide 
adequate food supply (Blaikie et al., 2004:133-134). This approach, however, is criticized on 
the basis that natural events (like drought, flood and climate change) can act as triggers, rather 
than causing famines. Because increased risks are caused by human actions, and relate to 
social vulnerability and to pre-existing ‘normal’ level of hazards. In other words human action 
is responsible for both the generation of peoples’ vulnerability and the increased level of 
hazard (Blaikie et al., 2004:136).  
 
 
2.4.3 Economic Theories of Famine 
 
In this economics perspective, there are three main economic explanations of famine based on 
different sets of causal explanations (Blaikie et al., 2004:137). They are (i) Food Availability 
Decline (FAD), (ii) ‘Market Failure’ to supply food, and (iii) Food Entitlement Decline 
(FED). In the following each of these explanations is described.  
 
i. Food Availability Decline (FAD): FAD approach states that famine occurs when adequate 
food is not produced in an area. This is just a balance sheet of available food (production) and 
population. This approach is related to “neo-Malthusian explanations, which focus on 
potential famine inducing consequences of rapid population growth outstripping the limits of 
food production” (Blaikie et al., 2004:133). FAD approach focuses on supply side of the 
picture and population growth which exceeds the means of subsistence.  FAD is criticized at 
least for two reasons. First famine can occur in an area where there is no decline in aggregate 
production. Secondly some areas, which do not produce food al all, can have access to food 
through purchasing food from elsewhere. Thus critiques of FAD argue that distribution of and 
access to food matter more than the aggregate production in a specific area. Therefore, FAD 
has a limited power to explain famines which would occur with or without it. 
 
ii. ‘Market Failure’ to Supply Food: In this approach famine is seen as being caused by 
imperfect markets which fail to supply food to meet the demand for food.  In this view the 
problem is not a fall in the aggregate regional production, but a market failure is not enabling 
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the satisfaction of effective demand. In other words a functioning market, which should be 
capable of supplying the food that is in demand, is not able to operate (Blaikie et al., 
2004:139). 
 
In a classical economic thought, famine was attributed to interference of government in the 
market (i.e. in fixing price of grain). In times of food shortage where the government orders 
the dealers to sell grain at a price that it determines, dealers tend to withhold supply 
sometimes causing famine. Anticipation of food shortage can lead to speculation and 
hoarding. Likewise, excess supply to the market at lower prices fixed by the government 
would encourage increased consumption, which ultimately leads to higher prices quickly 
resulting in famine again. Therefore, according to the classical thought, in a situation where 
free commence and trade prevails; the effects of seasonal conditions are not powerful forces 
to result in famines (Fassil, 2005:50).  
 
In relation to classical economic thought, some writers (Ravillion, 1996; Fassil, 2005) stated 
that contemporary analysis of famine causation still retains the main elements of classical 
thought. Ravillion (1996:4) added that the new emphasis is, therefore, to understand the 
circumstances of individuals in famine-vulnerable settings, and how those circumstances 
interact with economy-wide variables. The traditional emphasis on food availability and 
population growth to explain famine has been challenged. And the debate among scholars for 
better explanation of famine causation has been continued in the past five decades. In relation 
to this, the landmark work of Sen (1981) who introduced the concept of ‘entitlements’ has 
stimulated debates among contemporary economists in search of broader perspective to 
understand famine. 
 
iii. Food Entitlement Decline (FED): On the basis of case studies in Africa (i.e. Ethiopian 
1973/74 famine) and in Asia (Bangladesh famine of 1974), Sen established his theory of 
‘entitlement’ to explain famine causation in broader perspective than FAD approach did. In 
his seminal work Sen has challenged the notion of ‘food availability decline’ as primary cause 
of famine. He attributes famine primary to the loss of ‘entitlements’. In arguing for the “loss 
of entitlements” as cause of famine, Sen explains as follows:  
 
 … the temptation to see (famine) as invariably associated with a large and sudden 
drop in food production and availability is strong, but famines have occurred 
without such a drop both in Asia and Africa. Sometimes famines have coincided 
with years of peak food availability, as in the Bangladesh famine of 1974. Since 
food and other commodities are not distributed freely, people’s consumption 
depends on their entitlements, that is, on the bundles of goods over which they can 
establish ownership through production and trade, using their own means. Some 
people own the food they themselves grow, while others buy them in the market on 
the basis of incomes earned through employment, trade, or business. Famines are 
initiated by severe loss of entitlements of one or more occupation groups, depriving 
them of the opportunity to command and consume food. […] something very like 
this happened in the Wello famine in Ethiopia in 1973, with impoverished residents 
of the province of Wello unable to buy food, despite the fact that food prices in 
Dessie (the capital of Wello) were no higher than in Addis Ababa and Asmera. In 
deed there is some evidence of some food moving out of Wello to the more 
prosperous regions of Ethiopia where people had more income to buy food (Sen 
1990, quoted in Fassil, 2005:52-53). 
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Sen’s explanation of famine causation is broader framework than FAD. Devereux (2000:19-
20) and Edkins (2002:13) noted that Sen’s entitlement approach has shifted the analytical 
focus away from food availability towards the inability of groups of people to acquire food. 
The approach has made two contributions to famine literature: (i) a general analytical 
framework for examining all famines (the entitlement approach), and (ii) a new theory of 
causation (exchange entitlement failure) Devereux (2000:19-20).  
 
And yet some authors (Ravillion 1996:4; Devereux, 2000) criticized the entitlement approach. 
Some critiques questioned “whether those only people facing entitlement failure will go 
hungry, because there are evidences that some poor people with ample entitlements prefer to 
go hungry at certain times rather than sell their assets” (Ravillion 1996:4)46. Still some writers 
criticized it claiming that the ‘entitlement’ approach is “a long-standing explanation of famine 
dressed in new garb” (Srinivasan, 1983; Rangasami, 1985; Clay, 1991 quoted in Ravillion 
1996:7). Others also argued that Sen underestimates the importance of aggregate food 
availability (Devereux, 2000:20; Bowbrick, 1986 cited in Ravillion 1996:6).  
 
Devereux (2001:258) further identified four limitations of entitlement approach that include, 
(i) the failure to engage with social relations and power inequalities (i.e. social vulnerability);  
(ii) inability to explain collective outcomes of social crisis (hunger related and communicable 
diseases) and economic crisis with regard famine mortality; (iii) inapplicable in contexts (e.g. 
in common property regimes where resources are controlled collectively and rights or claims 
are mediated by non-market institutions; and (iv)  unable to explain the violations of 
entitlement (e.g. withholding food, looting grain, raiding cattle) and deliberate starvation or 
use of famine as weapons.  
 
In general the main limitation of entitlement approach is its failure to engage with famine as 
both a social process and a political crisis. The entitlement approach is mainly an economistic 
analytical framework which gives attention to economic aspects of famine excluding the 
social and political aspects. Devereux summarized the limitations and inadequacies of Sen’s 
entitlement approach in the following terms: 
 
… a failure to recognize individuals as socially embedded members of households, 
communities and states; and the failure to recognize famines as political crises as 
much as they are economic shocks or natural disasters. As a result an elegant 
framework which privileges the economic aspects of famine and excludes the social 
and political: the importance of institutions in determining entitlements (at intra-
household and community level), famine as a social process (mortality due to 
communicable diseases), and violations of entitlement rules by others (war and 
complex emergences). Without a complementary social and political analysis, the 
entitlement approach can illuminate only a small part of a very complex 
phenomenon (Devereux, 2001:259). 
 
Indeed in a later work (Hunger and Public Action), Dreze and Sen (1989 cited in Watts and 
Bohle, 1993) have addressed poverty and hunger equation, primarily in terms of command 
over food. In their view famine and hunger are defined by ‘entitlement collapse’ and the 
                                                 
46 Ravillion again has faced counter-critique from Devereux (for detail see Devereux, 2000).  
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socially circumscribed distribution of entitlements over basic needs. They also prescribe state 
action for ‘entitlement protection’ and ‘entitlement promotion’. And yet Watts and Bohle 
(1993:117) argue that though Dreze and Sen view “entitlement as embracing broader domains 
of wellbeing i.e. not only food intake (biology), but also health and education (the social 
environment), they have less to say about ‘capacity’, and totality of rights which secure basic 
needs. Devereux (2001:261) also contends that Sen’s policy prescription (i.e. technocratic 
bias) in preventing famine, privileges public action over political action to empower the poor.       
 
On the other hand, having recognized the strength of entitlement approach in relating poverty 
and hunger, Bohle and Watts (1993:117) suggested ideas for broadening the entitlement 
approach for famine analysis. According to them a famine analysis based on entitlements 
must account for: 
 
i. the particular distribution of entitlements and how they are reproduced in specific 
circumstances; 
ii. the larger canvas of rights by which entitlements are defined, fought over, 
contested, and won and lost (empowerment and enfranchisement); and 
iii. the structural properties [… crisis proneness…] of the political economy which 
precipitates entitlement crises.    
 
These suggestions for consideration are similar to what Devereux has identified as limitations 
of the entitlement approach.  In general in addition to its theoretical contribution to famine 
theory, Sen’s theory of entitlement has invoked a wide range of heated academic debates, and 
invited various critiques and counter-critiques in the past three decades. These in turn have 
further inspired other explanations which give attention to social, political and institutional 
factors in theorizing famine causation. This leads us to consider the political economy 
approach to famine causation.   
 
 
2.4.4 The Political Economy Approach and Human Rights 
 
This approach emphasizes on the political economy and human rights, and the emerging 
complexities of contemporary famines47. This approach attributes famine occurrence, 
whatever the economic or natural shocks, to governments’ incompetence and lack of 
commitment at best, or to a deliberate action or inaction at worst. The positions of writers, 
ranging from moderate to radical, are subsumed under the political explanation of famines 
(Fassil, 2005:57).   
 
Some writers hold the ideas that despite excess food somewhere in the world, famines occur 
in other parts of the globe due to denial of access to food resulting from lack of political 
commitment. Moreover, despite much rhetoric for ensuring food security, donor nations and 
                                                 
47 War, conflict, political instability and the concomitant results (e.g., displacement, death), and their interaction 
with climatic extreme events gave rise to the idea of complex emergences, ones where the root causes of 
vulnerability lie in a variety of relational exchanges (Alexander, 1997 cited in Bankoff, 2003). The emphasis of 
the ‘idea of complex emergences’ is the interconnectedness of factors that lie behind the disaster (famine) 
(Bankoff, 2003:24). 
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international organizations have channelled very limited resources for food security efforts in 
particular, and for development in general. A case in point is the steadily decline in the flow 
of financial aid into Africa (Cheru, 1989; Adedeji, 1991; Mengisteab and Logan, 1995 quoted 
in Blaikie et al., 2004:75-76). 
 
Other writers argue that donors also set preconditions which negatively affect the policies of 
receipt countries. Such precognitions compounded with globalization (world economic 
system) and structural adjustment policies have undermined households’ food security and 
affected national food production (Devereux, 2002:9; Blaikie et al., 2004:76).  
 
Many writers also attributed famine to political conflicts which take different forms like civil 
strife, ethnic conflicts, border wars, etc. These conflicts, both historically and currently, are 
known for their adverse impacts on systems of food production and distribution. Of 21 
famines occurred since 1970, 15 had war as a causal trigger, either alone or in combination 
with drought (von Braun, et al., 1998:3,176) 
 
Some authors also considered famines as consequences of government action or inaction. 
They ascribe the responsibility for famine causation primarily to the political regime. 
Historical famines which were attributed mainly to failure of then political regimes of the 
respective countries included the Soviet famines of 1921 and 1932/33; China’s Great Leap 
Forward famine; the 1990-91 famine in Sudan (Devereux, 2000; 2002); the 1973-74 and 
1984-85 Ethiopian famines (Devereux, 2002; Fassil, 2005:57; Mesfin, 1986). These examples 
indicate that even in earlier times, famines always had political dimensions48.  
 
Still some writers even went to the extent of considering the occurrence of famine as violation 
of the right to food, crime against humanity and an instrument of mass murder (Macus, 2003; 
de Waal, 1989 cited in Fassil, 2005; Devereux, 2000:26; Edkins, 2002:17). In this case Edkins 
took extreme radical position with regard famine causation.  Edkins stated his argument in the 
following terms:   
 
Any definition of famine that sees it as failure of some sort is missing the point. 
Whether famine is seen as failure of food supply, a breakdown in food distribution 
system, a multi-faceted livelihood crisis, the outcome is the same. These concepts 
blind us to the fact that famines, and the deaths, migrations or impoverishments that 
they produce, are enormously beneficial to the perpetrators: they are a success not a 
failure, a normal output of the current economic and political system, not an 
aberration (Edkins, 2002:17).   
 
Edkin’s argument is that “allocating responsibility to rulers or those groups in power for an 
inadequate response is merely a first stage”. He further contends that it is important to avoid 
conclusion that “democracy prevents famine” and “framing anti-famine contracts as simple 
measures against governments that fail to respond quickly enough to emergency crises”. Then 
Edkins concluded that,  
 
…. ‘famines occur because they are made to happen’. There is a need for a new 
language that talks of mass starvations, which, like mass killings, are regarded as a 
                                                 
48 Early 20th century famines in China and Soviet Union and recent Korean famine could be described as “state 
failure famine” (Devereux, 2002:25-26). 
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crime against humanity…. […famines…] are not caused by abstractions - climate, 
food supply, entitlement decline, war - they are brought about through the acts or 
omissions of people or groups of people. These people are responsible for famine 
and mass starvation - they should be held accountable (Edkins, 2002:15, 17).   
 
Devereux also shares Edkins’ notion with regard to famine causation. He stated that “famines occur 
because they are not prevented: they are allowed to happen. Most food crises have a long gestation 
period, not days or weeks, but months or years, so failure of public action must be incorporated in the 
causal analysis of all famines” (Devereux, 2000:27). 
 
A very recent view related to the above famine explanations is absence of democratic 
government and free press. This view is provided by Sen (1999) and he argues that 
institutions like democracy and free press play a role in preventing famines through 
influencing government to make serious efforts to prevent famines.  
 
Despite all endeavours in the past half of the century for famine theorizing, there is not one 
single agreed upon theory on famine explanations. The existing famine theories/explanations 
focus on one or a couple of casual factors (natural, or economic, or social, or political). None 
of them can claim superiority over the other. In relation to this Blaikie et al., (2004:147) noted 
that “no single theory is dominant; each may have certain advantages over the others”, and the 
“choice of explanations is governed by ideological and discipline based preconditions”.  
 
Devereux (2000:24) stated that two strands are currently competing for ‘paradigm 
dominance’. The first strand, which is “dominated by economists, views famine as a natural 
disaster or economic crisis resulting from failures of government policy, early warning, 
markets, or relief interventions”,  and the second which is “dominated by political scientists 
and human right activists, views famine as a political pathology which should be analyzed in 
terms of local power struggle, state repression of afflicted population groups, and a refusal by 
international humanitarian communities to enforce the fundamental human right to food” 
(Devereux, 2000: 24).   
 
Devereux further argues that most works of the economists (Ravillion 1996; Sen, 1981; von 
Braun et al., 1998) have emphasized natural and economic factors excluding political issues 
and violation of human rights in their famine explanation. Having reviewed the explanatory 
power of demographic, economic and political theories, Devereux (2000:2) suggested that 
each of these theories “embodies the reductionist perspective of disciplinary specialization, 
and tends to look for ‘technocratic’ and ‘technological’ solutions to end famines”. But 
according to Devereux, despite enhanced technologies and institutional capacity, various 
famines are allowed to occur due to lack of ‘political will’ where the main factors lie.  
 
Therefore, Devereux proposed a ‘taxonomic approach’ to famine analysis as reconciliation of 
recent debates on famine causation: “not to deny the complex interactions between multiple 
contributing factors, but recognizing that different elements play dominant roles in different 
context” (Devereux, 2000:26). Yet the same author noted a criticism against this approach 
too, stating that identification of a dominant explanatory variable implies still reverting to the 
reductionism of mono-causal theories and this blurs important distinctions between triggers 
and structural vulnerabilities which are both needed for holistic analysis (Devereux, 2000). In 
this case  Devereux further suggests  an “alternative approach (empiricist rather than 
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theoretical) which would be to examine each famine individually in terms of […] - economic, 
natural, political, and social […] - and to assign causality to a proximate trigger in one 
category exacerbated by structural vulnerabilities in one or more of  the four categories” 
(Devereux, 2000:26). Devereux’s proposal implies the need for empirical research and 
contextual analysis of contributing factors for a better understanding of famine causation.   
 
 
2.4.5 Summary  
 
The above review of literature shows that the ‘naturalness’ of disasters has been refuted by 
various researchers through empirical researches on vulnerability that began since the 1970s. 
Currently there is a general consensus that disasters are outcomes of interplay between 
environmental factors/processes and social systems. In other words, disasters are viewed as 
the intersection of hazard events and vulnerable human systems. Thus, there seems to be no 
substantive divergence over what constitutes the definitional nature of disaster.  
 
The current literature reveals the complexity of famine and the dynamic nature of social and 
economic processes that contribute to vulnerability to specific famine. Nowadays the trend in 
famine explanation is to view famine first as an outcome of interaction of multiple causal 
factors, of which a category of factors may play significant roles in creating vulnerability in 
specific context. The review of famine theories also suggests that an improved understanding 
of specific famines needs to consider politics which are overlooked by traditional famine 
explanations/theories (i.e. demographic, social and economic). With regard to famine 
theorization Blaikie et al., (2004) also noted as follows: 
  
…the task of building theories of famine is particularly difficult because of the 
complexity of each specific case. […] there is always a series of contextual events 
peculiar to each famine… […] therefore narrative of each event will be important 
element in the explanation of particular famines, and it is always advisable to 
maintain a flexible analytical approach (Blaikie et al., 2004:148).  
 
As stated earlier, during the 1970s and especially the 1980s the relationship between human 
actions and the effects of disasters - the socio-economic dimensions of vulnerability - was 
increasingly well documented and argued. From the late 1980s many conceptual frameworks 
were developed to provide frameworks for understanding vulnerability to disasters. The 
perspective of social vulnerability has been gradually an important conceptual tool in disaster 
research. In the late 1980s and early 1990s there emerged important frameworks or models to 
understand vulnerability to various disasters and livelihood chocks. In the following some 
important frameworks of disaster risk and vulnerability are briefly described. 
 
2.5 Frameworks and Models of Disaster Risk and Vulnerability 
 
From about the 1980s and early 1990s important conceptual frameworks have been developed 
for understating vulnerability to disaster, reducing vulnerability and for discerning 
livelihoods’ vulnerability to shocks. These include (i) Capacity and Vulnerability Assessment 
(CVA) (Anderson and Woodrow, 1998), (ii) Pressure and Release/Access Models (Blaikie et 
al., 1994), (iii) Sustainable Livelihoods Framework (SLF) (DFID, 2000; Carney, 1998), (iv) 
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The Causal Structure of Vulnerability (Watts and Bohle, 1993). In this section the first three 
are briefly discussed, as they are more relevant to this research.  
 
2.5.1 Capacities and Vulnerabilities Analysis (CVA) 
 
The basis of CVA framework is a simple matrix for viewing people’s vulnerabilities and 
capacities in three broad, interrelated areas which are physical/material, social/organizational 
and motivational/attitudinal. Each of these areas covers a wide range of features (Hareide, 
1991:23; Twigg, 2001:2-3).  
 
i. Physical/material vulnerability and capacity: This includes land, climate, environment, 
health, skills and labour, infrastructure, housing, finance, and technologies. Poor health, poor 
land, poor infrastructure, low level of technology etc show physical/material vulnerability 
(Hareide, 1991:23). Poor people suffer from crises more often than people who are richer 
because they have little savings, few income or production options, and limited resources. 
Therefore, to understand physical/material vulnerability, we have to ask what made people 
affected by disaster physically vulnerable. Was it their economic activities, geographic 
location, or poverty/lack of resources? (Twigg, 2001:2-3) 
 
ii. Social/ organizational vulnerability and capacity: Societies or social groups with better 
ways of organizing social and economic activities, and with an established and dynamic 
leadership and social coping system can withstand and recover from disasters better than 
those which are divided and with little or no organization. Therefore, how a society or 
community is organized, its internal conflicts and how it manages them are as important as 
the physical or material dimensions of vulnerability. To understand this aspect we have to ask 
what the formal and informal structures were before the disaster, and how well they served 
the people when disaster struck, and what impact disaster has on social organizations (Twigg, 
2001:2-3).  
 
iii. Motivational/attitudinal vulnerability and capacity: This includes how people in a society 
view themselves and their ability to affect their environment. To understand this we have to 
look at the attitudes of the people, their sense of agency, faith and strength. Groups that share 
strong ideologies, or belief systems or have experience of cooperating successfully may be 
better able to help each other at times of disaster than groups without shared beliefs or those 
who feel fatalistic or dependent (Hareide, 1991:23). Crises may stimulate people to make 
extraordinary efforts. To understand this we have to explore what people’s beliefs and 
motivations are, and how disasters affect them (Twigg, 2001:2-3).  
 
In general VCA framework links many different aspects of vulnerabilities and capacities. It 
covers livelihoods which fit within the physical/material category. The physical category 
includes hazards, but when applied in practice VAC tends to underestimate the significance of 
natural hazards by concentrating on human aspects of disasters (Twigg, 2001:3). 
 
2.5.2 Pressure and Release/Access Models  
 
The authors of ‘At Risk’ contend that the ‘hard’ science analysis focusing on natural 
processes or events is very partial and inadequate to understand how disasters occur when 
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natural hazards affect people. Therefore, there should be a conceptual framework which 
depicts how people or social groups get them in particular vulnerabilities in exposure to actual 
hazards49. The authors have presented two related models to understand disaster risk in terms 
of vulnerability analysis in specific hazard situations. These models are not theories; rather 
they are research frameworks suggested for organizing empirical researches to understand 
disaster causation (Blaikie et al., 2004:121). The two linked disaster study models can be seen 
as vital in bridging a theoretical gap of a single famine theory and incorporating many 
dimensions. 
 
The premise of PAR and Access Models is that disaster is primarily the result of human 
actions rather than the natural factors which only have a triggering role. The crux of the 
argument is that it is the social process that puts people or social groups at a particular 
vulnerability into the face of hazards. In the light of this argument Blaikie et al., (2004:11) 
emphasize the ‘human factor’ and ‘vulnerability’ in disaster studies via “rejecting the 
traditional views of ‘modernization theory’, environmental determinism, deterministic 
approach rooted in the political economy alone, and the notions which identify vulnerability 
with general poverty and definitions of vulnerability that focus exclusively on the ability of a 
system to cope with risks or loss”50. In the following the two frameworks are briefly 
described.  
 
i. PAR framework: Pressure and Release model (Blaikie et al., 2004:50) states that disaster is 
“the intersection of two opposing processes: the processes generating vulnerability on the one 
side, and physical exposure to hazards on the other”. Increasing pressure arises from either 
side. According to the authors in order to relieve the pressure, vulnerability has to be reduced. 
The PAR model suggests the progress of vulnerability at three levels (Blaikie et al., 2004:51): 
 
1. Root causes: These entail the underlying causes and the most remote influences such as 
economic, demographic and political processes within a society. The processes also embrace 
global ones. These processes at different levels mediate and reflect the distributions of power 
in a society, and are associated to the functioning and power of state. 
2. Dynamic pressure: It channels the root causes in particular forms of insecurity that have to 
be considered in relation to the types of hazards facing vulnerable people or groups. These 
include reduced access to resources as a result of the way regional or global pressures work 
through to localities. People or social groups are not equally able to access resources and 
opportunities. Whether or not people have enough land, access to water, or decent shelter are 
determined by social factors including economic and political processes at local and macro 
level. 
3. Unsafe conditions: are specific forms in which a population’s vulnerability is expressed in 
time and space in conjunction with hazards. People (individuals or social groups) are not 
equally exposed to hazards due to social processes which play significant roles in determining 
who is most at risk from hazards. Thus some people are forced to live in dangerous locations; 
                                                 
49 In fact the authors acknowledged that vulnerability approach to disasters began in the 1970’s and 1980’s (e.g., 
Emel and Peet 1989; Oliver-smith, 1986a; Hewitt, 1983a as cited by Blaikie et al. (2004).  
50 The authors argue that these notions lack explanations how one gets from very widespread condition (e.g. 
poverty) to very particular vulnerabilities.   
 44
being unable to afford safe buildings, having engaged in dangerous livelihoods, having 
minimal food entitlements, etc  
 
The above mentioned factors are very dynamic, and they interact with each other in complex 
ways and the outcome can also be unpredictable.  According to the PAR model “disaster risk 
is a combination of the factors that determine the potential for people to be exposed to 
particular types of hazard, and it depends on how social systems and their associated power 
relations impact on social groups” (Blaikie et al, 2004:7). Therefore, to understand disaster 
we must not only to know hazards, but also socially differentiated vulnerability which is 
determined by social systems and power, not by natural forces.  
 
The PAR model, however, has limitations or weaknesses as the authors themselves have 
acknowledged (Blaikie et al., 2004:87). First it does not provide a detail and theoretically 
informed analysis of precise interactions of environment and society at the ‘pressure point’ 
where and when the disaster starts to unfold. PAR framework separates hazards from social 
processes which should not be the case in practical world where nature forms a part of social 
framework of society in the use of natural resources for economic activities. Hazards are also 
intertwined with human systems in affecting the patterns of assets and livelihoods among 
people. Secondly the framework is static without suggesting or accounting change, either 
before the onset of a disaster or during and after a disaster. Therefore, the authors proposed 
the ‘access model’ to avoid the separation of hazards from social systems, and to account for 
details of the progression of vulnerability to the ‘pressure point’, and through the unfolding of 
the disaster. In the following this complementary model is briefly described.  
 
ii. Access Model: The second linked framework, the ‘access model’ unpacks the principal 
factors given in the PAR model that relate human vulnerability and exposure to physical 
hazards (Blaikie et al., 2004:92). It attempts to show how vulnerability is initially generated 
by economic and political processes, and what then happens as a disaster unfolds. The model 
also provides details how conditions need to change to reduce vulnerability and thereby 
improve protection and the capacity to recover.  In general the access model tries to depict 
how unsafe conditions arise in relation to the economic and political processes that allocate 
assets, income and other resources in society (Blaikie et al., 2004:94). Access model 
embraces factors like access to resources (material, human and social capitals) and 
opportunities, livelihood strategies (risk mitigation and survival mechanisms) and the 
mediating factors like social and economic relations including power relations among social 
groups that play a significant role in determining access and use of resources by individuals or 
social groups. The pattern of wealth and power are in turn the major determinants in the 
creation and distribution of impacts of disasters. 
 
The access model takes livelihood strategies as the key to understand the way people cope 
with hazards. Access entails the ability of individuals, family, class or community to use 
resources to secure a livelihood. Individuals’ or social groups’ access to resources is based on 
social and economic relations (i.e. the social relation of production, gender, ethnicity, status 
and age). Access to resources varies greatly between individuals and groups and this affects 
their relative resilience to disasters. Those with better access to information and cash; rights to 
means of production, tools and equipment, and social networks to mobilize resources from 
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outside  are less vulnerable,  and are generally able to recover more quickly (Blaikie et al., 
2004:93-94). 
 
However, after the first edition of ‘At risk’ (Blaikie et al., 1994), new developments have 
taken place with regard to conceptual frameworks51, and scholars have made criticisms52 to 
the Access model. Limitations of the model as it appeared in the first edition include 
(Haghebaret, 2001, 2002 as noted in Blaikie et al., 2004:97): 
 
i. the model appears to be designed to analyze general livelihood process than to 
investigate specific disaster related process, and the issues of safety are not well 
defined,  
ii. non-tangible assets, such as creativity, experience and inventiveness (i.e. human 
agency) are underemphasized, 
iii. the model does not link up with political and socio-economic processes.  
 
The authors of ‘At Risk’ have accepted these criticisms and tried to incorporate the first one in 
their access model which appeared in the second edition (see Blaikie et al., 2004:97). On the 
other hand they found the rest two criticisms difficult to accommodate in the access model 
claiming that the model is ‘economistic’, implicitly quantitative, and thus it has been difficult 
to find regularities in “human agency, inventiveness and political-economy processes” to 
model them (Blaikie et al., 2004:97). Rather the authors suggest that human agency, 
inventiveness can be treated in qualitative manner, and the access model together with PAR 
can provide analytical link with political and socio-economic processes. And yet the Models’ 
data requirement is so high that it constrains their operationalization in practice. In nutshell 
the major gap in the frameworks is the limitation to address the Psychological and cultural 
aspects, and human agency.  
 
In general terms the two models are improvements over the previous frameworks, though 
each has its weaknesses as mentioned above. For instance the PAR and Access model fill the 
gaps of HR (Hazard and Risk) model and they direct the attention on unsafe conditions 
leading to vulnerability and emphasize socially differentiated vulnerability. The PAR and 
Access model frameworks are primarily to explain vulnerability to disaster in order to identify 
strategies for disaster risk reduction. Therefore, depending on the context or situation, these 
frameworks can be employed separately or in combination to organize empirical research on 
vulnerability to disaster. In fact they require a great deal of data collection and analysis, since 
many variables are involved in the frameworks, especially in the Access Model.  
 
2.5.3 Sustainable Livelihood Framework (SLF) 
 
Sustainable Livelihoods Framework is developed in the area of development studies to 
provide framework for disaster managers and development practitioners. It seeks to 
understand how persons or groups derive their livelihood by drawing on/combining five types 
of capitals (human, social, financial, physical and natural). The framework starts with the 
                                                 
51 One of these new conceptual frameworks is ‘sustainable livelihoods (SL) approach promoted by UK aid 
ministry (Department for International Development).  
52 The authors acknowledge criticisms as constructive (Blaikie et al., 2004:97) 
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vulnerability context (shocks, trends, seasonality) in which people live their lives, and the 
livelihood assets (human, natural, financial, social and physical capitals) that they possess. 
Then it looks at how transforming structures (public sector, private sector, civil society 
organizations) and processes (laws, policies, culture, and institutions) generate livelihood 
strategies that lead to livelihood outcomes (more income, increased wellbeing, reduced 
vulnerability, sustainable use of resources etc) (DFID, 2000; Carney, 1998). SLF is a very 
similar and a parallel innovation with Access Model regarding the types of capitals (assets) 
involved in the model (Blaikie et al., 2004:96). Though SLF is not developed for analysis of 
disaster, it is significant framework to understand livelihood bases of communities and 
vulnerability to shocks or stresses which affect communities’ wellbeing.  
 
2.5.4 Summary  
 
The above overview of frameworks shows that the perspective of vulnerability has been one 
of the most important achievements in the disaster research and disaster management/risk 
reduction. The previous traditions in vulnerability research can be categorized into two: 
‘vulnerability research to hazards’ and ‘vulnerability research to livelihoods and shocks’ 
(Adger, 2006:271). While the development of the PAR and Access models is a progress in 
former case, Sustainable Livelihoods Framework approach is an advance in the later one. This 
is elabourated in section 2.6.1 below.  
  
Pressure and release/Access Models have appeared from the environment of political 
economies or neo-Marxism. In Pressure and release model ‘risk is presented as the result of 
the occurrence of some conditions of vulnerability and of some possible threats. Vulnerability 
is obtained from identifying the social pressures and relations from global through to local’ 
(Cardona, 2004:43). These are called at global level ‘root causes’ (i.e. social, political, 
economic structures); at intermediate level ‘dynamic pressures’ (e.g. population growth, 
urban development and population pressure, environmental degradation, and absence of 
ethics; and at local level ‘unsafe conditions’ (social fragility, potential harm or poverty). 
According to this model disaster prevention is perceived as relieving the pressure through risk 
reduction at each level (Cardona, 2004:43). The PAR and Access models consider various 
levels of analysis for understanding disaster causation and for reducing vulnerability.    
 
The access model shares similarity with SLF and with ‘entitlement approach’ in some 
respects. Its argument is that individual or social groups face different levels of risk from 
experiencing the same potential physical damage or event due to differential access to 
resources and capacity to cope with. In other words, when faced with an equivalent hazard, 
risks could be different depending on the capacity of each individual or social group to absorb 
the impact. Thus in this model vulnerability refers to lack of capacity to protect oneself and to 
survive a calamity (Cardona, 2004:44). The SLF, though it is not developed in context of 
disaster studies, has been an essential tool for understating the capacities, livelihoods and 
opportunities of individuals or social groups. The Capacity and Vulnerability 
Assessment/Analysis (CVA) also provides disaster managers or practitioners with framework 
for understanding vulnerability to disaster risks /shocks and for risk reduction. 
 
Currently practitioners have begun to use the concept of ‘vulnerability’ as a tool for 
understanding communities’ vulnerability to various disaster risks and for reducing them. 
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Thus the concept of vulnerability becomes an important analytical concept and tool for 
investigating exposure to risks at community level (Blaikie et al., 2004: 84, Wisner, 2004).  
The current research is aimed at understanding vulnerability to famine and coping strategies 
of the study community. Therefore, attempt has been made to employ some factors from PAR 
and SLF53 frameworks. Some key variables such as root causes, dynamic pressures, unsafe 
conditions, extreme events (drought, violent conflict) are drawn from PAR to investigate the 
vulnerability situation. And the “five types of capitals” from the SLF are used in order to 
understand how the study community draws their livelihoods. In fact the adoption of the 
variables is on the basis of research hypotheses and questions set for investigation in chapter 
one.  Moreover the main theme of this research is to understand the vulnerability of the study 
community to famine and their coping strategies and adaptive responses in the face of famine 
crisis. The following sections present theoretical discussions on “theory of social 
vulnerability” and on other related concepts (resilience and adaptation).  
 
2.6 Vulnerability Perspective  
 
2.6.1 The Evolution of Approaches to Vulnerability 
 
As discussed earlier, various perspectives have emerged in the literature and have been 
configured in many ways by various authors in order to further the understanding of disaster 
causation.  Initially there had been a tendency to view disasters as “natural” and to blame 
natural events such as drought, floods, earthquakes, etc. as primary causes of disasters. For 
instance, famine disaster was often attributed to drought or other natural events. This 
approach related a natural hazard directly to an actual disaster, which can not necessary be the 
case. It also focused on characteristics, patterns of infrastructures, and people’s location and 
their irrational response or maladaptation in order to explain effects of hazards. Such 
approach was labeled as “dominant approach” (Maskrey, 1989:2).  
 
However, it has been gradually recognized that a mere occurrence of a hazard could not 
always lead to a disaster. As the work on ‘vulnerability’ began in the 1970s and progressed in 
the 1980s, the ‘naturalness’ of ‘natural disaster’ has been questioned (O’Keef et al., 1976 
cited in Blaikie et al., 2004:19). And an alternative approach -‘political economy approach’- 
has emerged as critique of the ‘dominant approach’ (Maskrey, 1989:2). When vulnerability 
began to be viewed as effects of social and economic processes, the limitations of the 
dominant approach have been revealed. In other words the dominant approach is unable to 
explain how individual decisions are influenced by social and economic constraints. 
Alternatively the political economy approach tries to address social processes, organization 
and change (Maskrey, 1989:2).  And yet concerning the political economy approach, Maskrey 
also warned against the danger of losing sight on the local specificity of vulnerability in areas 
which suffer different hazards. Hence, Maskrey and other authors maintained that “the 
analysis of specific risks to a given hazard and the analysis of socio-economic processes are 
not mutually incompatible; …both are necessary to explain people’s vulnerability and their 
actions in the context of that vulnerability” (Maskrey, 1989:3; Wisner, 1993:13). Therefore, 
                                                 
53 Since the Access model is more quantitative and economistic that requires a great deal of quantitative data, the 
researcher has preferred to use PAR in combination with SLF. Moreover SLF is nearly similar to the Access 
model with regard to variables (e.g. the five capitals).  
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since the 1980s a significant advance has been made in thinking and research perspective 
concerning disaster causation. The primacy of natural hazards in explaining the causes of 
famine have been challenged. Hence, it has been stated that “the explanation of disasters 
should rest more fully on a social analysis of the processes which create the conditions under 
which ‘exceptional’ natural events can act as the ‘trigger’ for a disaster” (Hewitt, 1983 cited 
in Blaikie et al., 2004:129). 
 
In this case the human geography and human ecology have, in particular, theorized 
vulnerability to environmental changes (Adger, 2006:269). In fact a number of traditions and 
disciplines, from economics and anthropology to psychology and engineering use the term 
vulnerability (Adger, 2006:269; Wisner, 2004:183). These disciplines have made 
contributions to the present understanding of ‘socio-ecological systems’, while the related 
insights into ‘entitlements’ grounded vulnerability analysis in theories of social change and 
decision making (Adger, 2006). Accordingly Adger identifies two relevant theories that relate 
to human use of environmental resources and to environmental risks: (i) the vulnerability and 
related resilience research on socio-ecological system and, (ii) the separate literature on 
vulnerability of livelihoods to poverty. Adger stated that “these two research traditions in 
vulnerability acted as seedbeds for ideas that eventually translated into current research on 
vulnerability of social and physical systems in integrated manner”(Adger, 2006:270). This is 
further elabourated in the following paragraphs.  
 
i. PRA and Access Models: Bridging the Gap between Hazard Study Approach and 
Human/Political Ecology Approach: In the mid-1990’s Blaikie et al. (1994) came up with 
two complementary models or frameworks (PAR and Access Models) to show how 
vulnerability to specific hazard or stress can be created in space and time. The basis for the 
development of the models has been an effort to incorporate the natural and social causes 
(factors) of disasters in one organizing framework. In this case Adger stated that the PAR 
model bridges the traditions in hazard studies and human/political ecology approach, and the 
model spans the space between hazards and political economy approaches (Adger, 2006:270). 
The two complementary models are improved frameworks that can guide empirical 
researches, and help analyze and interpret results. Thus the models seem fine at least 
theoretically in terms of a social vulnerability approach. However, the practical problem is 
that the cross-disciplinary nature of the candidate factors or concepts that are used in 
developing the models. And if so, how can it be possible to achieve interdisciplinary 
cooperation to apply a model in one specific area concerning a specific hazard, say a drought 
or a flood. Moreover each discipline has its own orientation or preoccupation, concepts, 
methodology, ideology, etc. For instance, if we take each box in Access model, each can be a 
subject area of one or more disciplines.  
 
And yet the models are more comprehensive than ever presented in organizing previous 
research traditions. Among the efforts made in the 1990s to address these gaps of the 
approaches, PAR model has synthesized social and physical vulnerability and has, for 
instance, successfully bridged, the two traditions of hazard research - vulnerability to hazards 
studies and political ecology approaches which currently leads to “vulnerability of social and 
ecological systems” perspective (Adger 2006:271-2).  
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ii. Vulnerability of social and ecological systems perspective: The traditions in vulnerability 
study have shown a conceptual advance in analysis. The two research traditions - “analysis of 
vulnerability as lack of entitlement” and “analysis of vulnerability to natural hazards” are the 
seedbeds for ideals that translated into the current research on vulnerability of social and 
physical systems (Adger, 2006:272). According to Adger the hazard tradition is delineated 
into three overlapping areas - human ecology (or political ecology), natural hazards, and 
pressure and release model. The other current frontier of research is “sustainable livelihoods 
and vulnerability to poverty” perspective that is the successor of “vulnerability as absence of 
entitlements” approach (Adger, 2006:270-271). Adger describes how traditions on 
vulnerability research have developed over time in the following manner:  
 
…. Entitlement approach to analyzing vulnerability to famine underplayed 
ecological or physical risk, while it highlighted social differentiation in cause and 
outcome of vulnerability…. In contrasts the hazard tradition …. attempted to 
incorporate the physical science, engineering, social sciences to explain the linkages 
between system elements. ….. the human ecology/political ecology attempted to 
incorporate the political and structural causes of vulnerability and [….] to explain 
why the poor and marginalized have been most at risk…. The ‘pressure and release’ 
model bridged the two hazard traditions (i.e. human ecology and natural hazard) and 
… the analysis captured the essence of vulnerability from physical hazards traditions 
while identifying the proximate and underlying causes of vulnerability within a 
human ecology framework. …. PAR model also prescribed actions and principles 
for recovery and mitigation of disasters that focused explicitly on vulnerability 
reduction. Operationalising PAR necessarily involves typologies of causes and 
categorical data on hazard types, limiting the analysis in terms of quantifiable or 
predictive relationships. …. the successor of hazard research traditions is ‘research 
on vulnerability of social and physical systems’ (i.e. vulnerability, adaptation and 
resilience of social-ecological systems). …. the successor of ‘vulnerability as 
entitlement failure’ is ‘sustainable livelihoods and vulnerability to poverty’ which, 
within the development economics, tends not to consider integrative social-
ecological systems; … but it complements the hazards-based approaches through 
conceptualization and measurement of the links between risk and well-being at the 
individual level (Adger, 2006:271-272). 
 
The above quotation implies two frontiers of research perspectives on vulnerability. These are 
livelihood vulnerability and vulnerability of coupled social-ecological systems. In relation to 
this Adger suggested that cross-fertilization of development economics with vulnerability, 
adaptation and resilience research would yield better insight on social-ecological systems’ 
vulnerability, adaptation and resilience (i.e. vulnerability of coupled systems). The application 
of these concepts in vulnerability analysis, and the conceptualization of human-environment 
systems exposed to hazards, requires vulnerability analysis to be comprehensive to address 
the coupled systems. In this case Turner et al., (2003:4) also suggest that the usefulness of 
vulnerability analysis increases, when it: 
 
i. directs attention to vulnerability anchored in the condition of the coupled human-
environment systems; 
ii. identifies some of complexity, interconnectedness, and iterative nature of 
components giving rise to and comprising vulnerability; 
iii. illuminates the nested scales of the vulnerability problem but provides an 
understanding of the vulnerability of a particular place; 
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iv. draws attention to the potential dynamics within the coupled system that give rise 
to new hazards, 
v. facilitates the identification of critical interactions in the human-environment 
system that suggest response opportunities for decision makers; 
vi. is open to the use of both quantitative and qualitative data and novel methods to 
derive and analyze information; and 
vii. assists in the development of metrics, measures, and models for implementation. 
 
Turner’s suggestion is to portray vulnerability as property of social-ecological system, and to 
analyze the elements of vulnerability (exposure, sensitivity and resilience) of a bounded 
system at a particular spatial scale rather than focusing on multiple outcomes from a single 
physical stress (cited in Adger, 2006:272).  The above discussion has shown how “traditions 
on hazard researches” and “political ecology approaches” have been conceptualized, 
advanced and developed into “vulnerability of socio-ecological systems perspective”.  
 
iii. Sustainable livelihoods and vulnerability to poverty: As stated earlier “sustainable 
livelihoods and vulnerability to poverty” perspective is the successor of “vulnerability as 
absence of entitlements” approach (Adger, 2006:270-271).  As discussed in the theoretical 
review of famine causation and chronic poverty, we have seen that there is no single theory 
powerful in explaining famine or hunger or poverty. Rather nowadays, there seems to be a 
theoretical agreement to examine the relationship of poverty, hunger and famine instead of 
looking at causal factors. This is an agreement on the locally and historically specific 
configuration of poverty, hunger and famine. This is within the premise that understanding 
the social, political, economic and structural-historical processes that may lead to poverty, 
hunger or famine. This is what Watts and Bohle (1993: 117-118) call a “social map or space 
of vulnerability”.  
 
Poverty-hunger equation is addressed by works of Dreze and Sen (cited by Watts and Bohle, 
1993:117) and famine and hunger are defined by “entitlement collapse” and the “socially 
circumscribed distribution of entitlements over basic necessities”. Watts and Bohle (1993) 
argued that though Dreze and Sen’s entitlement approach is relatively broader and includes 
not only food intake but also access to health care and education, the “capacity and the totality 
of rights”, which secure basic needs, are not addressed. Therefore, Watts and Bohle suggested 
that entitlements have to be broadened not only in social or class sense but also politically and 
structurally. Accordingly they point out three elements that famine analysis must account for. 
These include: (i) the particular distribution and redistribution of entitlements in specific 
circumstances, (ii) the larger canvas of rights by which entitlements are defined, fought, 
contested, and owned or  lost (i.e. empowerment) and, (iii) the properties of political economy 
which precipitate entitlement crisis (Watts and Bohle 1993:117-118). Then Watts and Bohle 
concluded that the totality of these processes define the “space of vulnerability”.  
 
Moreover, poverty is not equated to vulnerability. Though it is mainly poor who suffer from 
hunger and malnutrition, not all poor are equally vulnerable to hunger. In addition to income, 
there are many factors which codetermine whether individuals go hungry. Indeed poor people 
are usually among the most vulnerable by definition, but understanding of vulnerability 
should rest on a carefully disaggregation of the structure of poverty itself (Watts and Bohle, 
1993:117). Though vulnerability as concept doesn’t rest on a well developed theory, and lacks 
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widely accepted indicators and methods to measure it as indicated above, elabourated 
discussions, definition and models/approaches on vulnerability are provided by many authors 
in the literature (Chambers, 1989:1; Wisner et al., 2004; Blaikie et al., 2004).  For instance 
Chambers (1989:1) defines vulnerability as “the exposure to contingencies and stress, and 
difficulty in coping with them. Vulnerability has thus two sides: an external side of risks, 
shocks and stress to which an individual or household is subject; and an internal side which is 
defencelessness, meaning a lack of means to cope without damaging loss.” 
 
Therefore, according to the above definition, the concept of vulnerability embraces three 
conditions of a system or area or individual or a group: - risk of exposure to shocks or 
stresses, inadequate capacity to cope with stress and severe consequences which limit 
recovery. This suggests that a system or individual or group with such characteristics can be 
the most vulnerable to perturbation (Watts and Bohle, 1993:118) This disaggregation of 
vulnerability further suggests what a response should embrace is to reduce vulnerability (i.e. 
reducing exposure, enhancing coping, strengthening recovery potential and bolster damage 
control). All these approaches and descriptions of vulnerability might be said theoretically. 
But the task of identifying conditions and factors which govern vulnerability, and define 
specific coordinates of exposure, capacity and potentiality is a complex one that falls across 
various fields. In fact the elabourated definition and discussion of vulnerability provided by 
Chambers (1989), Watts and Bohle (1993) have highlighted the complexity of the application 
of the concept for empirical examination of vulnerability. It is a multi-layered and multi-
dimensional social space determined by political, economic, social and institutional 
capabilities of people in specific places at specific times (Watts and Bohle, 1993:118). 
 
In general the evolution of approaches to vulnerability has confirmed that the concept has 
found space in both theoretical and practical terms in a wide range of disaster risk reduction 
discourses and in some interventions. Since the 1980s where many people began to 
distinguish disasters from hazards, the concept of vulnerability has gradually become an 
important tool for understanding disaster causation and risk reduction (i.e. disaster discourse). 
In relation to this Alexander (1997 cited in Bankoff et al., 2004:194) noted that “the 
emergence of the notion of vulnerability is one of the most salient achievements in the field 
during the last decades”. The following section further elabourates the conceptual 
advancement of ‘social vulnerability’ and its current application in disaster discourse and risk 
reduction interventions.  
 
2.6.2 The Theorization of Social Vulnerability 
 
The origin of the vulnerability approach can be traced back in the 1970s, when some authors 
began to question the “naturalness of natural disaster” (O’Keef et al., 1976 cited in Blaikie et 
al., 2004:19). Its application in disaster research has been more frequent in the 1980s with 
writings about disaster. At the time, however, it was not used in specific situations to identify 
vulnerable groups and, its application was in general terms and was simply identified with 
poverty (Wisner, 1993). The concept was not utilized in a manner to understand socially 
differentiated impacts of and responses to disasters. This resulted in attributing vulnerability 
to certain kinds of production systems¸ or to social organizations, or to certain spatial scales 
(town, region, zones). Consequently planners and activists were unable to articulate the 
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socially differentiated vulnerabilities and to formulate disaster mitigation plans (Wisner, 
1993). 
 
The above description of vulnerability implied the narrow theoretical and practical utility of 
the concept before the 1990s. The ideals and thinking about natural hazards, disasters and 
vulnerability also varied greatly before the 1990’s, and the approaches to disasters studies 
were subject-oriented. But in the 1990s a convergence of ideas and thinking has been 
observed among different ideas and approaches with regard to hazard, disaster and 
vulnerability (Wisner, 2004; Blaikie et al., 2004). 
 
In his recent work Wisner (2004) has thoroughly reviewed how the term ‘vulnerability’ has 
been used in disaster research and management. In order to match with respective disciplinary 
focuses, the concept of vulnerability has been preceded with adjectives (e.g. structural 
engineering vulnerability, lifeline infrastructures vulnerability, macro-economic vulnerability, 
regional economic vulnerability, commercial vulnerability, social54 vulnerability). All these 
have ‘one common core notion’ of the ‘potential for disruption or harm’ (Wisner, 2004:183).  
 
The concept of vulnerability has been advanced from its narrow theoretical and practical 
utility to broader application in disaster research. In an article on ‘assessment of capacity and 
vulnerability’ Wisner (2004:185-7) illustrates this through examining its application in four 
main approaches (demographic, taxonomic, situational, and contextual and proactive). It has 
been summarized as follows: 
 
…. demographic approach “tends to consider human beings as one of many 
‘elements’ at risk (e.g. structural vulnerability of buildings, bridges, health care 
systems and people). This approach does not conceptualize the social vulnerability 
of groups or people, and it lamps people with things and seeks to minimize the 
vulnerability of systems and things. Thus it fails to refer to social groups which may 
or may not experience increased vulnerability. The ‘taxonomic approach’- as an 
advance over previous and conventional use of term vulnerable - focuses on 
vulnerability of social groups and the causes of vulnerability. It also breaks down 
vulnerability into different elements (social, economic, environmental and 
informational) and identifies vulnerable groups (women, children, the elderly, ethnic 
or racial groups) on the basis of empirical studies. Practically it makes ‘visible’ the 
vulnerable groups to planners and service providers. And yet the taxonomic 
approach is not analytically strong. One can fairly argue that not all women or other 
groups are always socially vulnerable in all contexts.  ‘The situational approach’ 
tries to go beyond identifying the kind of groups and looks into the nature of their 
daily life and their actual situation. It recognizes three contingencies: social 
vulnerability is not permanent property of a person or group but changes in respect 
to a particular hazard; the constantly changing daily, seasonal and yearly 
circumstances of person’s situation regarding access to resources and power; and 
contingency born of the complex interactions of particular overlapping identities and 
forms of empowerment or marginality. Therefore, apart to listing of vulnerable 
groups, situational approach has recognized complexity, change and contingency 
thereby provides a more sensitive tool of analysis. The last approach presented by 
Wisner is a ‘contextual and proactive approach’ whereby communities and groups 
would use the concept of vulnerability as a tool to enquire their own vulnerability 
                                                 
54 The adjective social is more explicit and large domain embracing political, economic and cultural factors as 
well.  (For more see Wisner, 2004:183, Blaikie et al.,  2004: 8, and 11-12) 
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situation. For Wisner this is a new approach to assessment of social vulnerability 
and tool in a struggle for resources that are allocated politically.   
 
 
The above description indicated that the development of vulnerability assessment approaches 
nearly matches with the progress from “disaster study” to vulnerability research. It has shown 
how approaches in disaster study and vulnerability have been advanced over time and 
highlighted the strengths and weaknesses of each approach in terms of conceptualizing social 
vulnerability. It also revealed how the concept of vulnerability has gradually emerged as 
significant tool to understand differential vulnerability to disasters, and to involve “people at 
risk” or ‘disaster victims’ in risk assessment. 
 
Wisner also noted that the first three approaches to vulnerability are structuralists55 which 
mainly represent western discourse on reality (i.e. disaster discourse). He added that disaster 
researchers and practitioners who adopt social vulnerability are doing a bit different i.e. “the 
break out of the hegemonic ‘development’ and ‘disaster’ discourse by providing space for 
alternative subaltern stories and voices” (Wisner, 2004:189). Thus works on social 
vulnerability try to give attention to local capacity (coping), social capita, local knowledge 
and perception.   
 
From practical perspective, disaster response agencies also use the concept of vulnerability to 
analyze processes and conditions that lead to disaster and identify disaster responses 
(Heijmans, 2001:1). Moreover in some parts of the Latin America, Africa and Asia, 
employees of NGOs, professional planners or employees of governments and academics 
utilize the concept of social vulnerability as a tool to conduct community-based vulnerability 
assessments in which community members define their own vulnerabilities and capacities, 
and decide which risks are acceptable to them and which are not (Wisner 2004:187-88; 
Blaikie et al., 2004:43). Thus (social) vulnerability analysis enables outsiders to explore 
people’s perception of risks, and social capitals (i.e. local knowledge, networks, coping 
mechanisms, etc). Moreover, the concept of vulnerability is also applied across different 
disciplines56.  
 
What can be concluded from the above discussion is that the application of the concept of 
(social) vulnerability has found more space in both theoretician and practical terms. 
Therefore, despite the limitations of theory, data and methods (measurement), it can be said 
that enough is known about vulnerability to provide robust information to decision-makers. 
Other concepts related to vulnerability analysis are coping, resilience and adaptation. In the 
following these concepts and their role in vulnerability analysis are briefly described.  
 
 
2.6.3 Resilience and Adaptation 
 
The other side of vulnerability is the capacity of individuals/social groups or social systems to 
cope with stress or/and resilience to bounce back when a disaster unfolds. The development 
                                                 
55 In fact Wisner (2004:188) recognized the contribution of post-structuralist approach, particularly in the area of 
environmental social science.  
56 For its application in different disciplines see Alwang et al., 2001. 
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of vulnerability analysis thus draws on the concepts such as entitlement, coping through 
diversity, and resilience (Turner et al., 2003). 
 
Different social systems have different level of sensitivities to shocks or stresses. This 
characteristic of individuals or social groups is linked to entitlements (i.e. legal and customary 
rites to exercise command over food or other necessities). This is evidenced that modern 
famines (new famines)57 occurred not due to insufficient food stock, but because of inability 
of certain groups of people to command food access through legal or customary means (i.e. in 
Sen’s word lack of access to bundles of entitlements). The implication of this is that 
understating entitlement helps explain why certain groups are differentially at risk or 
vulnerable to specific disaster. In general the concept of entitlement enables us to understand 
socially differentiating causes and outcomes of vulnerability. 
 
On the other hand social groups or communities at risk are not passive receivers of effects of 
adverse events or shocks. They have different capacities to respond to harms or avert the 
potential harm of a hazard via myriads of strategies which may include mobilizing 
entitlements, social capitals (societal safety nets), certain endowment (assets), diversification 
of livelihood systems, etc. These strategies form coping mechanisms or adaptive responses to 
normal constraints and/or extreme events. Individual coping or adaptive strategies emerge 
with different constraints provided by the natural environment, or economic systems or 
political systems or both, and the concomitant opportunities and constraints available within 
them.  
 
Social vulnerability is the exposure of groups of people or individuals to stress as a result of 
the impacts of environmental changes, socio-economic-situations (lack of income and 
resources), war, civil strife and other factors. Stress encompasses disruption to groups’ or 
individuals’ livelihoods and forced adaptation to the changes and uncertainties (Adger, 2000). 
Social groups or systems experience various stresses and disturbances emanated from the 
increased environmental changes and socio-political processes. Vulnerable social groups are 
not passive recipients of stress, external disturbances and changes (Blaikie et al., 2004; 
Wisner, 2004:189, 191). Communities or social groups have their own inherent capacity to 
adapt, cope with stresses and to bounce back. Thus it is here that resiliency is important to 
absorb disturbances and to continue functioning without showing qualitative change or 
compromising future sustainability. 
 
The concept of resilience emerged in interdisciplinary research mainly via component of 
‘adaptive capacity’ (i.e. the flexibility of economic systems and the ability of social systems 
to learn in response to disturbances). In ecology the resilience concept was used in the 
analysis of ecosystems in order to understand the capacity of natural systems (properties) to 
function without showing qualitative change in the face of external disturbances (Bolling et 
al., 1995 cited in Adger, 2000:349). Then the analogy from the ecological systems is being 
applied to understand the resilience of communities and their social institutions to physical 
and social stresses emanating from external disturbances and environmental changes. The 
resilience concept has been adopted in social sciences which are engaged in vulnerability 
                                                 
57 The history of 1984-1985 and 2002 famines in Ethiopian and the 1984 and 2002 famine in Sudan are instances 
of such famines as some studies documented about them (Devereux et al., 2002).   
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researches. It has found space across disciplines, especially in the 1980s where the concept of 
vulnerability has turned up as a rich tool for analysis of social vulnerability. 
 
Resilience increases the capacity to cope with stress and hence a loose antonym of 
vulnerability (Adger, 2000:348). But resilience is about people’s capacity far beyond the 
minimum of being able to cope. This suggests the need for looking beyond capacity to 
respond or to absorb the negative impacts and thus considering the essential and non-essential 
elements of community systems able to adapt to survive shocks (Manyena, 2006). The 
concept of (social) resilience is sensitive to the institutional context to be observed in a 
meaningful manner. Because of this social resilience is defined at the community level rather 
than being a phenomenon pertaining to individuals. Hence it is related to social capital of 
societies and communities (Adger, 2000:349). The social capital of communities is here to 
mean the existence of integrating features of social organization such as trust norms and 
networks.  
 
In some case studies (e.g. Bollig, 2003:9) it is stated that “the concept of resilience is 
analytically useful, but difficult to handle in complex socio-cultural, historically embedded 
settings”. Therefore, finding convincing indicators for resilience in human systems, which 
allow a comparison of communities, and of different time horizons within a given 
community, are needed. In relation to this, exploring institutionalized buffering mechanisms 
to lower vulnerability is suggested (Bollig, 2003). Then a result of analyzing buffering 
mechanisms is that resilience is a socially generated, collective good. In this case Bollig 
(2003:9) concluded that “it is exactly this social process (the creation of resilience) that 
should become a formidable field for comparison”. Bollig considered three buffering 
mechanisms in analyzing resilience in two African herder societies (the Himba of Namibia 
and the Pokot of Kenya). These included economic diversification (herd diversification), 
network of livestock exchange, and institutionalized resource protection and management. 
 
In recent works there is a tendency to define resilience into two broad ways- “as a desired 
outcome (s)” and “as a process leading to desired outcomes” (Kaplan, 1999 cited in Manyena, 
2006). Resilience is now gradually conceptualized as process-oriented, as it suggests focusing 
on building something rather than just reducing something, which is the case when talking 
about poverty or vulnerability reduction. A close look at the definitions in the box 2.4 above 
reveals the gradual refinement of conceptualizing disaster resilience from more outcome-
oriented to more process-oriented. Accordingly disaster resilience is seen as the shock-
absorber or buffer that moderates the outcome to ensure benign or small scale negative 
consequences (Manyena, 2006). 
 
Nowadays resilience is being applied in a number of fields, especially in disaster 
management, and increased attention is paid to what affected communities can do for 
themselves and how best to strengthen them (IFRC, 2004). There is a new move to focus on 
resilience as a new way of tackling disaster. Cases in point are the “Hyogo Framework for 
Action 2005-2015, known as Hyogo Declaration” (UNISDR, 2005) and the “IFRC Report on 
World Disaster: Focus on Community Resilience” (2004). These agencies call for shift in 
disaster relief thinking from identifying what is missing in a crisis (needs, hazards and 
vulnerability) to identifying the strengths, skills and resources that are already in place within 
the communities. Building resilience through nurturing diversity, self-organization, adaptive 
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learning and constructive positive feedback loops is consistent with these calls (Tidbll and 
Krasny, 2007). 
 
In general concerning the concepts of vulnerability and resilience, two views emerged.  One 
sees them as factors for each other, while the other sees them as more separate entities. 
Vulnerability signifies a low level of (rather than lack) of disaster resilience, limiting capacity 
to recover. Each system has some degree of resilience. This suggests that disaster resilience 
could be viewed as the intrinsic capacity of a community or a society predisposed to a shock 
or stress, and survives by changing its non-essential attributes and rebuilding itself (Manyena, 
2006:442-4). Many definitions given in the box 2.4 above show that resilience is not the 
opposite of vulnerability. Therefore, it is important for development and relief industry to 
identify and map resilience. Further more increased awareness of and emphasis on resilience 
does not necessarily mean abandonment of support for infrastructure. It rather suggests the 
need to mainstream resilience building through people at the centre of disaster risk and 
recovery (Manyena, 2006). 
 
 
2.6.4 Summary 
 
The concept of vulnerability has been used as a key to understanding disaster risk and 
identifying responses to risk reduction. The traditional view that ‘disasters are purely physical 
happenings requiring technological solutions’ has been challenged and has given ground to 
the alternative notion that ‘disaster events are primarily the results of human action’. In other 
words while hazards are natural, disasters are not (Blaikie, et al., 2004; Cannon, 1994). This 
suggests that social systems or arrangements matter in facing low or high exposure to disaster 
risks, than the mere happening of hazards. This is because social systems generate unequal 
exposure to risks by making individuals or social groups more prone to disaster risk than 
others. These variations in proneness to risks, and opportunities to cope or recover are 
determined by power relations operating in every society. Therefore, understanding of the 
ways in which human systems place people or groups at more or less risk in relation to others 
and to their environments is critical for discerning the nature of disasters. This can be best 
understood in terms of individuals’ or groups’ or societies’ vulnerability. Vulnerability is a 
‘complex characteristics produced by a combination of factors derived from social relations 
(class, gender, and ethnicity, occupation, health age, social networks, etc) and economic and 
environmental processes. In general the concept of vulnerability has been an important 
analytical tool to understand disasters58. 
 
The use of concept, however, is not limited only to understanding or explaining disasters; it is 
also employed by disaster response agencies to analyze processes and conditions which lead 
to disasters and to identify disaster responses (Heijmans, 2001:1). Nowadays, the increasing 
number and impacts of disaster has given rise much concern about vulnerability reduction. 
Vulnerability assessment has been recognized as essential tool to analyze various factors and 
processes underlying the impacts of disasters on society. 
                                                 
58 Though some writer claimed that the concept of vulnerability is too broad encompassing everything and would 
be unusable for analytical purposes, it is engaged more and more in disaster researches and disaster management 
across various disciplines. 
 57
The appropriateness and effectiveness of disaster responses also depends on proper 
conceptualization of analytical tools. In this case, the concept of vulnerability has been the 
key to analyze disaster causation and identify response. However, as stated in section 2.2 (iv) 
it does mean that all stakeholders (researchers, disaster response agencies, people at risk) 
share a common understanding or definition of vulnerability. Heijmnas (2004:116-117) 
identified the existing three views on causes of disaster and the supposed strategies for 
vulnerability reduction. These are summarized as follows: 
 
i. Nature as a cause: This view blames nature and natural hazards as causes of people’s 
vulnerability which results from hazards (intensity) and risk (exposure to events). According 
to this view strategy to reduce vulnerability is ‘technological, scientific solutions (prediction 
of hazards and technology to enable human structures to withstand disaster impacts)’. 
 
ii. Cost as cause: ‘In spite of increasing technological and scientific capacity, people continue 
to suffer because prediction and mitigation technologies are so costly.  This view suggests 
‘economic and financial solutions, in that vulnerability will be reduced if national 
governments adapt safety nets, insurance, calamity funds, and provide financial assistance to 
build up people’s assets’. 
 
iii. Social structures as a cause: This view recognizes socially differentiated vulnerability, 
and it argues that ‘it is not only the exposure to hazards that put people at risk, but also socio-
economic and political processes in society that generate vulnerability. This view suggests 
political solutions (changing the processes that put people at risk) i.e. ‘transforming the social 
and political structures that breed poverty and the social dynamics and attitudes that serve to 
perpetuate’.  
 
In practice, however, more than one of these three views can be held by policy makers and 
implementers working for an organization. Most disaster agencies combine the first two in 
their analysis and actions, while the third is supported by activists and environmentalists 
(Heijmnas, 2004:116). Vulnerability reduction is related to social order and politics. If 
disaster risk has to be reduced, the social and political origins of disasters have to be 
addressed. For many countries and donors, ‘vulnerability reduction is too political’ (Bender 
1999 cited in Heijimnas, 2004:117). 
 
The above description presents how external actors (researchers and disaster response 
agencies) view disaster risk and vulnerability reduction. It is also important to examine how 
people at risk understand disasters and their vulnerability. Though local people are unfamiliar 
to concepts such as ‘disaster’ and ‘vulnerability’, ’they have their own way of disaster risk 
perception and communication. Many authors argue that without theorizing and 
conceptualization, the local people can analyze risk, and identify solutions using their own 
capabilities (experience, skills and traditional knowledge and techniques). The local people 
have knowledge about their locality, history of local disasters, and how vulnerability to 
disasters has changed over time. Understanding people’s perception of risk and their 
vulnerability is essential for effective disaster risk reduction. Therefore, vulnerability 
assessment (analysis) can be an important tool to explore people’s perception of disaster risk 
and vulnerability conditions. Equally important are community resilience and adaptation 
systems in vulnerability analysis. 
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In this chapter I have presented general discussions on concepts, theories, and 
frameworks/perspectives used in disaster studies and vulnerability researches. Drawing on 
insights from literature review, this study adopts a broad theoretical orientation (i.e. political 
economy) which considers socio-political processes in creating vulnerability situations. 
Accordingly in the next chapter, I attempt to identify and examine the social, cultural, 
political and environmental processes that create vulnerability to famine in the pastoral 
societies of East Africa.   
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Chapter Three 
 
Pastoralism, Development Approaches and Drought/Famine in East Africa 
 
The preceding chapter has presented a theoretical overview on how individuals or social 
groups are more or less vulnerability to various disaster risks. As the theoretical discussions in 
Chapter 2 showed, the current tone of theoretical literature is that various historical and 
contemporary socio-political processes and environmental factors are the prime factors 
putting communities or social groups in a situation of vulnerability to disaster. In the light of 
this theoretical orientation, I will present my own empirical study in Chapter 6. The current 
chapter attempts to review the general literature and some earlier empirical researches on East 
African pastoralists. This chapter mainly focuses on the current discourse on pastoralism; 
development policies and their consequences on pastoral groups; risks factors such as 
drought/famine, external encroachments, violent conflicts, political instabilities, state neglect, 
etc. First, pastoralism is briefly described in general terms. This is followed by an assessment 
of national governments’ policies and approaches to pastoral development and their 
consequences on pastoralists. Thirdly, various risk factors and pastoralists’ coping and 
adaptive strategies are discussed. Likewise an attempt is made to discuss the general condition 
of the pastoral groups in Ethiopia. Generally the main objective of this chapter is to see the 
research problem in the context of East African pastoral societies in general and in Ethiopian 
context in particular.  
 
 
3.1 General Background to Pastoralism 
 
3.1.1 Pastoralism: Definition and Classification   
 
Pastoralism is one of the main production systems in the drylands59 of the world. It uses 
rangelands for livestock production. Pastoral production takes up some 25% of the world’s 
land area; produces some 10% of the meat used for human consumption; and supports some 
20 million pastoral households (Blench, 2001: iv).  
 
Pastoralism is defined in many ways or has many definitions60. Many of its definitions are 
honed in the issues of extensive ruminant livestock production, characterized by some form of 
mobility (WISP, 2006). Some examples of definitions of pastoralism are given in box 3.1 
below.  
                                                 
59 Drylands are conventionally defined in terms of water stress, as terrestrial areas where the mean annual 
rainfall (including snow, fog, hail, etc) is lower than the total amount of water evaporated to the atmosphere. 
Drylands can be found on every continent and cover extensive areas of land. They stretch over 41% of Earth’s 
land surface (World Initiative for Sustainable Pastoralism/WISP, 2006). 
60 Pastoralism “can be described as both a means of production and a mode of subsistence. ‘Means of 
production’ is the act of production based on animals; ‘mode of subsistence’ is a configuration of productive 
strategies and social relations allowing the exploitation of natural resources and reproduction of the social groups 
involved” (Cribb, 1984, cited in Abdi, 2003:398).  
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Some of the important terms used for describing pastoral production strategies are contentious 
and can be described differently by different people. Many writers have also made different 
categorization of pastoral production system. Broadly speaking pastoral production is split 
into “extensive enclosed systems” (in North America, Australia and parts of South America), 
and the “open access systems” (in Africa, the Andes, Asia and Siberia). While the former is 
practised mainly in the developed countries using fenced ranges and the later is largely the 
domain of “traditional producers” in the developing countries (Blench, 2001:iv, 7).   
 
There is no generally accepted classification of the different forms of pastoralism. Various 
scholars have made different classification of pastoralism. The criteria used for classification  
may include degree of sedentarism, distance of pastoral migration, composition of herds or 
species, management system, organization of labour involved in herding activities, 
geographic distribution, ecology, etc. (Khazanov, 1994; Blench, 2001; Abdi, 2003). The most 
common classification is based on the herd size, duration and distance of livestock movement, 
and organization of labour (Abdi, 2003:398; Blench, 2001:11; Wilson, 1982 cited in Ayalew, 
1995). Moreover, other factors such as the degree of dependence on livestock products for the 
foodstuff of households and various types of agricultural activities, and foraging activities 
associated with livestock are also considered in classifying pastoral systems (Blench, 2001; 
Khazanov, 1994). In general three pastoral systems can be distinguished: nomadism, 
transhumance and agro-pastoralism61. Each of these forms of pastoralism is briefly described 
as follows.  
 
                                                 
61 For details on classification see Khazanov (1994:17-25). 
Box 3.1 Definitions of Pastoralism/Pastoralist 
 
• Pastoralism: “may be defined as dependence upon domestic herd animals held and bred as capital” 
(Chang and Koster, 1986 cited by Abdi, 2003:389). 
• Pastoralism: “is a mode of production which depends on natural forage. In the arid regions this 
requires constant or periodic movement in search of pasture, a factor that differentiates this form of 
livestock production from those practised by farmers and ranchers” (Markakis, 1993:1). 
• Pastoralism is “the predominant form of economic activity characterized by maintenance of herds all 
year round on a system of free-range grazing, periodic mobility within the boundaries of specific 
grazing territories, or between these territories, and the orientation of production towards the 
requirement of subsistence” (Khazanov, 1994:16). 
• Pastoralism: “is a mode of production concerned with the exploitation of domestic animals” (Abdi, 
2003:389). 
• Pastoralism: “often refers to extensive husbandry of herds of different species (cattle, sheep, goats, 
camels, equines) requiring periodic migration to access pasture” (WISP, 2006). 
• Pastoralist households are “those in which at least 50% of household gross revenue (including 
income and consumption) comes from livestock or livestock-related activities” (Swift, 1998 cited in 
IUCN/WISP, 2006). 
• Pastoralist: “often describes an entire ethnic group, irrespective of whether all members actually 
keep livestock or not” (Baxter, 1994 cited in WISP, 2006).  
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i. Nomadism: is a type of pastoral system in which pastoralists are “exclusively”62 livestock 
producers who do not grow crops and thus simply depend on sale or exchange of animals and 
their products. In this system herders movement is opportunistic and follows the pattern of 
pasture resources. Forage availability has a direct impact on the movement of herds; and 
mobility pattern is highly irregular (Blench, 2001; Rass, 2005). However, the idea of 
exclusive reliance of pastoralists on livestock products is disputed, as pastoral society may 
practice both pastoral means of production and agricultural means of production, or a pastoral 
mode of subsistence may coexist with an agricultural mode of subsistence (Abdi, 2003). 
Another author (Scholz, 1995 cited in Merkle, 2000:1) defines nomadism as “a region 
specific, temporally and spatially ubiquitous survival strategy that was based on subsistence, 
and coexisted as an alternative to the sedentary cultures of agricultural and urban societies”. 
Pastoral groups may also rely on trade with sedentary communities for grains and other 
products to supplement their livelihood (Chang and Koster, 1994). This suggests that societies 
known to be ‘pastoralists’ do also practise some agriculture or trading. 
 
ii. Transhumance: This system involves the ‘regular movement’ of herds among the fixed 
points in order to exploit the seasonal availability of resources. It is a “specialized form of 
(mobile) pastoralism that is still based on settlements, but involves seasonal movement of the 
herd between pastures with some use of campsites” (Abdi, 2003:398). Transhumance 
pastoralists have a permanent homestead or base camp where older members of the 
community remain the whole year. Herd splitting is the characteristics of transhumance. 
Herders take most of the animals to search for grazing, while some especially among lactating 
animals are kept at homestead. Weak animals or work animals are also left behind in the 
permanent camp (Blench, 2001; Ayalew, 1995). 
 
iii. Agro-pastoralism: where pastoralists are permanently settled and engaged in agriculture 
as their major economic activity. In this pastoral system agriculture constitutes the subsistence 
base, and agro-pastoralists derive the bulk of their subsistence from crop production. 
Producers depend on their own or hired labour for crop cultivation, and invest more on 
housing and infrastructure (Blench, 2001). In such societies pastoralism occupies an 
important place in their value system and its social reproduction is maintained. 
 
Concerning the relationship between agriculture and pastoralism some authors suggested that 
“most societies known to be ‘pastoralists’ do also practise some agriculture; as a result, no 
pastoral society subsists exclusively on the products of livestock. Therefore, the combination 
of pastoralism and agriculture can be viewed as a continuum with ‘pure’ pastoralism and 
‘pure’ agriculture respectively as the logical extremes” (Brandstom et al., 1979 cited in 
Ayalew, 1995:8). Similarly another author states that “pastoralism occurs in a continuum 
from fully sedentary (village-based herding) to fully mobile (nomadic) pastoralism” (Abdi, 
2003:398).  
 
Regarding forms of pastoral systems Blench also remarked that “any classification must be 
treated as simplification; pastoralists are by their nature flexible and opportunistic and can 
                                                 
62 Currently, however, the notion of exclusive dependence of pastoralists on livestock products has been 
challenged, as producers shift between herding and cultivation depending on the economic and ecological 
conditions.    
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rapidly switch management systems as well as operating multiple systems in one overall 
productive enterprise” (Blench, 2001:11). Khazanov (1994:16) also states that “forms of 
pastoralism are not absolutely static; on the contrary they merely point to the parameter of a 
changeable economy which is capable of transformation”. In relation to this, on the basis of 
findings of economic and social history of nomads in the Old World Dry Belt, Scholz 
(2001:1) noted that given the right conditions, nomadism, termed as a socio-ecological mode 
of culture, was able to appear and disappear at any place and any time. In general the above 
description of pastoralism shows the change and continuity of pastoralism, disappearance and 
reappearance of its various forms in specific contexts and conditions, and the coexistence of 
pastoralism and agriculture. However, given the current rapid modernization and mounting 
external pressures, mobile pastoralism has currently faced challenges to continue in its 
traditional way. Therefore, it is here important to review the existing debates on pastoralism. 
The following sections present the current discourse and perspectives to pastoralism. 
 
 
3.1.2 Discourse on Pastoralism 
 
3.1.2.1   The Future of Pastoralism 
 
Both archaeological evidences and earlier literary records show that pastoralism is an ancient 
mobile livestock production that survives into the 21st century by overcoming various 
historical catastrophes. Its inherent flexibility, dynamism, and adaptability to economic and 
ecological circumstances allow it to continue as one way of life in human history (Blench, 
2001). Some authors described pastoralists’ inventiveness and adaptability in the following 
terms: 
 
Past efforts by social scientists to define pastoralism were defeated by the 
inventiveness and sheer variety of pastoralist forms of adaptation to the demands of 
their environment. Nowadays, it is accepted [....] that ‘pastoralism is a mode of 
perception as well as mode of production’. Basically pastoralists define themselves. 
They know who they are. And there are those, of course, ‘who are sedentarized but 
plan to resume herding’ (Baxter and Hogg, 1990; De Bruijn and van Dijk, 1993 
cited in Markakis, 2004:14). 
 
On the other hand many anthropologists, sympathetic to pastoral people warned of the 
imminent end of pastoralism. In fact, the worry of the “crisis scenario” has not been without 
reasons. The reasons as stated include (i) the trend towards integration of herding with 
cultivation is interpreted as loss of resources necessary for pastoral survival, (ii) post-colonial 
development policy bias favoring arable cropping in terms of jurisdictional, technical and 
economic assistance, (iii) national governments’ official endorsement to restrict pastoral 
mobility and associated settlement programmes and thus, (iv) ‘traditional’ systems of pastoral 
production and resource management were posited as one of crisis (i.e. crisis in survival) 
(Babiker, 2002:1). Also the “recurrence of droughts and famines in recent decades has lent 
greater support to the prediction that pastoralism is on verge of extinction” (Baker, 1977; 
Carr, 1977, Morton, 1988, 1993 cited in Babiker, 2002:1).   
 
It is true that pastoralists have historically experienced many cycles of herd growth and 
collapse, good weather and bad weather and, high and low prices for their products (Barfield, 
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1992 cited in Babiker, 2002). And yet they have proved remarkably resilient in the face of 
both natural and man-made disasters and there is no reason to believe that the end of 
pastoralism is near (Hogg, 1992 cited in Babiker, 2002). The recent years’ situation of 
pastoral groups in China and Mongolia can serve as illustrative instance. These countries have 
seen the revitalization of pastoralism after decollectivization and decentralization since the 
1990s. For instance in Mongolia after the economic and political reforms, urban wage earners 
who were no longer employed by state bureaucracies or enterprises moved back to the 
country side to join their pastoral families (Fratkin, 1997:248). Similar developments have 
been witnessed in China and Tibet after decentralization and privatization processes which 
brought communal grazing rights accompanied by tenure security and adequate support 
services.  
 
Furthermore, some writers (e.g. Babiker, 2002) questioned the methodological foundations of 
the “crisis scenarios” with regard pastoralism in East Africa. Babiker identified two major 
hurdles in the progress of our understanding of the dynamics of human adaptation in East 
African drylands. These are “the persistence of ‘crisis’ scenarios and the insistence on 
‘herder/farmer’ dichotomy when the future of pastoralism is problematic in the context of a 
resource competition and conflict” (Babiker, 2002:2). Accordingly Babiker further argues that 
there are methodological problems in much of literature on African drylands. These as stated 
include (Babiker, 2002:3-6): 
 
(i) the making of assumptions about the future of pastoralism based on short-term 
observations and taking these as evidence of long-term trends;  
(ii) the tendency for a general preoccupation with the fate of the pastoralists rather than 
the future of pastoralism- the collective future of traditional pastoralists is at risk in 
East Africa;  
(iii) the crisis scenarios relates the use of the term pastoralism to designate a way of life 
rather than an economic activity and this designation bears a danger of misleading 
non-specialists into the belief that animal production and husbandry (herding)  is all 
that pastoralists do (emphasis in the original);  
(iv) the general tendency for research to focus on ‘a herder/farmer’ dichotomy, whereas 
there is ample historical and anthropological evidence that groups, individuals 
within the same group have shifted between pastoralism and cultivation when 
conditions demanded and allowed.  
 
Therefore, Babiker (2002) suggests the need for balance outlook on these processes, i.e. not 
viewing them as constraints but equally as opportunities that generate differential, but 
purposeful responses on the part of individuals and as well as groups of pastoralists. Blench 
(2001:17) also argues that “considering the present crisis as signal for final demise of 
pastoralism is a mistake in development literature”. He further states his argument in the 
following manner: 
 
… pastoralists and settled cultures establish dynamic relations and while pastoralism 
has certain ethnic component, it is above all a way of life appropriate to particular 
economic and ecological circumstances. […] it may disappear briefly, but will 
always make its return because the settled need the mobile, to trade, to breed 
animals and to open up areas remote for agriculture (Blench, 2001:17). 
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The above description reflects the inevitable aspect of nomadic production systems, frequent 
catastrophic collapses and recoveries (Blench, 2001:20). Hogg (1997a:1) also states that, 
“pastoralism as a way of life has endured for thousands of years”. The point is that the 
apparent flexibility of nomadic pastoralism, in that even the dissolution of pastoralism may 
not be permanent. A seminal work by Scholz (1995 cited in Merkle, 2004) found out that 
given a certain regionally specific, ecological and socio-political setting, nomadism as 
strategy developed repeatedly in new and original forms, in variety of settings. The existing 
literatures show changes between a sedentary lifestyle and a nomadic lifestyle, and these 
changes are mainly attributed to economic or political crises. For instance, for the Turks of 
southern Kazakhstan, it was common for a nomad to settle down and farm after loss of 
livestock, and a rich farmer to buy livestock and again shift to nomadism (Merkle, 2000:4)     
 
Therefore, with regard to the future of pastoralism, the tone of literature is that pastoralism as 
a way of life, in one form or another will survive (Hogg, 1997a). In this case Blench also 
argues that “climatic extremes and disease can cause terminal livestock losses, while 
prosperity and stability in nation-states lead to agricultural encroachment on pastoral land, but 
history makes clear that flexibility and opportunism allows pastoralism to be constantly 
resuscitated” (Blench, 2001:20). This has been evidenced by adaptive responses of various 
pastoral societies to various socio-political processes and environmental changes. Yet their 
adaptive strategies are under pressure, particularly in East African countries due to internal 
and external forces which include alienation of pastoral resources, ecological changes, war, 
civil conflict, frequent droughts and famines. The Somalia crisis can be illustrative of the 
current predicaments of pastoralists in East African countries. (The Somalia case is 
elabourated more in section 3.2).  
 
Indeed it is admitted that pastoralists currently face more threats and pressures to their 
livelihoods than at any time in the past. Some authors (Dahl, 2001:1; Merkle, 2000:7) stated 
that contemporary pastoralists almost universally suffer from a continuous process of vital 
land losses. The natural resource base is declining rapidly worldwide, while population 
pressures on the overall available agricultural and pastoral land are increasing (Merkle, 2000). 
Moreover, pastoral production is also undergoing serious structural changes through 
technological reforms or due to recent rapid modernization. This signals serious threats to 
nomadic pastoralism as mode of life (Merkle, 2000; Dahl, 2001).  
 
Nowadays, therefore, nobody would disagree with the predicaments of a pastoralist way of 
life, its transformation and as well as its continuity. Probably the difference among scholars 
and planners might be positions on what should be done with tribulations facing pastoralist 
societies. In the vast literature it is stated that nomadism is the optimal means to utilize the 
ecologically fragile dryland ecosystem. Under the changed conditions described above and 
the negative impacts of primarily market-oriented development projects, loss of vital pastoral 
land resources, rapid modernization, and technological reforms, etc what are the possibilities 
or preconditions for sustainable pastoral management of the drylands? Taking into account 
changes and ongoing processes in drylands and on the basis of traditional modes of 
appropriate uses (e.g. informal institution of Hema in Saudi Arabia), Scholz (1995: cited in 
Merkle, 2000:7) proposes a “modern form of mobile livestock keeping” whose success 
depends on three preconditions to be recognized by policy makers and planners. Priority has 
to be given to (i) subsistence rather than market-oriented production, (ii) job security rather 
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than increases in productivity, (iii) resource conservation rather than increasing yields. In the 
light of the above debates on future of pastoralism, the following section discusses the 
changing perspectives to pastoralism.  
   
3.1.2.2    Changing Perspectives to Pastoralism  
 
As indicated earlier, the discourse on crisis of pastoralism is not a recent issue. From early 
period, the literature is rich with articles and books analysing the crisis of nomadism or the 
problems of nomads’ experience (Blench, 2001). Yet it is in the late 20th century that a new 
up-welling of writing on pastoralism has been seen. Research on pastoral societies took off in 
the 1970s and 1980s, particularly from Africa and Mid-east. Increased droughts and famines 
during the 1970s and early 1980s, particularly in West and East Africa led to major 
discussions about the future of pastoralists (Fratkin, 1997:236). The writings are both 
“sentimental and aggrieved, regretting its inevitable demise and blaming pastoralists for their 
failure to respond to vagaries of climate and international economic systems” (Blench, 
2001:6).   
 
Broadly it can be said that earlier discussions on pastoralism have been dominated by 
romantics (often by anthropologists) who idealized the pastoral way of life, and pessimists 
(mainly range ecologists and economists) who considered overgrazing, range degradation and 
desertification as the inevitable consequence of a pastoral way of life (Hogg, 1997a:1; Blench, 
2001).  “The main anthropological progress in understanding pastoral production was reached 
in the 1960s and 1970s in a conjunction of interest from cultural ecology, Marxist 
Materialism and Barthian Action Theory. Later on many anthropological studies have mainly 
been propelled by an advocacy urge in defense of pastoralists accused of causing 
desertification” (Dahl, 2001:1). 
 
In the past pastoralists were blamed for destroying the environment. Their resource 
management system was viewed as inefficient and their livestock accumulation as irrational. 
Particularly the two theses - the “cattle complex” (Herskovits, 1926) and the “tragedy of the 
commons” (Hardin, 1968) had influenced the earlier conceptions of pastoral production 
(Amaha, 2002:3). The “cattle complex thesis” viewed pastoralists as irrational in their herd 
accumulation. Pastoral practices, including individual herder’s tendency to maximize herd 
size, were viewed as promoting desertification. Hardin’s thesis upheld that common property 
resources shared by pastoralists are not controlled, and thus led to overgrazing and 
environmental degradation (Fratkin, 1997:240). The assumptions of these paradigms shaped 
most of the policies and development plans pursued with regard to pastoralists and pastoral 
areas until the 1980s. At the time international donor communities supported large-scale 
development projects informed by the “tragedy of the commons” thesis that emphasized 
privatization of the range, commercial ranching, and sedentarization  of nomads, especially in 
Africa (Fratkin, 1997; Tafesse, 2001; Amaha, 2002).  
 
However, development projects failed and brought negative consequences to pastoral ways of 
life and to the environment. The perceived failures of many projects and the linking of 
livestock to a spectrum of environmental damage led to a major retreat from supporting 
pastoralism/pastoral programmes. Many works of anthropologists described the effects - often 
negative- of development efforts on pastoralists. Many writers criticized development policies 
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using the models of political encapsulation, hegemony of the nation state, and decline of 
pastoral autonomy and mobility (Doornbos, 1993:100; Bruijn and Dijk, 1993:140; Fratkin, 
1997:236; Abdel Ghaffar, 2001; Getachew, 2002a; Markakis, 2004).  
 
The ecologists’ view of the “new range ecology” was the starting point for a critical debate, 
with implications for management and policy decisions. Ecologists argue that pastoral 
systems are able to respond to fluctuating and patchy resources with cultural behaviours that 
include flexibility, mobility and diversity of species (Hjort 1981, Homewood and Rodgers 
1991 cited in Fratkin, 1997; Ellis and Swift, 1988). The assumptions that pastoral practices 
and pastoral land management led to degradation of resources have been challenged. Pastoral 
resource management systems are found to be complex systems that have evolved from 
pastoralists’ successful adaptation under harsh conditions of arid and semi-arid rangelands 
(Dahl and Hjot, 1976; Dyson Hundson, 1980; Bekure et al., 1991 cited in Fratkin, 1997). 
Moreover, herd growth cannot be indefinitely maintained due to drought and diseases. The 
idea of equilibrium model has been challenged arguing that rangelands are inherently 
unstable, because of large climatic factors. Accordingly development efforts that were based 
on the idea of equilibrium model was criticized, and development should enhance traditional 
pastoral practices, as they are more appropriate for arid ecosystems than those based on ranch 
management paradigms (Ellis and Swift, 1988). Thus the non-equilibrium model developed 
by Ellis and Swift (1988) is taken as appropriate to describe complex dynamics of arid and 
semi-arid lands.  
 
Cultural ecology framework was the dominant perspective in pastoralist research, and 
anthropologists and ecologists sought to understand how pastoralists responded to drought 
and environmental changes (Fratkin, 1997). The focus of range ecologists is on direct inter-
relationships between the natural environment and human adaptation that directly depend on 
that specific environment.  However, pastoralist groups are also affected by outside factors 
like social, economic, political events (Abdel Ghaffar and Abdel, 1996). Moreover,  it has 
been clear that the human-livestock-land interactions are explained less in terms of ‘carrying 
capacity’ or ‘desertification’, but more in terms of loss of common property rights, increasing 
economic differentiation and social stratification, incorporation and domination of tribal 
pastoral groups by larger state systems (Fratkin, 1997:236). Pastoralists’ predicaments are not 
dependent solely on the state of range and their animals, rather on a series of dynamics that 
reach far beyond the limits of the pastoral communities. Therefore, in addition to factors of 
climatic and ecological changes, external economic and socio-political processes are also 
major issues that should be dealt with (Manger, 1996; Abdel Ghaffar and Abdel, 1996).    
 
Pastoralists in the pursuit of adaptation to the changing environmental conditions are 
influenced by factors and actions far away from the immediate physical environment. 
Individual adaptiveness to natural environment can emerge within different constraints. The 
contexts in which adaptations operate are also man-made and have to be studied within their 
own terms. The various contexts for decisions are not given. Different people have different 
interests, and pursue different goals in their choice of adaptation. They have different strategic 
positions to reach their goals. Thus it is necessary to examine the working of such contexts. 
This implies a political economy - a type of analysis in which one can find the sources of 
constraints operating (Manger, 1996).  This perspective focuses on political processes of 
internal organization and dealings with other groups, particularly larger state structures 
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(Fratkin, 1997). In this case the focus is not on adaptation per se, but on the economic, 
political and historical events, some of which contain the exploitation of local people by 
indigenous or foreign groups. Other factors include levels of pastoralists involvement in 
market relations, national market and economic policies, national policies towards pastoral 
sector and other sectors, effects of wars and conflicts, etc (Abdel Ghaffar and Abdel, 1996). 
All these constrain adaptive processes and must be incorporated in the study of adaptation 
(Manger, 1996).  
 
One aspect of the wider societal frame is the relationship between the state and the society. 
The political economy approach emphasises state-pastoral society relations, and pastoral-
sedentary relationships. Pastoral groups often face difficulty in interacting with state and its 
structures when a state pursues formal exercise of control, through law and coercion, over a 
community and state control of social organizations (Fratkin, 1997; Nori et al., 2005). 
Pastoralists have experienced difficulties in articulating or representing their interest in 
national political context and governance. State authorities have often clashed with the 
interests and the practice of pastoral groups. The clashes are often on agricultural and land use 
policies, border arrangements, and state control on social organization (Nori, et al., 2005:10). 
Pastoral-sedentary relations are often ones of conflict, particularly because the aims and 
objectives of pastoral groups are at variance with neighbouring land users. Moreover, the 
history of pastoral-sedentary relation is one of encapsulation of pastoral communities rather 
than incorporation (Fratkin, 1997:239). Moreover, states have often favoured urban and 
settled population. Land tenure arrangements support farmers, settled agriculture and 
intensive land use. Such state policy biases and failure to respect pastoral tenure rights serve 
to curtail herders’ mobility and access to vital pastoral resources (Nori et al., 2005).  
 
As stated above, the time between the 1970s and 1980s was a period of vast body of research 
and development projects, both technical and social (Blench, 2001). Thus the theoretical 
understanding of development has moved from cultural ecology to political ecology. To 
understand forces which affect pastoral environment and cause growing vulnerability needs a 
broader perspective seeking to address broad socio-economic causes as they are linked with 
factors of population growth, incorporation of pastoral economies into the market economy, 
civil wars and conflict, and other factors arising from climate and ecology (Abdel Ghaffar and 
Abdel, 1996:5). 
 
In general the synthesis of pastoralist researches (ecological, cultural, economic and 
anthropological) and extensive literature on pastoral development projects has led to a 
paradigm shift. The debate has shifted from anthropologists challenging the range ecologists’ 
explanatory paradigm to ecologists challenging old certainties, such as the idea of equilibrium 
environment, and old certainties are quickly being replaced by new orthodoxies about pastoral 
environments and the contingent nature of pastoral adaptations (Hogg, 1997a:2). However, 
the ecologists’ explanatory paradigms “tend to view pastoralists and pastoralism in isolation, 
instead of seeing pastoralism as the product of a dialectic between a variety of shaping forces 
- history as well as nature - they seek single variable explanation (Hogg, 1997a:2). Hogg 
further contends that “cultural, economic and political relationships shape and give meaning 
to the natural environment, in a way which no single form of environmental determinism can 
allow, and it is only through understanding of these relationships that we can understand the 
current transformations taking place in the pastoral way of life” (Hogg, 1997a:2). 
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Therefore, improved understanding of pastoral situation in space and time needs analysis of 
both historical and contemporary ecological, economic, cultural and political processes. The 
flexible and opportunistic nature of pastoral society calls for both historical and contemporary 
analyses. This suggests the need for doing historically-oriented studies that reveal historical 
social and political processes that have shaped the current circumstances of pastoralists. In the 
light of themes and perspectives described above the following sections discuss on state 
policies, historical socio-political processes and climatic events (drought risk) that have 
affected pastoralists in East Africa and in Ethiopia.  
 
 
3.2 Pastoralism and Development Policy Orientations: East African Context 
 
3.2.1 Pastoralists and State Policies in East African Countries   
 
Pastoral system makes use of areas or rangelands which cannot be used by conventional 
agriculture. But the “modern world” has made technical advances and has expanded large-
scale agriculture into areas where such pastoral systems are traditionally operating in benign 
to the environment. As a result, pastoralists have been deprived of their key resource areas 
and are increasingly pushed into inhospitable terrains or marginal areas where forage 
resources are hardly available for their livestock. Their property rights have become uncertain 
and their traditional institutions and authorities are undermined. Moreover, national 
governments are often hostile to pastoralists63 and pursue policies which often favour settled 
cultivators. Many countries have also policies of sedentarization that are mainly derived from 
political considerations or for security and control reasons, rather than the concern for the 
welfare of the people they wish to settle. These external pressures have exacerbated the 
consequences of climatic events (droughts and floods). In East Africa, the interplay of these 
internal and external factors has put pastoral societies in a very precarious situation 
(Markakis, 2004; Babiker, 2002:18, 19; Fratkin, 1997; Manger, 1996:18). 
 
In East African countries pastoral societies make substantial contribution to the national 
economy both in supporting their own households and in supplying protein (meat and milk) to 
villages and towns. In spite of this, national governments are mainly hostile to pastoralists and 
apply biased policies that either exclude or disrupt pastoral way of life and their livelihoods. 
National governments rarely recognize their contribution, while taking investment decisions 
and policies. National policies are mainly based on general national goals without considering 
the needs and priorities of pastoral communities. Investment and development programmes 
are therefore mainly extractive in nature. They focus on harnessing pastoral resources (land, 
livestock and their products, minerals, water, etc) for achieving national goals at the expense 
of the pastoral societies. Moreover, projects and programmes intended for pastoral 
developments have been ill-conceived (i.e. drawing on simplistic understandings of pastoral 
systems as a major development problem; backward activity/sector, and superiority of settled 
life or agriculture; simple assumptions that pastoral areas are large and vacant, etc); and thus 
                                                 
63 With exception of Mauritania and Somalia, the ruling elites in African states are drawn from non-pastoral 
groups which also view pastoralism with ambivalence at best and often with outright hostility (Timberlake, 
1991:74-76).  
 69
they have not considered the broader cultural, economic, political and ecological 
circumstance of the pastoral areas (Manger, 1996; Abdel Ghaffar, 2001; Getachew, 2000). 
Since the colonial time to date such biased or inappropriate policies, and ill-conceived 
programmes and projects have been witnessed in many developing countries, particularly in 
Africa (Hesse and MacGregor, 2006; Markakis, 2004). In order to illustrate this, the following 
paragraphs present some evidences from selected East African countries (i.e. Sudan, Kenya, 
Tanzania, Uganda, and Somalia).  
 
i. Sudan: The livestock sector in Sudan is the “source of employment for about 80% of the 
rural labour force”, and animals are “almost entirely concentrated in ecologically marginal 
and semi-arid areas which also contain zones of large-scale irrigated and rainfed agriculture, 
small-scale farming and protected wildlife areas and forest reserves”. These latter sectors 
“tend to be supported by both government and international donors and reflect land 
legislations and development interventions that favours non-pastoral activities” (Ahmed et al., 
2002:12-13).  
 
Other authors (Salah, 1996; Ibrahim, 1996) also noted that the government intervention and 
land legislation have favoured agriculture and large-scale commercial farms. Since 1944 (i.e. 
over a decade before the independence) the “expansion of large-scale mechanized and 
commercial farming in the clay plains of south Kassala brought marginalization of nomads by 
undermining century-tested nomadic pastoral adaptations to predominately marginal region” 
(Salah,1996:213). The consequences of the mechanized farms on pastoral systems in Sudan 
included disruption of nomadic corridors and water points; diminished pastureland; forced 
concentration of herds in small areas with consequent increased in overgrazing and 
environmental degradations; proliferation of conflicts between farmers and pastoralists (to the 
detriment of the latter) (Salah,1996). 
 
Developments in non-pastoral sectors (mainly large-scale irrigated and rainfed mechanized 
farming) in Sudan compounded pastoral problems by restricting access to dry season water 
and grazing resources (Ahmed et al., 2002). The traditional system of land tenure which 
“recognizes the dar (homeland) of each ethnic groups was abolished and replaced by a system 
of tenure granting the government the right to appropriate land as it wishes”; and the “pastoral 
areas were given to operators of large schemes” (Shazali and Ahmed, 1999 cited in Abdel 
Ghaffar, 2001:175). Moreover, pastoralists have been politically marginalized through the 
abolition of their indigenous administrative systems, and they have no way of influencing any 
decisions which impact on their system of livelihood (Abdel Ghaffar, 2001). 
 
In 1994 the Sudanese government attempted to redress some of the above problems through 
“establishing pastoral union for instance in eastern Sudan”, and by issuing “decree ordering 
the reopening of all known nomadic corridors throughout the Sudan by January 1995” (Salah, 
1996:213-214). However, Salah (1996:214) noted that “the union seems rootless and only in 
Blue Nile State (south eastern Sudan) where a few corridors were opened under extreme 
pressures from the State Wali (Governor) in compliance with the decree, whereas in Gdarif 
State of eastern Sudan, reopening corridors seems to be blocked by powerful lobby of 
scheme-owners”. Salah further argues that “the Sudanese government used to make gestures 
which indicate some concerns about the condition of pastoralists, but which almost always 
amounted to no more than lip-service”. The same author concluded that “marginalization of 
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pastoral nomads in south Kassala, as in Sudan in general, was and continues to be, 
consequences and manifestation of particular configuration of governance (relation between 
government and society) in which nomads could not effectively influence government to cater 
for their needs and interest” (Salah, 1996:213-214).   
 
On the other hand another author (Ibrahim, 1996:260) stated that “recently the pastoral sector 
started to attract greater attention and the present government in Sudan seems to have 
appreciated the role of pastoral sector at least in terms of its policy statements”, one of which 
is the “Comprehensive National Strategy (CNS), the official blue print and plan of action that 
outlined development policy in livestock sector”.  
 
However, Ibrahim (1996) observed that the implementation of CNS with regard to pastoral 
sector did not address the priorities of pastoralists. According to Ibrahim, reasons for the 
failure included among others:  
 
i. the Sudanese Comprehensive National Strategy is a top-down approach in 
planning and implementation that gives very less attention to  pastoralists who as 
segment of population and as social strata have never been consulted either by 
planners or by an executing agency;  
ii. while range and pasture management have been given priority, many important 
issues of great consequences such as the question of land tenure, and entitlement 
to land use and the impact of all this on pastoral sector were not addressed; rather 
the CNS has spread the ground for the intensification of contradictions between 
the interests of commercial mechanized farming and pastoralists by calling for 
horizontal expansion of mechanized rainfed and irrigation schemes and reserved 
forests;  
iii. At the time when the state is officially embracing and advocating market 
liberalization, accepting and implementing strict Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (SAP), it formulates the Comprehensive National Strategy 
programmes which are a version of central planning. While the former (i.e. SAP) 
demands cuts in budgets and refreshment of staff, the latter requires higher levels 
of investment which may call for deficit expenditure if necessary. Thus results are 
crippling for the Department of Range Management and the programme as a 
whole (Ibrahim, 1996:269).  
 
In general the Sudan case illustrates the bias of the government policy to agriculture and large 
commercial farms, and inadequate implementation of pastoral programmes that have led to 
deprivation of pastoral groups from their key pastoral resources. This indicates the political 
and economic marginalization of the pastoral groups in the country.   
 
ii. Kenya and Tanzania: In Kenya and Tanzania, the Maasai pastoralists have experienced 
similar situations of marginalization as many other pastoral societies in East Africa. The 
Maasai of Kenya and Tanzania have been deprived of their rights to grazing lands. The 
expansion of commercial farms, modern private ranches, game reserves and parks, and 
encroachment of sedentary farmers from neighbouring communities have increased since the 
colonial time (Fratkin, 1997; Markakis, 2004). Before the colonial rule (1885-1963) Maasai 
cattle herders occupied the Rift Valley savanna plains from Lake Turkana in Northern Kenya 
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to the Maasai Steppe in Central Tanzania. An international border divided the Maasai into 
German Tanganyika and British Kenya in 1885 (Fratkin, 1997).  
 
In 1911, Kenyan Maasai saw their lands reduced by 60% when the British evicted them from 
north central Kenya to make room for settler ranches, confining Maasai to the present-day 
Kajiado and Narok districts. Maasai lands in both countries were further reduced with the 
creation of game parks (Fratkin, 1997:243). Moreover the Maasai in Kenya and Tanzania 
have faced competition for land from agriculturalists, including wheat-growing and beef 
producing commercial enterprises.   
 
Another example of alienation of herders from their customary rights is the case of Barabaig 
who are cattle pastoralists that live around Mt. Hanang near Arusha (Lane, 1996, cited in 
Fratkin, 1997:245). In 1968, 70,000 ha (later expanded to 100,000) of Barabaig’s land was 
taken over by the parastatal National Agriculture and Food Corporation (NAFCO) to grow 
commercial wheat on seven state farms. The project was funded by CIDA (Fratkin, 
1997:245). Though Barabaig presented their case to the Tanzania higher court for restoration 
of their traditional rights, the victory was limited by technical flaw. And the result was a 
major setback for Barabaig pastoralists and led to an increase in NAFCO aggression and 
expansion of the wheat scheme in the 1980s. Furthermore the Tanzanian Government set in 
motion a series of laws attempting to extinguish customary rights in land and prohibit 
compensation for such extinctions (Lane, 1994 cited in Fratkin, 1997:245).  
 
Development projects implemented between the 1960s and 1970s in Kenya and Tanzania did 
not bring any substantial development to Maasai pastoralists (Fratkin, 1997). The USAID and 
World Bank funded project - “Maasai Livestock and Range Management”- carried out 
between 1969 and 1979 did not result in any substantial increase in livestock sales. Rather the 
water and road development led to a large number of immigrant farmers, population 
concentration near boreholes and overgrazing (Homewood, 1995; Jacobs, 1980 cited in 
Fratkin, 1997).   
 
iii. Uganda: Since the colonial period the successive governments of Uganda have focused on 
development of commercial livestock ranching disregarding the significance of traditional 
livestock production sector (Frank, 2001:101; Frank, 1996; 2002; Markakis, 2004). Since the 
1960s when lands had been earmarked for ranch development, many cattle keepers were 
dispossessed of their land (e.g. in Signo, Bunyoro) and continued roaming the entire stretch of 
drylands. Others were also evicted from their area for the establishment of national parks. For 
instance pastoralists in Karamoja have been affected when 36% of the area was designated as 
a game and forest reserve and the remaining as a controlled hunting area (Frank, 2001). Large 
tracts in Uganda’s ‘cattle corridor’ were taken for ill-fated ranching projects (Markakis, 
2004:11). Moreover, during the Obote II the majority of the cattle keepers were harassed 
because they were suspected to be sympathetic to the National Resistance Army (NRA) led 
by Museveni (Frank, 2001:102).  
 
When the National Resistance Movement (NRM) came to power in 1986, it formulated an 
economic recovery programme focusing on improving and transforming the existing livestock 
production. At that time, the government attempted to provide facilities and infrastructure 
such as veterinary services, diagnostic facilities, water, training of animal health workers, etc. 
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(Frank, 2001). After 1996 the government adopted ‘agricultural modernization agenda’ aimed 
at reversing the decline in livestock number and settling nomadic cattle keepers. Resettlement 
was seen by the government as a panacea to resource management problems associated with 
the practice of nomadism which the NRM considers to be among the leading obstacles to the 
development of a livestock production sector in Uganda (Frank, 1996; 2001:103). Frank 
further notes that the government “sees not simply the sedentarisation of pastoralists as a 
solution to the crisis, but the transformation of cattle keepers into crop cultivators” (Frank, 
1996:76).   
 
The Ugandan government has uniquely pursued with more hostile policies against traditional 
pastoralism favouring modern ranching. Establishing modern ranching schemes, restructuring 
of ranches, delineation of national parks  and resettlement  of cattle keepers - all were taken 
against traditional pastoralism which “was seen as the greatest obstacle to government’s 
commitment to developing the livestock industry” (Frank, 2001:109). Frank noted the 
position of the Ugandan Government at the time on pastoralism as follows: 
 
At the time when the policy of restructuring government ranching schemes was 
being discussed, it was government’s strong belief that nomadism was the greatest 
obstacle to the development of the livestock industry. Because of this, the view was 
held that soon after the end of the ranch restructuring exercise a law banning the 
nomadic lifestyle would be introduced in parliament and this would make an offence 
for cattle keepers to continue roaming from one place to another.  […..] the 
government had been nursing the idea of making it [nomadism] a criminal offense to 
engage in nomadism ((Frank, 2001:120). 
 
In February 1992, President Museveni told two public rallies in Masaka District that 
the government would soon come up with a law prohibiting nomadism because it 
leads to the spread of cattle diseases and leads to overstocking and overgrazing 
(‘Nomadism will be outlawed-Museveni’ in New Vision, 1992 noted in Frank, 
2001:129). 
 
The above descriptions show that traditional pastoralism either as way of life or production 
systems is not recognised to continue in Uganda. A study on rangeland tenure and resources 
management in Uganda also stated the situation in the following manner: 
 
The customary rights and social institutions of pastoralists in their grazing land are 
generally no longer recognized by law…. Given today’s hostile rangeland 
environment, it is increasingly difficult to assume that pastoralism in its traditional 
form will persist, since pastoralists are easily displaced (Kisamba-Mugerwa, 1992 
cited in Rugadya, 2005:2) 
 
The above statements have revealed that the attitude of the Ugandan government towards 
traditional pastoralism has been outright hostile. The government has perceived that 
traditional pastoralism spreads cattle diseases, leads to overstocking and overgrazing. It also 
questions the viability of pastoralism and the trend is to outlaw it. Moreover, forced 
settlement or sedentarization is imposed on pastoralists by the government.  
 
In general pastoralists in Uganda are under numerous internal and external pressures 
including hostile government policy; population increase; loss of grazing areas to private 
farms and modern ranches, national parks, military installations; conflict with settled 
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cultivators, etc (Frank, 1996). Frank stated that the case of Karamoja district can be 
illustrative for never-ending crises facing pastoralists in Uganda. The crises are manifested by 
“recurrent famine conditions; ecological degradation; and diminishing resources and 
increased pastoral mobility which leads to violent conflicts among pastoralists and with other 
resource users” (Frank, 1996:76).      
 
iv. Somalia: Most of Somalia has a semi-arid to arid environment which is suitable primarily 
for nomadic pastoralism (Janzen, 1993:17; Ahmed et al., 2002:18). More than half of its 
population practices nomadic pastoralism. Before the civil war, 60% of Somalia’s  population 
were pastoralists or agro-pastoralists, about 20% agriculturalists and the remainder were 
urban dwellers (government employees, factory workers, shopkeepers, traders) (Ahmed et al., 
2002:18). Like in other African countries sedentarization and agro-pastoralism are increasing 
in Somalia. There is a rapidly unfolding process involving the formation of numerous 
transitional and combined forms of nomadic and sedentary ways of life in the rural sector 
(Janzen, 1993:17). The two major rivers Shebelle and Juba are increasingly used for irrigation 
to grow maize and sorghum. Plantations of banana, sugarcane and citrus fruits are also 
available in Somalia.  
 
As some authors (e.g. Doornbos, 2001; Farah, 1997) noted, Somalia is a different case by 
many standards, especially due to the fact that since 1991, after the fall of Syad Barre regime 
Somalia has no effective central government. Civil war, though in ‘low-intensity’ manner, 
still continues in many parts of the country, especially in the south (Doornbos, 2001:287). 
“Since the fall of Mogadishu in January 1991, Somalia has been divided into a mosaic of 
separate clan fiefdoms” (Farah, 1997:82). While the north-western part of the country has 
relative stability, various competing war lords have turned the south part into war zones.  
 
In fact the current problem in Somalia has its roots in the past colonial and post-colonial 
socio-political processes (Flintan and Imeru, 2002, Markakis, 2004). During the colonial time 
the Somali people were divided between Somalia, Somaliland, Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti. 
Following the establishment of the Somali Republic in 1960 and the beginning of Somali 
nationalism, the government of Somalia claimed the Ogaden region that is under Ethiopian 
administration. This led to the 1977-78 war between Ethiopia and Somalia, which eventually 
Somalia was defeated in 1978. But the tension between the two countries has existed in one 
form or another since 1977-78 war (Flintan and Imeru, 2002:249). 
 
Both the colonial administrative rules and the subsequent war emanated from laying claims 
on territory between Ethiopia and Somalia had brought never-ending consequences and 
recurrent crisis to Somali pastoralists living in both countries. Initially the colonial 
demarcation divided lineages, clans, and tribes among different countries; and then curtailed 
their mobility and access to key resources in attempt for protecting state frontiers (Flintan and 
Imeru, 2002; Markakis, 2004). Group cohesion was weakened and traditional clan authority 
was undermined resulting in inter-clan conflicts and mutual suspicion. These processes again 
led to loss of natural resources, ecological crisis, border wars, displacement of pastoral 
communities and disruption of their livelihoods, etc.      
 
Indeed, before the civil war the ruling elites were drawn mainly from pastoral groups. At the 
time the Somalis had at least access to the central government. However, the government was 
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authoritarian and the local people were under severe repression that led to the emergence of 
liberation movements and later to never-ending civil strife across the country. In this case 
some authors (e.g. Doornbos, 1993, cited in Frank and Otim, 2002:113) noted that “even in a 
country like Somalia, where pastoralists are in the majority, they continue to be marginalized 
by the state”. As a result, the Somalis have been affected by political crisis and lack of central 
government for the past 16 years, and Somalia became the first stateless country of the world 
in the 21st century. Consequently pastoralists in this country have been suffering from a 
protracted civil strife, displacement, poverty and famine, epidemics, recurrent drought, flood, 
environmental crisis, etc.   
 
In general the plight of pastoralists in East African countries has revealed that colonialism, 
and the post-colonial policies and development projects of national governments have had 
various far-reaching negative consequences on pastoralists of the region. However, it is not to 
deny some benefits of projects, though they vary to pastoralists. For instance water projects 
which created access to previously unutilized lands; veterinary services that reduced livestock 
mortality; and roads which improved access to markets. Yet the attempts to “develop” African 
pastoral systems with western production models and infrastructure have typically failed over 
the past 40 years (Behnke, 1983; Coppock, 1994; Jahnke, 1982 cited in Desta and Coppock, 
2004:466). In relation to inappropriate external interventions to pastoral areas of East Africa, 
Manger (1996:18) has this to say:  
 
 …the past history of planning and contact between public authorities and East 
African pastoralism has been one of misunderstandings as well as more or less 
conscious policies of marginalization based on simplistic assumptions. The most 
common of these are the widespread generalizations that accuse pastoralists of 
creating desertification, of managing their stock according to irrational economic 
principles and of being technically stagnant and backwards; of wandering about 
destroying nature, and of adhering to conservative social structure and cultural 
notions, i.e. being anti-developmental, unprogressive. 
 
Manger (1996:18) further states that “pastoralists themselves have often responded to such 
developments with distrust, resistance and violence. This was because their cooperation was 
never solicited, but was always imposed” 
 
However, failure to achieve the intended objectives of past development programmes does 
not mean pastoral societies have not changed. They have undergone great changes and 
transformations during their contact with state structures and external interventions (Manger 
1996). In this case Desta and Coppock (2004:466) also added that “lack of impact from 
economic development should not imply that pastoral systems do not change - indeed changes 
are pervasive”. For instance the Maasai of semi-arid Kajiado district in Kenya can be an 
illustrative case in East Africa. According to Desta and Coppock (2004:466) the overall 
pattern of change for Kajiado Maasai pastoralists in the past 50 years consists of: 
 
i. decline in per capita livestock holding largely as a result of limits imposed by 
scarcity of natural resources on animals and human population increase;  
ii. adoption of additional sources of food, e.g. agro-pastoralism and wage 
employment;   
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iii. increased internal pressures resulting in privatisation of resources as resources 
competition is intensified;  
iv. loss of key grazing or water resources to land annexation or ecological 
degradation;  
v. shift for households to keep more small ruminants (relative to cattle) as the forage 
base is altered, and people become more sedentary;  
vi. increase of poverty and food insecurity, especially for the poorer segments of the 
population.  
 
Therefore, though the degree and the causes of these changes vary from one country to the 
other, pastoral groups in Africa have nearly experienced such patterns of changes that the 
Maasai pastoral groups have experienced. For instance, a survey carried out on 317 Borana 
households in southern Ethiopia has confirmed largely similar patterns described above 
(Desta and Coppock, 2004:465). The recent study in the Somali Region of Ethiopia 
(Devereux, 2006) also reinforces this pattern.  
 
As the above discussion on experiences of East African countries reveals, pastoral 
development programmes pursued by the national states share the following common 
characteristics (Manger, 1996:18; Fratkin, 1997:240-2; Markakis, 2004:16-17, 21-22; 
Rugadya, 2005:2-3; Rotich, 2005:8): 
 
i. faulty land tenure policies and reforms (failure to recognize and protect traditional 
communal rights to key pastoral resources), and forced sedentarization,   
ii. ill-conceived or inappropriate pastoral development projects or programmes 
funded by donors and as well as by national states (i.e. considering the sector 
mainly as foreign exchange earner without addressing pastoralists needs and 
priority),   
iii. top-down approach focusing on technical supports only,  
iv. failure to recognize that pastoral livestock management in arid lands is productive, 
rational and an essential way of utilizing scarce and patchy resources. 
 
Generally the policies of most national governments (be they economic, political, social or 
administrative) have been geared towards harnessing resources of pastoral areas (e.g. 
livestock, land, rangeland resources, water, minerals etc) to develop national economies and 
not to benefit pastoral people and enhance their livelihoods. These external interventions have 
further replicated marginalization of pastoralists in the wider polity and economy. This in turn 
progressively affects the pastoral way of life (livelihoods) and makes pastoral households or 
communities vulnerable to vagaries of weather (drought, flood) and famine (chronic food 
insecurity), disease outbreaks, conflicts and instability.  
 
As a result, pastoral societies in East Africa are currently in grip of two main forces - the 
recurrent drought which affects their rangeland resources and livestock, and continuous 
external encroachment resulting in diminishing of prime grazing areas and curtailment of 
mobility. On the one hand drought cycles have shortened from 7-10 years in the past to 3-5 
years at present, on the other hand the state and sedentary farmers are expanding agricultural 
farms into pastoral areas thereby taking up both dry and wet season grazing areas. While 
pastoral communities have time-tested adaptation strategies to live in arid and semi-arid areas 
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and to cope with high variability of rainfall that often results in variable patterns of resources 
in space and time, they have less capacity/power to challenge external pressures or 
encroachments. They have less power to negotiate and influence governments for protecting 
their customary land rights; they are not often represented in the national political and 
economic contexts. Therefore, this latter factor, more than drought and its consequences, 
requires the political commitment of governments and empowerment of pastoral societies to 
protect their pastoral way of life and their land tenure rights on prime resources.        
 
3.2.2 Pastoralists’ Vulnerability to Multiple Risks in East Africa  
 
As stated above, pastoralists in East Africa face a multitude of risks. These include the natural 
covariant of drought; the idiosyncratic risk of human illness and risk of livestock diseases 
(which can turn into epidemic diseases); the economic risk of exclusion from markets; the 
social risk of violent conflict over increasing scarce resources (risks of civil strife), the 
political risk of marginalization, and the environmental risks of pasture degradation (Rass, 
2006:2). This section presents a brief discussion on some of these risks.    
 
i. Drought and its Characteristics: Drought as a natural hazard has been the subject of many 
studies and defined in many ways according to the needs for water or moisture. Drought may 
be considered in general terms as a consequence of a reduction over an extended period of 
time in the amount of precipitation that is received, usually over a season or more in length. It 
is a temporary aberration, unlike aridity which is a permanent feature of certain climates 
(ISDR, 2003:4). Drought is a temporary departure from ‘normal’ rainfall patterns, distribution 
and amount in a climate (Ifejika Speranza, 2006:14). Several terms and definitions for 
drought include seasonal drought, contingent drought, meteorological drought, agricultural 
drought and hydrological drought (Ahmed et al., 2002; Ifejika Speranza, 2006). The most 
common ones are described as follows: 
 
i. Meteorological/climatological drought refers to precipitation deficit in relation to 
some expected or ‘normal’ (average) amount over an extended period of time. 
ii. Agricultural drought refers to deficit in soil moisture available for crop growth. 
iii. Hydrological drought is defined best by deficiencies in surface and subsurface 
water supplies, which lead to lack of water to meet normal and specific water 
demands. 
iv. Socio-economic drought implies an extended and significant negative departure in 
rainfall, relative to the regime around which society has stabilized (Rasmusson, 1987 
cited in Ifejika Speranza, 2006:14).    
 
The first three types are commonly noted in many writings. “Common to all droughts is that 
they originate from precipitation deficit, which results in water shortage for various uses” 
(Ifejika Speranza, 2006:14). Other terms were proposed to qualify a drought according to land 
use or need such as “pastoral drought” and “ecosystem drought” (FAO, 2002, cited in Ahmed 
et al., 2002: 21).64  Droughts differ from one another in three characteristics:  
                                                 
64 Pastoral drought could be defined as lack of forage availability as a result of particular sequences of 
meteorological drought, in terms of length, seasonal timing and the intensity of the deficit (Bruins, 2000 cited in 
Morton, 2006:5). 
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i. Intensity, which refers to the degree of the precipitation shortfall and/or the severity 
of impacts associated with shortfall. 
ii. Duration, which refers to the timing of the onset of the precipitation shortfall, 
though the start of a drought is difficult to pinpoint (it can continue for months or 
years). 
iii. Spatial coverage, drought-affected areas evolve gradually as drought shifts from 
one area to another (Ifejika Speranza, 2006:14).  
 
Drought impacts also vary significantly between locations, because of differences in 
economic, social, and environmental characteristics at micro and macro levels (ISDR, 
2003:4). The same source also stated that drought definitions should be impact or application 
specific and region specific65. Mitigating drought consequences means activities related to the 
prediction of drought and intended to reduce the vulnerability of society and natural systems 
to drought (FAO 2002 cited in Ahmed et al., 2002).  
 
ii. Drought and other related risks in pastoral areas of East Africa: In the arid and semi-arid 
areas of the Horn of Africa drought is a normal part of climate. It is intricately related to the 
lives of the pastoralists of the Horn of Africa for centuries; however it had projected itself to 
famine disaster (Ahmed et al., 2002). In general terms drought is a normal part of life in the 
arid climate, often described as a natural hazard. Whether it leads to disaster depends on its 
severity and peoples’ vulnerability to such shock. Impacts of drought vary considerably, and 
the ability of people to cope with drought consequences also varies from one social system to 
the other. In the Horn of Africa, most of the severe droughts that occurred within past 3-4 
decades have developed into famine disasters.  
 
The bulk of land in the Horn of Africa that pastoralists inhabit lies in the semi-arid and arid 
zone which is characterized by high variability of rainfall. This zone has been severely 
affected by droughts. Recurrent droughts over the past three to four decades have had their 
impacts on the human and livestock population as well as reshaping the ecological scene 
(Abdel Ghaffar and Abdel, 1996:3). For instance the extra-dryness that occurred in the 1980s 
resulted in loss of livestock and famines that took the lives of many people. Those drought 
consequences and subsequent droughts constrained quick recovery and asset rebuilding.  
 
Though drought is a recurrent reality in East African drylands with which pastoralists have 
developed various forms of adaptation, the compounded impacts of internal and external 
pressures have undermined the means of escaping drought consequences. Therefore, the 
process of change among pastoral communities is not only a function of physical conditions 
(e.g. drought), but also a result of their interaction with and/or encroachment of external 
systems (Abdel Ghaffar and Abdel Ati, 1996:7).  
 
                                                 
65 For instance the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) proposed two definitions for drought: (a) 
prolonged absence or poor distribution of precipitation; and (b) period of abnormally dry weather sufficiently 
prolonged for the lack of precipitation to cause a serious hydrological imbalance. And the United Nations 
Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) defines drought as “the naturally-occurring phenomenon that 
exists when precipitation has been significantly below normal recorded levels, causing serious hydrological 
imbalances that adversely affect land resource production systems” (Ahmed et al., 2002:21). 
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Therefore, it can be said that the present situation of the dryland of East Africa has become 
very complex and the predicaments of pastoral groups have increased as a result of socio-
political processes as well as ecological or environmental crises. Pastoralists and agro-
pastoralists are striving to make use of this zone through managing existing resources via 
their adaptive strategies. However, their resource base (natural resources, livestock) have been 
eroded and their strategies are undermined due to mounting external interventions and internal 
processes. As a result, recurring droughts and their consequences have challenged 
pastoralists’ livelihoods and coping strategies. Therefore, pastoralists in East African 
countries have become more vulnerable to drought-related famines than they were in the past.  
 
In fact the local people still use their indigenous knowledge to manage their natural 
resources/environment and to cope with various crises. In some cases, this might have 
worked. However, in many cases due to internal or/and external factors, the local people had 
to abandon their traditional ways of land and pasture conservation and try to utilize natural 
resources to satisfy their immediate needs. The cutting of trees (deforestation), production of 
charcoal to satisfy the needs of rapidly growing urban areas; forced sedentarization which 
results in overgrazing and degradation of land,  etc. can be  cited as consequences of external 
pressures that exacerbated the impacts of droughts (Abdel Ghaffar and Abdel, 1996:3). 
 
In general many Sub-Saharan Africa countries have been afflicted by the prolonged and 
recurrent droughts, especially since the 1980s. Many empirical studies also showed that Sub-
Saharan African countries were repeatedly affected by droughts, most of which developed 
into disasters like famines (Ifejika Speranza, 2006:24; Markos, 1997:140). Markakis (2004:4) 
also describes drought occurrence in East Africa in the following terms:  
 
Drought is a frequent visitor to the region, which the pastoralists regard as ‘an 
act of God’. A rough collation of recorded incidents in the previous century 
suggests major incidents occur every 10 years. Anecdotal evidence suggests 
that drought cycles have shortened from 5-10 years in the past to 3-5 five years 
at present. Droughts are remembered because they are usually accompanied by 
famine. 
 
Yet drought does not necessarily lead to disaster which therefore cannot be called “natural”. 
Instead drought interplays with other factors to develop into a disaster (e.g. famine crisis). 
Ifejika Speranza (2006:22) noted that “there is general notion that if a (drought) hazard and its 
consequences are not properly managed and controlled, a hazard might develop into a 
disaster”. Ifejika Speranza further mentions that “a hazard occurrence may become a disaster 
in one society but may only cause negligible impacts in another society”. Therefore, other 
social, economic and political processes play major roles in creating vulnerability conditions. 
Many studies from East African countries showed that pastoralists’ livelihoods and their 
drought escaping strategies have been undermined by external encroachments (Ahmed et al., 
2002; Markakis, 2004; Devereux, 2006). The combined effects of internal and external forces 
have eroded the capacity of pastoralists. Traditional pastoral societies are increasingly unable 
to cope with drought, as indicated by large losses of herd capital, widening poverty and 
frequent famine (Coppock, 1994 cited in Ahmed et al., 2002:36). The incidence of extreme 
poverty ranges from 25-55% among African pastoralists/agro-pastoralists (Rass, 2006:1). 
Therefore, pastoralists of the region represent a particularly vulnerable group due to their 
exposure to multiple risks (Rass, 2006: 6).  
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This suggests the need for intervention of external agencies (government and NGOs) in terms 
of development investment and risk management to enhance pastoralists’ capacity for coping 
with risks. External interventions (investment and risk management strategies) should be 
based on existing livelihood systems, indigenous knowledge (e.g. local adaptive strategies) 
and on understanding whether risks are preventable (e.g. pasture degradation or violent) or 
manageable (e.g. drought risk). While an outbreak of epidemics, violent conflicts, or 
degradation of pastureland can, in theory, be prevented, in the case of drought only risk 
mitigation66 strategies can be set in place (Rass, 2006:2). Moreover, not all pastoralists are 
vulnerable. They often utilize their indigenous knowledge and strategies to adapt and cope 
with different circumstances. Therefore, pastoral strategies and adaptive responses have to be 
taken into consideration in order to understand local livelihood systems and peoples’ 
resilience.  
 
 
3.2.3 Pastoralists’ Adaptive and Coping Strategies 
 
3.2.3.1 General Description of Coping and Adaptive Strategies in the Literature  
 
Households and communities confronted with various shocks and circumstances respond in a 
number of ways. For the past four to five decades various coping and adaptive strategies have 
been documented in the literature, particularly in the context of drought and famine in Sub-
Saharan Africa. This section presents how these strategies are categorized and defined by 
different authors. 
 
Household and community strategies can be broadly categorized into two: coping strategies 
and adaptive responses. The former could be considered as short term survival strategies, 
while the latter are long-term strategies of adaptation. Coping essentially means “acting to 
survive within the prevailing rules” (Gore, 1992 cited in Davies, 1996). On the other hand, 
“when adaptation occurs, the rule system (or the moral economy) itself changes” (Davies, 
1996:55). It should be, however, noted that coping strategies and adaptive strategies could 
sometimes overlap (Barton et al., 2001 cited in Ahmed et al., 2002:31). Individual households 
and social groups employ various strategies depending on differential access to resources, and 
opportunities and constraints which emerge within different contexts. In relation to this 
Walker (1995:152) states that “not every famine-prone community will have access to all […] 
strategies or be able to use them all, and not every household in a ‘famine’ area starts off from 
the same level of vulnerability”.   
 
In the literature while some writers (Birks 1980, Watts 1983, Corbett 1988 cited in Davies, 
1996; Dessalegn, 1991) found out a sequential uptake of coping strategies, others (Mortimore 
1989, Riely 1991 cited in Davies, 1996; Yared, 1999) have challenged this simple sequential 
model arguing that the pre-crisis period circumstances of individuals or households (e.g. 
differential access to resources, endowments) influence their options and strategies.  Other 
social and cultural factors also affect options and strategies to be employed in particular 
                                                 
66 Mitigation refers to measures which can be taken to minimize the destructive and disruptive effects of hazards 
and thus lessen the magnitude of a disaster (Maskrey, 1989:39). 
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contexts. For instance with regard to coping strategies, Davies (1996:59) remarked, “The fact 
that one person’s coping strategy is another’s livelihood makes the identification and 
monitoring of repeated patterns of coping behaviour more or less impossible for 
representative groups”.  
 
Differences in options and choices occur at individual, household, community and livelihood 
systems levels (Davies, 1996:50). A study in northern Nigeria revealed that adaptive 
behaviour to drought over a thirteen year period varies between households in the same 
villages (Mortimore, 1989 cited in Davies, 1996:50). With each cycle of drought and partial 
rehabilitation, the range of options will change, and the rate of take-up of particular strategies 
will vary (Davies, 1996).  
 
Davies (1996:45, 55) also makes distinction between coping strategies and adapting 
strategies: the former “are the bundle of producer responses to declining food availability and 
entitlements in abnormal season or years”, the latter involve “permanent change in the mix of 
ways in which food is acquired irrespective of the year in question”. According to Davies 
“coping is a characteristic of structurally secure livelihood systems, and vulnerable ones are 
characterized by adaptation. In other words secure livelihood systems bounce back and 
restrict the use of coping strategies to periods of shock, whereas in vulnerable systems, coping 
strategies move up the hierarchies of activities after each shock to become simply an 
intensification of normal behaviour (Davies, 1996). Davies further argues that making 
distinctions between coping and adapting strategies is not sufficient. Thus Davies (1996:58) 
remarked  that (i) “the activity itself has not changed but only its motivation and frequency of 
use, (ii) at any given moment in a community, one person’s coping strategy may be another’s 
adaptive strategy, and (iii) the shift between coping and adaptation is occurring all the time”.  
 
Other writers also distinguished between types of coping strategies. For instance Corbett, 
(1988 cited in Davies, 1996) distinguishes between “insurance strategies and coping 
strategies”. The former are those activities undertaken to reduce the likelihood of failure of 
primary production. The latter are employed once the principal sources of production has 
failed to meet expected levels and producers have literally to ‘cope’ until the next harvest. 
Frankenberger and Goldstein (1990 cited in Davies, 1996:48) also distinguished between 
various types of risk management and patterns of coping. WFP (1989 cited in Davies, 
1996:48) differentiated between accumulation and diversification (insurance) strategies. The 
former aims at increasing a household’s resource base, and the latter at promoting a variety of 
sources of income with different patterns of risk to avoid the exposure associated with a 
single income source.  
 
Still further distinctions were made with regard coping strategies. In a study of famine in 
Darfur in 1985, De Waal (1989 cited in Davies, 1996:48) distinguished between ‘non-erosive’ 
and ‘erosive’ coping, i.e. between those strategies which use extra sources of income and  do 
not erode the subsistence base of the household, and those which do, thereby compromising 
future livelihood security. Distinction is also made between “hungry season strategies used 
for the most part of the year and strategies to survive particularly bad years” (Davies, 
1996:48).   
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In relation to disaster and hazards, having reviewed the literature on household coping 
strategies Blaikie et al. (2004:115-118) have identified six categories of coping strategies. 
These are (i) preventive strategies, (ii) impact minimizing strategies, (iii) building up stores of 
food and saleable assets, (iv) diversifying production, (v) diversifying income sources and, 
(vi) development of social support networks.    
 
Of all distinctions, as indicated above Davies (1996) makes an important distinction between 
coping strategies and adaptive strategies, and elabourates the role and use of monitoring them 
in different livelihood systems in relation vulnerability. Davies argues that while such sources 
of entitlement (e.g. production and exchange) have often been monitored by EWS, those 
sources of entitlements (e.g. claims as calls, coping and adaptation) and mediators of 
entitlement (e.g. livelihood system protection67, moral economy68, state69) have been ignored 
or rarely incorporated in EWS. Davies further contends that “monitoring the sequential uptake 
of coping strategies as sensitive indicators of proximate vulnerability70 has drawbacks”. 
Davies’s argument is that “as livelihood systems become structurally vulnerable, many 
coping strategies are incorporated into the normal cycle of activities and thus become part of 
the process of adaptation” (Davies, 1996:38).   
 
In the light of entitlement approach, Davies considers “entitlements derived from coping and 
adaptation as tertiary activities pursued by people to survive when their habitual primary and 
secondary activities can not guarantee a livelihood” (Davies, 1996:238). Therefore, Davies 
states that “production and exchange entitlements are the central planks of subsistence in any 
year and of accumulation in good year; coping strategies, in contrast are reserved for periods 
of unusual stress. Activities become adaptive strategies when they are used in every year to 
fill the food gap left once production and exchange entitlements have failed to meet minimum 
food requirements” (Davies, 1996:238).  
 
Davies further states that “most strategies are derived from the same agro-ecological and 
socio-economic conditions as production and exchange entitlements”, and “coping strategies 
are not hermetically sealed from habitual activities and the entitlements to which they give 
rise, but rather, are extensions or adaptations of such activities” (Davies, 1996:240). 
Accordingly Davies classifies coping/adaptive strategies by ‘entitlement base’, and 
distinguishes them as ‘insurance strategies’ to offset potential risk or/and ‘deficient-
management strategy’ to meet expected requirements in a given year. These include 
production-based, common property resource-based, reciprocally-based, asset-based, labour-
                                                 
67 Some evidences from Darfur (De Waal, 1989) and Ethiopia (Turton, 1977) indicate that people will strive to 
preserve future livelihoods even during crises (e.g. by reducing current consumption in order not to sell 
productive assets, or by returning home from remunerative migration in order to cultivate (cited in Davies, 
1996:39-40).  
68 By citing Gore (1992) Davies notes that it is erroneous assumption that moral economy is an informal 
insurance system which provides a community safety net in  times of crisis, whereas in fact such relationship can 
be both extractive and exploitative and can become more so in periods of acute stress (Davies, 1996:40).  
69 With regard to indicators of state mediators of entitlement Davies argues that two critical aspects of state 
mediation need to be addressed in EWS, (i) indicators of whether the state facilitates or inhibits coping and 
adaptation and, (ii) whether it makes damaging and untimely claims on entitlements (Davies, 1996:42). 
70 Proximate vulnerability: that which changes from one year to the next as opposed to more or less permanent 
state of structural vulnerability (Davies, 1996).  
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based, exchanged-based, migration-based, and consumption-based coping/adaptive strategies 
(Davies, 1996:240-41).  
 
The above section deals with general conceptual distinctions within and between coping and 
adaptive strategies found in the literature. As stated earlier options and choice of the strategies 
vary from household to household and from one community to another in a particular context 
or situation. The subject of this study is pastoral community. The following sections discuss 
strategies which pastoralists have developed over decades to adapt to and cope with difficult 
circumstances in African context.          
 
 
3.2.3.2    Adaptive and Coping Strategies of Pastoralists 
 
Earlier in section 3.2.2, it is stated that pastoral livelihoods are affected by multiple risks. For 
instance drought or epidemic may reduce herd size; conflicts may reduce social capital within 
a community; encroachment of land by settled farmers or commercial schemes may deprive 
pastoral people of key resources; decline terms of trade for livestock may make their sale 
unprofitable, etc. In order to discern the effects of these risks on the livelihood systems, and to 
design appropriate interventions, it is important to understand how pastoral households or 
communities respond to both external and internal shocks.  
 
Studies show that over the course of centuries, pastoralists have developed various strategies 
to adapt to their harsh environment, and offset risks or to cope with impacts of hazards 
(drought), disasters (famines) and external intrusions (Abdel Ghaffar and Abdel, 1996; 
Egeimi, 1996:35; Rass, 2006:34). They have developed various means and ways whereby 
they combine and use their assets and knowledge to achieve individual and collective goals. 
Many authors have identified a portfolio of adaptive and coping strategies pursued by pastoral 
households and communities to adapt to and cope with risks and uncertainties (Scoones, 
1996; Egeimi, 1996; Ali, 1996; Assefa, 1996; Bayer and Waters-Bayer, 1996; Ahmed et al., 
2002; Sommer, 1998; Fasil et al., 2001; Dereveux, 2006; Rass, 2006). These strategies 
include regular and opportunistic herd movements, tracking rainfall, diversification of 
species; herd splitting and distribution; livestock accumulation and changing species 
composition; dispersal of resources and assistance from relatives; forage supplementation; 
generation of food stores; sale of non-livestock assets; income generation from non-pastoral 
activities; reduction of food intake and change of composition of diet, etc. For the 
convenience of presentation I categorized these strategies into (i) adaptive 
strategies/responses, (ii) coping mechanisms to food crisis and (iii) drought recovery 
strategies. In the following sections each of these categories of strategies are elabourated. 
 
3.2.3.2.1 Pastoralists’ Adaptive Strategies 
 
i. Mobility and opportunistic tracking. The key strategy of pastoralists is the movement of 
their herds in response to seasonal and annual changes in pastures and water availability. 
Mobility allows pastoralists to avoid overgrazing and to evade disease, conflict or drought 
conditions (Hesse and MacGregor, 2006:7). The productivity of African rangelands is 
heterogeneous in space and variable over time. Flexible movement is, therefore, critical to 
pastoralists (Scoones, 1996:2). This pastoral strategy may involve tracking rainfall by moving 
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herds, movement between different agro-ecological zones and to key resource areas (Scoones, 
1996:2). Mobility allows herders for tracking fodder across landscapes and making use of 
patchy grass production caused by uneven rainfall or variations in landscape (Scoones, 
1996:16; Bayer and Waters-Bayer, 1996). Furthermore, animals depend on relatively small 
patches within a wider dryland landscape during dry seasons or drought periods. Therefore, 
strategic movements are usually pursued by herders to such key resource sites that could 
sustain animals (Scoones, 1996:11).     
 
In arid and semi-arid areas variation in soil type and topography can also result in very patchy 
pasture production, containing key sites for pastoral production such as dry season and 
drought reserves, swamps, water points, lakes, salt licks, and micro patches for fodder 
production, or cereal cultivation (Swallow, 1994 cited in Rass, 2006:32). Therefore, efficient 
tracking requires movement over different scales depending on the temporal and spatial 
pattern of primary production variability (Scoones, 1996).  
 
Various pastoral groups also pursue variable patterns of movement. Pastoral systems “differ 
by degree of movement from highly nomadic through transhumance to sedentary” (Rass, 
2006:32). Thus regularity of movements differs between the systems and involves some 
degree of flexibility. In elation to this Rass (2006:32) noted that “nomadic pastoralists prefer 
to certain established migration routes which they have developed balancing knowledge of 
pasture, rainfall, disease, political insecurity, national boundaries with access to 
infrastructures”. However, in very arid areas with high variability in quantity and distribution 
of rainfall, it requires certain flexibility and enforces irregularities in the movement. In 
contrasts, in semi-arid areas with less variability in rainfall transhumant pastoralists pursue 
regular movements of herds between fixed areas (Rass, 2006).  
 
Many pastoralists face various constraints while pursuing their tracking strategies. These 
include among others, administrative arrangements (borders and boundaries); land use 
changes (conversion of pastoral lands into non-pastoral uses); lack of tenure security; conflict 
with agriculturalists over key resource areas; livestock disease risks; infestation of areas; 
denudation of transit zones by preceding herds; prolonged drought and long distance 
movement, etc (Scoones, 1996; Ahmed et al., 2002). Costs are imposed on herders by 
regulations and restrict their movement. Most administrative arrangements (movement 
permits, veterinary regulation) assume also stable environment, and discourage movements 
(Scoones, 1996).  
  
Pastoralists also face difficulties while leading their herds through agricultural areas before 
harvests are completed. Pastoralists may also be forced to move to areas infested with tsetse 
fly and other parasites, and where grasses may be unfamiliar to animals (Ahmed et al., 2002). 
Consequently, tracking resources through movement has become increasingly difficult for 
many pastoral groups in East Africa. 
 
ii. Diversification of Species. Pastoralists strategically diversify the species, and breeds 
within species in their herds taking into account that species and breeds are affected 
differently by most animal diseases and adapt to different environment. Therefore, different 
species are bred for their resilience to drought and diseases. Different animals have also 
different niche specializations (Rass, 2006; Bayer and Waters-Bayer, 1996).  
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Diversity is crucial to pastoral survival in highly variable environments like the dryland 
Africa where risks are high and multiple. In this region pastoralists keep a diverse mix of 
livestock to match herds with different components of vegetation and to reduce risks (drought 
impacts, diseases, grazing scarcity). Viable herd can be maintained in a given area, if the herd 
includes several species which eat different components of the vegetation (Bayer and Waters-
Bayer, 1996:60). A mixed herd (cattle, camels, sheep and goats) can make full use of a ‘larger 
spectrum of the vegetation’ and ‘different niches in the environment’. Therefore, managing a 
variety of species helps take optimal advantage of the ‘heterogeneous nature of ecosystems’ 
(Perrier, 1996; Bayer and Waters-Bayer, 1996; Ahmed et al., 2002).  
 
Keeping several species also permits faster restocking after drought, as feeding habits and 
physiology of camels and goats allow them to survive droughts better than cattle or sheep 
and, afterwards, small ruminants recover in number more quickly than cattle and camel 
(Bayer and Waters-Bayer, 1996). In general diversification of species composition within the 
family herd is one of the risk reduction and adaptive strategies of pastoralists. Therefore, 
herders can reduce risks they face from a particular event by maintaining several species. 
 
iii. Herd splitting and distribution. In order to reduce the effects of localized drought, and 
risks of animal raiding and disease, pastoralists employ herd splitting and distributing stock 
through loans and exchanges with other herders (Hesse and MacGregor, 2006; Ahmed et al., 
2002). Animals may be kept in several different areas which reduce the effects of localized 
droughts, and disease outbreak. Herders divide their livestock into small herds grazed 
separately; and prioritize into other categories (e.g. milking animal, dry animal, young 
animal). Animals may also be distributed through loans and exchanges with other herders in 
order to reduce risks of drought and disease. This strategy also enables herders to create and 
reinforce social ties between households thereby maintaining social networks for future risk 
management (Ahmed et al., 2002:34).  
 
Moreover, herders use the strategy of herd splitting to enhance livestock productivity in 
relation to labour, forage and water. By dividing herd, labour for instance can be used more 
efficiently. Children and women frequently tend small stocks; and nursing animals are 
intensively cared by women. Lactating animals are kept near homestead, usually herded by 
men and milked by women (Perrier, 1996). Dry animals are often herded by young men far 
away from homestead. In so doing, herders enhance efficient use of labour and grazing (Oba, 
1993; Perrier, 1988 cited in Perrier, 1996).  
 
Concerning labour efficiency of watering, during dry season many herders adopt alternate-day 
or every-third day watering thereby saving labour to be spent in lifting water and in using 
grazing sites distant to water points. The level of feed intake also can be managed by 
controlling access to water. Reduced water intake reduces forage intake helping to conserve 
dry season grazing resources (Perrier, 1996; Bayer and Waters-Bayer, 1996:60). 
 
iv. Livestock accumulation and changing herd/species composition. Pastoralists are 
constantly exposed to risk of losing livestock. Thus, as opportunistic stocking strategy, they 
accumulate livestock numbers that exceed the subsistence demands during good years so as to 
 85
still have reproductive females for rebuilding herds after a crisis (Rass, 2006:32; Hesse and 
MacGregor, 2006:7).  
 
It is argued that “pastoralists’ attempts to maximize herd size are rational in a highly variable 
environment” (Sandford, 1983 cited in Bayer and Waters-Bayer, 1996:59). Herd-owners 
endeavor to maximize their herd size during favorable periods, so that animal losses during 
drought do not reduce the herd size below a viable size. They attempt to “protect themselves 
against the worst ravages of droughts and epidemics by expanding their livestock holding on 
the principle that quantity provides the best defense against heavy losses” (Bayer and Waters-
Bayer, 1996; Ahmed et al., 2002:34).  
 
In pastoral systems wealth71 in livestock provides a buffer against crisis. Households with 
high number of livestock can absorb high drought-related livestock mortality, and obtain 
sufficient milk to meet household needs during dry period (Coppock, 1994 cited in Perrier, 
1996:55). Therefore, pastoralists are motivated to maintain large herds in order to survive the 
risk of dry period and impacts of drought (Hesse and MacGregor, 2006:7).  
 
Feed habit or requirements differ among herds depending, among others, on species, age, and 
lactation. In times of feed shortage herd owners attempt to adjust their herd composition to 
reduce feed requirements. “Dry females and adult males require less feed than lactating 
females or young stock and can therefore survive periods of shortage. A herd’s forage 
demands can be reduced seasonally by disposing of young stock not needed to replace 
breeders and by drying off milk animals to keep only a reproductive herd. Mating can be 
timed so that lactation does not coincide with dry seasons” (Bayer and Waters-Bayer, 
1997:60).  
 
Pastoralists also change the species composition of their herd as a long-term strategy for 
coping with drought and change in vegetation and rangelands. This takes place among species 
that have a different reproductive rate, mobility style and feed habit (Ahmed et al., 2002). For 
instance the Afar pastoral groups in Ethiopia have changed their livestock composition from 
more grazers and less browser into more browsers and less grazers due to drought impacts, 
range deterioration, diminishing of annual grass and bush encroachment into rangelands (Ali, 
1996:204-205). In relation to this some studies (e.g. Assefa, 1996; Ali 1996) indicated that 
changing the species composition of herds has some limitations, if pastoral communities need 
to generate cash from time to time. For instance the market for camels is often much less 
developed than the market for cattle or sheep in Ethiopia.  
                                                 
71 With regard to wealth accumulation of herds more explanations are given by researchers. One explanation is 
that “because pastoralists do not maximize a profit function, livestock are used by pastoralists as their principal 
store of wealth rather than as income generating capital (Goldschmidt, 1975; Doran, Low and Kemp, 1979 cited 
in Rass, 2006:32-33). The store of wealth concept has been advanced to the “target income” concept (Dahl and 
Hjort, 1976 cited in Rass, 2006:33), which argues that in anticipation of livestock losses due  to recurrent risks 
(epidemics or drought)  pastoralists follow a risk reduction strategy and sell the minimum number of animals 
necessary to get the “target income” for some identified needs”.  Another explanation given by asset model 
explains that “income from livestock assets in pastoral areas is in the form of products produced from livestock 
themselves rather than in cash obtained from the sale of livestock. Accordingly livestock owners regard their 
animals as capital assets which produce a stream of valuable products while held and have a capital value when 
sold and slaughtered. Stock owners determine the optimal age of sale or for slaughtering by comparing the 
expected net capital value of animals if slaughtered or sold” (Rass, 2006:33).  
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v. Dispersal of resources and assistance from relatives. According to Sommer (1998:11) 
these strategies include herd and family splitting, temporary migration, transfer of animals 
within social networks (i.e. on basis of kinship, stock associates) on which individuals have 
legitimate claims, resource sharing (e.g. circulation of milking animals). Pastoralists adopt 
various resource (herd, labour, forage, manure) use arrangements among themselves or with 
their neighbouring farmers.  
 
Pastoralists also disperse animals in herds of allied households (Rass, 2006:33). Animals are 
exchanged between pastoral households to reduce the risk of losses, or loaned to other 
pastoral group members who suffer misfortune (Bayer and Waters-Bayer, 1996:66). In the 
first case, if one herd is affected by disease or drought in one location, other herds in other 
location may survive and a household will lose some but not all of its assets. In the second 
case, animals are transferred through social networks (kinship, bond relationships and stock 
association) in order to support those members who face crisis or to solicit care or feed for 
stock (Hesse and MacGregor, 2006:7). The creation of such stock alliance and patronage also 
creates social bonds; disperses the risk of animal loss during drought; and decreases the 
workload of households (Rass, 2006:33).  
 
Tending large stock of animals requires much labour, and thus rich households either give 
animals on loan to poor families, or employ poor herders (Rass, 2006:33). Young herders 
from pastoral families may also migrate and work for farmers, traders and richer pastoralists 
for some years in order to rebuild their own herds. Pastoralists, with few animals, or who lost 
their stock, may also enter into herding contracts whereby, depending on their agreement, 
they receive milking rights as well as some of the offspring of ‘contract  animals’. This has 
been practiced for instance by Wodaabe herders, in Niger (Bayer and Waters-Bayer, 
1996:66).  
 
Forage and manure use arrangements are made between herders and farmers depending on 
their relations. Arrangements for forage use between herders and farmers range from open 
access to stubble fields, to the sale of grazing rights or crop residues to particular herder 
(Bayer and Waters-Bayer, 1996:66). According to Bayer and Waters-Bayer, “arrangement 
between herders and farmers for stubble grazing is common throughout West Africa”. And in 
“central Nigeria, where stock density is low, few formal arrangements for the use of crop 
residues are made, and in the more densely settled zone in Northern Nigeria, herders gain 
rights to stubble grazing by paying cash or in kind or by helping farmers with harvest” 
(Perrier, 1983, cited in Bayer and Waters-Bayer, 1996). The same source states that similar 
trends are witnessed in eastern Sudan, and herders buy rights to use crop residues.  
 
Securing manure is crucial for cropping in many parts of sub-Saharan Africa, as forage 
arrangement is crucial for animal keeping. The expansion of cropping and decline in 
fallowing calls for measures other than long-term fallowing to maintain soil fertility. Manure 
is removed from pastoralists’ kraal and sold to farmers, and arrangements are made for 
keeping herds overnight on fields to deposit manure (Bayer and Waters-Bayer, 1996:67). For 
instance, farmers in central Nigeria pay Fulani herders in cash or kind to camp on their fields 
during dry season (Bayer and Waters-Bayer, 1996:67). In the millet zone of Mali, where 
farmers have private wells dug for attracting herders, manuring contracts are also arranged via 
access to water (Toulmin, 1992a cited in Bayer and Waters-Bayer, 1996:68).  
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Forage and manure use arrangements between herders and farmers, and herding contracts 
have considerable implications. Manuring contracts have importance for good herder-farmer 
relations and for creating close links between manuring and forage arrangements. Thus 
external interventions must understand these links and relations not to weaken them. Every 
opportunity should be sought to find ways to strengthen them (Bayer and Waters-Bayer, 
1996:66-68). The implication of contract herding is that there may be extensive milking and 
thus leaving less milk for calves. This may lead to higher calf mortality. Contract 
arrangements also limit the extent of herd movement since herd-owners want to “keep an eye” 
on the herds and are thus unwilling to allow long migration,  in turn contract herders are less 
inclined to invest more labour (Toulmin, 1992b, cited in Bayer and Waters-Bayer, 1996).     
 
vi. Forage supplementation. This includes hay-making, lopping of trees (leaves, fruits, 
branches), supply of commercial forage supplements, etc. (Scoones 1996; Sommer 1998). 
Many studies showed that coppiced trees and shrubs in dryland areas are critical to the 
nutrition of livestock in times of drought. Tree pods in particular may be important protein 
supplement for maintenance of animals during periods of stress (Bayer and Water-Bayer, 
1996). Depending on the herd species and availability of coppiced trees and shrubs, 
pastoralists thus collect and feed their stock with pods, fruits and leaves during periods of 
stress. Pastoralists track also woodlands and use them as refuge during prolonged dry seasons 
or drought period to survive feed shortage. 
 
Some writers stated that “hay-making is not widely reported from sub-Saharan Africa; and 
“crop residues may be stored and sold particularly near towns” (Bayer and Waters-Bayer 
1996:74). In Ethiopia, the Borana women traditionally collect grass in dry season for calf 
feeding. Hence hay-making during wet season was encouraged among the Borana. Though 
the amounts collected were small (i.e. up to 300 kg per household), it facilitated calf feeding 
in the following dry season (Coppock, 1991 cited in Bayer and Waters-Bayer 1996:74). In 
Burkina Faso, the Fulani men make hay in years with good or average rainfall. But, they can 
collect little or no hay in drought years (Bayer and Waters-Bayer 1996:74). In general, 
whether hay-making is a viable option in years of extreme droughts is doubtful, since hay 
yield suffers the same fluctuations as range yield in areas with high rainfall variability.  
 
3.2.3.2.2 Pastoralists’ Coping Strategies to Food Crisis  
 
i. Generation of food stores. In anticipating shortfalls in food, pastoralists attempt to store 
some foods in order to fill gaps and to avoid distress sales. These include, among others, 
cereal stores to prevent distress sales of livestock; stores of butter, meat and fat; collecting and 
storing wild foods, etc (Sommer, 1998:11). In Ethiopia, the Afar pastoralists often prepare 
and preserve various foods from meat and cereals for drought periods and/or for long 
journeys. This will be elabourated in Chapter 6.  
 
Some authors reported that wild foods feature as famine foods in almost all parts of Africa (de 
Waal 1989a, and McGlothlen et al., 1986 cited in Blaikie et al., 2004:119; Mohammed Salih, 
2001). Gathering of wild foods, however, is adversely affected by drought conditions. 
Consequently many bush products (e.g. berries, roots) may suffer from the impacts of 
recurrent and prolonged droughts, and they may not be available. In relation to this 
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Mohammed Salih (2001:210) states that “building up stores of food and diversification of 
production are climate dependent”. He further noted the need to “understand the 
consequences of drought and other climatic variables on horticulture, wild edible plants and 
watershed cultivations since they constitute the main sources food during drought”.  
 
ii. Reduction of food intake and changing composition of diet. Adjusting consumption 
patterns is often made very early when food shortages are anticipated. Reducing the number 
of meals and the amount of food, and resorting to less preferred foods72 are the common 
consumption smoothening mechanisms in times of food shortage. The immediate impact of 
drought in pastoral areas is decline of milk supply which is the most important source of 
calories. Thus pastoralists tend to take more cereals than milk, and reduce their food intake. 
The food related responses of Borana pastoralists in Ethiopia during the 1983-86 hunger 
period can be an illustrative instance. At the time the Borana pastoralists responded through 
household diet adjustments: These were: (i) giving priority to young children to receive milk; 
(ii) shifting diet composition for other age groups to include more cereals, meat and blood to 
accommodate the needs of children and; (iii) reducing the size and frequency of meals to 
adults and older youths (Coppock 1994:163 as cited by Ahmed et al., 2002:35).  
 
iii. Sale of non-livestock assets. When there is a potential food shortage or possible famine, 
households or communities attempt to mobilize assets or resources which are at their disposal 
in order to cope with food crisis. For instance sale of easily disposal assets is pursued. Sale of 
non-livestock assets (jewellery and other non-productive items) takes place in order to help 
bridge a temporary shortfall in subsistence supplies. In this case wealthy pastoralists are 
usually in a better position as they have certain assets that may be sold for buying grain, and 
therefore postponing the moment at which they will be forced to sell productive assets such as 
livestock (Ahmed et al., 2002). However, some evidences from Darfur and Ethiopia show that 
“even poor people also attempt to preserve future livelihoods by reducing current 
consumption in order not to sell productive assets” (Turton, 1977 and de Waal, 1989 as cited 
by Davies, 1996:38). On the other hand such coping is criticized by some reports. It is argued 
that poor or vulnerable people can survive almost any livelihoods crisis by their own 
resources. However, the reality is that malnutrition and child mortality rates in many places 
are unacceptably high even at ‘normal’ times (e.g. Bradbury, 2000 cited in Devereux, 2006).       
 
iv. Mobilizing social support networks and claims. These involve a wide variety of rights and 
obligations which members of household, or extended families or kinship groups claim upon 
their groups in difficult times. Claims may be by individuals or households upon kin groups 
or local patrons. Household links to larger social groupings are vital for survival in pastoral 
communities. Within groups these links provide support networks that assist households in 
times of crisis (Perrier, 1996; 55). Some sources presented “village level associations as being 
one of the key components in overcoming famine in a number of African countries” (Walker, 
1995:153). Walker added that the possession of structures to organize locally on both a 
kinship and peer-group basis seems to be of paramount importance in facing adversity. 
Claims can also be made upon government and international relief agencies (Walker, 
1995:153). This, in fact, requires strong local associations by which local people can assert 
their claims and rights to access external resources in times of crisis.  
                                                 
72 A common example is substitution of lower quality and wild foods (famine foods) for more expensive staples.  
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On the other hand some authors indicated that throughout the LDCs such networks and moral 
obligations are in decline (Blaikie et al., 2004:119). The ‘moral economy’ (e.g. ‘non-
economic relations between patrons and clients or between rich and poor, which is called ‘a 
subsistence ethic’ based on the norms of reciprocity) may offer a minimum subsistence and 
marginal security in times of hardship. However, some authors reported that “such obligations 
are being eroded, for instance in South Asia (Agarwal 1990, Fernandes and Menon 1987 as 
quoted by Blaikie et al., 2004:118) and in Kenya during 1971-1976 (Wisner 1980, Downing 
et al.,1989 as cited by Blaikie et al., 2004:118).  
 
In addition during some droughts/famine times, there were cases from India where some 
groups of people (caste) took up demeaning activities (thus to loss respect), and certain 
activities prescribed or discouraged by membership of a social group or caste or gender (thus 
below their dignity) to secure minimum food supply (Rao 1974, Agarwal 1990 as cited by 
Blaikie et al., 2004). Blaikie et al. (2004:114) also postulated that “despite economic and 
emotional support that it provides, family may break up to allow its individual members to 
survive” during famine disaster. In this case the authors suggested that “famine may be 
unique or at least extreme among disasters in often provoking social tension and break down 
of this kind” (Blaikie et al., 2004:114). Yet sociological studies on “community responses to 
disasters (earthquake and floods)” found out that “emergent organization is much more 
common than social chaos, and that altruism and stoicism are more common than selfishness 
and panic” (Qaurantelli and Dynes, 1972, 1977; Qaurantelli, 1978, 1984; Dynes et al., 1987 
cited by Blaikie et al., 2004:114).  
 
And yet a recent study (Doss, 2001:1) conducted on 323 pastoral households in northern 
Kenya and southern Ethiopia found that transfers of money, food and livestock among 
pastoralists as part of a social safety-net system was very limited during the drought year of 
2000. The same study concluded that “there is less of a social safety net than we had expected 
to find based on the ethnographic literature” (Doss, 2001:2). This indicates that local level 
informal safety nets are less able to buffer against stresses or shocks. Therefore, without such 
informal means of insurances, people whose animals die or who lose the sources of livelihood 
are likely to drop out of the pastoral system. This often has detrimental consequences for 
dropouts since they are usually ill-equipped to succeed in more urban settings. In addition, 
there can be detrimental effects to smaller towns and villages in pastoral areas (Doss, 2001:2).  
 
v. Income generation from non-pastoral activities. Livestock raising faces multiple risks 
(drought, epidemics, raiding) that undermine food security. Thus pastoralists use alternative 
sources of income to overcome risks and economic shocks. Some of these activities include, 
among others, charcoal making, handcrafts, hunting, fishing, petty trade, working in urban 
areas, and migration to neighbouring countries for labour (Scoones 1996; Ali 1996; Sommer 
1998; Fasil et al., 2001). These and other sources of income have been of varying importance 
for different households or pastoral groups in providing additional income in normal times 
and a fallback source of subsistence during times of crisis. On the other hand some authors 
remarked that some activities pursued as income source (e.g. charcoal making) may 
undermine the basis of livelihood in the long run (Grainger, 1990, and O’Brien and 
Gruenbaum, 1991 as cited by Blaikie et al., 2004:117). A case in point is deforestation 
resulted from cutting trees for charcoal-making.  
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In general the above strategies are used mainly as risk reduction and/or adaptive responses. 
They involve a variety of actions taken by households or social groups before or during an 
event in order to avoid risks or mitigate their effects. In fact, as stated earlier, some recovery 
activities may overlap with coping or adaptive strategies which are already discussed in the 
above sections. Pastoralists in the Horn of Africa and elsewhere use a variety of strategies of 
herd recovery after drought or crisis period. These include systems of restocking 
(stratification or stock lending), mobilizing social networks, migration or mobility of wage 
labour, small business, sedentarization, etc (Ahmed et al., 2002). As a strategy of drought 
recovery, some of these are briefly described in the following section.  
 
3.2.3.2.3 Drought Recovery Strategies 
 
After a drought or a crisis period, pastoralists attempt to rebuild their herds. As mentioned 
above herders “prepare for drought by lending their animals to relatives or friends in 
exchange for looking after some of their animals in return” (Blench and Marriage, 1999:21). 
Herders who lost breeding stock during crisis also mobilize their social networks to acquire 
essential stock (e.g. female ones) to rebuild their herds. Soliciting support or animal loan from 
kin groups or bond-relations is one of the strategies for restocking.    
 
Cattle-raiding was one method of restocking after a drought in East Africa73 (Blench and 
Marriage, 1999:20; Hendrickson et al., 1998:8). “Redistributive forms of raiding have 
traditionally been a sophisticated way of reallocating pastoral resources between rich and poor 
herders, and have been an equally common features of both intra-tribal and inter-tribal 
relations”(Dyson-Hudson and McMabe, 1982 cited in Hendrickson et al., 1998:8). 
Hendrickson et al. (1998) added that “within the context of an indigenous conception of 
livestock as collective property, raiding serves to rebuild herds after livestock have been 
killed by drought or seized in raids”. It is governed by complex rules and closely tied to 
climatic conditions and to the prevailing state of ‘tribal peace’ (Hendrickson et al., 1998:8).  
 
Diversification of incomes74 or engagement in temporary paid labour is an indirect means of 
restocking (Blench and Marriage, 1999:21). Sources of household income such as wage 
labour and petty commodity production or artisan are also taped to earn an income for the 
reestablishing of breeding herds. Particularly those pastoral households, who are unable to be 
reestablished in the pastoral sector, migrate to other places looking for employment.  They 
may go to work for other herd-owners; or look for employment outside the pastoral economy 
(e.g. in irrigation schemes, plantations and towns). In this case some studies in Sudan (Egeimi 
1996 as cited in Ahmed et al., 2002:42) and in Ethiopia (Fasil et al., 2001) indicate that 
“pastoralists wage labour migration seems to increase from time to time”. For instance 
                                                 
73 With regard to raiding some researchers (e.g. Hendrickson et al., 1998:1) argue that “livestock raiding has 
been transformed over years, from quasi-cultural practice with important livelihood-enhancing functions, into a 
more predatory”.  
74Some field reports (e.g. by Sandford and Johannes, 2000:9) indicate that in recent years many pastoralists in 
countries of Africa diversify their economic activities outside pastoralism and agriculture in order to spread the 
risks of natural and manmade disasters. But the same report indicated that none of the major pastoral groups in 
Ethiopia seem to have succeeded in diversifying their activities to a significant degree outside the agriculture. 
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Hadendowa pastoralists in Sudan are nowadays considering this strategy as an important 
outlet. Thus “migration for wage labour, which was not a tradition before, has increasingly 
become significant for the Hadendowa local economy” (Egeimi, 1996 cited in Ahmed et al., 
2002:42). In Ethiopia the Afar and Borana pastoral groups diversify their income by creating 
employment opportunities for the youth in non-pastoral activities or by sending part of the 
household (young men) in nearby towns or to other foreign countries (Assefa, 1996; Fasil et 
al., 2001). While the Afar usually send their young men to Saudi Arabia, Djibouti and Yemen 
(Assefa, 1996); the Borana youth migrate for labour to Kenya. (Fasil et al., 2001). 
 
Pastoralists also attempt to recover from drought by running small scale businesses and trade. 
These may include, among others, cross-border trades, salt production and trade, trading in 
handcrafts and animals, ‘contraband trade’, etc. Some studies indicate that trade, particularly 
“unofficial cross-border trades”, are common in the Horn of Africa. For instance “unofficial 
cross-border trade in Eastern and Southern Ethiopia involves a number of people from the 
major pastoral groups including the Afar, the Borana and the Somalis (Ahmed et al., 2002:42; 
Assefa, 1996). Some researchers stated that due to the fact that the pastoral areas are unable to 
provide employment opportunities in other sectors, the unofficial cross-border trade in the 
Horn of Africa appeared to be the only way out from the pastoral sector (Assefa 1996; Little 
2000, 1998 and Tegegne et al., 1999 cited in Ahmed et al., 2002:42). 
 
‘Sedentarization’ or ‘combining cultivation with animal raising’ can also be employed as 
post-drought recovery strategies. Some writers argue that sedentarization results from either 
excessive poverty or excessive wealth (Barth 1961, Baxter 1975, Salzman 1980, and Azarya 
1993 as cited by Ahmed et al., 2002). In case of “poverty (i.e. loss of livestock) pastoralists 
are forced to settle among agriculturalists and start cultivation”, while in the “case of wealth, 
prosperous pastoralists acquire land and have it cultivated by hired hands or dependants of 
various sources” (Ahmed et al., 2002:41). Markakis (2004:12) also stated that 
“sedentarization takes several forms; one is to remain in the region and become increasingly 
dependent on cultivation while retaining a depleted herd, and the other is to migrate to 
neighbouring district where land is available and to take up cultivation or become a worker in 
commercial farms”. In this case Markakis observed that “sedentarization via cultivation (i.e. 
agro-pastoralism) is a rapidly advancing phenomenon throughout the Horn of Africa, from the 
Masaai region of Tanzania to the Somali region of Ethiopia” (Markakis, 2004:12). A Beni 
Amer herder in Eritrea put it in  a similar way: “In the past all Beni Amer were pastoralists, 
but now there are three kinds of Beni Amer - one is an agricultural wage labourer, another is a 
petty merchant, and only the third owns livestock” (as quoted in Markakis, 2004:12). 
Markakis then suggested that “this is the shape of future as the mobility of pastoralists 
becomes increasingly constrained, their habitat progressively degraded, and their strategies 
for coping with progressive, mounting crises exhausted”.   
 
3.2.4 Preliminary Conclusions  
 
The above sections present a brief account of discourse on pastoralism; national governments’ 
positions and policies towards pastoralists of East Africa; the state of pastoral livelihoods; 
coping and adaptive strategies to multiple risks that pastoral groups are facing. The above 
discussions have also revealed that pastoralists in East Africa have become more vulnerable 
than they were in the past due to a number of factors rooted in climatic and ecological 
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conditions, state neglect, inappropriate programmes/interventions, alienation of key pastoral 
resources; tenure insecurity; restriction of mobility; civil strife, border conflicts, etc.  
 
It is also stated that the current state of pastoralists in East Africa is the result of historical and 
contemporary socio-political processes. Colonial and post-colonial boundaries and 
administrative arrangements have brought far-reaching consequences on various pastoral 
groups in the region. These processes have divided kinship or ethnic groups and restricted 
their movement; deprived them of worship places, markets, pasture and water points; 
disrupted their social and political integrity, thus undermining social cohesion and traditional 
authority among pastoral communities. These in turn have intensified competition over 
resources and conflict between pastoral groups, and with settled cultivators and state 
authorities (Markakis, 2004: Fratkin, 1997; Rotich, 2005:2).  
 
The policies of national governments throughout the region were aimed primarily at 
developing the livestock sector for national economic goals, not at improving the life of the 
pastoral groups. National governments have followed either hostile or inappropriate policies 
or programmes with respect to pastoral development; and the result was mainly failure except 
some few achievements in the area of services and infrastructure75.  Many development 
programmes were based mainly on the desire to harness pastoral resources (livestock, land, 
minerals) through implementing large-scale schemes (commercial farms, irrigation schemes, 
modern ranching schemes) and establishing national parks leaving pastoralists without rights 
of tenure. At the same time environmental risks or ecological degradation and population 
have increased. As a result, the material base of pastoralism has been thoroughly eroded, and 
pastoralists have been vulnerable to effects of recurrent drought, violent conflict and famine. 
Therefore, given these multiple risks and extreme vulnerability of pastoral groups, national 
governments need to invest in development and risk management programmes. This calls the 
need to distinguish between risks to design proper risk management or vulnerability reduction 
strategies. Moreover, it needs political commitment of national governments to address the 
issues of pastoral political and economic marginalization. In relation to this Markakis 
(2004:24) has to say the following:  
 
Pastoralists are unlikely to be able to assert their rights to communal lands in 
the push for privatization that is well underway throughout Africa today. 
Without a shift in power from state to local land users, from donors to 
recipients, from wealthy to poor members of pastoral society, then the current 
confusion and damage can be expected to persist.   
 
Earlier in section 3.3.3.2, it is also noted that pastoral groups have developed over centuries 
their own adaptive and coping strategies to survive in harsh environment and to cope with 
internal and external forces that shape their livelihoods. This points out to peoples’ agency, 
ingenuity and ability to help themselves individually and collectively. However, indigenous 
strategies which are often based on the existing resources/assets are constrained by external 
socio-political and institutional factors, and by dynamic context of risks. Therefore, the 
                                                 
75 Some researchers (Coppock, 1994 cited in Ahmed et al., 2002) stated some benefits accrued to the pastoralists 
(e.g. water projects created access to previously unutilized land; veterinary services reduced livestock mortality; 
and roads improved market integration).  
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traditional strategies are also under pressure and have become increasingly ineffective76 over 
the past decades to cope with excessive pressures imposed on pastoralism (Blaikie et al., 
2004:120; Rass, 2006:5; Ahmed et al., 2002). And yet if these traditional strategies are 
supported with effective interventions that do not undermine them or create dependency, 
pastoralists cannot only sustain themselves but also dispose the resources of the harsh 
environment they inhabit. This, in fact, needs proper understanding of the indigenous coping 
and adaptive strategies upon which external interventions can be built. In other words, it 
needs to understand how the local people are responding to internal and external processes. 
The common trends witnessed among the East African pastoralists include households’ shift 
to small animals; changing from nomadic migration to transhumance pattern of mobility, the 
engagement in other economic activities to augment incomes; combining pastoralism with 
sedentary agriculture (agro-pastoralism); and in some cases total departure from the pastoral 
sector. While the last two could be considered as long-term mechanism, the rest could be just 
short-term survival strategies (Abdel Ati, 1996:7; Markakis, 2004; Ahmed et al., 2002; Ali, 
1996; Fasil et al., 2001).   
 
In the light of above discussions, the present research attempts to understand the types of risks 
that the local people in my study community perceive, and their coping or/and adaptive 
strategies. The main focus in Chapter 6 rests on these issues. In the following section I present 
a general discussion on the Ethiopian pastoral groups; historical socio-political processes that 
influence the current state of pastoralists; approaches/policies of the government to pastoral 
development; drought/famine and other related risks in the pastoral areas of Ethiopia. 
 
 
3.3 Pastoralism, Socio-Political Processes, Development Policies and Famine: 
Ethiopian Context   
 
3.3.1 The General Condition of Pastoralists  
 
i. Some Characteristics of Major Pastoral Areas. Ethiopia with a population of 77 million is 
the second most populous country in Sub-Saharan Africa. The overwhelming majority of the 
population are rural,77 most of which live in the highlands. The concentration of population 
reflects the relationship between physiography, climate, economy and population (Hogg, 
1997a:5). While the highlands have a relatively high density, the lowlands are sparsely 
populated and are characterized by poor infrastructure and communication, highly variable 
and uncertain rainfall.  Some characteristics of the main pastoral areas are given in table 3.1 
below.   
  
                                                 
76 Some authors (Blaikie et al., 2004:120) noted that ‘coping is managing under stress, but it is in essence a 
strategy reactive to events beyond the immediate control of the individual, household, or community. As 
circumstances deteriorate, these may prove insufficient. For instance in famine context, informal support systems 
among the Dinka communities of south-Sudan were well developed, but they fell apart under extreme pressure. 
They could not resist the cumulative onslaught over a long period of war, drought, and enslavement and 
displacement.   
77 The agricultural labour force is 81% (FAO statistics and World Bank, 2006). 
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Table 3.1 Characteristics of the Main Pastoral Areas 
Main pastoral 
areas 
Area* 
Km2  
Human population 
(in millions) 
Annual 
rainfall 
(mm) 
Temperature 
(Celsius) 
Altitude  
(masl) 
Borana zone  78,314 1.66 440-700 15-35 1000-1500 
Somali region  282,300 3.69 100-700 20-45 300-1700 
Afar region  95,970 1.22 200-600 30-50 -100-1000 
Total  456,584 6.56 … … … 
 Source: Pastoral Area Development: Issues Paper and Project Proposal, Mission Report (World Bank, 2001:2).  
* Area shown under Borana is only for the six pastoral Woredas (districts).  
 
Aridity occurs where the rainfall is insufficient to replenish the loss of moisture - less than 
500 mm a year makes for aridity, and 500 mm to 750 mm for semi-aridity.  According to this 
criterion more than half of Ethiopia (i.e. 52%) is arid (Markakis, 2004)78. The physical 
environment that major pastoral groups inhabit mainly belongs to the arid and semi-arid 
zones. These arid and semi-arid environments are characterized by extreme variability and 
unreliability of rainfall both between different years and between different places in the same 
year (Ali, 1996:95; Ahmed et al., 2002: 4).  
 
The Borana pastoralists of Ethiopia inhibit the Borana Administrative Zone (in the Oromiya 
Region) that consists of 12 Woredas, six of which (Liben, Yabello, Dire, Arero, Teltele and 
Moyalai) are situated in areas below 1500 masl.79 Landuse in this area is dominated by 
pastoral and agro-pastoral productions. The other six Woredas of the Zone are situated in the 
mid-highlands with a dry sub-humid climate.80 The residents of two Woredas (Bore and 
Uraga) are fully sedentary and engage in cash crop production (World Bank, 2001:2). 
 
Somali pastoralists of Ethiopia reside in the Somali National Regional State. Desert and semi-
desert constitute 80% of the region. The Somalis practice mainly pastoralism, and some 
combine herding and cultivation81. The Afar inhabit the north-eastern part of Ethiopia. They 
practice pastoralism (i.e. 90%) and agro-pastoralism (10%) (World Bank, 2001:3). Other 
small groups of pastoralists inhabit in the southern and south-western parts of the country.  
 
As stated above pastoral areas are characterized by extreme variability and unreliability of 
rainfall. As a result rainfed agriculture is hardly possible in most pastoral areas (Ali, 
1996:195). Though some pastoral areas may provide some options to produce certain crop 
species in good years, they are generally marginal to intensive crop cultivation (Markakis, 
2004:1; Ahmed et al., 2002: 4). Therefore, livestock rearing is the major economic activity 
among pastoralists in the Ethiopian lowlands.  
 
Yet the marginal nature of the physical environment still imposes certain constraints to 
livestock production too. Moreover, pastoral areas are characterized by the scarcity and 
                                                 
78 The total land area of the country is 1,104,300 km2. 
79 It is arid and semi-arid with roughly <200mm and 200-800 mm respectively.  
80 It is roughly with 800-1200 mm. 
81 Though it is difficult to gauge the extent of sedenterization via cultivation, the government statement claims 
that 30% of the Somalis and 20% of the Afar are already settled (Markakis, 2004:12).  
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seasonal variability of vegetation, and vulnerability to recurrent drought (Ali, 1996:95; 
Ahmed et al., 2002: 4). As it is in other countries of the Horn of Africa, drought is recurrent 
in Ethiopia, and usually accompanied by food crisis or famine (see map 1 for drought 
probability in Ethiopia). 
 
 
Map 1 Probability of Drought in Ethiopia 
 
ii. Livestock Population and its Contribution. Ethiopia has more domesticated animals than 
other countries in Africa (World Bank, 2001). Pastoral groups manage some 40% of the 
national cattle herd, one quarter of the sheep, three quarter of goats and nearly all the camels 
(Ahmed et al., 2002:8). The total livestock population in pastoral areas is given in table 3.2 
below.   
 
Table 3.2 Livestock Population in Heads in the Lowlands/Pastoral Areas/ of Ethiopia  
No  Pastoral region  Cattle  Sheep Goats  Camels  Equines  
1 Afar  3,600,000 2,000,000 3,000,000 900,00 200,00
2 Oromiya (Borana) 1,400,000 1000,000 500,000 530,000 60,000
3 Oromiya (other zones)*  100,000 200,000 300,000 10,000 20,000
4 Somali 5,200,000 6,600,000 3,300,000 1,100,000 360,000
5 SNNP 450,000 340,000 500,000 1,000 40,000
6 Benishangul and Gambella 100,000 100,000 100,000 - 20,000
 Total 10,850,000 10,240,000 7,700,000 2,541,000 700,000
Source: Sandford and Yohannes, 2000:3  
* Karrayu and southern part of the Bale zone 
 
The primary livelihood of the pastoral groups in Ethiopia is the management of livestock 
(cattle, goats, sheep and camels). Livestock are critical to the well-being of pastoral 
households and communities in terms of income, savings, food security, employment, etc. 
Livestock also represent the means through which pastoral institutions, traditions and cultural 
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ties are assured and are the currency for building relationships (social capital) between 
families, groups and communities. Livestock inheritance, gifts, loans, etc are critical for social 
reproduction and maintenance of the social fabric of the pastoral communities or societies 
(Fekadu et al., 1984:64-65).   
 
In addition to supporting pastoral households and communities, the pastoral sector has an 
important contribution to the Ethiopian economy contributing 20% of total GDP and 10% of 
export earnings since the year 2000 (Markakis, 2004:18). About 90% of livestock export of 
the country comes from these pastoral areas (Ahmed et al., 2002). 
 
iii. Pastoral Groups and their Livelihoods. Pastoral and agro-pastoral communities constitute 
about 10-12% of the total population, and occupy 60% of the country’s land (Ahmed et al., 
2002:8). Pastoralism is extensively practiced in the Somali and Afar regions and in the 
Borana Administrative Zone of the Oromiya Region. Pastoral groups are also found in areas 
of SNNP, Benishangul Gumuz and Gambella regions. The pastoral groups in Ethiopia are 
given in table 3.3 below.  
 
Table 3-3 Pastoral Groups in Ethiopia by Geographical Location, Region and Ethnicity  
Geographical location and Region Ethnic groups 
North-East (Afar, Oromiya and Somali 
Regions) 
Afar, Somali, Argoba, Oromo. 
South (Oromiya and Somali Regions) Oromo, Somali 
South-East (Somali Region) Somali 
South-West (SNNP and Gambella 
Regions) 
Dasenetch, Hamer, Mursi, Bodi, Bumie, Bena, 
Erbore, Tsemay, Nuer, Anuak, Ari, Bali, Dime, 
Nyangtom, Chai, Trima, Ruli, Tinshana Muguji. 
West (Benishangul Gumuz Region) Komo, Shinasha, Gumuz, Benshangul 
Source: Dawit Abebe (2000) cited in Ahmed et al., 2002: 8) 
 
The main pastoral communities are Somali (53%), Afar (29%), and Borana (10%) living in 
the south-east, north-east, and southern parts of the country respectively. The balance (8%) 
are found in the Southern, Gambella and Benishangul regions (Hogg, 1997a; Coppock 1994 
cited in Ahmed et al., 2002:8). (See map 2 for major pastoral areas in Ethiopia). 
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Map 2 Major pastoral areas in Ethiopia 
 
 
Although the climatic conditions and hardship are nearly similar for the pastoral groups, 
people inhabiting these areas differ in their social structure, herd composition, coping 
strategies, and the extent of their orientation to the market (World Bank, 2001:2). The 
majority of the pastoral groups are engaged in extensive livestock herding. However, within 
and between each of these pastoral groups, there are different adaptive specializations 
depending on varying ecological, economic and cultural factors. The composition of herds 
varies from one group to another depending on the natural environment. The herd population 
usually consists of camels, cattle, goats and sheep. In some areas donkeys, horses and mules 
are reared. The Borana prefer to keep cattle. But currently they are increasingly participating 
in sheep, goat and camel production. Somalis have a higher production of camels in their herd 
mix and they also herd cattle, sheep and goats (World Bank, 2001:2). The Afar herd a mix of 
herds (cattle, camels, goats and sheep). In general some pastoral groups rely for subsistence 
primarily on livestock; others combine livestock production with other subsidiary activities 
such as cultivation, trade and wage employment.   
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iv. Relation between Pastoralism and Farming. The highland rural areas of Ethiopia are 
primarily crop-dependent. Extensive livestock herding is the primary activity in most lowland 
areas. In general terms, farming and extensive livestock herding form a continuum from 
“pure” pastoralism to farming at the two extreme points (Hogg, 1997a). In this case Hogg 
states that “pastoral societies pursue multi-resource activities constantly shifting in response 
to changing circumstances” (Hogg, 1997a:5). This suggests peoples’ adaptation to the 
environment and changes in socio-economic and ecological environments. Markakis (2004:4) 
further states this situation in East Africa, which includes Ethiopia, in this manner: “Due to 
nature of land in East Africa, [….] people tilled the land where it was possible to do so and 
herded livestock where it was not, often managing to do a bit of both. By and large this is still 
the way things are done”.  
 
In Ethiopia there are pastoral groups or households, especially from Borana, Somali and Afar 
who tend to combine herding with crop cultivation by themselves or in cooperation or 
through various resource use arrangements with sedentary cultivators. Pastoralists in the past 
have depended heavily on livestock and livestock products for their livelihoods. In recent 
decades, however, many pastoral households are gradually involved in practicing small-scale 
cereal cultivation to cope with crisis in their traditional mode of subsistence. Especially 
pastoral households or groups from Somali, Afar and Borana tend to take up crop cultivation. 
They strive to combine herding with cultivation by themselves or through various 
arrangements (e.g. sharecropping, renting out land, mutual cooperation, and hired labour) 
with neighbouring sedentary cultivators. This practice has been observed between Karrayu 
and Afar pastoralists and between these groups and their neighbouring crop cultivators 
(Ayalew, 2000:332; Getachew, 2001a:107).  
 
In the Somali Region, irrigated agriculture has been exercised along the Wabe-Shebelle, 
Genale and Dawa rivers. In Kelafo and Mustahil of the Somali Region, a form of agro-
pastoralism well adapted to local conditions is being practiced (Mohammed, 2004:2). In 
relation to this some reports (e.g. Mohammed, 2004:2) indicated that the expansion of 
cropping in recent years competes in some sense with livestock husbandry. In recent years 
traditional bottomland grazing areas are used for growing maize and other crops. As a result, 
grazing resources are shrinking. In addition encroachment from non-pastoral groups into 
pastoral areas has increased. In Borena, for example, non-pastoral groups from other areas 
cultivate even the wet-season grazing areas. Consequently, livestock are forced to concentrate 
in a given area causing overgrazing, land degradation, and change in vegetation cover from 
grassland to woody vegetation (Mohammed, 2004:2).  
 
In general pastoral groups are taking up cultivation either as secondary activity or as coping 
mechanism to crisis in their traditional mode of subsistence. Although lowland areas are often 
perceived as arid regions with no potential for (rain-fed) agriculture, in many pastoral 
frontiers, herders coexist with farmers, and are often cultivating crops themselves. Therefore, 
pastoral areas support a diversity of livestock-based, crop-based, and mixed (agro-pastoral) 
livelihood systems.  
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3.3.2. Socio-Political Processes and Previous Development Approaches to Pastoralism   
 
The circumstances in which pastoral groups found themselves nowadays are not only the 
results of the current actions or events. They are largely the outcomes of historical socio-
political and economic processes. Thus it is important here to give a bird’s eye-view of 
historical processes that have shaped the current situation of pastoralists in Ethiopia. The 
main historical events that have brought far-reaching consequences on Ethiopian pastoral 
groups are the advent of colonialism; the internal political processes (centralization and 
consolidation of power); and policies/approaches pursued by the successive Ethiopian 
governments. In the following I will try to assess these processes and their consequences on 
pastoral societies.  
 
3.3.2.1. The Colonial Legacy 
 
Colonialism had serious consequences for various pastoral groups inhabiting in Ethiopia82 and 
as well as in neighbouring countries. In relation to colonialism, Markakis aptly explains how 
it divided pastoral groups among different states as follows:  
 
Although colonialism was least concerned with the pastoralists among its subjects, 
its rule had fateful consequences for them. With few exceptions, colonial boundaries 
were drawn through the pastoralist domain which, in the absence of settlement, was 
considered unclaimed by anyone. Ethiopia expanded prodigiously at the same time, 
occupying vast stretches of the lowlands, and doubling its territory and population. 
The result was the partition of many pastoralist communities among two or more 
states. In the worst case, the Somali were apportioned among five states; the Afar 
among three…. (Markakis, 2004:7).    
 
Consequently colonialism brought adverse consequences on pastoralists and to their pastoral 
economy. Firstly people were cut from their kinship groups, traditional leaders, markets, 
worship places. Thus many pastoral groups found themselves on the margins of every state. 
Secondly, colonialism had undermined economic viability, political integrity, traditional 
authority and social solidarity of pastoral societies. Thirdly, the colonial demarcation curtailed 
the imperative movement of pastoral groups, as national governments saw it as defying their 
administrative, fiscal, and political and security imperatives of their state (Markakis, 2004:7).  
 
Moreover, provincial boundaries and tribal grazing areas were drawn to limit the scope of 
movement within each state. In relation to this Markakis (2004:7) stated that the gradual 
curtailment of spontaneous movement disrupted the natural process of adjustment that 
maintained a balance between people, land and livestock, and this in conjunction with other 
developments (e.g. large-scale irrigation schemes) brought pernicious effect on fragile 
ecology and pastoral economy.  
 
The colonial demarcation has also contributed to the current lingering conflicts among various 
pastoral groups and between neighbouring states. The partitioning of ethnic groups increased 
                                                 
82 In fact Ethiopia as a nation was not under colony, except a brief Italian administration/ invasion during 1936-
1941. But its “peripheral territories” where some pastoral group inhabited, were the interest of colonial powers 
that administered neighing counties (Somalia, Kenya, Sudan, and Djibouti) and Eritrea - the then province in 
Ethiopia. 
 100
conflicts between pastoralists and also paved the way for inter-state conflicts (Flintan and 
Imeru, 2002). Consequently, the colonial demarcation made pastoral groups vulnerable to 
various internal conflicts and wars that emanated from contention over national boundaries 
which were inherited from colonial administration. The case in point is the border conflicts 
and wars between Ethiopia and Somalia that have affected the Somali pastoralists of both 
countries. The Somali Region of Ethiopia was subject to military rule from mid 1960s to 1991 
(Markakis, 2004:27). Even after 1991 either for internal or external reasons the militarization 
of the Ethiopian Somali Region has continued to date. The Ethio-Eritrea conflict is also over 
boundary which the two countries inherited from colonial demarcation. The war between the 
two countries has affected the Afar and other pastoralists of both countries. For instance it is 
reported that in the latest confrontation with Ethiopian army and militia, about 70% of the 
Eritrean national herd was raided, at the expense of bordering pastoral groups (DFID, 2000 as 
quoted in Nori, n.d). 
 
The colonial demarcation fragmented pastoral groups and impeded cross-border movements 
essential to the viability of customary resource-use systems. For instance the Haud pastures 
found in the Ogaden region were a long source of conflict between the Ogaden and the Ishaq 
Somali clans. Earlier competition to control the Haud pastures rarely involved large loss of 
life; and traditional institution (known as Diya) effectively contained and resolved these types 
of conflicts. Following colonial demarcation, however, conflicts took on more political 
nature. The Ogaden, where Haud pastures are situated, came under Ethiopian territory. On the 
other hand the Ishaq were under British administered Somaliland and outside the Ethiopian 
territory. Thus a claim to the Haud pastures between the Ogaden and Ishaq became a 
territorial dispute. The border then impeded Ishaq entry into Haud (Flintan and Imeru, 
2002:252).   
 
Another example of inter-ethnic conflict fueled by the colonial rulers was the conflict 
between Borana pastoralists and their neighbours within Ethiopia. “During the brief Italian 
administration, the Borana started to face violent attacks from their neighbours (Degodia and 
other Somali); Gujji and Arsi Oromo recruits to the Italian army. These groups used the 
Italian administrative policy and military support to occupy the eastern and north-eastern parts 
of Borana grazing lands in the Liban Zone” (Getachew, 2002b:71). The never-ending conflict 
between the Somali-Issa and Afar within Ethiopia is also partly the legacy of colonialism. In 
general the impacts of colonial policy and border demarcation were alienation of resources, 
undermining the material base of pastoral economy, disruption of social cohesion of pastoral 
groups, and widespread conflict over resources, a lingering territory claims and counter 
claims, etc. Therefore, the colonial process that took place half a century ago has brought far 
reaching consequences on the pastoralists and their economy in Ethiopia and in the 
neighbouring countries as well.    
 
3.3.2.2. The Internal Socio-political Processes 
 
The past internal political processes also affected pastoralists groups within Ethiopia. In 
Ethiopia, state formation was punctuated by violent inter-state and intra-state conflicts. The 
nature of conflict between the various regional powers that vied for control of the state was 
nearly violent. In the process “divergent groups were integrated, not always successfully, into 
central state which reflected the values of an elite strongly Christian orthodox group” (Flintan 
 101
and Imeru, 2002:246). The authority of Ethiopia rulers before Emperor Menelik II was highly 
diffused and shifted between different regions. Though the centralization tendency continued 
under different emperors in the North and Shewa for consolidating their power, centralization 
of state culminated during the rule of Emperor Menelik, and further consolidated during 
Emperor Haile Selassie with the emergence of the modern state, modern education, civil and 
military bureaucracies ((Flintan and Imeru, 2002:245).  
 
In the process of expansion, centralization of administration and consolidation of power, 
mainly the Amhara and Tigrean elites spread their political and administrative systems, 
language, culture, and religion into ever-distant areas through forces and assimilation. 
Penetration and domination of diverse groups expanded without sufficient emphasis on 
identification and participation of citizens into the embryonic nation state (Flintan and Imeru, 
2002:245). State control means acquisition and control of resources by ruling elites. Thus 
competition over valuable land and natural resources became common between the central 
state and various groups/regions incorporated in the central state. Moreover, the central state 
expanded and imposed a new political and administrative system onto customary social 
formations in order to strengthen its control over dissident groups. This in turn led to 
disruption of traditional authority and self-administration of different peripheral groups 
including pastoralists, as the central state established its structure and incorporated different 
groups. In this case Nicol et al., (2000) aptly explain, for instance, what was the situation 
during period of the past two Ethiopian governments:  
 
… under both Haile Silassie and the Derg, maintenance of power and authority was 
equated with the appropriation of resources for the center and conversely, with 
denial of access to peripheral communities. In pastoral areas such as the Afar region, 
state capture and exploitation of land adjoining the Awash has, [as a result,] left the 
legacy of resentment which directly impacts on resources management in the region 
(Nicol et al., 2000 as quoted  by Flintan and Imeru, 2002:272 ).   
 
In addition to economic and political marginalization, the Ethiopian successive governments 
followed hostile policies towards pastoral groups. The fact that most pastoral groups inhabit 
the margin of the country, their area has always been under security surveillance either to 
suppress internal resistance or to pave off external invasion. Therefore, the state perceived 
pastoral people and their cross-border movement as a threat to security and reacted violently 
to any pastoral movements.  
 
In general the social and political processes that were pursued by successive Ethiopian 
governments have undermined the material base of pastoral economy; traditional self-
administration and social cohesion; customary pastoral land tenure and management systems. 
It has resulted mainly in the loss of key resources to state or non-pastoral purposes; extraction 
of resources (through levying heavy tax and tributes in the form of livestock, forest product); 
curtailment of pastoral mobility due to provincial boundaries, administrative procedures and 
delineation of tribal areas; widespread state-society conflict (e.g. resistance often resulted in 
harassment, killing, confiscation of property, eviction); intra-clan and inter-clan conflicts over 
resources, etc. Moreover the current situation in pastoral areas is also partly the result of 
biased and inappropriate development approaches/policies of the previous Ethiopian 
governments. This is elabourated in the following section.   
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3.3.2.3  The Past Development Approaches/Policies and their Consequences  
 
i. Large-scale Commercial Farms and Conservation Areas. In Ethiopia pastoral areas are 
mainly situated in lowlands which are often crossed by big perennial rivers (e.g. Awash, 
Omo, Wabe-Shebelle, Genale-Dawa, Baro-Akobo and Abay). Some of the lakes of the Rift 
Valley also lie in the traditionally pastoral areas. At different times the Ethiopian 
Governments have introduced various large-scale development schemes in the river basins 
where pastoral groups are living. In the past four to five decades the process of external 
encroachment into pastoral areas has taken place. This included the establishment and 
expansion of commercial irrigated farms and plantations, and designation of national parks, 
game reserves and conservation areas. At the time the pastoral land was seen by the state and 
policy makers as “vast fertile, vacant and unoccupied” area to be harnessed for national 
development without considering pastoral traditional land use (Ayalew, 2004:243; Getachew, 
2004:223). Moreover, settled life and agriculture received more priority than the pastoralism 
and pastoral economy.   
 
In addition pastoral mobility, which is a crucial adaptation strategy of pastoralists, was 
perceived by the state and its planners as “backward” and “inferior” to settled agriculture. 
Consequently, as some researchers (Getachew, 2002a:785; Yacob, 1999; Mohammed, 
2003:41) stated, pastoral groups were regarded as ‘inefficient land users’, ‘lawless’, and Zelan 
(literally means wanderer) which has derogatory implications. Their movement was also 
viewed as threat to settled life and state security. These misperceptions were the beginning of 
economic and political marginalization of pastoral groups. They led to ill-conceived policies 
or programmes that disrupted pastoralists’ way of life. These included forced settlement of 
pastoralists; alienation of customary users; inappropriate interventions resulting in 
overgrazing and land degradation. The detrimental effects of these interventions on different 
pastoral groups are well documented by many authors (Getachew, 1999, 2000, 2002b, 2001a; 
2004; Ayalew, 1997, 2002, 2004; Ali, 1996; 1997; Assefa, 2000; Markakis, 2004).  
 
Some of the consequences identified by many authors included loss of grazing land; 
restriction on mobility; displacement; disruption of communal tenure and traditional resource 
management systems; erosion of traditional local authority; intensification of inter and intra-
ethnic conflicts over grazing lands and water points; loss of sacred places; health impacts; 
aggravation of effects of drought; economic differentiation among pastoral households, etc. 
(Ali, 1997; 1996:206; Ayalew, 2004:246-257; Getachew, 1999:252-53; Markakis, 2004:11). 
The advent and expansion of large schemes in the Awash Valley could serve as illustrative for 
the consequences of external encroachments.  
 
As stated above since the 1950s and 1960s there was a persistent assumption that vast, excess 
and unutilized land existed in pastoral areas and could be allocated for other uses. This 
attracted the central government to establish large-scale irrigated commercial farms and 
national parks. This has been mainly undertaken in the Awash Valley where the Afar 
pastoralists and other pastoral groups (Issa, Karrayu and Argoba) are living. 
 
Large-scale development schemes in the Awash Valley or elsewhere were established for 
commercial and political interests of the central state with little or no concern for the 
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subsistence of the local people. The expansion of commercial farms and delineation of parks 
have resulted in   loss of pastureland, restriction of livestock movements and eviction of 
pastoral groups. Particularly mobility disruption has put pastoral livelihoods in a precarious 
situation. One can imagine how risky pastoralism is in a situation where territorial rights 
alienated, and freedom of movement is curtailed. Markakis explains how these two rights are 
crucial to pastoral life: 
 
Every herd must have access to dispersed, ecologically specialized and 
seasonally varied grazing lands and watering holes, in order to provide for the 
varied foraging needs of different livestock species, and to afford a margin of 
safety against the vagaries of rainfall (Markakis, 1993, as quoted in Assefa, 
2000:94).  
 
Since the 1950s the gradual expansion of commercial farms, plantations and parks in the 
Awash Valley also led to the eviction of local communities with no compensations. This is 
illustrated in table 3.4 below. 
 
Table 3.4 Groups Evicted From the Awash Basin Area at Different Times 
Groups 
evicted 
The reason for eviction Year Compensation 
Jille The Dutch HVA Wonji and 
Shewa sugar cane estates. 
Construction of Koka dam and 
creation of Galila lake. 
Assignment of land for other 
urban and rural development 
projects.  
1950s 
 
1960s  
None  
Arsi Nura Erra irrigation scheme 1950s-1960s  None. However, they 
continue to practice 
pastoralism in hilly 
Tibila area 
Karrayu Sugar cane development between 
Kessem and Awash rivers. 
Awash National Park which 
resulted in loss of 80,000 ha of 
dry and wet season grazing land. 
1950s 
 
1966 
None  
Afar Commercial agricultural 
development along river beds. 
Construction of Koka dam. 
Awash national park. 
1950s-1960s Resettlement, wage 
labour, although this 
was rarely taken up 
Source: Nicol et al., 2000 quoted by Flintan and Imeru, 2002:273. 
 
These external encroachments also exacerbated competition over scarce resources, and inter 
and intra-clan conflicts. The frequent conflicts between different pastoral groups (e.g. Afar, 
Issa, Karrayu, Argoba) are partly the consequences of past development interventions in 
pastoral areas.  
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Moreover, the establishment of irrigated commercial farms, plantations and national parks 
exacerbated the effects of drought; affected pastoral economy and then made the local people 
more vulnerable to famine or food crisis. A case in point was the effect of Tendaho Cotton 
Plantation on the Afar pastoralists. Some researchers (e.g. Gamaledin, 1993:56; Lars 
Bondestam, 1974 cited in Gamaledin, 1993) vividly explained the effects of the scheme and 
government policy as follows:  
 
When the 1973-74 famine struck, the Afar pastoralists who were denied access 
to the Awash River and its immediate environs were decimated. Lars 
Bondestam suggested that almost 30 per cent of the Afar population of the 
Awash perished. Irrigation and the government’s centralization policy 
interacting with prolonged drought were mainly responsible for this 
catastrophe.  
 
The advent and expansion of development schemes also brought social differentiation and 
inequality among the Afar. It encouraged privatization of some communal lands by clan 
chiefs and those who were affiliated to central government and private enterprises. These 
groups of people have benefited either from their own investment in private farms or by 
collecting rents of tribal lands. On the other hand the ordinary Afar were denied access to 
grazing lands and to water points and pushed farther into the marginal areas. This will be 
further elabourated in Chapter 5 (section 5.2.4.1)    
 
ii. The Past Pastoral Sector Development Programmes and Projects. Since the 1960s, the 
successive Ethiopian Governments initiated and implemented some pastoral development 
programmes and projects in the pastoral areas. As elsewhere in Africa the policy objectives of 
those interventions were to increase animal output and for range conservation. For instance 
the USAID and World Bank assisted projects emphasized the provision of veterinary services, 
construction of water points, creation of trade routes connecting to the highlands, and creation 
of public pastures (Helland 1997b cited in Ahmed et al., 2002:120-11; Tafesse, 2001; World 
Bank, 2001). Institutions were also established to facilitate such interventions. A case in point 
was the Livestock and Meat Board (LMB) that was established in 1964 to improve marketing 
infrastructure, mainly in the Borana and Afar pastoral areas (Tafesse, 2001:96-97; World 
Bank, 2001).  
 
Subsequent projects like the Second Livestock Development Project (SLDP), which went into 
operation in 1973, and the Third Livestock Development Project (TLDP) were initiated and 
implemented nearly with similar policy objectives and with some provisions added in the 
latter. While the SLDP focused on establishing infrastructures like slaughter facilities for 
provincial towns and cities and tried to improve stock routes and market places for livestock, 
the TLDP was designed to develop rangelands, including water supply and access roads in the 
pastoral areas (Tafesse, 2001; Ahmed et al., 2002:12-13).  
 
Pastoral sector development programmes aimed at developing the livestock sector, however, 
did not bring the intended benefits to pastoral groups. Firstly, those programmes were based 
on inappropriate assumptions and on the misunderstanding of a pastoral way of life.  
Secondly, they were designed and implemented with little or no participation of the pastoral 
groups. At the time the pastoral areas were viewed as a vast potential for the national 
development, and the international donor community channelled investment resources and 
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support to develop the livestock sector. The first rangeland development scheme designed and 
funded by the World Bank was launched in the 1960s focusing on stimulating livestock 
production and market take-off. The programme had concentrated on improving access roads, 
veterinary services and water supplies in the eastern and southern lowlands of Ethiopia 
(Markakis, 2004:16).    
 
Three more projects followed in the 1970s and 1980s, funded by the World Bank and the 
African Development Bank. The main deriving force for the investment was to modernise the 
pastoral sector and to integrate into national and foreign markets. For instance, several 
projects focused on livestock marketing options in the 1970s and 1980s. The Second 
Livestock Development Project (SLDP) established the Ethiopian Livestock and Meat 
Marketing Enterprise which used to buy a substantial number of live animals on a weight 
basis. The Third Livestock Development Project (TLDP) later sponsored livestock trucking 
programmes linked to highland fattening schemes. All these programmes have had episodic, 
but unsustained impacts on the market (World Bank, 2001:6). All that is left of the efforts of 
programmes are “the rusting bulks of broken machinery, pumps and vehicles strew on the 
range” (Markakis, 2004:16). “Evaluations of these projects have painted a picture of almost 
uniform failure - millions of dollars have been invested in development activities, often with 
no discernible impacts” (Devereux, 2004 cited in Markakis, 2004:16). In addition, most, if not 
all pastoral or rangeland projects, resulted in negative impacts which included degradation of 
range lands; high concentration of human and livestock population around boreholes and 
other services and infrastructures; resource competitions and conflicts; degradation of 
traditional authorities, etc.   
 
Consequently a series of rangeland or livestock projects have received widespread criticism. 
“Policies were designed primary to promote livestock production and not the welfare of 
producers. The intention was to increase meat production on the cheap for the benefit of urban 
consumers and for export which means the pastoralists were to gain least” (Markakis, 
2004:17). Furthermore, the projects were top-down, unsustainable and failed to provide 
sufficient technical, institutional and financial support (World Bank, 2001: iv). Yet some 
institutions (World Bank, 2001) stated that those projects made considerable progress in water 
development and animal health and in accumulating a wealth of knowledge on pastoral 
society and economy.  
 
Besides attempt was also made to resettle pastoralists or displaced pastoral groups. During the 
Imperial and Derg periods “the emphasis was placed on turning nomadic pastoralists into 
settled cultivators practicing a combination of crop and animal husbandry” (Ayalew, 
1997:373). Thus several resettlement schemes were created. For instance some attempt was 
made to settle the evicted pastoralists, mainly Afar as a token compensation for alienated land 
through establishing irrigated schemes (e.g. Amibara settlement, the Hale Debi, the Awara-
Melka/Doho/ and Dunti). In Afar region, however, the “attempt to sedentarize the nomadic 
Afar proved to be largely unsuccessful because it did not take into account the ethos of the 
would-be beneficiaries, and therefore failed to develop strategies of persuading the people of 
the usefulness of the schemes” (Ayalew, 1997:373). A number of reasons are enumerated for 
the failure of settlement schemes in the Awash Valley. Some of these include, the top-down 
nature of the approach; lack of clear policy on how to resettle pastoralists; improper planning; 
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failure to take into account the traditional clan territoriality; inadequate inputs (e.g. skill 
training for settlers, investment) (Ayalew, 1997:373-374; Getachew, 2004:235-236).     
 
In terms of provision of social services and infrastructure, pastoral areas are at a 
disadvantaged position both in the past as well as currently. There are disparities between 
pastoral and settled areas in terms of social services and infrastructures, especially in 
communication, education, health and transport (Desta and Coppock, 2004:483). Currently if 
we take education, the national average gross enrolment rate for primary level is 64.4%. For 
the Afar and Somali Regional States, it is 13.8 % and 15.1% respectively. In terms of gender 
disparity Somali Region has the lowest (10%) gross enrolment rate for girls at primary level. 
Health statistics are even more desperate. Under five year mortality in Addis Ababa is 113.5% 
per live birth, in the Afar Region it is 229.3%, which means one quarter of Afar children die 
before they reach their fifth year (Ethiopian Demographic and Health Survey, 2000 cited in 
Markakis, 2004:19). These disparities are partly a legacy of past policy gaps, and biased 
approaches which favoured settled and urban areas.  
 
In general pastoral development interventions implemented during the previous regimes 
focused on commercialization of livestock production to exploit the livestock potential in the 
country. Yet they failed to achieve their intended objectives. Rather, as some authors (Helland 
cited in Ahmed, et al., 2002: 12-13) argue, those interventions have eroded vital indigenous 
institutions and affected the environment negatively. Hogg (1997a) also noted that 
“development projects allowed little local participation; focused on technical solutions 
ignoring indigenous strategies; focused on implementation of project components neglecting 
their maintenance and sustainability; and little focus on cost recovery”. 
 
 
3.3.3. Preliminary Conclusions  
 
The development thinking at the global political and economic level dominated by the motto 
of “modernization”, the “tragedy of the commons” and the “cattle complex in Africa” partly 
shared state perception about pastoralists, and guided state policies and strategies as well as 
those of donors and lenders which later received heavy criticisms because of their negative 
consequences on pastoralists and their economy and the environment (Mohammed, 2003:41; 
Amaha, 2002:3, 6). The consequences of colonial demarcation, the internal socio-political 
processes and policies of previous governments had undermined the pastoral economy, 
traditional self-administration, communal land tenure systems, and traditional resources 
management systems in pastoral areas of Ethiopia. 
 
Particularly excessive intervention of the state had put pastoral lands and indigenous 
institutions under the control of the centre. During the Imperial Government, the 1955 revised 
constitution and the 1960 Ethiopian civil code made all lands occupied by the pastoralists a 
state property (Mohammed, 2003:40). The Military Regime (Derg) also followed similar 
policy with respect to pastoral lands. (This point will be elabourated in Chapter 5 by taking 
the Afar case as illustrative instance). Then the establishment of large commercial farms and 
enclosure for parks was extensively undertaken by the state. At the same time encroachment 
was made by cultivators - both from outside and from within as the formal laws were in their 
favour.  
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State-sponsored interventions sought primarily to attain peace and security in the lowlands 
and border regions through administrative control; heavy military presence and taxation; 
restricting mobility of pastoralists’ and their  livestock across national and regional borders; 
and encouraging or forcing the people to abandon pastoralism. Moreover, the government and 
planners (of development) abolished communal tenure, and introduced and implemented 
tribal-grazing areas or reserves (Getachew 2002a).  
 
Furthermore, the previous Government adopted development strategies and approaches which 
excluded pastoral people, their cultures, economies and institutions. Pastoral mobility, 
considered not to fit the predominantly highland sedentary system, was perceived as a great 
challenge to the government’s administration in the pastoral area. The pastoral communities 
live in the areas that border with neighbouring countries. Thus the state considered the 
pastoralists’ cross-border movement as a divided loyalty on the parts of pastoralists. Cross-
border mobility has added to widen the gap between state (which was not on good terms with 
its neighbours) and pastoralist societies (Mohammed, 2003:41). This contributed to political 
marginalization of pastoral societies which in turn resulted in a hostile relationship between 
State and pastoral groups. In brief the negative effects of previous external interventions on 
pastoral groups can be summarized as follows (Getachew, 2002a; Mohammed, 2003:41): 
 
i. marginalization of the pastoral community in all aspects; 
ii. alienation of communities by outsiders upon large areas of wet and dry-season 
prime grazing lands;  
iii. intensification of competitions and conflicts with respect to access to, use of and 
tenure right to resources; 
iv. disruption of traditional pastoral resource management systems;  
v. increased vulnerability to periodical climatic events, particularly drought risk.  
 
Generally the historical political processes, centralized administration and external 
encroachments coupled with ecological changes within pastoral areas have eroded the 
livelihood bases of most pastoral groups. Consequently, larger pastoral population in Ethiopia 
face more risks now than at any time in the past. They are increasingly becoming vulnerable 
to multiple risks (loss of key pastoral resources, famine, epidemic diseases, conflict, 
environmental crisis, etc). Besides, their traditional strategies are eroded and have become 
increasingly insufficient to cope with stresses and shocks. As a result, many pastoralists are 
increasingly relying on external food assistance to survive crisis periods. As indicated earlier 
about half of the Ethiopian population is poor and vulnerable to chronic food insecurity. And 
about 5-6 millions of people face severe food crisis every year and rely on food aid. Pastoral 
groups constitute the most vulnerable group to chronic food insecurity and famine. (This 
point is elabourated in section 3.4.6). The following section attempts to assess the present 
government’s policies and approaches to pastoralism in Ethiopia.  
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3.3.4 The Current Government Development Approaches to Pastoralism         
 
In the proceeding sections attempt is made to discuss the broader socio-political processes, 
policies of previous governments and their consequences that have shaped the present state of 
pastoral groups in Ethiopia. This section assesses the current government policies and 
approaches to pastoral development and disaster prevention. Since 1991 the current 
government has introduced different political and economic reforms, and issued various 
national policies and strategies. This section, in fact, is not intended to make comprehensive 
assessment of all reforms and policy measures. But it takes up only selected ones that are 
pertinent to pastoral areas, and gives a brief assessment of them. The focuses in point are 
Constitutional Provisions to pastoralists; Rural Development Strategies and Policies; Pastoral 
Development Policy; National Policy for Disaster Prevention and Management.   
 
 
3.3.4.1 Constitutional Provisions  
 
In the early 1990s Ethiopia saw enormous political changes. Since the 1991, new political 
arrangements and administrative structures have been established in the country. Accordingly 
there have been some changes in state’s approach towards pastoral communities. The Charter 
of the Transitional Government was adopted in 1991 and paved the way for the establishment 
of a federal system of government. The change in state structure resulted in “decentralization 
of power and administration”. Consequently, pastoral groups have got their own regional and 
local self-administrations established mainly on ethnic basis. Accordingly, the two largest 
pastoral societies (Afar and Somali) have their own regional governments. The other major 
pastoral groups (i.e. Borana) have their own Zonal and Woreda administrations under the 
Oromiya Regional State to which they ethnically belong. 
 
This new political and administrative arrangement can be viewed as a positive step as 
compared to the previous political space accorded to pastoral or marginal groups by the 
previous governments. In the past pastoral societies were divided into different provinces and 
had no their own self-administration.83 In addition to self-administration, some constitutional 
provisions and institutional measures have been made for pastoralist societies. For instance, in 
the 1995 FDRE Constitution important provisions are provided. Some of these provisions 
mainly related to pastoralists are presented in box 3.2 below.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
83 Towards the end of 1980s, the Derg regime organised an Afar administration under the “Assab Autonomous 
Region”, and a Somali administration under “Ogaden Autonomous Region”.  However, this arrangement was 
viewed simply as security measure rather than a genuine response to the demands of the Afar and Somalis.  
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These and other provisions are general ones, of course showing the government’s position 
and concern towards pastoral communities. If we see, for instance article, 40, No.5 in box 3.2 
above, it is an important constitutional provision which pastoralists were denied by the 
previous regimes. Yet its implementation is equally crucial to pastoralists. In the absence of 
rule of law, the provision only is not enough. Therefore, equally important is to what extent 
the government policies and strategies emanated from the above provisions and the like have 
addressed the pastoral issues and concerns in investment decisions and their implementation 
at the ground. In this case a member of the parliament (from a pastoral area) in Ethiopia states 
that, “the wind84 is blowing in our direction, but it hasn’t rained yet” (as quoted by Markakis, 
2004:25). This is to say that the actual implementation is yet to be seen. Again in relation to 
the importance of law interpretation a herder said this: “the law does not speak the Samburu 
language, or the Borana, or the Somali or the Turkana, or the Maasai” (quoted in Markakis, 
2004-:22). This suggests that enacting law is not sufficient, and equally important is the actual 
implementation or interpretation of laws. Therefore, it is imperative here to assess to what 
extent the current policies and strategies in Ethiopia have addressed pastoral issues and 
concerns at the surface.  
                                                 
84 Wind in this case is an indicator of the coming rain.  
Box-3.2: Some Constitution Provisions Most Related to Pastoralists: 
 
Article 8 
No.1. “All sovereign power resides in the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia”. 
No.2. The “Constitution itself is the expression of their sovereignty”. 
No.3. “Their sovereignty shall be expressed through their elected representatives…and …their 
direct participation.” 
 
Article 40 
No.5. “Ethiopian pastoralists have the right to free land for grazing and cultivation as well as 
the right not to be displaced from their own lands. The implementation shall be specified by 
law. 
Article 41 
 No.8. “… pastoralists have the right to receive fair prices for their products that would lead to 
improvement in their condition of life and to enable them to obtain an equitable share of the 
national wealth commensurate with their contribution”.  
 
Article 88 
No.1. “… Government shall promote and support the people’s self-rule at all levels”. 
 
Article 89 
No.3. “Government shall take measures to avert any natural and man-made disasters, and, in 
the event of disasters, to provide timely assistance to the victims”  
No.4. “Government shall provide special assistance to the nations, nationalities and peoples 
least advantaged in economic and social development”   
No.6. “… government shall at all times promote the participation of people in the formulation 
of national development policies and programs, it shall also have the duty to support the 
initiatives of the people in their development endeavors” 
FDRE Constitution, 1995 
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Nowadays both the state and NGOs have begun to give some attention to pastoralists’ 
concerns and priorities in Ethiopia. The government and policy makers also attempt to 
incorporate some pastoral issues in the national policies, programmes and projects. The 
following sections discuss some of the relevant policies and strategies and to what extent 
pastoral issues are incorporated in them.  
 
 
3.3.4.2  (Rural) Development Policies and Strategies 
 
i. The Agricultural Extension Programme. The governments’ emphasis is on rural and 
agricultural development. To this end the government has issued various policies, and 
designed strategies and programmes since 1993. The agricultural extension programme, 
which was initiated in 1993, focused on intensive crop production, and pastoral area issues 
were not incorporated in the programme (Mohammed, 2003:43). The major concern of the 
agricultural extension programme was to increase crop production85. In a research report done 
by UNDP on “Water Points and Grazing Reserves” in Somali Region, an elder informant said 
this in relation to exclusion of pastoral issues: "Those who are close to the pot are always the 
first to enjoy the food and we are far from it" (UNDP/FAO, 1994 cited in Mohammed, 
2004:5). The explanation of this remark was that the Somalis are economically and politically 
peripheral and as well as marginal in the national policy-making process. 
 
ii. Food Security Strategy (FSS). The Food Security Strategy (FSS) issued in 1996, 
incorporates some issues, especially problems (e.g. drought) encountered by the pastoral 
systems. It also prescribes some interventions that include: (i) development of an early 
warning system relevant to pastoral systems; (ii) supplemental feeding of livestock; (iii) 
encouraging small-scale cereal plots in post-drought years; (iv) establishment of processing 
plants near to sources of supply; (v) improvement of marketing to preserve the purchasing 
power of households in times of crisis; (vi) encouraging diversification in local economic 
system (e.g. production of forage legumes adapted to arid areas); and (vii) encouraging better 
management of livestock focusing on calf-growth rates and management of water supplies (as 
quoted by Mohammed, 2003:44). This strategy document focuses on food security, and its 
subsequent revision provides details of above-mentioned interventions.  
 
In 2002 the Government issued an update of the 1996 Food Security Strategy. The overall 
objective of the strategy is to ensure food security at a household level. The strategy rests on 
three basic pillars: (i) to increase the availability of food through increased domestic 
production, (ii) to ensure access to food deficit households, and (iii) to strengthen emergency 
response capabilities. It targeted the chronically food insecure, moisture deficit and pastoral 
areas (Sharp et al., 2003:14 in annex 1). The focus in the revised strategy is on environmental 
                                                 
85 Sectoral policies often reflect the way of life of the agricultural highlands and neglect that of pastoralism. For 
instance Agriculture Development Led Industrialization (ADLI) – the general development policy of the 
Ethiopian government, is biased towards the highland agricultural production system and does not adequately 
address the pastoral and agro-pastoral production systems (Mohammed, 2004:1). 
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rehabilitation as a measure to reverse the level of degradation and also as source of income 
generation for food insecure households.  
 
iii. The Five Year (2000-2004) Development Plan (FYDP). In the development of 
subsequent policies and strategies, the current government adopted the Five Year 
Development Plan (FYDP). It embraces three main policies and strategies: (i) Rural 
Development Policies and Strategies (RDPS); (ii) Capacity Building Strategy (CBS), and (iii) 
Strategy for Democratization (SD). The five year plan makes reference to pastoralism. The 
plan indicates that “the Government has a gap in its knowledge of pastoral development”, and 
it envisages “strengthening agricultural development activities in pastoral areas to raise the 
standard of living; strengthening the foreign exchange earning, and alleviating nomadic 
livelihoods step by step (as quoted by Mohammed, 2004:7). To this end the plan suggests 
interventions that include: (i) natural resource conservation, (ii) introduction of new varieties 
of grasses and vegetables, (iii) provision of water (iv) introduction of livestock extension 
programme and, (v) development of markets for dairy products (quoted in Mohammed, 
2004:7). For “alleviating or improving nomadic life style”, the plan also recommends 
“sustainable settlement” with introduction of small-scale irrigation. As can be seen from these 
suggested interventions in the five year plan, the government still focuses on provision of 
services, marketing, sedentarization, and crop cultivation. The idea of “alleviating nomadic 
livelihoods” also implies the intention of changing pastoralism into sedentary way of life. 
This reflects the view of technical experts who believe that there is no future for pastoralism.  
 
iv. Rural Development Policies and Strategies (RDPS). This policy document entails more 
issues on pastoral development than the preceding policy documents do, though it focuses, as 
usual, on crop cultivation. With regard to pastoral development this document phases its 
approach in (i) short and medium terms, and (ii) long-term.  
 
In short and medium terms, emphasis is placed on improving pastoral systems to ensure food 
security and sustainable development. In this regard the policy document states that, “since 
the livelihood of the people is based on pastoralism, our development endeavor and activities 
must be based on it (i.e. pastoralism)” (FDRE, 2000a). The policy document also suggests the 
opportunity to undertake certain agricultural activities when families are settled in one area 
for several months. Having pointed out the imbalance between stocking rates and the 
provision of water and pasture during the dry season, the policy puts priority on ensuring 
water supply in different selected places. The policy also recommends rangeland management 
and conservation based on traditional management systems. In general for short and medium 
terms, the RDPS focus on improving livestock husbandry basing efforts on a wide range of 
traditional knowledge. To this end the policy recommends: (i) preparing a package that can 
strengthen people’s knowledge of livestock husbandry; (ii) training extension workers and 
provision of extension services focusing on the indigenous knowledge, (iii) provision of 
veterinary and livestock development extension services which go well with pastoralists’ 
mobility; (iv) creating an efficient livestock marketing system that can make pastoral systems 
market-oriented (FDRE, 2002a:141-142). 
 
The long-term aspect of RDPS focuses on sedentarization of pastoralists based on the 
development of irrigation (FDRE, 2002a). It states that “unlike of highlanders, settlement in 
pastoral areas is a question of changing people whose life has long been rooted in pastoralism, 
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into cultivators who have to learn the ways of sedentarization” (FDRE, 2002a:145). In RDPS 
“it is emphasized that, though it takes a long time, settlement is a must in order to bring about 
accelerated and sustainable development aimed at improving the livelihood of pastoralists” 
(FDRE, 2002a:146-147). Thus RDPS envisages the preparation and implementation of 
settlement programmes that focus on extensive training on settled farming system to be given 
to pastoralists and undertaking the settlement activities step by step.  
 
In the RDPS, there seems be a contradictory ideas between prescriptions given in short and 
medium terms, and those in long-term. In the first case the RDPS recognize pastoralists’ 
livelihoods and pastoralists’ wide range of traditional knowledge and thus envisage the need 
to improve the pastoral way of life. In latter case (i.e. in the long-term aspect) of RDPS, total 
sedentarization of pastoralists and total transformation of way of life is envisaged. This 
implies that pastoralism (mobility) is not either desired or needed in the future. It also implies 
the preference for settled agriculture or crop cultivation. However, this prescription for 
settling pastoralists is questionable. Firstly, the policy does not make distinctions between 
different types of the pastoral system (‘pure’ pastoralism, transhumance and agro-pastoralism) 
which pastoral groups alternate or combine them depending on the circumstances. Secondly, 
it is difficult to imagine total transformation of a pastoral way of life through settlement or 
sedentarization, as pastoralism is not simply an economic activity to the pastoral groups. It 
rather involves social, cultural, psychological and political aspects. Therefore, it is simplistic 
to think that a pastoral way of life can be transformed through a settlement programme.  
 
However, it doesn’t mean that settlement or sedentarization is not taking place in certain 
contexts. At this time there are pastoral groups or households who take up cultivation and 
sedentarization as adaptive strategy based on their choice (or decision) and as they find it 
desirable. And for that matter pastoralism is not static, it is under transformation, but by its 
dynamism and adaptive mechanism rather than by “planned intervention”. Yet it is difficult to 
envisage settlement or sedentarization as a fixed programme to all forms of pastoralism86. 
Moreover, the previous attempts to resettle pastoralists also proved difficulty or failures. For 
instance, in the 1980s and early 1990s, international NGOs in collabouration with government 
organizations (e.g. Ministry of Agriculture) attempted to implement resettlement programme 
in the Borana zone. However, the programme was not successful since it ignored a range of 
factors including indigenous pastoral land tenure and resource use pattern, socio-cultural 
setup, economic and political organizations (Getachew, 2002a). A failure case has also been 
recorded in attempt to settle the Afar pastoralists in the middle Awash. This is already 
discussed in section 3.3.2.3.  
 
v. Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS). Poverty reduction strategy is the most recent 
government document of tackling poverty, and conditional for debt relief and concession 
loan. It was issued in 2000 as the Interim-Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (I-PRSP) and was 
                                                 
86 Some researchers (Alula, P., 2003, Cliffe et al., 2002) provided recommendations by assessing the previous 
settlement programs of the mid 1980s in Ethiopia. For instance, (i) “there is a case for learning from spontaneous 
migration which privileges social relations with local people, and maintains linkages between settlement and 
home areas, rather than seeking to create rigidly planned isolated units” (Alula, P., 2003).  (ii) Having 
recommended implementing a pilot program to test the viability of alternative models of resettlement in the 
future, “Cliff, et al (2002:15) warn that it is important to “proceed with caution and a high degree of doubt about 
the appropriateness and specific value of resettlement” (cited in Sharp et al., 2003).   
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open to public discussion and consultation until the mid 2002. As raised during the public 
discussion on I-PRSP, the coverage given to pastoral development issues remained minimal. 
It had a very weak section on pastoralism, thus failing to adequately address one of the major 
sectors of development of the country (Mohammed, 2004). Few lines that deal with pastoral 
interventions are superficial and illustrate the persistent knowledge gap in this area (World 
Bank, 2001). The strategy foresees “improving the welfare of pastoral people by increasing 
productivity and minimizing risk through infrastructure development, improved market 
access and other support” (World Bank, 2001:16). Finally the PRS document is incorporated 
into the government’s programme named “Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction 
Programme (SDPRP)” which was issued in July 2002 and submitted to the World Bank.  
 
vi. Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Programme (SDPRP). The SDPRP 
document identifies many issues pertinent to pastoral areas and pastoralism. It also mentions 
the socio-economic and institutional constraints affecting pastoral development. These 
included (i) ecological constraints (erratic rainfall, persistent drought, inadequate pasture and 
water); (ii) poor facilities (health and education services as a result of mobility, poor livestock 
health services, and poor market outlet owing to absence of roads and information); (iii) weak 
institutional support (conflicts and tribal disputes, poor governance and gender insensitivity); 
and (iv) lack of clarity of vision and strategy for pastoral development (donor driven, non-
sustainable programmes and projects, inadequate consultation and involvement of pastoral 
communities in the project design and implementation) (FDRE, 2002b:72). SDPRP also 
envisages similar approaches to pastoral development that are described in the Rural 
Development Policies and Strategies mentioned above. In fact SDPRP recognizes the 
complexity and the challenge of settling pastoralists as it involves culture change and takes a 
long time. Yet SDPRP envisages sedentarization as an approach to pastoral development. The 
strategies to be adopted include (FDRE, 2002b:73):  
 
i. Sedentarisation of mobile pastoralists on voluntary basis. 
ii. Consolidate and stabilize those who are already settled or semi-settled through 
improved water supply, pasture and social services. 
iii. Carefully select viable and reliable river courses for future sedentarisation based 
on irrigation, and link these places through roads and other communication lines. 
iv. Provide mobile social services including health and education holistically for those 
that continue to be mobile. 
 
In addition SDPRP also envisages technical interventions/support in pastoral development. 
These are summarized as follows (FDRE, 2002b:74): 
 
i. Improve water supply and irrigation development. Water harvesting; construct 
water points adjacent to range resources for dry season utilization; river/stream 
diversion; supply appropriate crop varieties; etc. 
ii.  Livestock and range resources development. Improve the indigenous breeds and 
veterinary services; forage production; livestock marketing; strengthen livestock 
EWS; initiate and conduct community-based rangeland management 
demonstration practices, etc. 
iii. Strengthening infrastructures and institutional support. Improve road, 
communication, and market; access to education, training, health services; 
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strengthen and revitalize local traditional institutions; encourage the establishment 
of viable pastoral associations; establish research institutions and rural technology 
promotion centres; provision of appropriate and strong extension services, etc.  
 
The objectives of pastoral development are (i) to improve livestock productivity through 
irrigated pasture, environmental rehabilitation, and improved animal health services, and (ii) 
explore market outlets and integrate livestock production into the national economy (FDRE, 
2002b:73).  In general the government policy focuses on sedentarization of pastoralists and 
provision of technical support to producers. Thus Ethiopia’s statement on pastoral 
development policy forecasts phased voluntary sedentarization along the banks of the major 
rivers as the main direction of transforming pastoral societies into agro-pastoral system and 
sedentary life (MoFA, 2002, as cited in Markakis, 2004:13). The pastoral policy is described 
briefly in the following section.   
 
3.3.4.3 The Pastoral Policy 
 
The pastoral policy was developed in 2002 as a continuation of policies and programmes for 
pastoral areas. The government policy statement entails the following visions (MoFA, 2002 
as quoted in Mohammed, 2004:10): 
 
i. Phased voluntary sedentarization along the banks of the major rivers as the main 
direction of transforming pastoral societies into agro-pastoral systems; from mobility 
to sedentary life; from a scattered population to small pastoral towns and urbanization. 
ii. Complementing sedentarization by micro and small-scale enterprises development in 
the urban centers and off-farm activities in the rural areas. 
iii. Undertaking integrated development based on irrigation and focused on livestock 
production, complemented by static and mobile education and health services as well 
as rural roads, rural energy and water supply, rural telephone services, etc. 
iv. Co-ordinated and concerted federal support for programme ownership by the Regional 
States and communities, with capacity building to enable them to lead development at 
all levels. 
v. Allowing, enabling and coordinating the private sector and NGOs to play a positive 
role in line with the policy direction and within the framework of the broad 
programme and strategy, after mobilizing their own resources. 
vi. Tapping indigenous knowledge and skills on animal husbandry and rangeland 
management.   
 
From the above mentioned strategies and approaches envisaged for pastoral development, it 
can be observed that some old ideas are reflected in the government policies and strategies, 
for instance, ‘viewing mobility as pastoral problem and prescribing sedentarization’; high 
preference to settled way of life; overemphasis on technical inputs; etc. which were dominant 
views that guided pastoral development policies and programmes in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Above all, sedentary life or sedentarization for pastoral areas is considered to be the ultimate 
goal. In this case it is emphasised that “resettlement programmes have become part and parcel 
of the national economic and social development programme” (FDRE, 2002b:73).  
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Most of the ideas mentioned in the government’s strategies and policies are related to 
sedentarization, increasing the productivity of the production systems and integrating of the 
sector in the market, and the provision of technical inputs and construction of infrastructures 
and services mainly geared for increasing the productivity of livestock production system. 
This suggests that historical, socio-political and cultural factors that shape the life of the 
pastoral societies have not been adequately analyzed during the design of these pastoral 
development approaches or interventions. In fact the policy and strategy document recognized 
the need for pastoralists’ participation, their willingness, and persuasion work to implement 
resettlement or other programmes. While these merit consideration for success of any 
intervention, it is important to analyze the historical as well as contemporary transformations 
in pastoralism as a result of changing state-pastoralists, herders-cultivators, local inter and 
intra clan or  ethnic relationships,  and as well as changes in wider political and economic 
environments. Equally important is the understanding of pastoral economic and decision 
making behaviour, distinction between different pastoral communities characterized by 
different social and economic systems which are confronted with different development 
issues. In relation to this Hogg (1997a:17) has this to say: “any pastoral development must 
start from the premises that ‘pastoralist environment’ is also a cultural construct, in which the 
interplay of wider political and economic forces, must have important determining effects on 
the likely success of development option available.” Therefore, before designing and 
envisaging pastoral development programmes, it requires a careful analysis of pastoral ways 
of life and adequate consultation with concerned pastoral communities for determining 
(mainstreaming) the kinds of interventions, as pastoral systems and groups are differentiated 
with varying interests, choices and concerns. Otherwise policy prescriptions and strategy 
statements will remain as only “shopping lists”.  
 
3.3.4.4. National Policy on Disaster Prevention and Management  
 
Different hazards have been recorded in Ethiopia. There have been area specific crises caused 
by different kinds of events/hazards at different times and in varying degree and magnitude. 
DPPC (now DPPA) claimed that hydro-meteorological hazards, particularly droughts have 
remained the leading cause of disaster87 and human suffering in Ethiopia in terms of 
frequency, area coverage and the number of people affected. Flooding has also affected 
people and their property particularly in the lowland areas (DPPC, 2004).  
 
There were times when disease epidemics also caused serious famine, and migratory pest 
infestation has been a serious problem in parts of the country; bush fires occurred and 
depleted forest and wildlife resources; people have been internally displaced due to conflicts 
of different nature; and in recent years HIV/AIDS has reached to the level of disaster (DPPC, 
2004:1).  
 
                                                 
87 The proclamation for the establishment of “Disaster Preparedness and Prevention Commission (DPPC)” 
defines disaster as “the development of a situation wherein a segment of the community or the population of a 
locality cannot any longer meet the need for food and other basic necessities, due to natural and man-made 
calamities, with its daily life thus falling into crisis which renders it unable to survive without assistance from 
others” (FDRE, Proclamation No.10/1995:74).  
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In the Ethiopian context, a host of factors contribute to the vulnerability of individuals, 
households or communities to frequent disaster risks such as drought related famine, 
epidemics, flood, landslides, civil strife and mass displacement. In particular, millions of 
people have been affected by drought-related famines for several decades. Very huge amounts 
of resources have been deployed in the form of relief, which, of course has saved many lives 
(DPPC, 2005; FDRE, 2002b). 
 
Based on lessons drawn from past experiences of relief operations for domestic shocks, a shift 
in policy direction was made with the National Policy on Disaster Prevention and 
Management (NPDPM) ratified in 1993, which introduced “new approach” on the utilization 
of relief resources based on prevention and preparedness. The previous Relief and 
Rehabilitation Commission (RRC), whose duties were mainly to manage effects of drought 
through relief distribution to and rehabilitation of victims of drought and other disasters, has 
been replaced by Disaster Preparedness and Prevention Commission (DPPC) with the 
objectives of: (i) preventing disasters by way of removing the basic causes of thereof; (ii) 
building, in advance, the capacity necessary to alleviate the extent of damages that could be 
caused by disasters; (iii) ensuring the timely arrival of necessary assistance to victims of 
disaster (FDRE, Proclamation No.10/1995:75). The main powers and duties of DPPC are 
summarized and given in box 3.3 below.  
 
 
 
The National Policy on Disaster Prevention and Management (NPDPM), and its directives 
have been in place since 1993. The main priority areas of the Policy have been: 
  
i. saving human lives and their livelihoods;  
ii. protecting the quality of life in the affected areas from deteriorating on the account 
of disaster;  
iii. ensuring best use of natural resources endowment; and  
iv. overcoming the root causes of vulnerability to disaster through provision of relief in 
the short-term and promoting sustainable development in the longer-term (DPPC, 
2005:3). 
Box 3.3: Some of the Powers and Duties of DPPC: 
 
i. Prepare a disaster prevention and preparedness national policy; formulate strategy for its 
application; [….] follow up its implementation; formulate strategies for future disaster prevention 
by way of studying previous disaster areas.   
ii. Administer the National Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Fund and the National Food 
Reserve.  
iii. [….] undertake prior studies on the causes of disaster, set up systems for advance warning; 
iv. [….] make known the magnitude and extent of a disaster together with measures that should be 
taken in connection therewith; officially declare any relevant part of the country a disaster area; 
v. [….] request and receive any form of assistance from domestic and foreign sources; register all 
forms of assistance [….] and cause the distribution of same to the people being helped; 
vi. Inform the public through the mass media of the type, volume and utilization of assistance received 
from domestic and foreign sources.  
vii. [….] rehabilitate the victims of disaster, 
viii. coordinate and supervise relief activeness of NGOs. 
  Source: (FDRE, Proclamation No.10/1995:75-76). 
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The Policy makes references to all phases of disaster management (prevention, mitigation, 
preparedness, response, and rehabilitation/recovery). It focuses on multi-sectoral approach 
and involves all relevant Ministries. The policy entails the ideas of “preparedness”, 
“prevention”, ‘vulnerability’, and ‘saving livelihoods’ which were mainly lacking in the 
previous RRC activities.  Prior to the issuance of the policy, relief resources were distributed 
directly to the drought-affected population on free handout basis. The new approach or policy 
has discouraged free relief distribution to the able-bodied population with the aim of 
integrating the relief resources with development works, i.e. “linking relief to development”.   
 
The most important elements of the disaster prevention and management policy are the Early 
Warning System (EWS) established to monitor and give warning of disasters ahead of time; 
the Emergency Food Security Reserve (EFSR); the development of Relief Plan; National 
Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Fund (NDPPF). These elements form mainly the 
preparedness aspect of the policy. In recent years, of course, these policy measures have 
helped largely to avert famine.  
 
On the other hand elements for prevention, especially for addressing the main causes of 
disasters or livelihood protection are not clearly worked out in the policy implementation 
process. In relation to Ethiopian famine policy during the 20th century, some authors argue 
that “government self-interest and a disinterest in prospects of people led to untimely and 
insufficient responses and policies” (Stephen, 2004:109 quoting Mesfin Woldemariam, 1986). 
On the other hand DPPC claims that its policy was formulated in a systematic fashion 
involving: 
 
i. Analysis of drought and famine situation over the 20 years prior to the policy, 
which revealed that food aid increasing; beneficiary number increasing; 
dependency increasing; local production falling; and then the government was 
forced to ask itself - what next? 
ii. Formulation of policy that introduced “linking relief to development” as key 
mechanism of preparedness. 
iii. Implementation of the policy through the various modalities (e.g. EGS) (Sharp et 
al., 2003:4 in annex 1). 
 
Yet in its report for the world conference on disaster reduction (held in Kobe-Hyogo, Japan in 
January 2005), DPPC described its challenge in relation to policy implementation in the 
following terms:  
 
…. implementation of the NPDPM in its full sense, particularly in addressing the 
root causes of food shortage still remains a key challenge. In spite of the intensive 
familiarization of the policy and the associated training programmes, some of the 
policy components are not yet fully put into practice. Out of the many preparedness 
modalities/strategies stated in the Policy Directives, the establishment of seed 
reserve, the livestock preservation strategy, the initiation of Relief Plan at Woreda 
level and the allocation of resources based on Relief Plan as well as the declaration 
of disaster using decentralized EWS information are examples of strategies that are 
not adequately realized (DPPC, 2005:3-4). 
 
 118
It is clear that for the past three to four decades the number of people affected by droughts and 
famines has increased and many have been forced to rely on food aid every year. At the same 
time relief agencies have had to increase relief supplies to be distributed either for free or in 
exchange for beneficiary labour participation in communal works. Therefore, what the 
national policy on disaster prevention has brought is to discourage free food distribution to all 
able-bodied beneficiaries and to establish a modality on how to disperse relief resource to the 
needy. Accordingly the policy envisaged Employment Generation Schemes (EGS) whereby 
able-bodied beneficiaries get access to food by participating in EGS activities; and free food 
distribution (gratuitous relief) to those who are unable to work on EGS either due to health 
problems and age or due to any other physical disability. The basic assumption, as stated 
above, was to use relief resources for development activities too, i.e. ‘linking relief resources 
to development’.  
 
Therefore, in this case it can be said that there is no major departure in the policy 
implementation to address the root causes of increasing vulnerability to famine disaster in 
recent decades. In fact the two seemingly new elements include the discouraging of free food 
distribution and the introduction of EGS to undertake some development works. However, 
using relief resources for EGS activities is not as such new innovative approach88. It is similar 
to that of previous food-for-work or cash-for-work programmes which were applied since the 
1984-85 famine. Various agencies (e.g. World Food Programme and various NGOs) have 
implemented such programmes in the past three decades. Even some experts consulted in the 
highland areas commented that EGS is just like as “an old wine in a new bottle”.   
 
In fact DPPC acknowledged that addressing the root cause of food crisis still remains a key 
challenge (DPPC, 2005). It has faced constraints in implementing its disaster prevention or 
risk reduction strategies.89 This is attributed to a ‘capacity problem’90 mainly at Woreda level, 
lack of legislation to enforce the implementation of the Policy and to fill other gaps in the 
national policy. Major stakeholders particularly key line departments do not seem to accept 
the main policy strategy - the Employment Generation Scheme (EGS) - a mechanism to ‘link 
relief to development’ as part of their mandates. The link between responsibility, authority 
and accountability is not clearly understood and observed, which became an impediment to 
the policy implementation. This calls for policy revision taking into account the lessons learnt 
during the past implementation periods (DPPC, 2004).  
 
                                                 
88 Some case studies, of course, indicated that EGS programmes showed improvements in beneficiary targeting 
by minimizing errors of inclusion and exclusion which were the major problems of previous FFW/CFW 
programmes (Ali, 2000).   
89 Some of these strategies include EGS; establishment of seed reserve; livestock preservation strategy, Relief 
Plan at Woreda level; and declaration of disaster using decentralized EWS information.  
90 In fact, presenting a “capacity problem” in defending “policy implementation failures” is a common reaction 
of the government concerning all its policies.  On the other hand other sources attributed largely the policy 
failures to other key issues, for instance (i) Absence of proper diagnosis of problems (lack of clear linkage 
between analysis and policy choice). Details of problem analysis and the operationalization of the conceptual 
framework have major weaknesses. Therefore, in terms of the development of government policies, there is a 
general lack of systematic problem diagnosis/identification in Ethiopia (Teshome, 2002: 5 cited in Haan et al.,  
2006:12; Sharp et al., 2003:4 in annex 1); (ii) Resistance to reviewing/revising policy (e.g. land, education, 
NPDPM policies); absence of operational manuals/guidelines for policy implementation; and lack of consistency 
across sectors (Sharp et al., 2003:4 in annex 1) 
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Of course the proclamation for establishment of DPPC indicated the need to “undertake prior 
studies on the causes of disaster and set up systems for advance warning”, and to “enhance 
capacity to alleviate the damages” (FDRE, Proclamation No.10/1995:75-76). However, it has 
limited the objectives of studies to a setting up of systems for advance warning and that of 
“enhancing capacity to lessen damages.” Though, these objectives worth consideration, the 
Policy and its Directives have not clearly envisaged a framework for understanding factors or 
causes that increasingly put people in vulnerability situations.91 In other words it is to say 
making distinction between chronic and transitory food insecurity and addressing the issues 
accordingly.  
 
Indeed at project level there was an attempt made under the project named “Strengthening 
Emergency Response Abilities (SERA)” to undertake studies aimed at understanding the 
extent and nature of vulnerabilities to disasters. The project had two main objectives: (i) to 
develop vulnerability profiles of drought prone areas and design relevant response packages 
to enhance capacity;  (ii) to conduct vulnerability researches to understand the root causes of 
disasters (famine, severe food crisis,  epidemics).  In general the study had three components:  
 
i. Preparing vulnerability profiles for districts (Woredas) prone to chronic food 
shortages. 
ii. Undertaking research on selected topics to investigate the factors that render 
communities vulnerable. 
iii. Designing response packages to the vulnerable communities.  
 
The study also had a purpose of improving early warning systems and implementation of food 
security programmes; helping effective use of food resources and targeting vulnerable 
population and reducing their vulnerability to shocks.  
 
A pilot study covering 16 Woredas in four regions was completed. With regard to research 
agendas, the first was a study on “Vulnerability to Epidemics, Prevention and Preparedness” 
that was carried out by Ethiopian Health and Nutrition Research Institute (EHNRI). It 
addressed the major epidemics in the country, their severity and geographic distribution as 
well as prevention and preparedness mechanisms. The other research topic, “Analysis of 
Drought Forecasting Capability in Ethiopia” was undertaken by the National Meteorological 
Service Agency (NMSA). It was expected to contribute to the understanding of drought 
monitoring and forecasting methods in the country. The research topics related to “flood 
hazard” and “population pressure and carrying capacity” were not undertaken at all, due to 
lack of commitment and institutional problems on the part of partner agencies designated to 
undertake these topics.  
 
The SERA project was the first attempt made to understand disaster in terms of “vulnerability 
research”. It was intended to understand the types of disaster risks and their root causes. The 
intention was to analyze broader vulnerability factors rather than only risks/events/ and their 
symptoms. Unfortunately the project did not progress with its initial objective, and finally it 
                                                 
91 In fact some experts from DPPC state that “addressing vulnerability is a development issue that mainly falls 
under the mandates of other sector ministries which have a direct responsibilities for development activities” 
(personal communication).  
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ended up in being a “capacity building endeavour” which, as the usual routines of DPPC, 
focuses on enhancing EW systems of Regions. This happened mainly when international 
agendas (e.g. household food security, capacity building, poverty reduction, good 
governance) have become modus operand.92 In relation to this Lautze et al., (2003:20) noted 
that “leading humanitarian agencies in Ethiopia theorize famine as the outcome of food 
shortages leading to starvation. Termed a ‘food first bias’, and this has been the prevailing 
model of famine theory in Ethiopia since the 1970s. This concept has influenced the policies, 
institutions and processes of humanitarian responses in Ethiopia”.  
 
Although the vulnerability concept included in the national disaster prevention policy 
reflected the government’s initial reshaping of its ideology and position to show consistency 
with global concepts and a commitment to Ethiopian people, the policy prescriptions 
envisaged for addressing the basic causes of disaster have not yet been addressed adequately 
in process of implementation. In fact some sources (e.g. Maxwell, 2002) noted that the 
Ethiopian EWS is successful in alarming and putting some standing preparedness components 
in place (food grain reserve, public works-based safety nets). Since the catastrophic famines 
of the mid 1980s, the humanitarian communities (including the Government of Ethiopia as 
well as donors, the UN and NGOs) have invested heavily in institutional improvements for 
famine prevention in Ethiopia (Maxwell, 2002). DPPC also claims that “though drought-
induced food shortage is still recurring, it has not reached to the level of famine since the 
ratification of the Policy and this is a success in relation to the short-term objective” (DPPC, 
2005:3)93.  
 
Nevertheless this is not the whole of the matter when it comes to disaster prevention. The 
Ethiopian tradition to disaster prevention, in its long history, did not address the root causes of 
disasters. “The underlying orthodoxy in Ethiopia has been explained as a ‘food-first bias’ 
linked to the use of  ‘food availability decline’ model for food security analysis” (Lautze et 
al., 2003:20), and “this has its roots in the prevailing understanding of food security in the 
1970s and early 1980s” (Haan et al., 2006:15). Still another researcher (Maxwell, 2002) also 
noted that the underlying famine processes were not adequately addressed by prevention 
mechanisms in Ethiopia. In this case Maxwell has this to say:  
 
Much of famine preparedness in Ethiopia […] focuses on famines as events - 
specific episodes that put people at risk of starvation - rather than as processes that 
over time lead to either an improvement or a deterioration of people’s livelihoods. 
Despite the improvements made in famine preparedness […] in many parts of the 
                                                 
92 In Ethiopia global discourses on EW, famine, and food security had influenced the government policies. For 
instance Stephen (2004:106-108) investigated how food aid discussion is framed in Ethiopia and how food 
insecurity is homogenized in order to fit within the prevailing socio-political setting. She found out that the 
information processing for EW was shaped by different interpretations paired to particular worldviews about 
food security and famine, and by the disjuncture between locally situated food insecurity and national decision 
making.   
93 Despite DPPC’s claim, however, some studies labeled the crises of 1999-2000 (Maxwell, 2002:53) and 2002-
2003 (Degefa, 2005:123) as famines that occurred after the introduction of a new National Policy on Disaster 
Prevention and Management. The 2002-2003 famine affected even localities which previously had no famine 
record. Pastoralists were the most affected segments of the population during the 2002-2003 famine (Degefa, 
2005:126).  
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country, including those most hard hit by the crisis, people were steadily losing 
assets - and thus their ability to cope with the shocks that led to the crisis - all 
through the 1990s (Maxwell, 2002:52). 
 
Moreover the existing EWS and assessments have gaps too in terms of area coverage and 
issues to be considered. In relation to this Maxwell also observed it as follows:   
 
While lack of information is probably not to blame for the crisis of 1999–2000, 
several lessons about information systems can be drawn. One is that, in addition to 
the standard early warning information collected, the humanitarian community 
ought to pay much closer attention to assets and to the coping capacity of vulnerable 
populations. The underlying process of destitution in rural Ethiopia was known, but 
was not widely incorporated into early warning analysis before the crisis. Second, 
early warning systems developed for agricultural areas probably require greater 
adaptation before being used in pastoral areas (Maxwell, 2002:52-53). 
 
Retrospectively even it was not because of lack of information or warning that the tragedies 
of 1973-74 and 1984-85 famines occurred in the country. There were ample evidences even in 
the then RRC documents and provincial offices that such tragedy could occur. Therefore, it 
was not because of lack of prior warning or information that those famines took the lives of 
thousands of people. It was because of the Imperial and the Derg regimes’ and even 
international donors’ inactions or delays that led to those disasters94. Even currently it is not 
fair to attribute averting famine only to DPPA95 early warning system, given the proliferation 
of a dozen of NGOs engaged in food crisis monitoring and relief assistance more than any 
time in the country’s history. In relation to this Mesfin (1991:5) states that, “starvation has not 
disappeared. But thanks to a multitude of NGOs who closely monitor the situation, starvation 
has not been allowed to develop into famine since 1984-85”. Therefore, the knotty or crux of 
the matter is to address vulnerability which is in fact political as some writers  put it (Bender, 
1999 cited in Heijimans, 2004). And it requires political change and commitment more than 
channeling relief aid and public relation to prevent famine.  
 
Likewise the issue of pastoralists’ vulnerability has to been seen in the light of this framework 
that can address the root causes of their vulnerability. Concerning pastoralists the National 
Policy on Disaster Prevention and Management recognizes that livestock preservation is a key 
aspect of disaster preparedness in pastoral areas (Hogg, 1997b:4). Accordingly, the specific 
recommendations that are of long-term as well as emergency nature include alleviating fodder 
and water scarcity, avoiding distress disposal of stock and controlling decline in health status.  
However, as stated above, disaster prevention strategies envisaged for pastoral areas have not 
yet been materialized. For instance EGS, livestock preservation strategy, relief plan at 
Woreda level and declaration of disaster using decentralized EWS information are not put in 
place. Even the above mentioned types of projects or programmes (e.g. SERA and EGS) that 
                                                 
94 “The 1973-1974 and 1984-1985 famines, which caused the deaths of thousands of people, testify well the 
failure of the Haile Selassie and Menegistu governments to protect the citizens from famine/hunger” (Degefa, 
2005:346). 
95 The previous Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission (DPPC) is now called Disaster Prevention 
and Preparedness Agency (DPPA).   
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were attempted in agricultural areas have not been undertaken in the pastoral areas. The pilot 
study project (SERA) has been undertaken only in settled agriculture areas.96  
 
Therefore, in pastoral areas the intervention of DPPA is focused on some early warning 
activities and relief work. Assessment of livestock conditions, market, diseases, rainfall, etc. 
is done mainly on ad hoc basis. However, the existing EWS is not well adapted to pastoral 
areas as it is designed on the experience of agricultural areas. Moreover, the current early 
warning activity in pastoral areas is weak. Therefore, DPPA’s intervention is mainly on 
emergency assessment in order to target affected areas and communities and to distribute 
mainly relief food, and sometimes water to the needy. 
 
Very recently DPPA seems to undertake livelihood-based information systems for early 
warning, and for vulnerability and poverty monitoring and analysis. Although the tools 
developed have not yet been officially endorsed, pilot-testing of a livelihood-based needs 
assessment system is done in the SNNP Region (Haan et al., 2006:18). However, Haan et al. 
(2006:31) have remarked that “strong conceptual frameworks concerning food security 
analysis exist within the key government policy documents; the challenge is to adequately 
operationalise these in the Emergency Food Security Assessment (EFSA)”. Therefore, so far 
there has been little attempt for monitoring livelihood systems’ vulnerability (i.e. socio-
economic determinants of vulnerability in individual sub-regions),97  despite the fact that the 
sources of disasters are rooted more in social, economic, political and environmental 
processes than in the vagaries of nature.  
 
3.3.5 Preliminary Conclusions  
 
Generally it can be concluded that the current approach to disaster prevention has not yet 
adequately addressed the root causes of vulnerability at different levels for reducing risks. The 
activity of DPPA has been mainly emergency relief distribution during disaster98. The 
“Ethiopian EWS (e.g. spatial analysis of famine at higher level of aggregation) has been a 
tactical measure, exercised by the state and non-governmental agencies”, and “it is a policy 
designed to control the dispersal of scarce resources, but also to preserve the status quo” 
(Stephen, 2004:109). Stephen added that “this has limited the development of conceptual 
views within the national early warning systems to only superficial parts of the analysis”. The 
practice of EWS has been mainly monitoring traditional indicators (e.g. food supply, 
behaviour of market, rainfall and livestock health). Its methods of analysis fall in line with the 
greater demand for information in emergencies and resources available for relief, as opposed 
to long term development (Stephen, 2004:11). Of course there is success of the early warning 
system in terms of averting widespread famine (Lautze et al., 2003:27). But it failed to take 
adequate account of more localized food crises and of the general impoverishment and 
                                                 
96 After I completed my field work, some pilot safety net programs have been started in some pastoral areas in 
2007. Thus I had no the opportunity to assess these programs in this research.   
97 The dominant methodology is an assessment of national needs using technological equipments whose purpose 
is to provide a broad view.  
98 However it does not mean that relief intervention has not done well. It has, of course, saved the lives of 
victims of various crises/famines. In here, however, it means addressing the root causes of and differential 
vulnerability at different levels, and accordingly designing risk reduction strategies.    
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erosion of capacity that recurrent crises have on the affected households (Haan et al., 
2006:19).  
 
Very recently the government claims that it is committed to overcome the root causes of food 
insecurity. It states that “strategies like intensive water harvesting, safety net, alternative 
income generation activities and resettlement of people from vulnerable areas to fertile 
locations are some of the main areas of focus aimed at reducing disaster risk in a sustainable 
manner” (DPPC, 2005). These interventions are new and their viability has to be seen in the 
future. 
 
Furthermore, the government’s intention is to settle pastoralists as a long term solution to 
tackle impacts of drought, and shortage of water and pasture. However, the fragility of the 
pastoralists’ environment is identified as a major challenge to the present government’s 
intention to settle pastoralists and to expand irrigation schemes.  
 
Indeed the frequency of drought has increased from once in 10 years (during the 1970s and 
1980s) to once in about three to five years in recent decades. And drought-related food 
crises/famines have affected millions of people and killed a significant number of people 
between 1970 and 1996 (Lautze et al., 2003). Drought-related food crisis is still recurring. In 
the past fifteen years (i.e. after the new policy on disaster prevention is in place), the number 
of people exposed to famine/food crisis is in an increasing trend, though the number of 
victims fluctuated between years (see figure 3.1).  
 
Figure-3.1: Affected (vulnerable) Population per Year (1974-2003) in Ethiopia*  
Affected (vulnerable) Population  Per Year in Ethiopia (1974-2003) 
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Source: Own computation on the basis of DPPC data source.  
* Data for 1976 and 1977 are not available.  
 
In general on average 5-6 million people are in need of food assistance every year. As figure 
3.1 shows, the number of needy people is increasing, whereas the Ethiopian Government 
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claims success of its rural-centred development policy in the past fifteen years.99 Worst to this 
is also an increase of destitution in rural areas. Of all social groups, the pastoral communities 
which inhabit mainly the peripheral parts of the country have been more vulnerable to various 
risks now than any time in the past. The main risk factors that face pastoral groups in Ethiopia 
are brief described in the following section.    
 
3.3.6 Pastoralists’ Vulnerability to Multiple Risks  
 
The preceding sections discussed the socio-political processes, external encroachments and 
government policies that have influenced the current situation of pastoral societies in 
Ethiopia. As it is indicated earlier pastoralists have become vulnerable to multiple risks. This 
section presents a summary of main risks that pastoral groups are facing in Ethiopia.   
 
i. Recurrent Drought Risk. The pastoral areas are characterized by frequent drought with 
high livestock mortality followed by famine and a high death rate in human population. 
Drought has increasingly become the major deterring factor of pastoral production. When a 
drought occurs it substantially increases livestock mortality; reduces livestock prices and 
raises the prices of food grains, a situation that aggravates the problems of pastoralists by 
shifting the terms of trade in favour of their purchase than their sales (Futterknecht, 1997 cited 
in Ahmed et al., 2002). Since 1972-1974, severe drought occurrences decimated a high 
percentage of livestock population with little time for recovery. The following table depicts 
the size of livestock lost to the past drought events. 
Table 3.5 Size of Livestock Loss to Major Droughts 
Affected livestock species (%) Drought 
year 
Regions 
Cattle Sheep Goats Camels Equines 
1972/1974 Afar  72 45 34 37 - 
1983/1985 Oromiya/Borana 60 - - - - 
1995/1997 Oromiya/Borana 78 - - 45 - 
Afar up to 45 up to 15 up to 15 up to 25  
Oromiya/Bale 50 35 20 15 20 
Somali up to 80 60 40 35 - 
1999/2000 
SNNPR/South Omo 50 20 20 15 - 
Source: Sandford and Yahannes (2000:6) 
 
There is a general idea that drought is a normal state of affairs in drylands where pastoral 
groups inhabit and have developed adaptive strategies to escape drought effects. This has 
been in fact true for long time where pastoral groups’ capacity to withstand the effects of 
drought was high. As a result of mounting pressure from outside and increased frequency of 
drought, indigenous coping mechanisms have been insufficient to cope with impacts of 
prolonged and recurrent droughts. Moreover, the natural resource base of the pastoral 
economy has been undermined by a number of socio-political processes that have taken place 
in the past half a century. Consequently, drought risk has become a number one threat to 
livestock production and to pastoral livelihoods. This is mainly because of the loss of drought 
                                                 
99 “Failure of human beings to minimize vulnerability is blamed for famines since 1950; and much of the blame 
lies on failure of governments i.e. lack of good governance, lack of pro-poor policies, and lack of preparedness 
and sound EWS” (Degefa, 2005:346).  
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and dry seasons grazing areas and the restriction of herders’ movements that are the main 
drought-impact escaping mechanisms. Furthermore, the direct impacts of drought have been 
severe, and recovery has been extremely difficult for pastoral groups. Resources or assets 
both at household and community levels have been eroded overtime and community level 
fallbacks have been insufficient either to cope with crisis or recover quickly. For instance a 
recent study (Devereux, 2006:47-48) of pastoral livelihoods in the Somali Region of Ethiopia 
showed that:  
 
i. The recent series of droughts in the Somali Region have caused widespread and 
seemingly irreversible losses of livestock in thousands of pastoralist households. 
ii. Many of these households have been forced out of livestock-based livelihoods and 
into urban areas or internally displaced person (IDP) camps as a consequence, 
possibly permanently. 
iii. Pessimism about the future viability of livestock-based livelihoods is high, especially 
among women and young people in parts of the Region. 
 
Therefore, some pastoral households are forced out of their traditional livelihood system 
and/or to rely on external assistance as they are not able to cope with shocks through 
traditional mechanisms. Generally recurring and prolonged droughts have become the main 
risks to the pastoralists in Ethiopia. 
 
ii. Risk of Political Marginalization (Persistence of State Neglect).  In recent decades 
pastoral groups have gained some degree of “representation” at the national, regional and 
local levels. This seems a promising start, though it has yet to be fruitful. The potential to 
influence state policy and to assert pastoral needs and priorities has not yet reflected at the 
surface. This needs a significant and a true decentralization, local autonomy, fair and effective 
representation at all levels which in turn enhance trust and smooth state-society relationship. 
Nevertheless, a recent study from the Somali Region came up with discouraging results after 
a decade of “political decentralization” processes. The findings “suggest that three-quarters of 
the people in the Somali Region feel disenfranchised (not fairly represented) and believe that 
the Government is not working effectively to serve their interests (ineffectively represented)” 
(Devereux, 2006:117). The same study also explored critical views with respect to the 
government-local people relationship. In one of the discussions with the community, the 
people expressed the following critical views about their relationship and interaction with the 
government.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 3.4: Some views of pastoralists towards government 
 
1. We do not know if we have representation. It seems no one is conveying our problems to the 
government. 
2. Nothing changes. Electing leaders is a waste of time. 
3. Government, government - what government are you talking about? We only see the army, if that is 
what you mean. 
4. No one talks to us to ask what we need. The government does not exist here. 
5. The government does nothing at all for us. 
Source: Devereux, 2006:118 
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In the same study key informants also reinforced the above views. An elder from Kelafo 
District expressed it as follows: 
 
… successive regimes have marginalized the district and the Somali Region in 
general. […] elected local representatives cannot have any positive impact, because 
they are effectively voiceless and quickly forget their roots in the rural 
constituencies: The elected representatives do not look back, they go and disappear 
in Jijiga”100 (Devereux, 2006:18) 
 
Alternatively other informants “recognized the potential for decentralization to make a 
difference to local people, but identified serious shortcomings in its implementation” 
(Devereux, 2006:118). One of the focus group participants expressed this as follows: 
 
Decentralization can be a good process, but there must be clear communication 
between the different levels. The District must pass messages to the Regional 
Government and then they must pass it onto the Federal Government. At the 
moment, decentralization only means that we have these different levels, but not that 
there is any communication between the levels (Devereux, 2006:118) 
 
In general what can be drawn from the case of the Somali Region is that political 
marginalization of pastoral groups still persists. Representation is inadequate at all levels. 
Moreover communication gaps between the local people and other actors have been pervasive 
at all levels. In this case the situation in other pastoral areas may not be significantly different 
from that of the Somali Region. This point is examined in the context of my study community 
in Chapter 6.  
 
 
iii. Risk of Violent Conflict. In Ethiopia despite the political developments since 1991, 
various forms of conflicts have been intensified. Conflicts occur at different levels, from 
widespread commercialized animal theft, to political rebellion and secessionism101. Given 
pastoralists’ position along the state’s boundaries, conflicts from neighbouring countries also 
spill over across borders, and aggravate inter-state conflicts. Typical examples are the Ethio-
Eritrea border war and Ethiopia’s invasion to Somalia.  
Conflicts among and between pastoral groups for pastureland, water and access routes are 
also intensified. Clashes between herders and cultivators have become more frequent. 
Frequent clashes also occur between indigenous people and authorities of national parks and 
private investors, as livestock-herders move their stock into parks and private commercial 
farms, especially during drought periods.  
 
The ethnic-based political process also involves contention over control of government 
offices and resources at local level. Tension and conflict among power-mongers has been 
pervasive at all levels. “Ironically, the modicum of politico–administrative resources brought 
to the pastoralist domain lately by the move towards decentralization has also become a bone 
                                                 
100 Jijiga is the capital of the Somali national regional government.  
101 In most regions, insurgent groups are operating at different levels for political power, some with agenda of 
seceding or broader autonomy (e.g. OLF, ONLF, ARDUF).   
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of contention” (Markakis, 2004:26). Control of state office and resources at the local level has 
sparked inter and intra group conflicts. For instance, Anuak and Nuer contention for 
dominance in the Gambella Regional State climaxed in massive violence in 2003 (Markakis, 
2004:26).  
 
The policy of ethnic federalism has also brought a risk of increased conflicts at the regional 
frontiers. Some authors argue that “the ethnic based regionalization and mapping of 
administrative regions has created or added more tension to what is a conflict-prone part of 
Ethiopia” (Alem, 2001 cited by Flintan and Imeru, 2002:284). This has been common 
between Somalis and Oromos in the south-east and between Afar and neighbouring sedentary 
cultivators in the north-east.  For instance, changes in distribution of land with the recently 
defined regions between Somali and Oromiya Regions have escalated ethnic conflict in the 
Borana area (especially between the Somali clans in Liben and Arrero ward in the Borana 
lowlands (Flintan and Imeru, 2002:284). The conflicts between the Borana and Hamar 
pastoralists, and between the Borana and Arbore pastoralists have been ongoing for many 
years. One major conflict area is the Chewbahir Lake where pastoral groups from Hamar and 
Borana bring their animals for pasture and water during the prolonged dry seasons or drought 
periods (Mohammed, 2004: 20-21).  
       
New transport links that cross the lowlands represent a new resource and source of conflict in 
Awash. The Afar and Issa Somali in eastern Ethiopia are locked into a bitter conflict over the 
control of the Addis Ababa-Djibouti road. Similarly, the Borana and Gerri have been fighting 
for more than a decade over a section of the Ethiopia–Kenya road, north of Moyalai 
(Markakis, 2004:26).  
 
Pastoralists are also affected by larger conflicts between states and/or between the national 
government and rebel groups. For instance the conflicts between Eritrea and Ethiopia, and 
conflicts between the Ethiopian government and rebel groups (OLF and ONLF) have affected 
pastoral groups in the north, and south and south-east respectively. In general, in recent 
decades inter and intra-ethnic conflicts over resources, access routes and territory boundaries 
have been intensified due to increased scarcity of resource,  and accelerated by curtailment of 
mobility, high incidence of drought, proliferation of weapons, etc. In a net shell both vertical 
and horizontal conflicts among various ethnic groups have been pervasive in different parts of 
the pastoral areas. Therefore, violent conflict has become a risk to livelihoods of many 
pastoral groups in Ethiopia.  
 
iv. Risk of exclusion from market. Currently there emerge modern ranching schemes and 
animal fattening for both domestic and foreign markets. These schemes often fulfil standards, 
since they have access to services and can also invest in disease prevention. Moreover, 
animals are trucked by modern transport and risks of animal weight loss or morality are 
avoided. On the contrary, pastoralists live in remote areas and have little access to 
infrastructures and services or they do not have the means to purchase drugs for disease 
prevention. Moreover for the pastoralists transport involves major costs. Animals are either 
trekked or trucked to markets. Trekking is the dominant mode of transportation in pastoral 
areas. However, trekking has high costs due to animal mortality, weight loss, risk of raid or 
conflict, taking inconvenient time and bad routes as a result of water point or grass, etc. Taxes 
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or transit fees may be high, or livestock may be repeatedly taxed. As a result of these 
constraints, pastoralists face a high risk of exclusion from market. This is due to either their 
livestock may not meet sufficient health standard for export or for local market, or may not 
compete in open markets. Sporadic crackdown by the government on “illegal cross-border 
livestock trade”, and bans by Gulf States on livestock import also contributed to market 
exclusion. Consequently, pastoral groups are facing constraints to get access to regional 
markets and cross-border livestock trade due to internal and external factors.  
 
v. Risk of flood (hazard). Geographically, nearly all pastoral areas are found in the lowlands 
which are crossed by major rivers (Awash, Wabe-Shebelle, Genale, Omo and Baro-Akobo). 
The highland areas are highly degraded and the runoff from these areas has been very high in 
recent decades. Therefore, flash flood is becoming an emerging disaster risk. For instance in 
summer 2006, a dozen of local people were affected and displaced by flood in South Omo, 
Somali and Afar; and a number of people were drowned. As a result communities, especially 
pastoral groups inhabiting in low-lying areas are at risk of flood hazard. This is particularly 
true in Afar and Somali regions, Southern Omo (SNNP region) and in western Ethiopia (see 
map 3 for flood prone areas). Therefore, flood hazard is leading to a disaster in marginal areas 
where pastoral societies are living.   
 
Map 3 Flood Prone Areas in Ethiopia 
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vi. Risk of HIV/AIDS. HIV/AIDS spread rapidly reaching epidemic proportions by the end of 
the last century in all the countries of East Africa. In Ethiopia HIV/AIDS is a growing new 
source of vulnerability with serious economic, social and demographic impacts. The rate of 
infection in Ethiopia is estimated at about 10% of the adult population (Markakis, 2004:19). 
Its prevalence is higher in urban than in rural areas.  
In pastoral areas there are conditions that are conducive to the spreading of HIV/AIDS. These 
include lack of education and information; lack of health services, testing facilities and 
condoms; poverty and insecurity; and traditional harmful practices. For instance according to 
the Ethiopian Demographic and Health Survey report (DHS) the lowest use of modern 
contraceptive methods is in Somali Region (CSA, 2001:vii). Besides, traditional harmful 
practices such as female genital mutilation, polygamy, wife inheritance, early marriage, 
under-age marriage to older men, etc. are other conducive factors for the spread of HIV/AIDS 
in pastoral areas. Moreover, nowadays small towns are emerging, and the number of animal 
traders and migrant labourers is increasing in pastoral areas102. Such developments also 
indirectly contribute to spread of the HIV/AIDS. A recent study in Somali Region of Ethiopia 
indicated that prostitutes who migrated from highlands; internally displaced persons; and 
refugees from Somalia were blamed for the spread of the disease in the Region (Devereux, 
2006:154). Therefore, given all these factors the spread of HIV/AIDS pandemic is a risk for 
pastoral population in Ethiopia. 
 
With special emphasis on pastoralism in East Africa and Ethiopia, this chapter has presented a 
review of empirical researches carried out on pastoralism, pastoralists’ adaptive and coping 
strategies, pastoral development policies and strategies pursued by the national governments 
and their consequences on pastoralists, etc. It is also attempted to depict the pastoralists’ 
predicaments, marginalization, and transformation caused by internal and external factors. 
With this review of the previous empirical works as background, the next four chapters will 
focus on the Afar pastoralists. Chapters 4&5 will discuss on the Afar political structure, social 
organizations, livelihood systems and their constraints, adaptive and coping strategies to 
external pressures and extreme events, etc. Discussions in these two chapters mainly 
constitute regional level analyses. Chapter 6 presents community and household level 
analyses focusing on the case study community. Chapter 7 summaries the main findings, and 
provides conclusions and recommendations.     
                                                 
102 For instance a study carried out in pastoral district (i.e. Maasai-populated Kadjado) of Kenya indicated that 
animal traders are suspected of being the main conduit of transmission, because they have a high incidence rate 
of sexually transmitted diseases (Koech, 2001 cited in  Markakis:2004:19). 
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Chapter Four 
 
The Afar Pastoralists: History, Political Structure and Social Organizations 
 
This chapter mainly focuses on the history of the Afar and their socio-political structure and 
organization. The background information used in writing this chapter came mainly from 
secondary sources (Lewis, 1955; Trimingham, 1976; Voelkner, 1974; Fekadu et al., 1984; 
Ayele, 1986; Gamaledin, 1993; Kebede, 1994; 2005; Yacob et al., 2000; Getachew, 2001a; 
Ayalew, 2000; 2004; Yirgalem, 2001; Kelemewrok, 2002; ANRS, 2003; 2004b). In some 
sections of this chapter, whenever needed, discussions are supplemented with primary data 
material generated during the field work.  
 
Firstly, a brief account of the administrative structure and population of the Afar region is 
provided on the basis of statistics and empirical researches. Secondly, a brief history of the 
Afar and their historical relations with the central state and with their neighbours is briefly 
discussed. Thirdly, descriptions of Afar social and political structures and organization (clan, 
marriage pattern, settlement pattern, clan leadership, council of elders, sanction-executing and 
conflict management institutions) are elabourated. Finally, an attempt is made to assess how 
the traditional social organizations and authorities are affected by social and economic 
pressures and processes of incorporation into the state structures in the past several decades. 
In doing so this chapter situates the social and political organizations of the Afar society in 
the context of the research problem under consideration. 
    
4.1 Location, Administrative Structure and Population  
 
In Ethiopia with the change of government in 1991 came a new administrative structure 
established on the basis of ethnic federalism. Prior to this period the Afar land was partitioned 
into the provinces of Wello, Tigre, Shewa, Hararghe and Eritrea. In fact prior to 1991, the 
1987 constitution of the People’s Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (PDRE) provided the Afar 
with “autonomous regional status” under the name of “Assab Autonomous Region” which 
was changed since 1991.  
 
During the transition period (1991-1994) the Afar territory changed into two respects. The 
north-eastern portion from the junction of the Ethiopia-Djibouti border to the Buri peninsula 
was incorporated into the new state of Eritrea, and the territory extending from the salt mining 
area of Berehale was made part of the newly reorganized territory of the Afar Regional State. 
Then the Afar population was consolidated within one regional administration with its own 
powers of self-administration.  
 
The current Afar National Regional State (ANRS) covers some 95,266 km2 across the north-
eastern part of Ethiopia (ANRS, 2004b:1). The Afar region shares international boundaries 
with Djibouti and Eritrea, as well as regional boundaries with Tigray, Amhara, Oromiya and 
Somali regions. It is organized into 5 zones (sub-regions), 29 administrative Woredas 
(districts), and 358 Kebeles of which 326 are rural kebeles and 32 urban Kebeles (ANRS, 
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2003:1). Kebele is the lower government administrative unit (For administrative region and 
location see map 4). 
 
 
 
Map 4 The current administrative zones and Woredas in the Afar Region103  
 
                                                 
103Delineation of international and regional and/or other boundaries on maps must not be considered 
authoritative.  
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The Afar population is estimated at 1.2 million (ANRS, 2004b:1). The population distribution 
by zones and rural population density are depicted in the table 4.1 below. Some 92 percent of 
the population live in the rural areas. Pastoralism and agro-pastoralism are the main economic 
activities, the first being the dominant one. Along the western edge there are an increasing 
number of rural families who practice rain-fed cultivation (ANRS, 2004b:1).  
 
Table 4.1 Rural and urban population and rural population densities for 2000  
Zone Rural Urban Total Rural density (persons/km2) 
Zone 1 320,089 48,936 369,025 10 
Zone 2 230,281 5,705 235,986 8 
Zone 3 127,074 42,811 169,885 8 
Zone 4 139,724 2,025 141,749 13 
Zone 5 317,032 0 317,032 59 
Region total 1,134,200 99,477 1,233,677 12 
Source: Afar National Regional State (ANRS), 2004b, p.22. 
 
As shown in table 4.1 above, Zones 2 and 3 have the lowest overall population densities, a 
reflection of their low natural resource potential and low rainfall on the eastern side of the 
Region. On the other hand, Zone 5 has the highest density. Within the Region and the Zones, 
the Woreda densities per total area vary (see map 5 below). A maximum of 139 persons per 
km2 occurs in Artuma Woreda in Zone 5, and 1 person per km2 in Afdera Woreda in Zone 2. 
The higher population densities are found in those Woredas in the foothills and piedmont 
plains below the main escarpment in the western side of the Region (ANRS, 2004b:22).  
 
 
 
Map 5 Population Density by Woreda, Afar region 
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4.2 History of Afar People and their Changing Relationship with the State 
 
4.2.1 Origin of the Afar People 
 
The Afar, Somali and Oromo belong to Cushitic language family. The Afar language - cafar-
af - is classified along with the Somali and Oromo languages within the Lowland East 
Cushitic language family (Getachew, 2001a:35; Kebede, 1994:4). Trimingham (1976:8) also 
stated that “the Afar-Saho, Somali and Oromo belong to one of the waves of Cushitic 
migrations […] who crossed the Bab-al Mandab104 and the Gulf of Aden in early times into 
the coastal regions of East Africa”. According to Trimingham these groups fundamentally 
belong to the same Hamitic stem, and are usually classified as “Low Kushite” and their 
original African homeland seems to have been between the upper course of the Webi and the 
coast of the Gulf of Aden. Trimingham asserted that they became differentiated 
ethnographically into three great groups due to migration, fractionings, and through mixing in 
varying degrees with Negroes. And those who spread northwards into the Danakil depression 
and its coastal region are distinguished by the linguistic group names of Afar and Saho 
(Trimingham, 1976:8).   
 
 According to the above description the Afar are a Hamitic people of the same branch as the 
Somali, and their ancestors must have come across the Red Sea in the distant past 
(Trimingham, 1976:171). But, Trimingham remarked that “their history is unknown for, like 
that of all nomadic peoples it is the issue of migrations and super-impositions, fractionings 
and regroupings”.  
 
The Afar were first mentioned by Ibn Sa’id in the 13th century under the form or by the name 
Dankal/Danakil (Trimingham, 1976:171; Lewis, 1955:155). The Afar call themselves cafara-
umata, the Afar people, and they call their language cafar-af, and their country Afer-barro 
(Getachew, 2001a:35, 49). The Afar are identified by their neighbours and outsiders by 
various names: Danakil by Europeans and Arabs; Adali by their Oromo neighbours; Oudali 
by the Issa-Somali; Taltal by Tigre; and Adal by the Amhara and Argoba (Getachew, 
2001a:49, Trimingham, 1976:171).   
 
4.2.2 The Afar Sultanates and their Relation with the Central State   
 
For many centuries the north-east part of the Ethiopian Afar land has been an area where a 
number of big and small Sultanates evolved and declined (Getachew, 2001a:35). Some of 
these included the Sultanate of Aussa; Sultanate of Rahyata, 60 kms to the south of Assab; 
Sultanate of Biru in Tigray [nowadays found in Afar Regional state]; Sultanate of Tadjoura 
and Sultanate of Gobaad, both found in the Republic of Djibouti (Dahilon, 1985 cited in 
Kebede, 1994:35). 
 
Trimingham (1976:171) also noted that they [i.e. Danakil] formed the nomadic part of the 
peoples of the Kingdom of Adal and a substantial section of the Imam Ahmed’s armies. 
                                                 
104 For the location of Bab-al Mandab (Balel-mandeb) see map 1 (Languages of North-East Africa) in 
Trimingham (1976:16).  
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Getachew (2001a:49) further indicated that the Afar used to have Sultanates, which seem to 
have evolved from the Adali Muslim state of Harar since the 17th century. According to 
Getachew the earlier Sultanate of the Afar was the Ankala Sultanate with its capital Rahayto, 
which developed in the northern part of the present day Djibouti Republic and southern 
Eritrea.  
 
Trimingham (1976:171) claimed that after the death of Imam Ahmed Gragn and the collapse 
of his armies that consisted of substantial recruits of Afar, the Danakil (Afar) were soon 
dispersed and back again in their miserable desert, where in one place where permanent 
settlement was possible, the Sultanate of Aussa was formed. In this connection Getachew 
(2001a:49) also stated that the Awsa [Aussa] Sultanate evolved from the [Ahmed] Gragn 
Wars and the Oromo invasion.105   
 
Historically, the Afar have had a complicated relationship with the central government and 
their neighbours. Trimingham (1976:172) noted that “the Aussa Sultanate was comparatively 
free from raids from the highlands and the Abyssinian power until the time of Emperor 
Menelik II when, as a result of its Sultan having formed treaties with the Italians, it was 
invaded in 1895 by the Shewan army and forced to pay tribute”. Another explorer (Thesiger, 
1935) also reinforced Trimingham’s idea. He stated that "the Afar country has never been 
effectively conquered by the Abyssinians, who are highlanders, unsuited by nature to operate 
in those hot and feverish lowlands" (Thesiger, 1935 as quoted in Kebede, 1994:29). 
Therefore, according to these sources, the Sultanate of Aussa remained independent and un-
penetrated by the central government of Ethiopia until 1944106. 
 
According to Trimingham, however, the Northern tribes such as the Dahrimela came under 
the hegemony of the rulers of Tigray, whereas those in the centre and south, with whom the 
Shewan kings had to remain on good terms in order to ensure the safety of their caravans to 
the coast always maintained a practical independence. No Abyssinian force dared to penetrate 
beyond the fringes. The Afar were continually contending even for the possession of these 
(Trimingham, 1976:171). 
 
Of all Sultanates of Afar, “the most important was that of the Sultanate of Aussa by virtue of 
its considerable wealth and strategic location. It is only the Aussa region which is fertile, and 
agriculture has been practiced there for so many years by the help of the Awash River" 
(Dahilon, 1985 cited in Kebede, 2005:36). Thus the Aussa Sultanate became stronger than 
any other previous Sultanate, and political and economic factors contributed to this. The 
economic factors that had contributed to the strength of the Aussa Sultanate included caravan 
trade, livestock production, small-scale agriculture along the lower Awash delta, and later the 
                                                 
105 There are two views concerning the emergence of the Sultanate in Aussa. The first view relates the 
emergence of the Sultanate to the coming of Arabs to the area from a place called Yambu in Yemen, while the 
second view maintains that it is the result of the fall of Islamic Kingdom of Harar (Kebede, 1994:21). The 
former description seems unlikely while the second one is most likely and also widely supported by other writers 
(e.g. Trimingham, 1976: 96-97), and traditional interpretation of history (Kebede, 1994:22).   
106 Clapham also further argued that “Ethiopia as a whole did not have a centralized administration until after the 
end of the Italian rule in 1941, when attempts were made to set up a civil and military  bureaucracy” (Clapham, 
1969 cited in Kebede, 1994:29).   
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introduction of large-scale commercial farms in the Awash Valley in the 1960s (Kebede, 
1994; Getachew, 2001a).  
 
Historically the Awash Valley had been the main gateway for the caravan trade between the 
coast and the highland of Ethiopia. Aussa formed an important link on this route and its 
Sultanates depended on revenue from trade. The early Sultans had also benefited from slave 
trade and other trade activities as Aussa was the vital trade route to Tadjoura for centuries 
(Gamaledin, 1993:48). Until the early 1960s (i.e. before the advent of large-scale commercial 
farms in Aussa), the main economic base of the Sultanate of Aussa was mainly livestock 
breeding. As animal production was the major economic activity in the region, the major 
concern of the Afar had been the availability of water and grass for livestock. This economic 
base continued as the main mode of economic life until the introduction of large-scale 
commercial farms in Aussa in the 1960s. Agriculture, though on small-scale, had been 
practiced for thousands of years which first began in today's Afambo area. 
 
Since the early 1940’s (i.e. during Emperor Haile Silassie’s time) the relation between the 
Imperial Government and the Aussa Sultante had changed. In 1944 an Ethiopian expedition 
was sent against Aussa on the grounds of the insecurity of the trade-routes, and its Sultan 
(Mohammed Yayo) was captured and brought to Addis Ababa where he died whilst in 
captivity. One of his relations, Ali Mirah was appointed as the Sultan of Aussa. (This will be 
elabourated in Chapter 5, section 5.2.4.1). However, the Imperial Government’s attempt to 
directly administer Aussa through centrally appointed governors was challenged by Sultan Ali 
Mirah and his supporters. Thus the central government resorted to indirect rule through 
appointing local chiefs (Balabats). At that time the relationship between the Sultan of Aussa 
(Ali Mirah) and the Emperor Haile Silassie was largely smooth. In relation to this Kebede 
(1994:33) stated as follows:  
 
…. after a little-known Boha Revolt by the Sultan in 1949 when he decided to exile 
himself to Boha - a small village near the border of the Republic of Djibouti - an 
agreement was made between the Ethiopian government and the Aussans. […] this 
agreement served the interests of both the central government and the Aussans. The 
Emperor was aiming to incorporate the then French territory of Afar and Issa. 
Hence, to the central government the long-term objective of the agreement was to 
use the Sultan as mediator to influence political conditions in that area. The Sultan 
was also careful to normalize relations with the Emperor for the role the Emperor 
could play in influencing or determining who should take power when the 
opportunity presents itself. This was a lesson the Sultan learnt from the Emperor's 
role in his coming to power in 1944. Both Sultan Ali Mirah and the Emperor needed 
to have smooth relations with each other. The Sultan was practically a semi-
independent Sultan, having a direct access to the central government. For the 
Emperor, for anything to be done in Aussa the Sultan's prior consensus was 
important.  
 
Therefore, following the agreement between Emperor Haile Silassie and Sultan Ali Mirah 
after the brief revolt of the Sultan at a place called Boha, the Ethiopian governor was removed 
from Asayita. Governors henceforth were to administer the Aussa district from their remote 
base at Bati town in the highland. The Sultan who had complained about restriction of access 
to the Emperor was given such access and he was promoted to the position of 'chief’ 
(Balabat) and then Bitwoded (the beloved). This later ushered the era of indirect rule, because 
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other Afar leaders were subject to this new overlord (Gamaledin, 1993:53). This point is 
elabourated in 4.3.4, No.I.  
 
Though exploitation was in its rudimentary stage and not widespread, there were some 
dominant chiefs who were ‘first among equals’. In relation to this some authors stated that the 
Afar had Sultanates resembling feudal kingdoms (Fekadu et al., 1984:18). According to the 
informants from the study community, the Chiefs (Balabats)107 during the Emperor time were 
reported to be ‘exploitative’. At each level the local people had to pay tax to their respective 
chiefs (Balabats) and each chief to the higher level leadership (i.e. to the Sultan in Aussa). 
Informants reported that the Sultan of Aussa was able to accumulate large herds collected 
from tax and share from penalty collected at the community level. The Sultan’s wealth of 
stock was managed by herding groups assigned to each species of stock. Every 500-1000 
cattle were herded by a group of about 15-20 persons, and this grouping was called Bahiri-
Derimo. Likewise every 500-1000 camels were herded by a group of about 15-20 persons, 
and this grouping was named Bahiri-Akelie. Therefore, groups of people who were becoming 
dependent for subsistence on livestock owned by the Sultan had emerged. In relation to this 
Gamaledin (1993:48) noted that “the period witnessed the appearance of pastoral aristocracy, 
many of whose members owned land, and client population who were becoming dependent 
for their subsistence on the livestock owned and managed by the Sultanate’s own Malokti108 
(bailiffs)”. Gamaledin further stated that the inclusion of Malokti within the power structure, 
imposition of these officials in pastoral sectors and the introduction of livestock taxes reduced 
the power of the Makaban. 
 
The introduction of large-scale commercial farming in the late 1950s into Aussa also shifted 
the Sultanate’s economic base and changed the class structure and relations in the region. The 
Sultan had been among the shareholders and benefited much from the new commercial 
farming. The percentage share of the Sultan Ali Mirah was seven percent109 (Kebede, 
1994:34). This new economic wealth of the Sultan together with his traditional authority has 
strengthened his power and he became stronger than his predecessors. This gave rise to a new 
class previously unknown to Aussa. Thus the Sultan and a small number of clan chiefs 
promoted to Balabats benefited from the new commercial farms through shareholding and/or 
running their own farms. In addition to this the Sultan acquired substantial land and profits 
from taxation. On the other hand, the majority of the pastoralists were out of the main stream 
of development, and had no or very little participation in the new economic activity. 
Therefore, the majority of the Afar were neglected while modernized agriculture with 
attractive profit was growing fast at their expense.   
 
In general the Sultanate of Aussa had supremacy over the other Sultanates and succeeded in 
maintaining its existence as a strong traditional Sultanate for four centuries until 1974. The 
Aussa Sultanate survived until the 1974 Revolution in Ethiopia. During the Derg rule the 
Sultanate was officially abolished in 1974. The demise of the Sultanate of Aussa led to the 
                                                 
107 Some authors noted that the introduction of Balabats caused political havoc, because some Afar Kidho Abba 
(lineage heads), with aspiration to power, began to use the government to promote their personal rise in status 
(Gamaledin, 1993).   
108 Malokti were officials assigned by the Sultan.  
109 Mitchell-Cotts Group (a British Firm which managed Tendaho Plantation) had 51 per cent of the share; the 
Ethiopian government 38 percent, and 4 percent was left for various local and foreign private interest shares. 
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weakening of the political strength of the Afar (Helland, 1980, cited in Assefa, 1995; 
Kelemework, 2000; Gamaledin, 1993). After 1974 the Derg regime abolished the office of the 
Sultan, clan leaders (Balabats) and the lineage heads (Chikashum) and their feudal privileges 
(Getachew, 2001a:64). At the same time the relationship between the Derg government and 
the Afar society deteriorated and became very hostile as the central government pursued 
aggressively expanding state farms in the Awash Valley and the militarization of the region 
on the grounds of security and for suppressing insurgent groups from Tigray, Eritrea and the 
Afar Region as well.   
 
After the fall of the Derg regime, the Aussa Sultan was restored in 1991 (Getachew, 
2001a:35). The current Sultan (i.e. spiritual leader) of the Afar is Ali Mirah.  As stated earlier, 
subsequent to the 1991 political change in the country, the Afar have their own Region 
covering a vast area in north-eastern part of Ethiopia. The establishment of this self-
administration, which was long-desired by the Afar, is viewed as a positive measure. In fact it 
has yet to yield fruit by bringing the entrenched economic, political and ecological 
marginalization of the Afar society to an end. The following sections discuss the Afar social 
and political organizations, and the central governments’ attempts to incorporate them into the 
government structure.    
 
4.3 The Afar Social and Political Organizations  
 
4.3.1 Major Branches of the Afar: Adohimara and Asahimara 
 
Historically the Afar people have been divided into two major branches: the Asahimara (the 
reds) or nobles and the Adohimara (the whites) or commoners (Lewis, 1994:155; 
Trimingham, 1976:173). All the Afar in the Upper Middle Valley (UMV) area are of the 
Adohimara branch. The Asahimara occupy mostly the area in the Lower Awash plain and 
delta (Voelkner, 1974:6; Fekadu et al., 1984:19). But some Asahimara clans live as far as 
Gewane north of Angelele (Voelkner, 1974:6). According to some writers (e.g. Lewis, 1994: 
155-56) both groups comprise a variety of tribal confederacies and tribes, but they are not 
always territorially distinct groups. Sometimes Asahimara and Adohimara clans occur as 
separate territorial groups, but most tribal groups contain a mixture of both. Thus the 
Asahimara/Adohimara cleavage cuts across the total Afar society. For instance Ayele (1986, 
56) identified that the Dodda clan has eight Adohimara and four Asahimara local 
communities; the Arapta clan has 43 Asahimara local communities110, the Ali-Hamedo has 
four Adohimara local communities. Thus a clan can belong either to Asahimara or Adohimara 
or to both.  
 
Scholars and writers gave different origins to the duality structure of Asahimara and 
Adohimara. In general two hypotheses have been raised. The first claims that the duality of 
Asahimara and Adohimara is an outcome of political developments, migration and 
intermingling in the past between people of different origins, status and economic 
organization; the second hypothesis attributes the two groups to their respective habitat 
(Getachew, 2001a:59).  
 
                                                 
110 Local communities may refer to lineages or sub-clans.    
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According to the first hypothesis pastoral groups from the coastal areas of the Red Sea and 
Gulf of Tadjoura migrated and joined the people of hinterland in the Awash Valley. And in 
the process the Asahimara intermingled with the local population of the Adohimara 
(Getachew, 2001a). Ayele (1986:56) noted that the Asahimara reckon descent from Haralmais 
and the Adohimara from Ankala Derder. This view is linked to a widely held Afar myth about 
Haralmais (an Arab Sheikh) that is said to have introduced the faith of Islam to the Afar 
hinterland, particularly in the Middle Awash. According to this legend the descendents of 
Sheikh Haralmais became Asahimara (thus regarded as conquerors), while the rest of Afar 
became known as the Adohimara (the conquered) (Getachew, 2001a). On the other hand 
Lewis (1994:156) reported that “the Asahimara are generally supposed to be descended from 
immigrant peoples of Ethiopian highlanders who imposed themselves upon earlier Afar tribes 
in Dankalia in the 16th century”. Trimingham (1976:173) and Lewis (1994) as well as 
informants like Mohammed Hanfre (as cited in Kebede, 1994:9) reported that the divisions 
arose due to status differences within a descent group111, in that the Asahimara were the "red" 
people and were the ruling group, and Adohimara were regarded as "white" people and 
thought to be inferior. This view involves political reason for red/white dualism in the Afar 
society.  
 
However, other authors (Getachew; 2001a:60; Voelkner, 1974; Helland, 1980 cited in 
Getachew, 2001a) have challenged this view. On the basis of oral accounts112, Getachew 
stated that there seems to be no solid evidence to justify that the duality of Asahimara and 
Adohimara refers to conquering and conquered groups (Getachew, 2001a:60). The view of 
“conqueror” and “conquered” did not demonstrate the nature of the Afar people, as there is no 
significant distinction (status difference) in the lower status of the Afar social organization 
(Ayele, 1986: 56; Kebede, 1994:9; Getachew, 2001a). It was because of coincidence, 
exposure and interaction with different types of neighbours and outsiders that the Asahimara 
clans were able to form a Sultanate in Aussa. But the relation between the two groupings was 
and is still loose and flexible (Getachew, 2001a). A study done some three decades ago also 
indicated that “at the branch level no leadership position could be seen to exist for the 
Adohimara. They had several Sultans in former times, but they are now either not existent or 
are totally ineffective” (Voelkner, 1974:6). On the other hand the same source pointed out that 
“the Asahimara branch having a longer history of sedentary agriculture in the Awash delta has 
developed a more sophisticated political organization […], and “it culminated in the 
considerable political power and business acumen of the Sultan of Asahimara in Asayita” 
(Voelkner, 1974:6). And yet Getachew (2001a:60) argues that “there is no strong evidence 
that demonstrates the Asahimara to have been politically dominant over the rest of the Afar 
                                                 
111 A similar view is reported by some other studies (e.g. Kebede, 1994:9; Ayele, 1986:56) that ‘the differences 
are those of descent only while, historically, these two tribes were mutually hostile and were organized into 
separate distinct chieftaincies’. 
112 An oral account, collected by Getachew (2001a:60), reads as: “The Asahimara and Adohimara are children of 
one father. One was born red and called Haralmais, the other was born black, Bidaitu. But their father died 
without giving word or any message, and then the two sons quarrelled over inheritance. Haralmais, the younger 
wanted to be an elder and became Amoyta, the king, while Badohaita or Bidaitu also wanted power. This quarrel 
over the share of power led to a conflict and a split of the family members. The elder son and lineage of 
Adohimara group is the Adi-Ali. In principle all clan heads (Balabats) of Adohimara section are appointed by the 
Adi-Ali group head. The dualism began at that point and since then the dualism continued to exist between the 
two sections of the Afar: the Asahimara and Adohimara”.  
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and the Adohimara sections were subjected to the Asahimara. There seems to be no tribute 
payment relationship and no registered case of power relation between Asahimara and 
Adohimara”  
 
In the past, as oral accounts indicate, the Afar clans had been mutually hostile to each other, 
so conflict might have led to the formation of the two groups of Afar with distinctive names 
of Asahimara and Adohimara. In relation to hostility among clans, Trimingham (1976:175) 
noted that “what little sense of unity the Afar possess […] is based on the factors (language, 
religion and way of life) they do possess in common. But even these have never enabled them 
to combine against the common enemy such as the Oromo, or Abyssinians, whilst they live in 
perpetual bloody struggle with one another”.      
 
The second hypothesis attributes the two groups to their respective habitats. The name 
Asahimara, the red people, seems to be derived from the red color of soil of the Aussa region 
and of the Awash Valley. The name Adohimara seems to be derived from the cream-colored 
sand of the coastal regions of the Red Sea and Gulf of Tadjoura (Getachew, 2001a).  
 
Getachew (2001a:60-61) argues that the two hypotheses about dualism in Afar failed to take 
into account other possible factors and relations. According to him dualism in Afar has to do 
with a range of other factors to which oral traditions and historical evidences alone seem to be 
insufficient. Despite occasional conflicts and competitions between the descendants of 
Haralmais and Bedaitu, today they are intermingled through marriage in many places. Both 
groups have a strong sense of Afar solidarity and shared cultural values, language and ethnic 
identity over centuries (Getachew, 2001a, Ayele, 1986; Kebede, 1994, 2005). Group 
solidarity extends to their kin that are living in the neighbouring ethnic groups and countries 
(e.g. Djibouti, Eritrea). This can be attributed to their sharing of a common language, their 
way of life (pastoralism), their traditions, and their religion (Thompson and Adloff, 1968 
cited in Kebede, 1994). Nowadays, the Adohimara and Asahimara cleavage is increasingly 
disappearing in keeping with the motto of the present Afar unity. The two branches are 
intermingled and it is difficult to see differences in their behavioural characteristics (Ayele, 
1986:56). Therefore, the entity of the clan is stronger and more significant in the Afar society. 
This point is discussed in section 4.3.3 below.  
 
 
4.3.2 Tribal and Clan Structures: Social and Political Organizations   
 
In his study on the social structure of Adohimara in the Upper Middle Valley, Voelkner 
(1974:6-7) pointed out that the Afar society is structured into tribes, clans, lineages and 
families. Accordingly, Voelkner identified two tribes -Waima and Dabine - which in turn are 
divided into clans, which are sub-divided into lineages. But Waima and Dabine tribes did not 
occupy exclusive areas. The clans of the both tribes were inter-mixed throughout the Upper 
Middle Valley. Tribal boundaries had once been effective. Because the tribal boundaries 
between Waima and Dabine can still be pointed out by elders of any clan (Voelkner, 1974:7).  
 
In relation to Waima and Dabine sections which are regarded as tribal sections by Voelkner 
(1974), Getachew did not consider them as tribes per se. He rather presented them as a sort of 
“confederation of clans whose members claim shared distant agnatic ancestors” (Getachew, 
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2001:71). According to Getachew, clans affiliated with each other, form a sort of 
confederation with the names (e.g. Waima and Dabine), but with each clan (Kedo) being an 
autonomous unit in its own internal affairs. In relation to tribal sections, Trimingham 
(1976:174) also noted that “the traditional political system of the Afar is based upon kinship 
groups […] rather than tribal sections and the heads of these kinship groups are the real 
holders of authority”.  
 
Other authors (Fekadu et al., 1984:19) stated that the clan organisation is dominant in the 
Afar society and it has three levels of segmentation: the clan family, the clan and the lineage 
(Dula). According to these authors the clan families are three: Waima, Babine (in the middle 
Valley) and Asahimara (in the lower plain). In this case the ‘clan families’ seem to refer to 
‘tribe’ as it is compared to a description given by Voelkner above. In the past whatever the 
levels of social and political structures were, nowadays clan, lineage and family (household) 
levels are important in social, economic and political life of the Afar society. Such structures 
are discussed in the following section. But before we look at a clan system, let us describe 
briefly kinship, marriage and settlement patterns. 
 
i. Descent/Kinship: In Afar society genealogies are either shallow or missing above the clan 
level and the Afar mostly reckon descent through the male line, from family (Burra) and 
extended family (Dahla) to lineage (Gulub/dahla) and clan (Kedo) (Getachew, 2001a:53). 
Individuals can count back as far as six ancestors. Beyond that few individuals, particularly 
those persons belonging to traditional political or religious authority within a clan know their 
own genealogies (Ayele, 1986; Getachew, 2001a). Kinship or descent provides an individual 
with his social identity, and access to resources of other individuals in maternal and paternal 
kin groups. Kinship also regulates marriage and distribution of property rights (Ayele, 1986; 
Voelkner, 1974). In general, descent and kinship are important to Afar as organizing 
principles in a number of ways in different economic and social contexts, for instance for 
legal protection, claims in rights and obligations, gifts, and marriage (Getachew, 2001a:53). 
Therefore, in Afar society relations of an individual to his paternal and maternal kin are 
crucially important in economic and social contexts.   
 
ii. Marriage patterns: The Afar practice endogamous marriage. Due to religion (i.e. Islamic) 
as well as sororal marriage, polygamy is also extensively practiced (Fekadu et al., 1984). 
There are several marriage patterns which include cross-cousin (Absuma) marriage, 
intermarriage with unrelated clans, levirate arrangements, intermarriage with non-Afars 
(Yayneshet and Kelemework, 2004).  
 
The ideal type is prescriptive patrilateral cross-cousin marriage. A man may marry daughters 
of a father’s sister (Getachew, 2001a; Yayneshet and Kelemework, 2004). Family is founded 
mainly on cross-cousin marriage. The nearest cousins are preferred as partners. Girls in such 
category (Absuma) to a man are his potential wives and are considered as his reserves to such 
extent that if any man touches them, he will be penalized by customary law. A man has 
absolute right to his father’s sister’s daughter (Fekadu et al., 1984; Getachew, 2001a). In this 
connection Fekadu et al. (1984:24) noted that “there are two most important things that a 
person should defend, and these are Absuma and land”.  
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A lineage of an individual also enforces the customary principles of the Absuma marriage 
among the Afar. Such type of marriage is preferred, and the prescriptive rules are generally in 
force among the Afar. The principles force an individual to marry a real cousin, and thus an 
individual does not have any right to choose a partner of his or her own preference. If a man 
has just one Absuma, even crippled or ugly or with bad manners, he will be forced to marry 
her and vice-versa (Getachew, 2001a:81). 
 
In principle a man should not marry his parallel cousin (i.e. his father’s brother’s daughter or 
his mother’s sister’s daughter). But there are circumstances in which such marriages do take 
place. It occurs particularly when the parents of two parallel cousins agree to the marriage. 
Someone who could not find Absuma or a parallel cousin has to arrange marriage with a 
woman from another clan or non-Afar group. However, children born of such union cannot be 
claimed as cross-cousin (Abuse or Absuma) (Getachew, 2001a:72).  
 
In empirical researches many explanations have been given for the practice of cross-cousin 
marriage among the Afar. It is claimed that this type of endogamous marriage has the effect 
of creating a more cohesive social system at the lineage level. Perhaps some degree of 
isolation is also created by this very fact (Fekadu et al., 1984). Cross-cousin marriage 
provides access to production resources and mutual support between two intermarrying 
families and lineages (Ayele, 1986). Moreover, newly married cross-cousins can acquire 
livestock in short or long-term loans and as gifts from a father-in-law and other close kin. 
Some authors (e.g. Yayneshet and Kelemework, 2004:10) also reported that “cross-cousin 
marriages are stronger than marriages between unrelated persons because no serious harm is 
inflicted on ones own blood and flesh in times of conjugal conflict”. Cross-cousin marriage is 
stable; divorce is less likely; and dispute can be handled through negotiations (Getachew, 
2001a). Getachew added that inter-clan marriage widens alliance and creates relations 
between members of intermarrying clans; creates access to other’s resources and distribution; 
leads to defence cooperation; and enables to resolve conflicts without resorting to warfare 
(Getachew, 2001a).  
 
Generally the above description of marriage patterns has pointed out the social and economic 
implications of the Afar patrilateral prescriptive cross-cousin marriage (Absuma) among the 
Afar pastoral communities. According to Getachew (2001a) these implications include among 
others: the strengthening of social ties; provision of security to parents in old age; 
concentration of wealth and distribution within intermarrying, linked lineages of a clan  and 
clans; and the provision of mutual support among all involved (families and lineages).  
 
iii. Settlement Pattern: The Afar live in villages or camp groups. Their residency patterns are 
highly complex. Many authors have identified slightly different patterns of settlement in the 
Afar society (Voelkner, 1974; Fekadu et al., 1984; Getachew, 2001a). The slight variations 
might be due to their consideration of different pastoral groups (e.g. transhumance, semi-
nomadic/sedentary) at different periods in time. For instance, Voelkner (1974) stated that 
village sites are mostly permanent each having a long-established name, whereas occupancy 
of village sites is seasonal, not permanent. This settlement pattern is observed in the study 
community under consideration.  
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Voelkner further stated that village occupation is neither solely by clan nor by lineage. 
Families of several clans and lineages may occupy a village site for certain periods of the year 
though in a more or less consistent pattern. In some localities occupancy of villages may be 
more exclusively by clan only, and very little inter-mixture of different families from different 
clans may occur there (Voelkner, 1974).  
 
Fekadu et al. (1984) also identified that the lineage normally owns one or two villages nearby 
the river bank for dry season grazing and about the same number at the nearest foothills for 
wet season grazing. Thus camping groups move back and forth within the clan territory and 
accommodate each other in times of need. Getachew (2001a:57-58) has identified four types 
of settlements (Ganta)113. These are described as follows: 
 
i. Family settlement (Dahla): has fenced residential enclosures, multiple huts, and 
animal enclosures (Gasso).   
ii. Lineage settlement: consists of several extended families (Dahla), and all its 
members belong to one named lineage and it has a representative elder.  
iii. Clan settlement: consists of households from several intermarrying lineages of one 
clan, and it has a named ancestor, political leadership, a shared ritual leadership, 
and Fimaa (sanction-enforcing body).      
iv. Clan neighbourhood: consists of several lineage settlements dispersed over clan 
land; comprises also households from other clans which have conjugal ties with 
host clans, and has its autonomous ritual and political authority.   
 
Getachew (2001a:56) has also observed that the nuclear or extended family settlement unit 
has two types of residence: the main settlement (Homa) and, the satellite herd camp (Magda 
or Magida). The family unit in Homa comprises the core family unit and contains the 
lactating large stock and small stock, the later is a highly mobile satellite herding camp. These 
settlement or camping patterns are practised mainly for better productivity and growth of 
offspring, for avoiding seasonal feed and water shortages and risks from disease outbreaks 
and drought.   
 
Settlement unit varies contextually in the type of members it comprises. Members are 
recruited to all settlements by kinship, affiliation with a certain locality, conjugal ties and 
host-client relationships. For instance in the family settlement (Dahla), members are related 
to each other through shared descent, kinship, property right in livestock and conjugal ties. 
Members of a settlement are also bound together by a shared graveyard and by collective 
ownership of land resources. They also cooperate in herding, holding rituals and sacrifices 
and a shared prayer place (Getachew, 2001a; Ayele, 1986).  
 
Settlement patterns in Afar areas have been changing over time. The Afar settlement patterns 
and mobility are affected by the encroachment of peasant farming, irrigated and mechanized 
farming and drought (Fekadu et al., 1984). Particularly following the introduction of 
irrigation farming and the establishment of modern administrative structures, social services, 
                                                 
113 According to Getachew (2001a:57) the term “Ganta” refers to a totality of nuclear and extended families that 
form a larger cooperative residential unit or local community. 
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and emergence of small rural towns, there have been changes in settlement patterns. The 
change of settlement patterns in the study community is illustrated in the box 4.1 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
4.3.3 Clan and Lineage 
 
i. Clan: The clan is the most cohesive group structure among the Afar. It is also the level at 
which the strongest and most effective traditional leadership structures are to be found 
(Voelkner, 1974). In Afar clan (Kedo) refers to a group of people related to each other by 
descent, living with shared clan territory and shared common rituals and political leadership. 
It may comprise ‘a few hundred people up to a thousand and between ten and twenty lineages 
and sub-lineages (Dahla) whose number changes through time due to continuous fission and 
fusion (Getachew, 2001a:55). Clan has a name used for social identity and cooperation when 
Box 4.1. Settlement patterns and changes in the study community  
 
1.  Burra:  It is single household unit (nuclear family).   
 
2. Debala (Dahla): It is extended family/residential unit which comprises 2-6 households. In the past up to 15
households were located in such residential unit. Though the number of household units in Debala is reduced, 
it is a common settlement unit in the study community.  
 
In an extended family residential unit, individual households may use one kraal for each of the animal species. 
For instance they can keep their camels in one kraal, and cattle in another kraal. Households living in one 
Debala pool and mobilize their labour force for livestock management. Adults from each household unit keep 
large stock together. Children from each household unit herd small animals together. 
 
3. Burari (Buri): It consists of scattered Debala. It may consist of 3-5 Debala. Nowadays such settlement is 
rarely found in the locality. It is mainly found in other places like Dalifagie.  
 
4. Ganda: It is large residential settlement which may comprise from 7-10 Debala or Burari. Nowadays this 
type of residential settlement does not exist in the locality. It is found in Dalifagie.  
 
Ganda was a large cooperative residential settlement that was common in the past because of the security and 
other reasons. Before 4 decades, up to 100 Debala were put in one place to strengthen force against external 
threats. The local people used to establish such type of settlement in order protect external attacks, especially 
to strengthen their force against repeated invasion of Waggirats of Tigray. At the time Waggirats, Oromos and 
raiders from Shewa were the main threats to the local Afar. These groups and Issa-Somalis raided animals and 
killed persons at different times in the past. Therefore, establishing large Burari or Ganda was crucial to the 
protection of the community against external invasions or attacks from other clans.   
 
Secondly, the local people also used to establish Ganda settlement or camping when they were displaced by 
severe drought and had to move to distant places beyond the Afar land. The third reason for concentration in 
big residential units (Ganda) was to reserve areas for grazing and for balancing the available resources in 
certain localities with the number of herds. In recent decades following the scarcity of pasture, this pattern of 
settlement, however, shifted into Debala or Burari size and pattern, as villagers had to disperse into different 
localities where fodder can be available. Moreover, as time went on the incursion of Waggirats and Oromos
had been stopped and inter-clan conflicts have been reduced. Thus, the local people felt secure and have 
started establishing relatively scattered and small settlement units, like Dahla and Burari types.   
 
Source: Key informant interview, December 2005 
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there is a case which affects the whole clan families. Members of a clan cooperate in defence 
of their land, people and property (Getachew, 2001a, Fekadu et al., 1984; Ayele, 1986). Clan 
has legislative, executive and judiciary functions and it resolves intra and inter-clan conflicts 
and those occurring within lineages (Fekadu et al., 1984:22). This will be elabourated in 
section 4.3.5 below.  
 
ii. Lineage: Each clan is divided into a number of lineages. The term Dahla/Gulub is used to 
refer to lineage and lineage segments which consist of several related individuals that are 
linked to each other by shared descent. Lineage members share the same locality, residence, 
pasture and migrations. And internally each lineage consists of a number of extended family 
units (Getachew, 2001a). 
 
Each lineage has a name and head who is normally an elder in the clan. The head represents 
the lineage as one unit in the external relations with other similar units that form Kedo 
(Getachew, 2001a; Voelkner, 1974). The lineage which traces its members up to seven 
generations is the most significant in terms of pastoral production and maintenance of social 
order at the grassroot level. It is vital for social identity, livestock production, regulation of 
marriage, mutual aid and defence, and the control of common property (Fekadu et al., 
1984:22).  
 
Lineages and sub-lineages are intertwined with each other through multiple-overlapping webs 
such as shared resources, political leadership and residence. Therefore, the component 
lineage, and sub-lineages of clan have the following functions. Lineage: (i) settles, sends its 
scouts for prospecting possible settlements sites and moves together; (ii) discourages and 
prevents members from depleting their stock by selling for purchase of unessential urban 
consumer goods, (iii) regulates the cross-cousin marriage system, (iv) in terms of mutual aid, 
it takes responsibility of restocking the individual family who lost its stock for one reason or 
the other (Fekadu et al., 1984:22). 
 
iii. Nuclear Family and Extended Family: Nuclear family is composed of a male household 
head with one or more wives and children. In some cases it may consist of unmarried adults, 
related by blood or friendship to the head of the household. A nuclear family or household 
unit (Burra) is founded mostly on cross-cousin marriage (i.e. a boy marries his father’s 
sister’s daughter). It is realized through evolving rights of production, reproduction and 
consumption (Getachew, 2001a; Fekadu et al., 1984, Voelkner, 1974). The establishment of a 
household marks the beginning of an independent livestock production unit. The household 
unit has ownership rights over stock (camel, cattle, goat, sheep and donkey) and other types 
of assets (Ayele, 1986; Getachew, 2001a). To maintain itself in the arid and semi-arid 
environment, a married couple114 (nuclear family) requires the cooperation of three persons: a 
male head of the household responsible for herding cattle and supervising all activities, a 
woman responsible for housework, looking after children, milk animals and who also assists 
in herding, and a child who herds small stock. As the number of stock increase more labour is 
needed and different work teams are formed (Ayele, 1986). The term Dahla115  is used to 
                                                 
114 The newly married couple shares food with the bridegroom’s parents and vice versa. 
115 Dahla also refers to households of co-wives’ households who share the same residence, and this 
accommodates from 2-6 huts (Getachew, 2001a). 
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refer to an extended family. An extended family settlement consists of from five to eighteen 
huts (Ari)116 and comprises families of up to four generations deep (Getachew, 2001a:56).  
 
4.3.4 Leadership Structure 
 
Historically, as stated earlier, the Afar had four major Sultanates: Tadjoura, Rahyata, Biru and 
Aussa (Ayele, 1986). Though the Afar have had such Sultanates resembling that of feudal 
kingdom, the clan organization has remained the dominant and the higher unit. In relation to 
this some authors (e.g. Fekadu et al., 1984:19) stated that “the Sultanates did not manage to 
encapsulate the enormous clans by creating centralized political machinery.” 
 
A study done three decades ago in the Upper Middle Valley recorded that standing tribal 
leadership was not present at the time (Voelkner, 1974:9). This same source stated that tribal 
leadership functioned in the past only in raids on, or in wars with non-Afar neighbours. Even 
in the past tribal leadership was elected only for such special occasions and was empowered 
only for this duration. The election was conducted by the inter-tribal council composed of the 
more esteemed elders and Balabats/Makaban of various clans. Therefore, at the time the 
inter-tribal council had only the function of discussing and mediating inter-tribal problems 
(Voelkner, 1974:9). This description of tribal leadership suggests that it is the clan level at 
which the strongest and most effective leadership structures were/are to be found.  
 
Currently the functions of three clan leadership branches or structures are significant in the 
Afar society. These include clan leaders (Makaban), council of elders (Daar-edola) and a 
sanction-executing unit (Fimaa/Finna). Grading of clans and lineages as young/small/junior 
(Hundah) and elder/bigger/senior (Kaddah) is one feature that is noticed among Afar. 
Accordingly different roles are allocated to each lineage: a senior lineage of a clan provides 
political leadership of a clan and a junior one provides ritual leadership and leadership of the 
sanction-executing unit (Fimaa). But members of the council of elders (Daar-idola) and 
members of Finna are conscripted from all lineages of a clan (Getachew, 2001a:61). The 
main leadership structures of clans are discussed below.  
 
i. Clan leaders (Makaban): The role of a Makabantu is not that of an order-giving chief, but 
of an arbiter of intra-clan disputes and representative in inter-clan arguments and affairs. He is 
the representative of the clan towards everything outside the clan, be it the government or 
groups of other clans, Afar or non-Afars. Clan leaders and lineage heads act as mediators 
between the local government representative, the central government and the Afar. They 
represent their people for everything outside their clans (Voelkner, 1974; Getachew, 2001a; 
Kebede, 1994).   
 
The position of Makabantu is hereditary in the male line; but sometimes could be appointed 
and changed by an elder elective-group (Ayele, 1986; Kebede, 1994). The criteria by which 
the Makabantu is judged to be fit for a position are, for instance: one, who looks after his 
people, protects his clan, who works for his people, who is a good speaker and who speaks 
the truth, one who has a “good brain” and is a good administrator (Voelkner, 1974; Fekadu et 
                                                 
116 The number of huts in extended family settlement may vary over time, and from one community to the other 
as stated in box 4.1 above.  
 146
al., 1984). A strong and respected Makabantu may be able to command a certain amount of 
obedience but in general this is minimal and there is no pressure on the Afar individual to 
obey any but religious laws and to conform to the Afar norm of co-existence with one's Kidha 
(father of the people) neighbour (Kebede, 1994:12). No lineage is considered as superior or 
inferior, and equality of components of a clan is stressed and competition between members is 
discouraged through emphasis on shared descent, shared political and ritual leadership, 
cooperation and intermarriage (Getachew, 2001a:61). Other authors (Fekadu et al., 1984:23) 
also observed that “in principle all adult males have equal say, since all can speak in the 
general assembly of their clan, but the opinions of certain category of men carry more weight. 
The indices for prestige are: wealth, family background, skill in oratory, political acumen, 
religious piety, wisdom, and other personal qualities”. 
 
As stated earlier in this chapter the Ethiopian successive governments have employed indirect 
rule to administer the Afar from remote highlands. A case in point is the use of Makaban as 
mediators between local people and the state through promoting some of them to a status of 
Balabat or Chika-shum. Traditionally Makaban are representatives of the clans towards 
everything outside the clan during all Ethiopian governments. Makaban represent their clans, 
and contact government, private groups and other clans. In the study community Makabantu 
is known as Detamo Abba or Daara Abba. For instance before 1991, Dawid Muhayta was 
Datamo Abba for Bahir-Aghini sub-clan and Seko Duba for Megenta Aghini sub-clan. 
Nowadays Dawid is Detamo Abba for both groups and Seko Dawid is his deputy.  
 
During the Derg time the father of Dawid was on bad terms with Derg. He refused to work 
with Derg rule. Thus, Derg was searching him for his protest. He died while he was in hiding. 
However, at the time the leadership of Makabantu (Detamo Abba) and clan leader (Kedo 
Abba) were not abolished in the study community. They were functioning as they used to 
before the 1974 Revolution. Unlike in settled and semi-settled places the structure of 
pastoral/peasant association was not established in the study community. Therefore, in such 
areas the Makaban (clan chiefs) handled all issues related to everything outside the clans 
during the previous governments. 
 
In general during the Emperor and Derg regime, the Afar clans, lineages and the Aussa 
Sultanate were incorporated into the Ethiopian administrative structure. During the imperial 
time the Sultan of Aussa was entitled to use the imperial title Bitwoded, and other clan and 
lineage heads were given the title of Balabat and Chika-shum117 (village chief) respectively 
(Getachew, 2001a:64). After 1974, the Derg regime abolished the offices of the Sultan, 
Balabats, and Chika-shum and their feudal privileges. And very similar offices replaced 
imperial offices with similar functions called representatives (Yegosa-teteri/Yegosa-tewekay), 
peasant association (Gebere Mahbar)118 and the position of Sultan was officially abolished. 
The following table summarized the “titles of traditional authority” and “titles or roles given 
to traditional leaders by the previous and incumbent governments”.  
                                                 
117 Bitwoded was the most senior title of the Imperial Government of Ethiopia, and it literally  means ‘the 
beloved’ in Amharic; Balabat was the title for the clan head (Kedo Abba) and it literally  means ‘notable’ and 
Chika-shum was the title for the lineage head and it is equivalent to ‘village chief’.  
118 Peasant association (gebere mahbar) was a grassroots association of peasants mainly in settled areas. In Afar 
context such association was established mainly in some agro-pastoral areas or in settled agriculture 
neighbourhoods during the Derg time.   
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Table 4.2 Local Leadership and Titles  
Traditional 
title of local 
leaders 
Title given during 
Emperor Haile 
Silassie period  
Title/role  given during 
the Derg regime (1974-
1991) 
Current title/role   (1992 to 
present)  
Sultan  Bitwoded Sultanate was 
abolished  
The Sultan is restored and 
became spiritual leader  
Clan heads  Balabat  The Balabat was 
abolished and replaced 
by Gebere mahbar 
leaders  
- Clan heads act as 
traditional leaders119  
- Makabantu (some 
individual Makaban are 
given advisory position in 
the formal structure)     
Lineage 
heads  
Chika-shum The office of  Chika-
shum was replaced by 
Yegosa-teteri/ Yegosa-
tewekay 
Lineage heads have 
continued 
Finaa-t-
abba  
Yegobez-Alaka  Finaa-t-abba continued Finaa-t-abba has continued 
Source: (i) Getachew, 2001a; Gamaledin 1993; Kebede, 2005; and Voelkner, 1974 (ii) Interviews with key 
informants. 
 
As can be seen in table 4.2 column 4, after the establishment of Afar National Regional State 
(ANRS), there is an overlap of traditional authority and modern administration at the 
community level. In recent years the Kebele Administrations (KA) established by the 
Government represent the local community towards everything outside the clans. Most of the 
“elected KA leaders” are not from clan leaders. In this connection some informants from my 
study community reported that during the Transition Period (1991-1994) their clan leaders 
were to some degree involved in local government when the Afar Liberation Front (ALF) led 
by Sultan Ali Mirah (now the Afar spiritual leader) was active in the Afar Region. After the 
ALF withdrew, the informants said, office holders selected among traditional leaders were 
gradually replaced by individuals affiliated to the Afar Peoples Democratic Organization 
(APDO).120 Currently it seems that the role of Makabantu as intermediary between the local 
people and the state authorities is being taken over by “elected Kebele leaders”. Kebele 
Administrations perform the following activities: 
 
• Mobilization of community members for communal works (e.g. access road 
construction, water development, etc). 
• Acting as liaison/mediator between local government authorities and the local 
people. 
                                                 
119 Currently Kebele Administration through “elected leaders” acts as formal grassroots government structure. 
On the other hand clan and lineage heads and Finaa-t-abba continue their traditional function in parallel to 
Kebele administration. In fact some hand-picked Makaban are given a status of “advisor on Afar culture” (Ye-
bahil-Amakari) in the formal structure.    
120 APDO came into existence shortly after the fall of the military regime. It is supposedly supported by Afar 
who were formerly part of Tigray province and is an EPRDF affiliate. Considering the close ties between APDO 
and EPRDF, it seems that APDO largely represents the interests of the country’s ruling party, instead of the 
interests of the Afar (Ali, 1998:113).   
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• Communicating government programmes and policies to the community members. 
• Presenting community’s requests to formal government institutions (e.g. district 
administration). 
• Enlisting the support of clan or traditional leaders to recognize the Afar Ada 
(customary law).  
 
The traditional authorities also function at clan level without interfering with Kebele 
Administration. Clan leaders and elders mainly manage and resolve conflicts through the Afar 
Ada (customary law). They handle mainly conflicts over resources (pasture, cultivable land, 
watering points); conflicts resulting from adultery/rape, theft and robbery; clan rivalry, and 
conflicts related to Absuma.   
 
Though the formal government administration is put at the grassroots levels, the local people 
still pay more attention to the traditional authorities (clan leaders, elders and religious 
leaders). A number of informants claimed that the source of authority for ‘elected leaders’ is 
by chance (i.e. not inherited from traditional source of authority) and leadership position is 
temporary, whereas the clan leadership is long-term and life-long. The informants also 
reported that the formal administrative posts are filled mainly with youths who give less 
weight to the Afar Ada (customary law).    
 
Currently very few “hand-picked” clan leaders are involved in the new formal structure and 
such individuals are given an advisory role on cultural matters (Ye-bahil-Amakari). In return 
for their service they receive a monthly allowance. Traditionally the community members 
often put more trust into clan leaders and view them as true representatives towards 
everything beyond their community. Obviously the local people heed to clan leaders rather 
than to the “elected Kebele authorities”. This suggests that the local Afar want to maintain the 
full involvement of their traditional leaders in the modern administration. This issue is further 
elabourated in Chapter 6.  
 
As table 4.2 above shows, in spite of the incorporation of the Afar people into the Ethiopian 
administrative structure for such a long time, traditional authority structures and the clan 
authority of the pastoral clans have undergone little transformation. Although the authority of 
the Aussa Sultanate was undermined during the military rule of 1974-1991, the authority of 
clan leadership has been largely maintained. This owes partly to the resistance of Afar and to 
the policies of the governments of Ethiopia that stressed the indirect rule through the 
traditional authority of clans and the Sultanate of Aussa (Getachew, 2001a).  
 
Therefore, it can be said that traditional Afar leadership at grass-root level peaks at the clan 
level in the position of Makabantu. Clan is still the most cohesive group structure among the 
pastoral Afar. It is also the level at which the strongest and most effective leadership 
structures are to be found. All clans are divided into sub-clans (lineages) which are made up 
of related families. A clan belongs either to the Asahimara or the Adohimara or to both. Each 
clan is headed by a clan chief (Makabantu) with overall prescribed functions and powers. 
However, his powers are shared and controlled by the elders of the clan. Decisions are usually 
made by the elders together with the clan chief (Voelkner, 1974; Kebede, 1994). 
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ii. Council of elders (Daar-edola): Elders appear to be the second powerful leaders in a clan. 
The majority are actually the older. But an elder does not have to be old. He can be of any age 
of an adult man who has to be wise. Wisdom has to be proven: an elder has to “keep cool” in 
terms of temperament and partiality in disputes and issues, and has to be able to take the long 
point of view of what is best for the people of the clan and be able to “make peace” 
(Voelkner, 1974:10). Often an elder represents a lineage as its head - a position he acquires as 
much by survival and inheritance as by ability. Other elders, however, are chosen purely for 
their above-average competence and performance to an ideal elder. Elders function mostly as 
judges of the internal affairs of a clan. They represent the major Afar leadership principle of 
government by group decision (Voelkner, 1974:10-11). Council of elders (Daar edola) hold 
the supreme power and it can be summoned at clan or lineage level whenever need arises.  
 
iii. Sanction-executing unit (Fimaa/Finaa): The executing arm or sanction-executing unit in 
Afar society is Fimaa121.  Fimaa is a multi-purpose institution whose size and number varies 
from one clan to the other. Bigger clans with large populations and vast clan land may have 
more Fimaa. Members of Fimaa are often recruited from all lineages of a clan, and 
recruitment is made by clan elders and clan head on the basis of birth into one of the lineages 
of a clan, kinship affiliation, locality, and personal character such as good manners and 
respect for the elderly and community value. Potential members seem to be all able - young 
and strong men in the clan (Getachew, 2001a:65-66; Voelkner, 1974:11).   
 
The institution of Fimaa has a principal leader (Finna-t-abba) and deputy/assistant (Eerena-
abba). The leader comes from a particular lineage of a clan and his deputy is his younger 
brother. This post is hereditary, but in some exceptional cases some other Fimaa leaders can 
be selected by elders of the clan with approval of members of Fimaa (Getachew, 2001a:66-
67). The Fimaa leaders carry out basic community tasks which include executing sanctions 
passed by clan leaders, supervising activities of Fimaa members, looking after the peace of 
the community and working closely with clan elders and clan heads. When there is sanction 
to be executed or tasks to be done, a Fimaa leader will call up on Fimaa members with a cry 
Eei-eei in the morning, and hearing the sound, members will come and gather in the residence 
of their leader. Then they will be given the instructions to enforce or perform tasks 
(Getachew, 2001a:67). 
 
Generally the main purpose of Fimaa institution, its leaders and members is to serve their 
community and clan as a community police and clan defence force. Consequently their 
activities are linked to traditional authority of the clan and they are expected to work in 
collabouration with elders and clan head. Their main task is to enforce sanctions passed by 
clan authorities and by the clan head (Getachew, 2001a; Voelkner, 1974). Members of Fimaa 
and its leader are expected to implement all actions required by the decisions of elders and 
clan leaders ranging from enforcement of the law to fighting wars, and from protecting clan 
herds to guarding clan villages (Voelkner, 1974:11). Fimaa members also assist in 
disciplining young men who misbehave or challenge the authority of parents. Other 
subsidiary tasks of Fimaa are defence of livestock and other resources of the clan; deterring 
                                                 
121 The term Fimaa in Afar language denotes ‘of equals’ and ‘of the same stage of circumcision’ but not 
necessarily of the same age. Differences among members occur and this has been seen as advantage where 
younger members can learn a lot from older members with rich experiences (Getachew, 2001a).     
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neighbours from expanding into Afar clan lands; and monitoring and assessing seasonal 
grazing areas. Fimaa also functions as mutual assistance institution whereby members help 
each other through contribution of material, financial and labour services and through moral 
support (Getachew, 2001a). 
 
4.3.5 Conflict Management and Resolution  
 
As it is true in all societies, different sorts of disputes and conflicts occur in Afar community. 
These include inter and intra-clan disputes over clan land or other resources (pasture and 
watering points) and conflict with non-Afar migrants and neighbouring ethnic groups (Issa, 
Oromo, Amhara, Argoba, Tigre). Though there is some degree of tolerance to accommodate 
each other, conflicts between clans over scarce resources, and disputes over or claims on 
territories are common among the pastoral Afar (Yacob et al., 2000: 16). In this connection, 
the Afar say, “We love each other, but we will quarrel with each other, if it comes to land. It 
means there is no compromise over clan land.” (Getachew, 2001a:62). 
 
In Afar community most inter and intra clan conflicts and disputes are settled by their 
traditional authorities: elders, clan leaders, Fimaa and religious leaders. The pastoral Afar 
have their own customary law (Ada/maada) which is effective in conflict management and 
resolution. As stated above the Afar are organized into clans, each with clan leader, Fimaa-
abba, and group of elders (Daar-edola). At each level these leaders manage the internal 
affairs including conflict management and resolution. They organize assembly to handle 
disputes according to the Afar customary law (Maada) through which disputes within and 
between clans are settled. The Islamic law (Sharia) is also used alongside the Afar customary 
law. In relation to this, Sheikhs are important in assisting the traditional authorities, especially 
when conflicting parties need to swear on Quran and to seal the case with pronouncing Fatiha 
(i.e. the completion of litigation). The Sheikhs work along with clan leaders and elders in 
settling disputes in addition to teaching and prayers services in their community. Let us 
closely look at how the pastoral Afar handle ordinary and severe cases through their 
customary laws. 
 
The pastoral Afar apply their customary law to adjudicate criminal acts and ordinary cases. In 
pastoral Afar crime is a collective responsibility of the clan to which a culprit or offender 
belongs. The responsibility for any criminal act is not restricted to the party committing the 
crime. It includes the lineage of the criminal in particular and his clan in general. The closer 
one lies in a clan bond to the criminal, the greater the portion of responsibility that falls on 
him (Jamaluddin, 1973 cited in Voelkner, 1974: iv in annex-b).  
 
A given case is often processed in an Afar tribunal. A council of elders can be summoned at 
clan or lineage level to see a case or one’s grievance brought to the attention of elders. 
Jamaluddin (1973) described the procedure for an ordinary case as follows:  
 
… the plaintiff brings his grievance to the attention of the elders. The elders 
construct Maro. Maro is a session to be held in a circle-like manner under a tree 
shade. Maro consists of plaintiffs, defendants, jury and observers. Once a Maro is 
set, the Makaban gives the first right of speech to the plaintiff. But before doing this 
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the elders ask both parties to name guarantors (Habi) who are asked to bring 
Lekeaysso122. Both the plaintiff and the defendant have the right to speak in person 
or through an advocate according to their wishes. The plaintiff then addresses his 
speech to one of the persons in Maro and spells out details of his case. Then the 
defendant answers the charges levelled at him by the plaintiff. If it seems necessary, 
both parties are once again given the right of rebuttal. Then the Makaban asks 
someone among the Maro to give a short resume of what was said by the plaintiffs 
and the defendants. After all this remains to Makaban to investigate the argument 
put forward by both sides and decide. Then recourse is made to the Maada 
(customary law) to find out a fitting punishment (Jamaluddin, 1973 cited in 
Voelkner, 1974: vi, in annex-b). 
 
Jamaluddin (1973) stated that unless it is for Billu (case involving murder); the process for the 
rest of Mable (litigation) is the same. But punishment (compensation) differs from case to 
case. The case of Billu does not require Mable but there are certain ways in which Ama 
(reconciliation) is conducted. Hence, the procedure for murder case is described below:  
 
…when a member of a clan kills somebody from another clan; two courses are open 
to the former. The clan members can either leave the area immediately and appeal to 
other clans to act as a go-between and help them make peace with the concerned 
clan, or they can stand their ground and let the bereaved clan take vengeance upon 
the killer, but prepare to defend themselves if the clan exceeds the rule of 
vengeance. If vengeance is not taken immediately, the other clans in the area try to 
reconcile (Ama) the two clans by the payment of Diat (compensation for murder). If 
this is accepted by the bereaved clan, a general meeting of the clans in the area is 
called. The clan of the killer is called upon to provide Sepa - a sort of Lekeaysso for 
the Makaban. The two clans are then stationed at separate places for the purpose of 
facilitating mediation. The Billu is judged according to the Maada. After this, 
members of the murderer’s clan disarmed including sticks and wearing garments in 
a loose manner are taken over to where the bereaved clan is stationed. They follow 
the Makaban in single file repeating after him Yalial Habai Nel Rasa (forgive and 
forget) to members of the bereaved clan who remain seated during the whole 
process. After this the Makaban pronounces the Fataha and that seals the case 
(Jamaluddin, 1973 cited in Voelkner, 1974: vi-vii in annex-b). 
 
The Afar customary law (maada) embraces eight basic principles. They are the essence, the 
types of crime, the responsibility, the category of crime, the punishment, the varieties of 
bodily injuries, the compensation, and the execution. Fines for each category of criminal acts 
and a standard compensation for each category of body injuries are prescribed in the Afar 
community (for details of each see Voelkner, 1974: vi-vii, in annex-b).  
 
The Afar traditional rules stipulate the number of animals to be paid as fine or compensation 
for killings or other offences. Compensation and fines are often paid in the form of animals. 
For instance in the study community kidnapping a girl (one’s Absuma) 123 involves a fine of 
12 cattle, raping 36 cattle, marrying a widow without the permission of the legitimate heir 36 
                                                 
122 Lekeaysso is an amount collectable from plaintiff and defendant and payable to the jury for conducting the 
litigation. 
123 According to the institution of cross-cousin marriage and levirate institution, each girl and widow has a 
legitimate husband and heir respectively. Marriage and inheritance outside of the prescriptions of these 
institutions involve punishment. If not handled by elders when individuals violate these rules, it may lead to 
conflicts between offenders and legitimate claimants. 
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cattle124. Blood compensation paid for the victim’s family is 55 cattle per person killed, and 
compensation paid for wounded person varies from 12-30 cattle depending on the seriousness 
of the injury. Relatives and clan members together have to help pay the compensations. This 
practice gives the whole clan an interest in preventing violence, because all clan members 
must help pay the fine if one of their relatives or members is found guilty.    
 
Generally in Afar pastoral community conflicts can take place at three levels: intra-clan, inter-
clan and inter-ethnic. The causes may include claims on or access to resource (land, grazing, 
and watering points), animal theft, adultery, raids and counter raids, insults, etc. Intra-clan and 
inter-clan conflicts are often resolved according to the socio-political structure, depending on 
the level of conflict. Disputes, which arise between neighbourhoods or individuals related by 
kinship or marriage, are handled by relatives, neighbours and friends of disputants.  These 
mediators act on the basis of social obligations. They cool down emotions, investigate causes 
and resolve disputes.  
 
Conflicts that cannot be managed by the extended family leader (Dahla Abba) will be passed 
on to the sub-clan or clan level chief (Makabantu). Serious disputes are often managed by the 
council of clan elders (Mabilo) summoned by the clan chief (Makabantu). Likewise inter-clan 
conflicts/serious disputes like homicide, stealing, and heavy physical injury are often 
managed by elders council (Mabilo) consisting of the respective clan leaders (Makabantu) of 
the disputants. Therefore, on the basis of these principles the Afar traditional authorities apply 
customary rules in handling murder and ordinary cases in their respective local communities.  
 
The Afar also use various institutions or mechanisms to settle conflicts/disagreements that can 
arise with their neighbouring communities. For instance in northern part of the Afar Region 
where the Ab’ala Afar interface with Tigray community, the institution called Gereb is used 
to resolve any disputes which may arise between them. Gereb court is established by elders of 
both sides to try and resolve disputes (Kelemework, 2002). Likewise elders and religious 
leaders attempt to resolve disputes between the Afar and neighbouring Oromos.    
 
Afar-Issa conflicts used to be settled through the initiative of elders. First three women tying 
sheep’s flesh onto their neck are sent to the victim’s group to show sympathy and the need for 
a peace deal. Peace deal is inferred if the women delegates come back adding another three 
women from the victim’s side. Subsequently elders would do the same and negotiation is 
made. Then a compensation of 55 cattle per person killed is paid to the victims. Peace deal is 
usually wrapped up with cultural ceremonies and religious rituals (Yirgalem, 2001). Over the 
past decades, however, Afar and Issa traditional conflict management systems are disrupted 
with the changing context of conflicts. The traditional systems of conflict management are 
overwhelmed by external factors and incapable with the changing context of the conflict. The 
                                                 
124 The fine for the act of adducting a widow involves paying more cattle. This is because a widow may have 
children and wealth in which case only a close relative to the children has to take responsibility for them and 
their resources. Thus the legitimate right to inherit a widow is vested only on the brother or close relative of the 
deceased. The community strongly disapproves remarrying of a widow to an outsider who has no blood relation 
to the deceased. The logic behind this is that an outsider misuses children’s resource and does not properly 
nurture them.  Moreover, the resource of the deceased is often viewed as communal property of the extended 
family (i.e. his brothers, sisters and uncles). Thus an outsider is not allowed to get access to the deceased’s 
resources through marrying the widow. 
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traditional animal raiding which both parties involve have taken new dimensions due to 
historical and socio-political processes taking place in the countries of the Horn of Africa. 
The Issa’s intrusion into the Afar land has increased over the past decades as a result of the 
following factors:  
 
• Historically and now the Afar and Issa-Somalis in Djibouti compete for power 
dominance. The Issa-dominated government in Djibouti favours the Issa-Somalis in 
Ethiopia. This has an influence on relations between Ethiopian Afar and Issa-Somalis 
in Ethiopia.     
 
• The proliferation of firearms and the Issas became well-armed. Contraband traders 
proliferates firearms for sale, and hence this increases the level of conflict and its 
context. The Issa-Somalis have better access to border livestock trade and contraband 
trade through Djibouti and Somalia, as their clan groups have political dominance in 
these two countries. Therefore, the increased involvement of Issas into contraband 
trade affects Afar-Issa economic and power balances.  
 
• The Ogaden question and related war with Somalia that created inflow or access to 
various firearms for Issa-Somalis in Ethiopia.  
  
• Lack of substantial support to the Afar from their respective governments, and the 
tendency to perceive them as separatists with a vision for “one Afar” in the Horn of 
Africa. One of the political problems in the Horn of Africa is the Afar ethno-centric 
politics, which aspires for an independent "Afar state" in the Horn sub-region. The 
Afar who now live in Ethiopia, Djibouti and Eritrea have already developed such a 
political aspiration. Those in Ethiopia clearly want self-determination for all of the 
Afar peoples. Some of those in Djibouti are struggling against the Issa-dominated 
regime (Kebede, 2005:2). Thus political conflicts from Djibouti spill over into the 
territory of Ethiopian Afar.  
 
• Lack of inter-state cooperation to stem cross-border conflicts and promote cross-
border trade (Getachew, 2001a). The political and economic marginalization of the 
Afar in their respective countries makes them hostile to the central governments in the 
sub-region. These neighbouring states also use the Afar insurgent groups for 
subversive activities against each other (Kebede, 2005:3-4). 
 
• The current ethnic-based federal system in Ethiopia has added conflict to the long-
aged Afar-Issa conflict over boundary, as both sides are involved in border claim and 
counter claims in order put territories under their respective domains.  
 
In general the Afar have been affected by the political changes and processes which have 
taken place in Horn countries (i.e. Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia). The separation of 
Eritrea from Ethiopia has split the Afar into two countries. The Djibouti Afar Liberation 
Movement against the Issa-dominated government in Djibouti had a consequence on the 
Ethiopian Afar. The Issa-dominated government considered the Ethiopian Afar as having 
allied with dissidents in the Djibouti. Thus the Djibouti government curtailed the hitherto easy 
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movement of the Ethiopian Afar into the Djibouti. Moreover, the Ethiopian government is 
using the Djibouti port and this has influenced the arbitration process since Djibouti is ruled 
by the Issa-dominated government. In most cases the Afar are losers of the Ethiopian 
triangular relationship with Djibouti, Somalia and Eritrea (Yirgalem, 2001).  
 
As a result of the all these socio-economic and political processes, mistrust and enmity 
between Afar and Issa has increased in the past three decades. Moreover, the frequency of 
raiding and killing has increased. Therefore, traditional conflict management systems have 
overwhelmed by external factors and have been ineffective. Consequently conflict resolution 
is now taken over by government-sponsored peace committees that comprise community 
representatives, Afar Regional Government, Somali Regional Government and the Ministry 
of Federal Affairs. However, this government approach did not bring sustainable peace 
between Afar and Issa due to the following reasons (Yirgalem, 2001, Yacob et al., 2000): 
 
• The religious and cultural values used to disapprove retaliation and to strengthen 
negotiation processes between Afar and Issa have been eroded in the past decades due to 
the factors mentioned above.  
• The community representatives (elders) are refraining from meetings feeling insecure. 
They are unhappy about poor communication among stakeholders and complain about 
the attempts of officials to arbitrate than to mediate. 
• At grassroots level the communities have lost trust on the committees for not achieving 
sustainable peace, despite a series of peace conferences sponsored by the Federal 
Government. 
• Absence of development programmes that involve warring groups working 
cooperatively and without fear of encroachment or displacement from their traditional 
incumbency.  
• The failure of the government to settle the territorial issues by employing fair and 
equitable method of territorial allocation.  
 
In general, conflicts in the Afar Region take place at three levels: intra-clan, inter-clan and 
inter-ethnic conflicts. The first two types of conflicts are still managed by the existing 
traditional conflict management system. On the other hand inter-ethnic conflicts, especially 
Afar-Issa conflicts have become very violent and are beyond the capacity of traditional 
dispute management systems.  
 
 
4.4 Concluding Summary 
 
The Afar belong to Cushitic-speaking language group and have their own language called 
cafar-af. Their original African homeland seems to have been between the upper course of the 
Webi and the coast of the Gulf of Aden. Historically their territory stretched from the 
Djibouti-Dire-dawa railway in the south to peninsula of Buri in the north, and from the shores 
of Red Sea to the eastern spurs of the Abyssinian plateaus. Currently the Afar have been 
partitioned into three states, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Djibouti. 
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As stated earlier in this chapter, various researchers indicated that the Afar had maintained 
independent self-administration until the beginning of the 20th century. Prior to their political 
incorporation into the Ethiopian state in 1905, the Afar had been outside Ethiopian state 
administrative control. They also remained outside the effective control of the central 
government until 1944. After this period the political and economic importance of Afar 
territory in terms of location (access to the Red Sea) and agricultural potential in the Awash 
Valley has been recognized and the successive Ethiopian governments have pursued with full 
incorporation of Afar territory through setting up civil and military bureaucracy. This finally 
culminated in the abolishment of the Sultanate of Aussa in 1974, the gradual incorporation of 
traditional structures into central government administration and into far-reaching 
consequences on the Afar pastoral economy.  
 
Over the past half of a century the Afar have been squeezed into the Lower and Middle 
Awash Valley alongside of the river Awash due to Issa-Somali successive incursions, 
pressure from highland peasant cultivators, expansion of commercial large-scale farms and 
establishment of national park and wildlife games. (This point will be discussed later in 
chapter 5).  
  
And yet the Afar social and political organizations are still effective at the clan and lineage 
levels, despite excessive pressure from the central government. The Afar social and political 
organizations are based on descent, kinship and clan territory. Nowadays clan leadership is 
still significant and cohesive among the Afar pastoralists. Despite the formation of new 
structures and institutions by the successive Ethiopian governments at the grassroots level, the 
Afar traditional authorities (elders, clan and lineage leaderships) have continued to function in 
governing the Afar social, economic and political life. Especially clan leaders have continued 
to be important political leaders representing their respective clans towards external actors. 
Community members often take heed of traditional authorities (clan leaders and elders).  
 
The long-standing Afar Maada/Ada (customary law) is still instrumental and effective in 
handling cases, and in guiding traditional governance, self-help and mutual assistance. People 
are proud of their traditional way of administration through Maada. They feel that their 
Maada provides them with justice which entails fair and common use of resources. Justice is 
understood as careful observance of Maada principles (mutual recognition, mutual respect, 
common use of resources in the locality) (Yacob et al., 2000:24). 
 
In general it can be said that the Afar social and political organizations have largely remained 
resilient in pastoral communities, despite the excessive pressure from modern governmental 
administrative structures for such long time. This might be partly attributed to the following 
factors: 
 
i. The traditional organizations and leadership structures are very much participatory 
and transparent to all adult male members. Political systems, leadership and 
decision making processes require full participation, full debates and examination 
of cases at length, and consensus in decision.   
ii. The cohesiveness and solidarity of the Afar people against external pressures. The 
Afar elders stress that all Afar are governed by the same Afar Ada (customary law) 
irrespective of clan membership, area of residence, national politics, etc.   
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iii. The continuous resistance of Afar to the attempts of complete incorporation by the 
successive Ethiopian governments. This relentless resistance has reduced exercise 
of direct rule by the successive Ethiopian governments.  
iv. The fact that the Afar inhabit the peripheral areas where the modern governmental 
structures (civil and military bureaucracies) could not be easily set up into all the 
Afar land.   
v. The ability of the Aussa Sultanate to handle the central state pressures in its favour 
via playing by the strategic importance of Afar territory for the nation. 
vi. The policies of Ethiopian governments that have pursued indirect rule (i.e. through 
‘traditional authority’ and the Sultanate of Aussa).        
 
Recently after the 1991 political change in Ethiopia, the Ethiopian Afar population is 
consolidated within a single region with autonomous powers of self-administration. 
Therefore, it seems that the current federal system has opened an opportunity for the Afar 
society to enhance the roles of traditional organizations and authorities in handling their 
internal affairs, representing their people, and linking them with external actors. However, the 
involvement of traditional authorities in the present local government (Woreda and Kebele 
administrations) is so far very limited. Community members lack trust in the current local 
government administration due to lack of commitment and non-participatory, patron-clientele 
system, clan favourism, and corruption and individualism. This issue of local governance is 
assessed in Chapter 6 by way of considering the perception of study community as illustrative 
instance. The next chapter deals with the Afar pastoral economy and its predicaments.  
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Chapter Five 
 
The Afar Pastoral Economy: Historical and Situational Assessment 
 
This chapter presents a historical and situational analysis of the Afar livelihood resources and 
systems, herd management strategies, relations with the state and their neighbours, ecological 
and economic changes and Afar pastoralists’ predicaments brought about by the introduction 
of large commercial farms in the Awash Valley. In doing so, this chapter focuses mainly on 
the regional level assessment and analysis of factors that have contributed to Afar livelihood 
predicaments. The background information for discussions in this chapter is based on both 
primary and secondary data sources.   
 
5.1 Climate, the Resource Base and Land Use Systems 
 
5.1.1 Climate 
 
The climate of the Afar region is semi-arid and arid, with the aridity increasing from west to 
east. Temperature is inversely related to altitude, with mean annual temperatures of 22°C to 
27°C (ANRS, 2004b:14). In areas like the Danakil Depression, the temperature usually 
reaches up to 50°C. Rainfall ranges from 100 to 700mm with most parts of the Region 
receiving an annual rainfall of less than 300mm (MCE, 2001:3). 60% of the annual rainfall is 
received in July-September, and another 20% in March-April. The remaining months of the 
year are dry leaving the Afar pastoralists dependent on the Awash River for water resources, 
and opportunistic cultivation along the banks of the River (Yacob et al., 2000:12).  According 
to the “woody biomass inventory and strategic planning study” (ANRS, 2004b:14), the 
Region has three major rainfall distribution patterns. These include: 
 
i. Low overall and extremely erratic rainfall (less than 200mm per annum) with a peak 
during October to March (Gilel) as exemplified by the pattern at Tendaho. This pattern 
is found in the eastern part of the region. 
ii. Moderate and erratic rainfall (less than 500mm per annum) with a single peak 
between June and September as exemplified by the pattern at Gewane. This pattern is 
found just west of the previous pattern. 
iii. Slightly higher and less erratic rainfall with a double peak: a low peak which occurs 
between March and May (Sugum), and a second and pronounced peak which occurs 
between July and September (Karma) as exemplified by Bati, Eliwaha and to a lesser 
extent Awash. The Sugum rains are more reliable in the central and northern areas, and 
nearer to the Eastern Escarpment.  
 
Generally rainfall is erratic and scarce in the Region. Due to this, the region has frequently 
experienced recurrent drought, and is classified as one of the drought prone regions of 
Ethiopia.  
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5.1.2 Natural Resources Base  
 
The Afar land covers 10% of the total area of the country and 29% of the pastoral lowlands 
(Yirgalem, 2001:5). One of the hottest areas in the world is found in the Afar Region. Though 
most of the Region is arid and semi-arid, it is able to support the population of the Afar 
pastoralists mainly due to the presence of the large and permanent Awash river which is the 
life-belt to the Afar people and their livestock population. Moreover, most of the large-scale 
farms in the Region and subsistence irrigated crop cultivation have been possible due to the 
Awash River.  
 
Some studies have indicated the presence of other natural resources including 18 perennial 
and 19 seasonal rivers, 26 major forest sites, 17 lakes and a number of mineral sites (Yacob et 
al., 2000:11; MCE, 2001). Natural resources such as water and forage vegetation play a key 
role in providing fodder and water points for livestock production in the Region. The 
wetlands, which are found along the Awash River, are classified as seasonal swamps and 
marshy areas. The seasonal swamps found in Zones 2, 3 and 4 serve as dry season grazing 
areas (MCE, 2001:43). The Awash River floods the Afar land during the months of July to 
September due to the heavy rainfall in the head water areas.  Pastoralists move away from the 
flood plains usually to the escarpments on the west or to the Alledeghi plain on the east. 
When the main rain stops in the highlands and floods recede to the banks of the Awash River, 
the Afar move down to the flood plains to provide their livestock with flash grass and 
abundant water resources. Therefore, the traditional Afar pastoralism is sustained by 
pastoralists’ oscillation between the flood plains and the wet season grazing territories away 
from the flood plains and river banks (Yacob et al., 2001:12). However, over the past decades 
this pattern of mobility has been affected by a number of external and internal factors. We 
will be back to this issue in section 5.2.4 below. 
 
The vegetation types, which are the main stay of the pastoral livestock economy, comprise 
riverine woodland, bushland, shrubland and grassland. Currently livestock get their feed from 
bushland, shrublands, riverine forests, grassland and seasonal marshes and swamps (MCE, 
2001). However, “land use and vegetation cover survey” carried out by Afar rangelands and 
water development study estimated that 70 % of the region is barrenland125 and only slightly 
less than 30% of the area is considered potentially productive rangeland (MCE, 2001:44). 
This implies the limited feed resources from these areas, given the increase in livestock 
population and human population. The same study also identified the extent of the potential 
grazing and browsing areas in the Region and this is presented in table 5.1 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
125 Different sources (studies) provided varying percentage figures for barrenland. For instance MCE (2001:44) 
provided 70%; the woody biomass inventory and strategic planning study (ANRS, 2004b:14) provided 50%, and 
Land Resources Inventory (1999) provided 63.67%. Most of the percentage figures fall between 50% and 70%. 
Therefore the figure, which is provided by Land Resources Inventory, seems to be the best estimate.   
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Table 5.1 Potential of the Region in Relation to Range Development  
Description  Extent of each Unit (ha) % of the region  
Potential for grazing and browsing  1,517,524 16.50 
Potential for grazing  725,062 7.88 
Potential for irrigated pasture  87,569 0.95 
Potential for seasonal grazing  151,320 1.65 
Potential for crop production  208,966 2.27 
Un-utilizable land  6,505,559 70.75 
Total region  9,196,000 100 
Source: MCE, 2001: p.44. 
 
 
5.1.3 Vegetation and Land cover  
 
The major land cover patterns are closely related to patterns of rainfall and temperature, with 
local variations due to soil and drainage factors. In the southern and central parts of the 
western piedmont hills and plains, dense shrubland/woodland changes to open shrubland with 
decreasing altitude and rainfall.  To the north with decreasing rainfall in Zones 2 and 4 the 
vegetation is lower and less dense (ANRS, 2004b:16).   
 
Along the middle Awash River floodplain dense riverine woodland and swamp are found 
where it has not been cleared for irrigated agriculture.  Below Dubti where the Awash River 
divides into a number of distributaries to form the Awash delta, a mosaic of dense woodland, 
permanent and seasonal swamps occur. Much of this has been reclaimed for irrigated 
agriculture (ANRS, 2004b:16). 
  
The riverine plains and interfluves of the Mile, Logiya, and Uwa Rivers in the West-Central 
Plains; Mile, Chifra, Ewa and Gulina Woredas in Zones 1 and 4 have extensive areas of 
grassland. Extensive areas of grasslands also occur on the wide sand grabens and plains in 
Amibara and Gewane Woredas of Zone 3 (ANRS, 2004b:16).  
 
The “woody biomass inventory and strategic planning study” has identified areas of land 
cover types in the Region. The major types and their percentages of the Zones and of the 
Region are indicated in table 5.2 below.  
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Table 5.2 Dominant Land Cover Types as percent of Total Zonal Area126 
Zone rainfe
d 
cultiv
ation  
irrigat
ed 
cultiv
ation 
grass 
land 
shrub 
land 
wood 
land 
natural 
forest 
riveri
ne 
forest 
wat
er 
wet
lan
d 
exposed 
soil, sand, 
or rock 
Total 
Zone 1 0.0%  1.2%  15%  24%  2%  0.0%  0%  1%  1% 55% 100% 
Zone 2 0.1%  0.0%  10%  27%  0%  0.4%  0%  1%  0% 62% 100% 
Zone 3 0.4%  0.0%  19%  38%  4%  0.0%  1%  1%  1% 36% 100% 
Zone 4 0.0%  0.0%  16%  45%  2%  0.0%  0%  0%  0% 38% 100% 
Zone 5 0.0% 0.0% 26% 56% 2% 0.0% 1% 0% 0% 15% 100% 
% of 
Region 
0.1% 0.4% 15% 32% 2% 0.1% 0% 1% 1% 50% 100% 
Source: Afar National Regional State (ANRS), 2004b, p.19. 
 
The Afar rangelands and water development study also reported that “almost all the land in 
the Afar region is classified as rangeland127 which serves as a source of forage for the 
livestock” (MCE, 2001:8). As depicted in the table 5.2 above some 50 percent of the Region 
is covered with bare soil, sand or rock, with 32 percent in shrubland and 15 percent in 
grassland. In the eastern part of the Region much of this grassland comprises annual grasses, 
so that much of the year bare soil is the dominant land cover (ANRS, 2004b:18). 
 
5.1.4 Rural Land Use systems  
 
The “woody biomass inventory and strategic planning study” (ANRS, 2004b:25) identified 
four rural land use systems in the Afar Region. These include pastoralism, agro-pastoral 
systems based on rainfed and irrigated agriculture, and sedentary agriculture. Each of these 
systems is briefly described as follows:  
 
i. Sedentary agriculture (growing maize and sorghum): Its main distinguishing feature is the 
production of nearly all crops from seeds. The crops are mainly cereals, pulses and oil 
crops. Livestock holdings are comparatively very small (less than 6TLUs per family). 
Herd splitting does not generally occur. There is little or no movement of livestock 
(ANRS, 2004b:25). 
 
ii. Agro-pastoral agriculture based on rainfed agriculture (cultivating maize and sorghum). 
Livestock holdings are large (average of 23 TLUs per family). Herd splitting occurs. 
Livestock movements can occur over long distances in search of grazing and browse. 
Camels travel the furthest because of their ability to go for long periods without water. 
The “dry” cattle herds can travel long distances but must be within a maximum of three 
days to water. Goats and sheep generally stay within one day’s travel from the settlement, 
although goats have a wider feeding range than sheep because of their ability to consume 
                                                 
126 The “woody biomass inventory and strategic planning study” might not include small-scale traditional 
cultivation (rainfed or irrigated ones) from some Zones (e.g. Zones 4 and 5). For instance I was able to observe 
small-scale cultivation in my study community that is located in Zone 5.  
127 In this case rangelands are defined as those areas with natural vegetation, which for some ecological reasons 
(normally low rainfall, in some cases rocky, steep or intractable soils or severe climate) are unsuitable to stable, 
rain-fed cultivated agriculture (MCE, 2001). 
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a greater portion of browse. Calves and milking cows generally stay close to the 
settlement (ANRS, 2004b:25). 
 
iii. Pastoralism with no crop cultivation, and livestock holdings larger than agro-pastoral 
families (average of 29 TLUs per family). Herd splitting occurs. Movement of livestock 
for grazing and browse are the same as for the agro-pastoralists (ANRS, 2004b:25). 
 
iv. Agro-pastoral agriculture based on irrigated agriculture in the Awash delta area (i.e. 
growing maize, sorghum and sesame). Livestock holdings are very large (average of 36 
TLUs per family). Herd splitting occurs. Movements of dry cattle and camels during the 
wet season are as far as Chifra Woreda. Sheep graze over relatively short distances along 
the Awash floodplain, whilst goat and camel movements occur over much larger distances 
(ANRS, 2004b:25). 
 
The above systems are not spatially distinct and it is possible for one or more systems to exist 
within one Woreda (district). However, generally the first two systems are found away from 
the Awash River and the fourth is found along the Awash River in Asaita and Afambo 
Woredas of Zone one.  
 
In general terms pastoral and agro-pastoral systems form the main livelihoods of the Afar 
population, the first being the dominant one. The overwhelming majority of the rural 
households (about 95 %) are pastoralists, and rely on a system where extensive livestock 
raising is the principal subsistence, milk as staple food. The pastoral groups sell live animals 
and animal products to get cash for purchasing agricultural and manufactured foods. On the 
other hand the agro-pastoralists in some pocket areas practise crop cultivation as subsidiary 
component. They cover some of their food needs from their own production and appear in the 
market to get supply of manufactured foods and some non-agricultural commodities (ANRS, 
2003:1). The following section deals with the Afar pastoral livelihood systems and herd 
management strategies. 
 
5.2. Livelihoods of Afar the Pastoralists 
 
5.2.1. The Afar System of Livestock Production 
 
As stated above the mainstay of the Afar society is livestock production. Like many other 
pastoralists in East Africa and elsewhere, the Afar keep multiple species and multi-purpose 
stock. They rear multiple species including cattle, camels, goats, sheep and donkeys (Ayele, 
1986; Ali, 1996; Getachew, 2001a:37). The proportion of the different species varies with the 
vegetation cover of the Region. In parts of the Region, in the escarpment and around the 
perennial rivers where the grazing resource is relatively good, cattle and sheep are the 
dominant types of livestock. In the drier part of the Region camel and goats make the 
prominent parts of the herd composition with mainly camels in the extreme arid areas (MCE, 
2001:14-15).   
 
An extensive livestock production system has been the predominant livelihood system which 
provides subsistence for Afar pastoral households. It supplies goods for household 
consumption (milk, meat, butter, hides, skins, etc). Live animals are also used in transactions 
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such as barter, and sources of cash from the market. In addition to the economic value, 
animals are also a means of establishing networks of social relationships and exchanges 
which provide security and mutual aid essential for the continuity of Afar pastoralism. Within 
the context of kinship and clan affiliation, members practise a good deal of sharing of 
resources (livestock and labour) and cooperation in economic activities. This point is 
elabourated in Chapter 6 on the basis of case materials from the study community.  
 
In general the Afar are engaged in subsistence livestock production not only for its economic 
value but also for the social and cultural values as well as life it renders to kinship groups and 
the Afar society. Pastoral values are a dominant feature of their social and cultural life 
(Getachew, 2001a:37). Therefore, among the pastoral Afar, livestock is the most important 
economic factor influencing all other socio-political and cultural activities. In addition they 
are used as a store of value and monetary, and as basis of enforcing social ties. 
 
However, as indicated earlier, in the past three to four decades the Afar subsistence pastoral 
system has been under pressure due to internal and external factors. Like other pastoral 
groups in East Africa the Afar pastoralists face various problems that include loss of grazing 
lands and water points to non-pastoral activities; recurrent drought and famine; loss of 
livestock, and impoverishment; political instability and conflict; population growth, etc. Each 
of these will be discussed at length in sections 5.2.5 and 5.2.6 below. Here I describe only the 
concomitant consequences of these developments on food supply from the subsistence 
livestock production.  
 
The Afar have derived the bulk of their food from milk, meat and butter in the past good days. 
In the past three decades particularly since the 1970s and 1980s, the pastoral Afar have made 
a shift towards grain as a major component of their diet. This is partly attributed to (i) 
insufficient milk yield and loss of livestock due to above mentioned factors, (ii) their gradual 
integration into market whereby they exchange animal and animal products for grain and, (iii) 
exposure to relief food provided in the form of grain during the past famine crises and the 
resultants changes in food habits.  
 
Particularly the losses of grazing and livestock owing to alienation of key resource area and 
recurrent drought have contributed to decline of food supply (milk, meat and other by-
products). The advent of large-scale commercial farms in the Middle and Lower Awash Basin 
has deprived Afar pastoralists of the dry and drought season grazing areas. This has 
exacerbated the consequences of drought that led to high livestock mortality and reduction of 
food supply. For instance the livestock mortality rate following the 1999/2000 drought ranged 
between 5-12% for camel, 30-80% for cattle, 30-60% for sheep, and 20-30% for goats in the 
Afar Region. During the 2002/2003 drought in Afar Region livestock mortality, particularly 
cattle, was estimated to be over 50%. (Beruk, 2003:9).  
 
Furthermore, with establishment of commercial farms came small towns, local markets and 
sedentarization. Then pastoral groups had to offer live animals (cattle, sheep and goats) and 
some animal products for sale at markets. During drought period terms of trade has been 
against pastoralists, in that livestock price drastically falls, whereas the price of grain soars. 
Therefore, these new circumstances and market forces have their own impacts on the Afar 
subsistence pastoral economy.  
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All these socio-economic processes have led to the increased dependence of pastoralists on 
the wider society and market forces; and to social inequalities and wealth differentiation 
among pastoral groups. Moreover, these processes have led pastoral groups to take up other 
non-pastoral pursuits such as practising crop cultivation, wage labour, charcoal making, and 
firewood selling that are new lines of occupation which pastoralists resort to when the 
pastoral household income falls. Consequently, the hitherto economically undifferentiated 
pastoral groups have been disintegrated and some pastoral households pursued non-pastoral 
activities. Some have started practising crop cultivation. Still some are forced to take up wage 
labour and other non-pastoral activities. And some still, fortunate ones maintain their herds 
through grazing alliance (i.e. stock association with neighbouring farming population or with 
bond friends) and engaging in animal trading.  
 
Therefore, the economic change implies a growing pattern of wealth differentiation. For 
instance in the Middle and Lower Awash Valley a few wealthy Afar were transformed into 
commercial agro-pastoralists, while the poor Afar households were neither able to sustain 
themselves in the pastoral sector nor were able to cope with the new circumstances that 
followed development, including increasing involvement in opportunistic farming on 
marginal lands, wage labour and the cash economy (Getachew, 2001a:149). As food supply 
from livestock production declines and drought cycle has increased, pastoral households are 
gradually less able to cope with recurrent food shortages and to recover after drought 
episodes. Consequently pastoralists, particularly poor households and those who lost their 
stock and assets rely on external food assistance.  For instance during the 2003 drought, 
204,115 (i.e. 18% of the total) of the Afar people were chronically drought affected and food 
insecure who required not only food assistance but also basic services such as water, health 
and nutrition as well as stock recovery (Beruk, 2003:11).   
  
Generally, it can be said that the diversification of sources of livelihoods (i.e. pastoral 
households’ involvement in non-pastoral activities) has been an increasing trend in response 
to both internal and external pressures on subsistence livestock production. And yet the 
subsistence-based pastoralism remains the main livelihood system for the majority of the Afar 
pastoral households, despite the gradual taking up of subsidiary economic activities (petty 
trade, small-scale cultivation, wage labour). The increase of non-pastoral strategies implies 
the fragmentation of the traditional pastoral system. On the other hand the majority of 
pastoralists still continue with their subsistence livestock production event at its marginality. 
Pastoral households employ various strategies of customary resource and herd management 
strategies in order to maintain their pastoral systems. This implies both the change and 
continuity of the pastoral system in response to internal ecological changes and external 
pressures. In the following section I discuss adaptive responses or strategies employed by the 
Afar pastoralists to maintain their pastoral system under the destabilizing events and 
processes going on in the Afar Region.  
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5.2.2 Customary Resource and Herd Management Strategies 
 
Earlier travellers characterised the Afar territory as “unpleasant consisting of stony or sandy 
desert traversed by great lavas …miserable desert, barren” (Nesbitt, 1935; Trimingham, 
1976). In fact the Afar land is largely semi-arid and arid which is, except in some pocket 
areas, not suitable for conventional or rainfed agriculture. And yet the Afar have managed to 
survive in such an environment for centuries via maintaining ecologically and economically 
sustainable pastoral production systems. Their pastoralism represents a highly rational 
adaptation to a severe and adverse environment. They have employed various herd 
management strategies and have developed flexible and adaptive social-political 
organizations to survive in such an adverse environment.  
 
Seasonal mobility, changing herd compositions (when the situation demands), and traditional 
institutions of mutual aid have been used to maintain the sustainability of the pastoral system 
both ecologically and economically. However, as indicated earlier over the past three to four 
decades this system has come under mounting pressure and increasingly becomes vulnerable 
to various stresses (economic, political and environmental ones). Changing land use, political, 
economic, demographic and institutional changes have all either in single or combined 
brought a growing pressure on Afar pastoralism. In other words these mounting 
environmental, demographic and political forces have put their long-adapted strategies at a 
test. I will be back to these factors at length in section 5.2.4. Here I first briefly discuss the 
main herd management strategies employed by the pastoral Afar. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, among the Afar and in many pastoral groups in East Africa herd 
management strategies are responses to many factors such as limitations set by ecology, 
physical needs of the stock, the social needs of people who keep the herds and, other socio-
cultural factors (Getachew, 2001a:38). For instance different species of stock prefer different 
niches and have different feeding habits; require distinct herding patterns; have different 
breeding rates and tolerance to vagaries of nature; provide different amount of yields; and 
have different social, cultural and religious significance. Therefore, it is in the light of all 
these considerations that herders or pastoral households pursue various herd management 
strategies and organizing their household labour.  
 
Households are production, reproduction and consumption units. The stock management unit 
in Afar is the household unit/extended family (Burra/Dahla) whose basic objective is geared 
towards provision of sufficient milk and exchange, and  balancing the reproduction and 
further survival of stock after droughts or misfortunes (Getachew, 2001a). In general for a 
successful pastoral production system in an economically risky and politically volatile 
environment like that of the current situation in the Afar Region requires an effective 
livestock management strategy; stock diversification;  mobility of stock; stock redistribution 
and transfer; establishing stock alliance and mobilizing social networks; change of residence 
by households, etc.  Each of these strategies is elabourated below.             
      
i. Accumulation and diversification of stock: One of the challenges of the pastoral 
households is the growth of livestock or to acquire more livestock and to diversify species in 
order to be a viable production unit and to recover from unexpected losses or misfortunes. 
Therefore, the Afar pastoral households in each extended family try to acquire more stock and 
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to keep multiple species as much as possible for feeding family members, for social 
investment and insurance against unexpected losses due to raid, disease or drought 
consequences. To this effect they strive to keep a sufficient number of cattle, camels, goats, 
and sheep. Particularly family members refrain from selling productive female stock and 
young heifers. Moreover, lineages or kinship groups often discourage and prevent members 
from depleting their stock (particularly camels and cattle) by selling for purchasing 
unessential urban consumer goods. Even transfer of stock to an individual family, who has 
lost its stock for one reason or the other, needs to ensure the availability of proper stock 
management, adequate and appropriate labour and skill in the recipient family. If a recipient 
mismanages a loaned stock, immediate recall of a loan stock can take place. All this is to 
build up family’s or lineage’s stock for provision of sufficient food, social investment, and for 
safeguarding against destitution which may result from unexpected stock losses or 
misfortunes. Transfer of stock between households also resolves shortage of herding labour 
for households who own relatively more stock than labour power. However, in recent decades 
the strategy of herd accumulation has been constrained by loss of stock because of recurrent 
drought impacts, shrinkage of pastureland and loss of key resource areas to non-pastoral uses.   
 
ii. Livestock mobility and labour organization: As stated in Chapter 3, the most conspicuous 
adaptive strategy of the pastoral production system is the mobility of herders and livestock. 
The mobility of herders and herds which is mainly dictated by the availability of forages and 
water can follow different patterns, but is always characterized by a combination of individual 
stock ownership and communal land use.  
 
Among the Afar the strategy of mobility is pursued mainly to minimize stock losses and to 
provide access to seasonally varying grazing resources and to sufficient water. Mobility also 
occurs to escape floods, mosquito infestation and livestock diseases. The Afar pastoral system 
is based on the utilization of rangeland resources which vary temporally and spatially. In 
order to utilize such different rangeland resources, the pastoral groups adopt various patterns 
of mobility depending on seasonal availability of pasture, vegetation and water. As the Afar 
Region is characterized by extreme variability in and low amounts of rainfall, the Afar have 
developed an extremely flexible system of livestock and rangeland management that utilizes 
the poor/scarce livestock feed resources available to them in a highly efficient manner.   
 
Spatial mobility is made to dry-season and wet-season pastures involving short-range 
mobility and/or long distance migration. Transhumance is practised between dry-season 
pasture within flood plains of the Awash River and key resource areas at the banks of some 
perennial rivers and the wet-season pastures on the high grounds outside of the riverine lands 
and on foothills or escarpments in the western part of the Region. (See map 6 for directions of 
livestock movement within and beyond the Region).  
 
 166
 
 
Map 6 Livestock Movement during Wet and Dry Season 
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During the dry season people and livestock retreat to areas with relatively secure water 
supplies. During the short rain herders split their livestock into grazers and browsers, and into 
“wet” (milk) and “dry” animals. Using a highly developed system of scouting and verbal 
communication (Dagu) they direct their animals to areas where browse and/or pasture are 
temporarily at their best. (This point is elabourated in Chapter 6 on basis of case materials 
from the study community). 
 
Mobility also involves the division of management units (i.e. the households and their stock). 
Herding unit is often based on types of animals, age, sex and lactating status. The herd is 
divided into camel, cattle and small stock herding units which in turn sub-divided into 
main/permanent settlement-based lactating stock (Homa) and temporary camp-based dry-herd 
stocking unit (Magida). Likewise labour resources of households are organised into herder 
groups on the basis of age, gender, kinship relation, traditional rules and settlement. If we see 
labour organization in terms of type of stock, age and gender of herders, camels are often kept 
only by adult men and cattle by adult men and women. Small stocks are mainly herded by 
children and women who are in fact overseen by adult men to ensure their security against 
any external threats (e.g. theft, wild beasts, raids from Issa, Karrayu). Livestock are penned in 
accordance with kinship relations. Kinship groups or households within extended families 
often pool their labour, organize and herd their stock together. As a rule camels are herded 
and milked only by men, cattle by men and women, goat and sheep by children and women. 
Elders supervise the management of herd units both in main settlements and temporary 
camps. They also tend lactating, small stock, some pack animals, weak and work stocks 
which are kept near the base camp (Homa). On the other hand junior, unmarried and energetic 
young men drive dry-herd from the main settlement to wet and dry season grazing areas (see 
box 5.1 below about livestock in space vis-à-vis homestead/family enclosure in the study 
community).  
 
 
 
 
 
Box 5.1 Livestock in Space 
 
         
 
Hut and   
animal 
kraal   
                     1 
 
        2      
 
                       3  
 
 
 
1. Gudata (Kelao): space allowed only to extended households to graze kids and calves. Other large animals 
can stay for short time in Gudata.  Gudata is closer to the homestead and often reserved for small kids and 
calves. 
2. Dahari: area designated mainly for goat, sheep and cattle 
3. Der-dahari:  Area far from homestead and mainly used for camel and cattle grazing.  
 
Sources: Focus Group Interview, December, 2005 
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The range of mobility varies spatially as well as seasonally. Previous studies done in the 
Awash Valley (e.g. Getachew, 2001a:50; Voelkner, 1974:21) indicated that the mobility 
range of the main settlement camp of the Afar family is estimated to be between 0 to 5 kms, 
but sometimes it is between 5 to 30 kms radius and conversely the dry-herd satellite camps 
have ranges of migration between 30 to 100 kms radius. Long distance migrations are 
practised during the rainy season and enable efficient use of the distant pasture and 
preservation of the nearby for the later use.  
 
However, over the past three to four decades the Afar pastoral mobility into the dry/wet 
seasons’ key resource areas has been highly affected by the introduction of irrigation schemes 
in the Awash Valley; the change of the Awash River course and flooding; delineation of 
national parks; the intrusion of Issa and other neighbouring groups into the Afar land; and the 
mounting of intra and enter-clan and ethnic conflicts over the use of scarce resources, and 
shrinkage of pasturelands. Each of these constraints is discussed in section 5.2.4 below. But 
here let us proceed with discussing on herd management strategies employed to overcome 
stock losses during dry or drought seasons.  
 
In Afar society the last part of the dry season is the most difficult period for the pastoralists. It 
is a period where household heads and clan/lineage leaders have to make critical decisions to 
overcome stock losses. Until the rainy season comes they tend to the disposal of part of the 
stock through sale, transfer to other households or bond friends, exchange of animals, etc 
(Getachew, 2001a). Equally critical is the drought period where pastoral households have to 
resort to distress migration, stock disposal, slaughtering animals and destocking. Some of 
these strategies are elabourated below.  
 
iii. Stock distribution and transfer: Stock redistribution and transfers are made on the basis 
of kinship relations. Stock can be transferred in different contexts in the form of gifts, loans 
and exchange (Getachew, 2001a; Ayele, 1986). Stock transfer starts from birth through 
marriage to establishing of independent households (i.e. cycle of household development). 
Each son acquires the birth gift from his father, paternal and material kin and affines. 
Likewise a daughter also acquires gifts from parents and relatives. Birth gifts constitute the 
core herd by the time a son gets married. As a boy grows he again acquires additional gifts of 
stock from his father, mother and close kin at circumcision and marriage. (This point is 
elabourated in Chapter 6 on basis of case materials from the study community). Besides he 
could acquire stock through his own effort by engaging in herding and wage employment in 
town and non-pastoral works.  
 
On the other hand households or individuals who face misfortune and loss of their stock could 
ask for free gifts or loans of stock from their close kin. A household head that could not afford 
his children’s marriage, circumcision, mortuary rituals, or could not cover cost of treatment of 
ill-dependent could ask his relatives or kinsmen for loans or gifts.  A poor or a household 
head who could not sustain his household members could ask his paternal, maternal kin and 
in-laws (affines) of milk-stock (Hantilla/Hantita), or redistribute his children among these 
groups of relatives. Stock distribution or transfer through Hantilla could be viewed in terms 
of practical livestock management strategy which includes security guarantees and 
ecologically efficient resource uses. The transfer of stock to relatives living away from the 
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giver’s residence is preferred and considered as more advantageous to those living closer 
(Getachew, 2001a:42). Various stock transfer and mutual aid associations exist among the 
Afar. These associations are described in Chapter 6 using case materials from the study 
community.     
 
Generally, among the Afar, kinship groups have a shared claims and rights in each other’s 
stock, and moral responsibility for raising the necessary number of animals or cash in 
assisting members who face misfortunes for one reason or the other and/or could not sustain 
their household members, since they are involved in mutual aid and cooperation. The 
arrangements of stock transfers are the function of social organizations and effective herd 
management strategies. Transfers are done within a household and across households linked 
by kinship relations in order to tackle shortage of milk and breeding stock by the recipient 
households. However, nowadays the amount of transfers and the degree of mutual aid have 
been constrained by decline of assets both at household and community levels among the 
Afar. Though solidarity, good will and the ethos of mutual help are still strong among the 
pastoral groups, the amount of transfers has been gradually insufficient either to rebuild stock 
or to cope with severe crisis. This point will be illustrated in Chapter 6 by the way of 
analyzing the case study of Aghini pastoral community. 
 
iv. Stock-Alliance and Animal Entrustment: For an individual or a household it is customary 
to have bond friend(s) (Kataysa) from the own clan group or from non-Afar groups. Bond-
friendship is one way of forming an alliance or networking for reciprocity or resource sharing. 
Such alliance is based on voluntary, self-selected contracts between individuals or 
households. Thus individuals and households who have established bond friendships 
exchange gifts, loans and form stock-alliance.   
 
Stock-alliance is established between individuals or households. It is customary for an 
individual to have four stock-partners, two of his own and the other two of his father.128 If one 
gave one particular animal to his friend, his friend could ask him for another animal at another 
time (Ayele, 1986:37). The stock partner could also tend livestock of his ally for a certain 
period, and in return he could receive animals or firearms for his service.  
 
The relation between Afar and neighbouring groups (Oromo, Argoba and Amhara) is 
characterized by both conflict and cooperation. The relations of Afar with their neighbours 
living in the west part (i.e. Oromos and Argoba) have been friendly, peaceful and important as 
compared to that of the Issa. There have been economic and social relations. Intermarriage 
and friendship (Kataysa) as well as relationships with their neighbours have been important in 
creating peaceful trade relations and access to scarce pastoral resources and markets 
(Getachew, 2001a). In order to escape drought risks, shortage of feed and livestock diseases 
the local Afar move part of their stock to their Oromo or Argoba friends (Kataysa). Likewise 
their Oromo friends bring their stock to their Afar friends during wet seasons. Moreover, the 
Afar and the neighbouring groups exchange pasture resources and stubble (crop residues). In 
recent years, however, forging stock-alliance with neighbouring Oromos has been reduced. 
                                                 
128 Kataysa (bond-friendship) is inherited among the Afar. Children often continue their relations with their 
father’s Takaysa, when their father passes away.  
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This will be explained in Chapter 6 by analyzing the relationships of case study community 
with its neighbours. 
 
v. Slaughtering, Destocking and Restocking Livestock: The pastoral Afar sell or slaughter 
only specific types of animals like dry females, kids (Bakal) and older animals. In normal 
times older animals and non-productive stock are often disposed either through selling them 
at market or slaughtering them for household consumption or offering for the feast called 
Dasiga. As a rule female stock are not offered for market unless they are old or non-
productive. Old and non-productive stock are offered for Dasiga. Dasiga is an Afar term that 
denotes sharing meat in the bush. It is practised mainly by young men who want to hold a 
meat-sharing feast. An animal is often offered for such a feast on payment in kind. For 
instance, a camel slaughtered for a Dasiga is equivalent to 90-100 goats (Helland, 1980, cited 
in Getachew, 2001a:51). The practice of Dasiga is partly to overcome craving for meat. On 
the part of the stock owner, it is a way of disposing an old stock, and reconstituting the herd 
by young and productive ones. In relation to Dasiga as a means of disposing unwanted stock 
and restocking, my key informants stated as follows: 
 
In the study community unless there is severe problem, female-animals are not often 
offered for sale. Under the normal conditions male-animals, old animals (both 
sexes), those female-animals with less yield, or with deformed breast, or those 
which are emaciated or thin; or a cow whose calf could not grow (called Sobiyalie), 
and finally heifer are often offered for sale at market.  Male-camel which is fattened 
or old can be offered for meat to the clan members on loan basis for the feast called 
Dasiga. Dasiga is often feasted with a group consisting of seven or nine or eleven 
members. The number of Dasiga group is always odd number. A herder who has a 
fattened or old camel offers it for Dasiga. The owner in return can receive nine 
female-goats immediately (i.e. in advance). After 2 years, the owner will receive 
nine castrated bulls. Then the owner will fatten and sell the bulls for cash, or 
exchange them for heifers, or rent out the bulls to the neighbouring sedentary 
cultivators for grain and to be used for plowing (Key informant interviews, 
December, 2006) 
 
The Afar also dispose stock selectively even during dry season or drought period. They also 
cull animals when there is a critical shortage of feed during drought, and during disease 
epidemics. They tend first to sell old, non-productive and male stock early to avoid losses due 
to shortage of feed and to preserve the existing scarce feed for those core and productive-
female stock. When a drought becomes severe they slaughter very young ones or calves as the 
dams could not provide them with sufficient milk and withstand the exposure to drought 
effects.  
 
5.2.3 The Increased Involvement of Afar Pastoralists in Non-pastoral Activities: Trade 
and Crop Cultivation 
 
Even though pastoralism was and is long-standing mainstay of the Afar, trade and crop 
cultivation had been adopted since earlier times. They are not newly introduced practices 
among the Afar who reside in the lower delta of the Awash River Valley. Earlier travellers 
(Nesbitt, 1935:207; Trimingham, 1976; Dahilon, 1985 cited in Kebede, 2005:51) observed 
such non-pastoral pursuits in parts of the Afar land at earlier times. For instance, during his 
expedition to Aussa, Nesbitt (1935:207) recorded that “at present agriculture is practised only 
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sufficiently to supply the needs of the population, and certain reserve crop which is stored in 
the Sultan’s granaries for use in the less productive years.” Crop cultivation had been 
observed along the Awash River, particularly in the fertile districts of Badhu and Aussa where 
a series of lakes developed from the Awash River had been exploited for cultivation by the 
creation of a system of dykes built by Arabs at the instigation of the Sultanate of Aussa 
(Nesbitt, 1935: 208; Lewis, 1994:162). And at the time maize, cotton and tobacco were 
grown. 
 
Earlier travellers and explorers also reported the excavation of salt as one economic activity 
apart from pastoralism in the northern and central part of Danakil (now northern Afar). Afar 
traders were also engaged in exporting salt block (Amoliay) to the west to highland areas (i.e. 
to Abyssinian merchants129) and to the east to the coast (Arabian merchants). Salt deposits 
provided an essential article of trade130. Livestock and their products were also traded in 
exchange for durra and cloths brought by coastal merchants (Lewis, 1994:155,158).  
 
Moreover, the long distance caravan trade route was through the Afar territory. While the 
local people earned some income from providing escorts for the caravans, and exchanged 
their goods against imported goods, the local (tribal) chiefs collected transit fees from caravan 
traders. Therefore, the Afar being in the strategic location - in an area through which the 
caravan trade route to and from the hinterland and the coast passed, have benefited from this 
traffic by acting as middlemen between the coastal and hinterland traders, and have also 
themselves involved in the trade for centuries. Earlier times the external trade between Afar 
and their neighbours was largely carried out through the caravan networks (Getachew, 
2001a:45).    
 
Until the establishment of Djibouti-Dire-dawa railway, the caravan trade route and coastal 
commerce (trade) played a significant role in the Afar economy. Moreover, the route also 
served the Afar Sultanates to maintain their practical independence from the Abyssinian 
rulers, as the later remained on good terms in order to ensure the safety of their caravans to 
the coast. However, since 1895, the independent Sultanate of Aussa gradually came under the 
control of the Ethiopian rulers. Particularly after 1944, the pressure from the central 
government has increased and it has been enhanced by the establishment of civil and military 
bureaucracies. Moreover, the advent of the large irrigation schemes in fertile districts of the 
Awash Valley hitherto used for traditional irrigated agriculture and grazing has brought far-
reaching consequences on Afar pastoralism, crop cultivation and trade.                 
 
Generally speaking the Afar pastoralists have neither subsisted from the products of their 
animals nor grown sufficient food crops to meet their consumption, ritual and luxury 
requirements. Therefore, they have to sell livestock and other products, and rent out their pack 
animals (camel and donkey) to local and non-local traders in order to purchase grain, cloth, 
medicine, and luxury goods. Still others engage themselves in additional income sources 
                                                 
129 In relation to this Nesbitt (1935:63) observed that “the Danakils had carried the bags of salt to the boundary 
of their territory, where they had been taken up by … Abyssinians”.  
130 “Licata wrote in 1885 that slavery [was] the main commercial enterprise of the Afar” (Licata, 1885:272 cited 
in Lewis, 1994:167) and Nesbitt (1935: 189) also indicted that “though very restricted … trade in slave or the 
slave-traffic continued … because it was such a lucrative business”.  
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such, growing food crop, wage labour, animal trading, charcoal making, fuel-wood selling, 
etc. Nowadays, therefore as income and food supply from subsistence livestock production 
declines over time, pastoral households gradually resort to taking up of additional livelihood 
strategies either to augment their income sources and/or to cope with economic shocks. These 
non-pastoral activities will be illustrated in Chapter 6 with reference to the study community. 
Therefore, the following section focuses on the historical political processes, and socio-
ecological changes that have affected the current Afar livelihood systems. State-society 
relations, Afar relations with their neighbours, ecological and economic changes, and the Afar 
predicaments are the focus in the following sections.    
 
5.2.4. Relation with State and Neighbours 
 
5.2.4.1. State-Society Relation 
 
i. Political incorporation: As indicated earlier in Chapter 4 the Afar-state relation has 
evolved for centuries. Various historical, political and economic factors have contributed to 
shaping the Afar relations with successive Ethiopian governments. The political incorporation 
of the Afar territory and the partial annexation to highland economy, and the development 
programmes that reflected the priorities of government political, strategic, national and 
foreign commercial interests have played a great role in shaping Afar-state relationships. 
Some of these factors are elabourated in the following paragraphs.  
 
As stated by various authors, until the end of the 19th century the Afar and their Sultanates 
were able to maintain their “practical independence” from the Abyssinian rules. The 
Sultanates of Rahyata and Tajoura passed under European domination, but the Aussa 
Sultanate remained independent and its influence extended over southern Dankalia (Lewis, 
1994:157). A number of factors have been mentioned by many writers for the “practical 
independence” of Afar land prior to early 1940s, and for a semi-independence status after this 
period (Nesbitt, 1935; Lewis, 1994; Trimingham, 1976; Gamaledin, 1993; Getachew, 2001a). 
Some reported that Danakil harsh environment, a circle of sterile desert on one hand and the 
braveness and ferociousness of the local people on the other hand had guarded the Danakil 
territory against Abyssinian authorities or raids from Abyssinian highlands (Lewis, 1994:157; 
Nesbitt, 1935). In relation to this Nesbitt (1935:72) noted as follows:   
 
Though the Danakil country belongs to Abyssinia, the agents of the government are 
unable to penetrate in its deserts, except fringes. The brave and ferocious Danakils 
are in a continual state of contention with the government forces for possession of 
the borderlands lying between their tribal territories and the plateau. In any given 
sector, sometimes the government forces and sometimes the Danakils hold the upper 
hand. Beyond the borderlands no government forces ever dare to pass.  
 
Other authors stated that the fact that Abyssinian rulers, particularly those of Shewa wanted to 
ensure the safety of their caravans to the coast and thus had to remain on good terms with the 
Afar had contributed to maintain a practical independence (Lewis, 1994:156-157; 
Trimingham, 1976:171). The caravan route was the main access trail to the coast for import 
and export at the time. Still other authors claimed that the Abyssinian rules (Amhara and 
Tigre) followed the policy of indirect rule through natives of the Afar (Getachew, 2001a; 
Gamaledin, 1993). Gamaledin (1993.45) further contended that it is not only in Afar, but 
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“Ethiopia as a whole did not have a centralized administration before the end of the Italian 
rule in 1941, when attempts were made to set up civil and military bureaucracy”. According 
to Gamaledin until 1941, the Afar region was not effectively controlled by the Ethiopian 
government partly due to the inability of the central government to provide the necessary 
administration and partly because of the historical relations between Shewa and the southern 
Afar (Gamaledin, 1993:49). Later on, with the end of colonial administration in Northern 
Ethiopia, the security of border and safe access to the coast had become a priority concern for 
the central government. This emanated from the economic and political importance of the 
strategic position of the Afar land for the central government. Consequently the central 
government strengthened its surveillance and expedition into Afar land to salve any external 
threat.  
 
Generally the Danakil territory was comparatively free from the Abyssinian authority until the 
time of Emperor Menelik II, when, in 1895, on the pretext that the Sultan of Aussa had 
become an ally of the Italians, a Shewan army was sent against him and the Sultan was forced 
to pay tribute (Lewis, 1994:157). Therefore, after the withdrawal of Italians from Eritrea, an 
Abyssinian expedition reached to Aussa in 1944, captured Sultan Mohammed Yayo and 
brought him to Addis Ababa where he died in captivity (Lewis, 1994). His office was passed 
to Ali Mirah (a kinsman-young boy from the Aydahiso family), who was indebted to a 
celebrated Wazir (chief assistant), Hamadi Yayo, until he was crowned as Sultan of Aussa. 
Then after Aussa remained as a semi-independent Sultanate tributary to Ethiopia until the 
1974 Revolution when the Sultan was deposed and forced into exile to abroad (Lewis, 
1994:157). In relation to this Gamaledin (1993:47) stated that the “policy of the Imperial 
Government in Afar land was to create an Afar officialdom on lines similar to those 
everywhere in the country by conferring titles and stipends on Afar notables, and in so doing 
the Centre was to exert its influence. Gamaledin (1993:47) also added that the introduction of 
agricultural reforms and large-scale commercialization into the Awash Valley was to 
consolidate the position of state bureaucracy, thereby creating an economic bond with the 
wider Ethiopia society. The increasing incorporation of Afar territory under the control of the 
centralized state administrative and political machinery has been enhanced during the 1940s 
with the advent of modern civil and military bureaucracies in Ethiopia and further intensified 
with the introduction of irrigation schemes into fertile lands of the Awash Valley in the 
subsequent decades. In general the Imperial Government and the Derg regime attempted to 
incorporate the Afar traditional structure and authority into the central state. This aspect has 
been already discussed in Chapter 4. In the following sections I describe the consequences of 
large-scale commercialization and delineation of parks on Afar pastoralists.     
 
ii. Farm Commercialization and National Parks/Game Reserves: Pastoral Land Alienation: 
As stated earlier in Chapter 3, the development policies and programmes implemented in the 
Afar Region have historically reflected the priorities of government political and strategic 
interests and selected national and foreign commercial interests. The land tenure and 
development policies of the successive Ethiopian regimes were hostile to pastoral economy of 
the Afar society. Their policies were mainly in favour of settled agriculture including large-
scale state and private commercial farms aimed at achieving national economic goals that 
excluded the social and economic interests of the local customary users.   
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If we begin with the time of the Emperor Haile Selassie, the lands of the pastoral areas were 
made the property of the state by constitutional decree. In 1955 the revised constitution of the 
Haile Selassie Government dispossessed all pastoralists of their land by declaring it as State 
property. The ground which prepared for such policy could only have emanated from a total 
misunderstanding of the ways of life of pastoral nomads, their social system, particularly their 
customary law regarding land (Fekadu, 2001:1). A survey carried out in 1969 found out that 
42% of the total area of the country was classified as Government land (MoLA, 1969a:118 
cited in Abdul-Mejidi, 1976:12). According to this same study, 78% of the Government land 
had “a grazing only” potential and could not be used for agriculture without heavy investment 
in irrigation. And such areas were those lowlands inhabited by pastoral groups, and had been 
declared Government land. Accordingly the government and prominent individuals inside the 
pastoral groups and in the high echelon of the central government began to seize on these 
opportunities to assign the pastoral land for commercial farming. The immediate victims of 
such exploitation were the Afar, whose prime land was exploited by commercial farming to 
the detriment of the productivity of pastoralism (Fekadu, 2001).  
In fact the rise in government interventions since the 1960s was part of much broader 
development strategies that most developing countries adopted during the 1950s and the 
1960s. Taking into account the global economic order of the time, the Imperial Government 
in Ethiopia designed an industry-focused economic development strategy (Bekele, 2006:6). 
Expansion of large-scale commercial farming was taken as a means to supply raw materials to 
domestic industries, and food supply for workers. While expanding commercial farms, the 
Afar plains were among the areas that attracted the attention of the Government.  
 
Out of the total of some 200, 000 ha of irrigable land, 25% was developed in 1970-71, mainly 
for the production of cotton and sugar. It was precisely those areas most frequented by the 
Afar, i.e. their grazing pastures which are traditionally flooded during June to August 
resulting in excellent grazing for the greater part of the year (Abdul-Mejidi, 1976:19). The 
prime land “corridor of survival” of the Awash River which was used strategically in the 
height of the dry season when the grass is depleted in other areas was no longer available for 
them. The taking of this land had such disastrous consequences that the Afar were vulnerable 
to withstanding the slightest of the usual cyclical droughts (Fekadu, 2001:1).  
The 1974 Revolution in Ethiopia deposed the Imperial Government. The Military 
Government (Derg) came to power. This was followed by the 1975 Land Reform 
Proclamation. However, the 1975 land reform, which was expected to restore communal 
lands lost to private commercial farms since the 1950s, failed to address the land tenure issue. 
The reform that led to the nationalisation of all lands did not redress the disastrous 
consequences of land tenure and development policies of the Imperial Government. Rather 
the expropriation of pastoral communal lands for large-scale irrigation schemes had continued 
during the Military Regime. Firstly, the Derg Government confiscated all large-scale farms 
owned by private commercial farmers and concessionaires. Later on large-scale private farms 
were transformed into state-owned enterprises. Secondly, new farms were expanded under the 
Derg regime through appropriation of more pastoral lands. The Derg Regime promoted a 
rapid expansion in state-run irrigation schemes, which brought vast tracts of grazing land 
under cash crop production. For instance, after the 1975 land reform the Middle Awash 
Agricultural Development Enterprise (MAADE) was expanded from 300 ha in 1968 to 13, 
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116 ha in 1985 by clearing more land from dry-season grazing areas (Bekele, 2006:6). 
Therefore, the local Afar were denied of property rights, of their remaining grazing lands due 
to additional expansion of state-owned large-scale irrigation schemes. 
Though the Afar region is one of the hottest areas and is extremely inhospitable, it has been 
able to support the Afar pastoral and agro-pastoral groups due to the presence of the Awash 
River and other permanent water courses. Particularly the Awash River is the life-source of 
the Afar pastoralists and agro-pastoralists inhabiting the Lower and Middle Awash Valley. 
However, their relative autonomy and pastoral economy have been severely threatened since 
the early 1960s by the establishments of irrigated agricultural schemes and national parks in 
the Awash Valley. Particularly the land which has been taken for early development was 
mostly land close to the river, in areas which flooded easily and took a long time to drain. 
Consequently, the pastoralists have lost important dry season grazing areas that have good 
grazing during the hottest and driest part of the year from February to June (Abdul-Mejidi, 
1976; Flood, 1976; Ali, 1996; 1997). The estimated dry/wet season grazing lands lost to non-
pastoral uses in the Middle Awash Valley is given in table 5.3 below. 
 
Table 5.3 Estimated Grazing Lands Lost to Non-pastoral Uses in the Middle Awash Valley 
Pastureland Area (ha.) 
I. Dry-season grazing lost to: 
1.1 Middle Awash Agricultural Development Enterprise  
1.2 Awara Melka and Yalo farms  
1.3 Settlements  
1.4 IAR, Melka Werer Irrigation pasture project  
1.5 Irrigated pasture project 
Sub-total  
15, 840
2,430
3,011
360
1,200
22,841
II. Wet-season grazing lost to: 
2.1. Alledeghi Animal holding center 
2.2. Northern part of Awash national park   
Subtotal  
6,000
23, 000
29, 000
          Grand total 51, 841
Source: Ali, 1997, p.126.  
 
Generally, out of the total area of 130, 000 ha put under commercial farms in pastoral areas of 
Ethiopia, the Afar Region contributes 70, 000 ha (Beruk, 2003:5). Similarly a significant area 
of rangeland is designated for wildlife reserves, parks and sanctuaries in the Afar Region (see 
map 7 for major parks/ conservation areas).  
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Map 7 Parks/conservation Areas in the Afar region 
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A total of 466, 640 ha of range areas have been converted to wildlife parks and sanctuaries in 
Ethiopia (Beruk, 2003:5). Of this amount of rangeland, about 75% of the alienated pastoral 
land belongs to the Afar pastoralists131.  This is shown in table 5.4 below.   
 
Table 5.4 Parks, Wildlife Reserves and Sanctuaries in the Rangeland Area of Afar 
Park/wildlife reserve/sanctuary Area (in hectare)
Awash National Park  7,560
Yangudi-rassa national Park  47,310
Alledeghi  Wildlife Reserve  18,320
West Awash Wildlife Reserve  17,810
Gewane Wildlife Reserve  24,390
Mile-Serdo wildlife Reserve  87,660
Gewane Controlled Hunting Area  59,320
West Awash Controlled Hunting Area  91,360
Sub-total  353,730
Source: Ethiopian Wildlife Conservation Organization (EWCO), 1993 cited in Beruk, 2003, p.5 
Generally speaking all the interventions of the state were without the consent of the 
customary users. Compensatory measures such as irrigated pasture and resettlement schemes 
were attempted.  But they could not satisfy pastoral groups who lost their key resource areas. 
All compensation measures had proved failure for the reasons already mentioned in Chapter 
3. Therefore, there were always series of resistance from the local people during and after the 
establishment of the commercial farms particularly during the Derg time. At times the 
pastoralists expressed their dissatisfaction and desperation in damaging mature crops and 
confronting with state authorities. Conversely they suffered from penalty, confiscation of 
stock, harassment, eviction and killing. The following incidence that occurred immediately 
after the 1975 land reform illustrates Afar pastoralists’ resistance to the central state: 
Following the flight of the Sultan Ali Mirah, Afar grievances sparked a rebellion 
which culminated in the burning of a cotton plantation and killing of many non-
Afars. As the Sultan left Asayita on June 2, 1975, his followers killed about 221 
non-Afars the next day. The killing of the highlanders was provoked by the fears of 
the Afars that the government would hand over their land to those tilling it in 
accordance with the land proclamation since highlanders worked on Afar owned 
farms by being employed at the time. The Addis Ababa-Assab highway was also 
closed as result of the uprising. As it had serious implication for the country's 
economy, the Derg regime soon reacted harshly by sending troops to the area and 
began what Shehim (1985) called an “Afar genocide”. Asayita, the capital of Aussa 
Sultanate was destroyed and many Afars were murdered. The Sultan claimed that 
“the government army killed as many as 1,000 Afars by using airplanes and armored 
cars” (Ottaway and David, 1978, Shehim, 1985 and Ali 1998 cited in Kebede, 
2005:57-58) 
 
                                                 
131 The balance, 35% belongs to other pastoral areas (i.e. 62, 300 ha in SNNPR and 50,610 ha in Gambella 
Region have been converted to wildlife reserves, parks and sanctuaries).  
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The flight of Sultan Ali Mirah to Saudi Arabia marked the end of friendly relations between 
the central government and the Afar. It ushered in a period of open ethnic confrontation 
between the Afar and the central government (Ali, 1998:111). Therefore, state-local people 
relation was that of suspicion, distrust and conflict. This in turn combined with ecological 
marginality contributed to economic and political marginalization of the Afar pastoralists. 
Apart from loss of pastoral key resource areas and conflicts between Afar and government 
authorities, the advent of large-scale development schemes in the Awash Valley also brought 
ecological crisis and socio-economic consequences. The following paragraphs briefly present 
some of these consequences.  
iii. Ecological and Socio-economic Consequences: The arid and semi-arid areas of East 
Africa have rainfall patterns that are highly variable temporally and spatially making pasture 
and water availability for livestock unpredictable. Moreover, key ecological resources of such 
areas are characterized by small patches of seasonal grazing and important water points that 
are critical to support the entire livestock production system. When such key resources are 
degraded or lost, the production systems can be badly affected. 
In the Afar Region huge areas used by the pastoralists during wet season have no permanent 
water supply. The great plains which support no human habitation during dry season are 
capable of providing grazing for several million animals during the wet season. In the dry 
season, with most people clustered around the Awash River, the density of population is high, 
whereas in the wet season people are very sparsely scattered on the land. Particularly 
pastoralists who inhibit the Middle and Lower Awash Valley stay close to the river much of 
the year (i.e. during the long dry period lasting from September to May). The only time they 
venture great distance is during the rainy season in the highlands when the river overflows its 
banks creating an area of rich soil for the rest of the year. Therefore, they are largely 
dependent on grazing near the Awash River banks. When a small area close to the Awash 
River is made unavailable for dry season grazing in the past four decades due to the 
establishment of irrigated farms, a much larger area away from the river is rendered useless 
(Flood, 1976).  
Moreover, the regime of the Awash River has been changed drastically by the construction of 
Koka dam and dykes constructed for regulation of Awash River water. Land degradation that 
occurred at the upstream has caused a high run off and sedimentation at the Awash River bed. 
An earlier study reported that Koka dam has reduced the peak flow of water from 700 m3 per 
second to 300 m3 per second (Flood, 1976:65). The reduction in river potential to flood has 
effects throughout the Middle and Lower Awash Valley. As the irrigation process takes much 
water from the river and allows it to drain away or evaporate in the fields, less water reaches 
inland delta. Therefore, vegetation balances have been disrupted and desertification is allowed 
to encroach (Flood, 1976).   
 
Since much of the land taken for schemes had been good grassland, and the rest grasslands 
are no longer to provide sufficient pasture due to drought and conflict risks, cattle in particular 
have been hit by the consequence of external interventions and impacts of drought. 
Consequently, a number of pastoralists have resorted to raising more goats. Goats and camels 
gradually came to dominant the pastoral economy, with resultant destruction of tree cover and 
topsoil in forest areas close to the River. The domination of pastoral economy by goats gives 
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in a short term the best chance for survival. But in the long term, concentration of goats 
destroys grazing. Lacking grass, pastoralists also had to lop trees for feeding animals with 
leaves. Moreover, due to the development of permanent settlements and small towns near 
commercial farms and plantations, a vast amount of trees were cut for both construction and 
for firewood. This in turn resulted in deforestation (Flood, 1976).  
 
The consequences of external interventions on Afar people are not limited only to loss of 
prime pastoral resources and land degradation. The interventions also brought social and 
institutional consequences among the Afar pastoral groups. The advent of large-scale irrigated 
farms, parks and the subsequent establishment of civil bureaucracies have led to the formation 
of small towns and settlements with large numbers of highland migrants and government 
employees. These developments and migrants have brought an alien culture that undermines 
local people’s culture. For instance prostitution and thievery, which were unknown some 
years ago, are now widespread in towns. Many young Afar, both men and woman are 
absorbed into the urban-based irrigation scheme culture, and urban life. Clan integrity is also 
beginning to suffer, as the clan is unable to maintain all its members in one place due to 
changing nature of pastoral production (Getachew, 2001a; Piguet, 2001:8; Flood, 1976).  
  
Moreover, traditional resource management systems have been disrupted with the advent of 
irrigation and land privatization. Forced sedentarization, expansion of crop cultivation, and 
the adoption of agro-pastoralism resulted in privatization of some communal lands (i.e. 
making enclosures) along the river banks. This new landholding element competes with 
communal land rights, and traditional landuse management system. It has created disparity 
among clan members in the level of resource use. In fact seasonal mobility, herd-splitting, 
changing herd composition and traditional mutual aid institutions have been used to maintain 
the pastoral system. These strategies have played great roles in herd management and in 
balancing herds with available pastoral resources. However, with advent of irrigation and 
privatization of some land resources previously shared and communally managed in the past 
three decades, the Afar pastoral subsistence system has come under growing pressure and 
increasing vulnerable to vagaries of nature and environmental stresses (Bekele, 2006; Piguet, 
2001; Flood; 1976). Insecurity and resource competition also make difficult the opportunistic 
movement or the tracking of available fodder resources in other places. The wet season 
migration, camping and patterns of group placement have been already breaking down. The 
recurrent drought and ecological crisis make pasture and water scarce for livestock 
production. These risks translate into risk of human food shortage as livestock yield falls 
along with loss of these key pastoral resources.  
 
The expropriation of key resource areas for non-pastoral activities and the resultant ecological 
changes have both affected the lives of Afar pastoral and agro-pastoral groups. As stated 
earlier their pastoral production is determined by their dependence on livestock, sufficient 
grazing land and their pattern of mobility. However, over the past four decades they have 
faced severe ecological changes in their environment manifested in terms of erosion, land 
degradation, deforestation, and overgrazing. Consequently, their pastoral resource bases have 
shrunk; key resource areas have been no longer accessible, and mobility has been constrained. 
These in turn have led to diminishing herds and subsequent impoverishment, under-
nourishment and starvation (Abdul-Mejidi, 1976:19; Flood, 1976:64). Therefore, all these 
processes have resulted in vulnerability to drought consequences and livelihood insecurity.  
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In conclusion, as it is attempted to show in the above paragraphs, until the last quarter of the 
19th century, the Afar controlled trade and major routes in the Horn of Africa. The advent of 
colonialism, the redrawing of boundaries and the appearance of new states during colonial 
and post colonial periods diminished the political and economic power of the Afar. The Afar 
have been partitioned into three states and their pastoral mobility has been affected. Internally 
the Aussa sultanates obviously resisted and challenged the direct rule of the successive 
Ethiopian governments and various interventions in the Awash Valley. However, continuous 
state intervention and lack of access to political and economic power or representations in the 
central government undermined the Afar relative autonomy and pastoral economy 
(Gamaledin, 1993). All these factors, either combined or independently have resulted in 
political and economic conflicts between the state and pastoral groups on the one hand, and 
inter and intra-ethnic conflicts on the other. As a result of all these overlapping processes the 
Afar pastoralists have faced multiple marginalizations (political, economic and ecological) in 
the past five decades. The following section briefly describes Afar relations with other 
neighbouring groups. 
  
5.2.4.2 Relation with Neighbouring Pastoralists and Cultivators 
 
Pastoral, agro-pastoral and cultivating neighbours surround the Afar. In the eastern Issa-
Somali, in the south and southwest the Oromo groups (Jille, Ituu, Karrayu, Harsu), and in the 
west Argoba, Amhara and Tigre surround them. The relations between Afar and their 
neighbours have been shaped by various factors such economic, social and religious factors, 
population movements and migration, clan territoriality and resources use, government 
policies and interventions and global economic and political forces, etc. Therefore, the Afar 
relation with neighbours has been constantly changing and it is characterized by mixture of 
cooperation, competition, and conflict over access to and control over resources.   
 
In the wars between Ethiopian Christian kingdoms and Muslim principalities that ended in the 
16th century, the Afar formed the major portion of the Ahmed Gragn’s force and fought along 
the side of Gragn. However, after his defeat they suffered from revenge from Christian rulers 
of Ethiopia and experienced major displacement. They also entered into conflict with Issa-
Somali who were once an ally during the Gragn war against the Christian kingdoms of 
Ethiopia. The Oromo migration from their homelands from southern Ethiopia into the 
present-day southwest, north, east, and north-eastern Ethiopia has led to the incursion of Issa-
Somali clans and Oromo groups into the most fertile lands of the Afar. This also led to 
displacement of some Afar clans and squeezed them into the narrow strip of Awash River and 
arid areas of Alledeghi plain (Getachew, 2001a:46).  In general terms, historically the Afar 
relation with Issa-Somali has been a long-standing enmity manifested in violent conflict 
resulting in loss of human lives and property and in continuous animal raiding.   
 
A sample survey conducted some decades ago in the Middle Awash Valley found out the 
following number of Afar killed and animals raided by different ethnic groups which are 
neighbours to the Afar. These are shown in table 5.5 below.  
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Table 5.5 Number of Afar killed and animals raided between 1981/82-91/92 as reported in a 
sample of 83 households.  
Animals raided Raider Afar killed 
Camel Cattle Sheep and Goat 
Issa 70 353 937 314 
Karrayu 4 2 27 30 
Ittu - 10 33 - 
Argoba 12 - 81 - 
Total 86 365 1,078 344 
Source: Ali, 1997, p.135 
 
The development interventions and land policies pursued by the successive Ethiopian 
governments also have increased the competition over land and pastoral resources involving 
warfare. A case in point is the escalating violent conflict between Afar and Issa-Somali after 
the introduction of irrigation development in the Awash Valley. Such schemes also increased 
competition between Afar and Karrayu pastoral and agro-pastoral groups over the use of 
scarce pastoral resources (See map 8 for land use pressure created by Issa and conflict 
between Afar and highlanders).  
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Map 8 Land use pressure created by Issa and conflict between Afar and highlanders 
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Though the Afar and Issa-Somali share pastoral values, ecology and geographic proximity 
and the faith of Islam and Cushitic value, their relationship has been characterized by a 
century-old animosity, which is still manifested in raids and counter raids (Getachew, 2001a; 
Fekadu et al., 1984; Flintan and Imeru, 2002). In chapter four I have described the history of 
Afar-Issa relation and how it has gradually evolved into near-war type of violent conflict in 
recent decades.  
 
On the other hand the Afar relation with other neighbouring groups (e.g. Oromo, Argoba, 
Amhara and Tigre) is not as hostile as that of the Issa-Somali. The Afar relation with these 
groups is largely peaceful, friendly and important as compared to that of Issa. Social, 
economic and trade relations have played a significant role in maintaining peace and 
cooperation between them. For instance Afar and Oromo share pasture and they intermarry. 
Moreover, the Afar visit markets in Oromo country and Afar too. The impact of this long-
established relation is manifested in the ability of Afar and Oromo in sharing resources, in 
speaking each other’s language, and in sharing similar styles of clothing (Getachew, 2001a). 
Similar type of relation has been observed between Afar and Argoba, particularly in sharing 
resources, intermarriage and trade relations or networks. In general, despite occasional clashes 
over scarce resources in some pocket areas, the economic and social relations between them 
are largely maintained. In fact in some Afar frontiers relations with their neighbours oscillate 
between cooperation and conflict.  This issue shall be further illustrated in Chapter 6 by 
analyzing the changing relation of the study community with its neighbouring Oromo, Argoba 
and Amhara who are crop cultivators. The following section summarizes the Afar 
predicaments resulted from ecological changes, external encroachments, drought impacts and 
conflict. 
 
5.2.5 Concluding Summary: The Current Predicaments  
 
The current major problems facing the Afar pastoralists are lack of grazing and water points; 
insecurity and resource competition; decline of herd; recurring drought and food crisis. 
Recurrent droughts, ecological crisis, increasing salinity as well as change in the course of the 
Awash River have contributed to degradation of pastoral key resources (decline of fodder 
supply, disappearance of palatable fodders, drying up of water points, swamps). Moreover, 
direct human related causes such as insecurity, resource competition, population increase, 
destruction of watersheds in the upstream, soil erosion are the major factors in the loss of 
grazing, water and arable lands. In general the main predicaments of the Afar pastoralists are 
summarized in the following paragraphs.  
 
i. Environmental crisis and loss of prime pastoral resources. The Afar pastoralists have been 
faced with environmental crisis and loss of key ecological resources over the past five 
decades with the advent of large-scale commercial farms in the fertile land of the Awash 
River Valley. Some of the detrimental impacts of the large schemes include: 
 
• Loss of dry season grazing pasture and reduction of available fodder supply. 
• Prevention of flooding by construction of dykes that reduces grazing availability in the 
plains. 
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• Change in the Awash River course that causes flood hazard to settlements and affects 
mobility and migration routes. 
• Increase incidence of livestock diseases and effects of agro-chemicals that have 
negative consequences on livestock health. 
• Disappearance of palatable species, encroachment of unpalatable species and prosopis. 
• Soil pollution and salinity. 
• Increased incidence of human diseases (malaria, encephalitis, cholera, typhoid and 
various intestinal disorders). 
• Increased vulnerability to drought and violent conflict over the use of the remaining 
pastoral resources (Ali, 1997:127; MCE, 2001; Getachew, 2001a). 
 
The ecological resources of the Afar pastoralism have been increasingly degraded. Moreover, 
most of their fertile land along the Awash River banks has been expropriated for non-pastoral 
uses. This has sharply reduced the area available for seasonal pasture. As a result, pastoral 
groups are forced to move into less fertile, more arid areas which cannot support their 
livestock production. This in turn has exposed different pastoral groups to risks of drought, 
famine and violent conflicts. In the following I briefly describe these risks.  
 
ii. Increased vulnerability to drought and famine. In Ethiopia two views dominate as to the 
relation between drought and famine. Some scholars argue that there is no necessarily a direct 
link between drought and famine, though the two are related (Abdul-Mejidi, 1976; Mesfin, 
1986). On the other hand government authorities and agencies tend to present the whole issue 
as just ‘natural calamity’ like drought and epidemic diseases. However, to the extent that there 
is a connection between drought and famine, it is mediated by social and economic 
arrangements of a society that can either minimize the human consequences of drought or 
accentuate its effects (Abdul-Mejidi, 1976). As discussed in Chapter 3, the effects of drought 
as well as other economic and political factors led to famine disasters of the 1970s and 1980s, 
which the then Regimes deliberately presented the whole issue as natural calamity. Therefore, 
the Afar case could not be different from this. However, the increased expansion of irrigation 
schemes and other encroachments (parks and game reserves), and conflicts have rendered the 
Afar pastoral economy susceptible to recurrent drought and famine crisis. Even the 
experience of earlier famine episodes evidenced this. The famine disaster of the 1972-73 
severely affected the Afar pastoralists. Many writers (Bondestam, 1974, cited in Abdul-
Mejidi, 1976; Flood, 1976) reported that the adverse effects of commercial farms in the 
Awash Valley had accentuated the effects of the 1973 drought. Pastoral population hardest hit 
by the famine of 1973 were the Afar. The establishment of commercial farms in the Awash 
Valley since the early 1960s with the aid of massive investments of foreign capital has 
undermined the pastoral economy and there is no doubt that the greater famine of 1972-73 
owed much to it. The famine was caused in great part by development allowed and 
encouraged by government elites working in corrupt liaison with international capitalists 
(Flood, 1976).          
 
On the one hand the commercial large-scale irrigation schemes increasingly expanded since 
the early 1960s depriving local people of pastoral resources, on the other hand the 
catastrophic droughts with large livestock mortalities began to occur approximately every 
seven to ten years. Therefore, much of the time between droughts has been spent re-building 
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herd numbers which again is affected by another drought event before fully recovered132. 
When drought hits, pastoralists have no longer drought escaping areas as season grazing lands 
are already lost to other uses. They are also less able to venture long distance migration as 
they have no security in previous receiving areas due to competition over use of scarce 
resources with neighbouring groups. As a result of all these overlapping factors the Afar 
pastoralists have become more vulnerable to vagaries of nature and famine in recent decades.   
 
iii. Vulnerability to increased violent conflicts. As stated above conflict can be caused by 
many factors such as poor governance, unequal resource allocations, uncertain rights over 
land, spillovers from national and international level conflicts, easy availability of firearms, 
large-scale cattle theft for sale by criminal elements and in some parts of East Africa deep-
rooted social and cultural patterns of raiding (Morton et al., 2006:4). Conflicts can occur 
between pastoralists and farmers, between them and government, and among pastoral groups. 
In relation to these causes and types of conflicts, the Afar pastoralists are not exception. They 
have experienced conflicts with government, and inter and intra clan or ethnic conflicts that 
resulted from competition over resources (water points and key grazing areas), animal raiding, 
alienation of rights over communal lands, etc. These types of conflicts form the traditional 
ones which are long standing. However, nowadays conflicts between Afar and other 
neighbouring groups have been recurrent and more violent that result in huge damage in terms 
of human life and property. Moreover, as stated in Chapter 4, they have been beyond the 
traditional conflict management institutions. A case in point is the violent conflict between 
Afar and Issa-Somali. At least three factors contributed to such escalation of violent conflicts.  
 
The first is the continuous incursion of Issa into the Afar territory and the squeezing of the 
Afar pastoral groups into marginal lands by such incursion and loss of key resource areas to 
non-pastoral uses (irrigation schemes, wildlife reserves and parks).  
 
The second is the increased competition between Issa and Afar to control the Addis Ababa-
Djibouti highway which has a greater economic significance. Prior to the establishment of 
regional administration on the basis of ethnicity, the conflict between the Afar and Issa has 
been mainly to get access to Alledeghi plain and water points surrounding it. Nowadays, 
whereas the Issa push to control the highway and get access to the Awash River, the Afar 
want to keep the route fully under their domain and to maintain access to Alledeghi plain for 
dry season grazing. As a result, the Alledeghi plain has remained as battle field for two 
groups. Moreover, both parties compete for putting settlements along the highway in order to 
control trade route and truck-stop economy.  
 
The third is the prolonged and recurrent drought that aggravated conflicts between Afar and 
other neighbouring groups, as pastoral groups move deep into settled zones and other 
localities. In times of drought, the fertile pasture along the Awash River provided some 
security as an alternative source of water and grazing. Nowadays, such key resource area is 
unavailable for the pastoral group. Therefore, drought has a role in triggering violent 
conflicts, as the Afar pastoralists or other pastoral groups (e.g. Karrayu, Issa) move deeper 
into settled zones and as competition for water points and key grazing resources intensifies 
between different neighbouring pastoral groups.  
                                                 
132 The recorded drought periods include 1972-73, 1984-1985, 1996, 1999-2000 and 2003.  
 186
 
In general the continuous incursion from Issa, loss of key resource areas along the Awash 
River banks, and recurrent drought have been exposing  Afar pastoral groups to various 
violent conflicts which often result in loss of livestock and human life. Consequently, the 
local Afar are more vulnerable to the risk of violent conflicts now than they were in the past.   
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Chapter Six 
 
Case Study: The Aghini Clan/Pastoral Community 
 
Background  
 
In this chapter I seek to place the local people’s perspective in the context of the research 
problem stated in Chapter 1. Accordingly, the present chapter discusses the perspective of 
local people on livelihood resources and their trends, vulnerability to famine/food crisis, 
external interventions and local responses to environmental stress and livelihood shocks. 
Earlier in Chapter 3, I have discussed pastoralists’ vulnerability to multiple risks and their 
coping and adaptive strategies mainly by drawing on secondary materials and empirical 
researches undertaken in East Africa and in Ethiopia in particular. The discussions in Chapter 
3 have revealed that pastoralists’ subsistence livestock production in East Africa and in 
Ethiopia has been affected by multiple risks - recurring drought being the main natural risk 
factor that constrains pastoralists’ livelihood. And yet most of the earlier empirical works and 
theoretical perspectives reviewed for this research have shown that the underlying sources of 
vulnerability lie mainly in social and political processes rather than in natural factors. 
Accordingly the main sources of pastoralists’ vulnerability in East Africa and in Ethiopia are 
ecological changes (crisis), social-political processes (political and economic 
marginalization), conflict, poor governance, market forces, etc. This is, therefore, in line with 
one of the hypotheses of this research that is stated in Chapter 1, section 1.3.3 (no.1). If this is 
the case at the regional and national level analysis of the sources of vulnerability, it is equally 
important to explore the local people’s perspective on livelihood trends, sources of 
vulnerability, external and local responses to recurring food crisis. My aim in this chapter is, 
therefore, to situate the research problem within the local context (local pastoral community) 
that goes in line with two other hypotheses indicated in Chapter 1, section 1.3.3 (i.e. no. 2&3). 
Therefore, the focus of the present chapter lies on the source of local people’s livelihoods, 
their risk perception, vulnerability, external responses, and adaptive and coping strategies 
developed by the local people as responses to adverse circumstances. As indicated in the 
methodology section in Chapter 1, primary data was generated at the community level 
through household surveys, individual and focus group interviews, observations and case 
history narratives. Accordingly, the analysis presented in this chapter is based on both 
quantitative data (household survey data) and qualitative information. 
 
 
6.1 Local Livelihood Resources and Their Trends 
 
Different livelihood strategies and activities depend on availability and access to basic 
productive resources and social assets. Livelihood assets can be grouped into natural, 
physical, human, economic/financial and social capitals (Ellis, 2000; Carney, 1998; Scoones, 
1998). The overall livelihood strategies of communities depend on access to these assets, and 
the environment (i.e. political, organizational and institutional infrastructures) in which these 
assets are combined for production and consumption purposes (Ellis, 2000; Rass, 2006). This 
section is not intended to elabourate theoretical discussions on the entire livelihood assets. It 
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rather focuses on the assets/capitals identified by the local people as central to pursuing their 
livelihoods. Most of my informants have stated that natural, financial, social, physical and 
human capitals play vital roles to pursue various livelihood activities. The following sections 
describe the types of assets considered by the local people as essential for pursuing their 
livelihood strategies and activities.  
 
 
6.1.1 Natural Resources  
 
The immediate environment strongly shapes the mix of livelihood strategies in pastoral 
communities. Natural capital refers to natural resource stock from which resource flows 
useful for livelihood are derived. Natural resources consist of land, vegetation, water, wildlife, 
etc. As it is true in many pastoralist societies, the Afar pastoral system relies on these key 
natural resources. The vital natural resources in the study community include pastures, water 
points (ponds, wells and rivers), browsing trees, and farm plots found along the river banks 
(Telalak, Wata, and Gewis Rivers). The availability and accessibility of these environmental 
resources is crucial for pursuing livestock production which is the mainstay of the local 
people’s economy. Growing food crop, which is being taken up by some individuals and 
households, also depends on the availability of river water, farm plots (enclosures), river 
diversion furrows, and labour with a required skill. The following paragraphs present an 
assessment of these key natural resources from the perspective of the local people.  
 
i. Pasturelands/Rangelands: Rangelands with productive and diverse natural vegetation 
represent the fundamental resources for pastoral livelihood. Pasturelands that are available 
within the immediate environment of the local people and/or in distant places are among the 
resource bases for the local pastoral system. Rangeland productivity depends largely on 
rainfall patterns as well as on the composition and diversity of natural forage vegetation. 
Whenever there is normal rainfall distribution and pattern during the main rainy season 
(Karma) in July-September, and in the short rainy season (Sugun) in March-April, the local 
herders can get forage (grass and herbaceous) for much of the year in their clan territory. 
Whenever some shortage of feed occurs in their immediate environment during such seasons, 
herders compensate the deficit through moving herds to sites beyond their traditional grazing 
zones (see map 9). If the dry season is prolonged, herders will drive their stock into the dry 
season retreats (i.e. river banks, flooded areas and wetlands).  
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Map 9 Livestock Movement during Dry and drought Periods to grazing reserves 
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As shown in map 9, some of the previous distant grazing areas of the Aghini clan included 
Ba’adu, Megenta, Weama, Weranso that are situated in the Afar Region, and Cheffa wetland 
(Borkena Valley) located in the Amhara Region. Though these areas are still important dry 
season and/or drought retreats, they lack sufficient forage to accommodate all migrating herds 
during feed stress. This is due to failure of rainfall in the highlands, land use changes, and 
reduced flooding of the major rivers (Awash, Awra, Gulina, Borkena). Seasonal flooding has 
been reduced by irrigation practices in the highland catchments, changes in the course of the 
Awash River and construction of dikes for flood protection. Currently, areas that provide 
grazing reserve when other areas fail to produce forage are under pressure and do not provide 
sufficient fodder for mobile herds because of land use changes, risk of conflict and loss of 
pasturelands to non-pastoral activities. Moreover, the participants of the focus group 
interview stated that essential grass types were abundant in their localities some three to four 
decades ago. Nowadays, however, pastureland in the area has been reduced mainly due to 
bush encroachment. Invasive plants that were either rare or unknown in the past are 
increasingly expanding and undermining undergrowth or important grasses. Some of the 
invasive bushes/plants identified by the informants include Geydeberara, Bangui (xanthium 
Abyssinicum), Merkato (acacia mellifera), and Adedoyta.  
 
In most cases the local people reported that pastureland in their locality and beyond has been 
reduced in the past several decades for a number of reasons. Pasture availability has declined 
as a result of impacts of recurring drought, invasive bushes, encroachment of agricultural 
frontiers, and expansion of large-scale irrigated farms in the dry season grazing areas found 
along the banks of the Awash River and its delta. My key informants have articulated how 
each of these factors has affected their pastoral system. This point will be elabourated in 
section 6.3 that deals with ecological/environmental and social changes taking place in the 
study community and beyond. In this section I describe the existing key sources of fodder for 
livestock within the immediate environment of the local people. During my field study I 
attempted to identify important localities where the key fodder resources occur in the study 
area (see box 6.1 below). 
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Box 6.1 Some Key Resource Areas in the Community and Livestock Movement Patterns 
1. Natural Vegetation Fodder Distribution  
In the study community the distribution of available resources is governed by the drainage system, and 
perennial and seasonal water resources that originate from the upper catchments. Neighbourhoods which are 
currently the main sources of livestock fodder in the area include depressions /river gorges and ridges/hills. 
These are described as follows:  
 
1.1. River Valleys/banks where fodder is available: 
 Awarena-Areda Kebele Administration (KA):  The area from Abomsa to Abarume is a forest area where trees 
and bushes with fodder value are currently available. This locality also provides some grass during the rainy 
season. 
Gewis and Hamedidas KA: These areas are located above the all weather road (i.e. to the west part of the 
district). Currently localities like Sifi and Hina are key resource areas. These areas are situated mainly along
the riverbanks. During the rainy season these areas provide some grass. During dry or drought seasons herders 
collect tree leaves and pods of standing trees found in these localities. 
Kersana-Hujuba: This area is found along the sides of seasonal streams of Kersa and kile’el-dora. Palatable 
trees and bushes are found in this locality and livestock rely on such feeds. This area also provides some grass 
during the rainy season.  
 Bank of Taa River: Taa is a seasonal river where trees and bushes are found along its banks. From this 
locality, herders use leaves of trees, and bushes to feed their livestock. Some grasses can be available at this 
locality during the rainy season. 
Medera, Dida & Ayo: These localities are found along the sides of Telalak River particularly near the border 
between Oromo and Afar communities. These areas have trees and bushes whose leaves are used as fodder for 
livestock. They also provide some grass during the rainy season.  
Aware (seasonal river): Threes and bushes are found along the course of this river. Tree leaves and pods are 
used for animal feed. This area also provides some grass during the rainy season.  
 
1.2. Ridges or hills where some palatable bushes and trees are available:  
Mudeno: It is found in Awarena-areda KA. There are trees and bushes whose leaves and pods are used as 
fodder for animals. Trees such as Kukuksa (dichrostchys cineria), Uddaito (balanites aegyptica), Jejeba
(berchemia discolor), Serekto, Ledo, etc are found in Mudeno neighbourhood.  
Areda: It is located in Awarena-areda KA. Plants such as Kukuksa, Uddaito, Jejeba, Serekto, Ledo, etc are 
also found in Areda.  Leaves of these trees are used for animal feeding. 
Eyira: It is located in Awarena-areda KA and some palatable trees and bushes are found in this locality. 
Wahay: It is located in Awarena-areda KA and some palatable trees and bushes are found there. 
 
In the past (i.e. in the 1980s) these ridges/hills had some grasses. Currently they have few grazing areas since 
bushes and trees such as Merkato and Adedo have already invaded all these ridges and hills.  
 
2. Livestock Movement Patterns 
The relative availability and distribution of natural vegetation forage vary within the Telalak district and the 
movement of herds is pursued accordingly. The relative resource endowment and movement of livestock in 
the Woreda is described as follows: 
- The eastern side of the Telalak Woreda (i.e. below the main road) is good largely for goat rearing. As 
the western side of the Woreda is infested by ticks that attack goats, it is less favourable for keeping 
goats in this locality. On the other hand the western part of the Woreda is also good for camels since 
there are large browsing trees on which they rely during fodder stress.  
- Herders who live on the Awash River side rear both camels and goats, though the area is more suitable 
for goats than for camels. In times of fodder scarcity for camels, the local people move their camels 
towards the west part of the Woreda (above the road that connects the district to the Bati-Asayita road). 
- Those villagers living in the intermediate zone (i.e. both sides of the all weather road) rear camels, 
goats, sheep and cattle, though the area is more suitable for camels. In times of fodder scarcity for 
cattle, herders move stock close to the foothills (i.e. escarpments) found at the buffer zone bordering the 
Telalak district and Oromiya zone of the Amhara Region.  
Source: Focus Group Interview, December, 2005 
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As it is described in box 6.1, the local people sub-divided grazing lands into what are locally 
called Ala (ridges or mountainous area) and Kalo (swamp and marshy areas or river valleys). 
Ala is a ridge or mountainous area with high potential for livestock production. It is mainly 
used during the rainy season. On the other hand Kalo embraces swampy or marshy areas or 
river valleys which are usually located along riverbanks. Kalo areas are mainly used during 
the dry season. Accordingly, the livestock movement pattern relies on the spatial and 
temporal availability of grazing resources and browses in Ala and Kalo. However, this 
traditional practice of range management is diminishing due to increase in human population, 
drought consequences, overgrazing, bush encroachments and frequent changes in river 
courses. 
 
ii. Vegetation (Browsing Trees and Bushes): The second key pastoral resources identified by 
the informants are browsing trees. According to a previous study (MCE, 2001) carried out on 
land use and land cover in the Afar Region, two major types of vegetation occur in the 
Telalak district. These are open shrubland and wooded grassland. The shrubland is mainly 
found in the west side of the district and is dominated by trees such as acacia thicket. Wooded 
grassland occurs in the eastern part of the district (see map 10). 
 
 
 
 
Map 10 Types of Vegetation Cover in the Study Area (district) 
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During the fieldwork I tried to identify the most important browsing trees/bushes in the study 
community. The identification was made in focus group interviews with knowledgeable 
informants. A series of interviews with informants were carried out to record important fodder 
plants, preferences of browsing animals and seasonal preferences (dry or wet). The local 
people have a thorough knowledge of important fodder plants, fodder preferences and the 
selective eating habit of the different types of animals. The types of desirable fodder plants, 
their availability and suitability are presented in Table 6.1 below. 
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Table 6.1 Some Important Browsing Trees/bushes, and Parts Used as Sources of Animal Feed in the Dry and Wet Seasons133 
Local/vernacular  name Scientific name Part browsed Type of browsing animal for a plant Season when a plant  is preferred  
Adayto Salvadora persica.L leaves Camel & goat Dry season 
Adimegari * “ Camel, cattle & goat Wet &  dry seasons 
Addo-hadita/hamai Delonix elata (L) Gamble “ Camel & goat Dry season 
Amayto * “ Camel & goat  Wet season 
Ame-ada (bush) * “ Camel & cattle  Wet season 
Bobo-auyto * “ All species Wet season 
Bunket (bush) Tribulus terrestiris “ All species  Wet season 
Dabayto * “ Camel & goat Dry season 
Dedebayto/Jejeba Berchemia discolor “ Camel, cattle & goat Wet & dry seasons 
Do-auto (bush) * “ All species Wet season 
Eibeto Acacia tortilis leaves & fruit Camel, cattle & goat Dry season 
Fley-mäe * leaves  Camel, cattle & goat Wet season 
Genselto (bush) * “ Camel Wet season 
Germoita/gerento Acacia oerfota/nubica benth leaves & fruit Camel and goat  Wet season  
Gerssa Dobera glabra  leaves & fruit Camel, cattle & goat Drought period 
Hebeleyta/habeli Grewia villosa willd. leaves  Camel, cattle & goat Wet  season 
Helal (bush) * “ All species Wet season 
Hemeraysa Acacia brevispica Harms “ Camel Wet &  dry seasons 
Hidayto Grewia ferruginea hochst. “ Camel, cattle & goat Wet  season 
Humura (roka) Tamarindus indica (L) “ Camel & goat  Wet &  dry seasons 
Keselto Acacia nilotica (L) Del “ Camel & goat Dry season 
Kukuksa Dichrostachys cinerea (L) leaves & fruit Camel, cattle & goat Wet &  dry season 
Kurbeyta Commiphora sp. leaves Camel & goat  Wet season 
Kusra Zizipphus spinna Christi (L) “ Camel, cattle & goat Wet &  dry seasons 
Kuti-gera (bush) * “ Camel & cattle Wet season 
Medera Cordia sinensis lam leaves, fruit  Camel, cattle & goat Drought period  
Merkato  Acacia mellifera (vahl.) leaves, fruit & flower Camel and goat Wet &  dry seasons 
Orma/ormaito Boscia angustifolia A.Rich leaves Camel  Dry season 
Rigidi-Adoyta * “ Camel & goat Dry season 
Subahe (bush) * “ Goat  Wet season 
Subla Ficus sycomorus L. “ Camel & cattle  Dry season 
Uda/udaito Balanittes aegyptica (L) Del leaves & fruit Camel, cattle & goat Drought period  
Uly-yayto (bush) * leaves Camel & cattle Wet &  dry seasons 
Wa-aroyta (bush) * “ All species Wet season 
Yemarukta Blepharis persica Burm.fil “ Camel  Dry season 
Source: Focus Group Interview (elders, religious leaders, clan leaders), April 2006. 
* Scientific name not identified. 
 
                                                 
133 Some of these sources of feed are getting scarce in recent decades.  These are described in Table 6.8 under section 6.3.1. 
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In general the local people use various woody plants for a wide range of purposes134, the 
primary being a source of livestock feed. Livestock feed resources are mainly obtained from 
browse (woody plants and bushes), and natural pasture that are available in the district. 
Natural grazing and browse constitute the major feed sources to the entire livestock. In the 
household survey, respondents were asked, “what are the current sources of animal feed in the 
locality”. As it can be seen in Table 6.2 below, about 91% reported ‘browses’ as the major 
source of livestock feed followed by ‘natural grazing’ (78%). The use of crop residue and hay 
is limited in localities that are close to neighbouring highland crop cultivators. In the study 
community animal fodder was not conserved some three decades ago. But in recent years 
some individuals have started to conserve feeds in the form of hay or crop residues either 
through preparing or purchasing from neighbouring crop cultivators.     
 
Table 6.2 Feed Sources Reported by respondents (multiple Responses are Possible) 135 
Sources of feed  Respondents (n=60) Percent 
Browse (trees and bushes)  55 91.6 
Grazing (grass) 47 78.3 
Crop residue  7 11.6 
Hay (prepared or purchased) 2 3.3 
Source: Sample Household Survey, December, 2005.  
 
iii. Water Resource: Water resource is the third key resource for the pastoralists. It is a 
determinant of pastoral movement/migration. The local people rely on both permanent and 
seasonal sources of water for human and livestock consumptions. Both underground and 
surface waters are the basis for survival of the local people and their livestock. The major 
sources of water in the locality are rivers and shallow wells. The local people have their own 
classification of the sources of water. These sources are described below. 
 
1. Dahara (river): This type of water source accounts for the greatest part of water 
resources in the community for both humans and animals. Rivers such as the Awash, 
Telalak, Wata and Gewis are the main water sources for both human and livestock 
consumptions during dry and wet seasons. 
2. Ela (traditional shallow wells): These are hand-dug holes located by the side of 
intermittent or perennial streams. Elas may be dug by all villagers or individuals. Elas 
are mainly found close to the courses of streams or depressions located within the 
limits of 40-60 meters from the main streams. They are permanent sources that 
provide water for both human and animals in dry and wet seasons. In fact the yields of 
some Elas fluctuate depending on seasons.  
3. Derra (springs): are mainly found on upper catchments and along the banks of some 
permanent rivers. These sources provide water during wet and dry seasons. In recent 
decades, however, some Derras that were situated along the banks of perennial rivers 
                                                 
134 Other purposes of woody plants include house construction, firewood, fencing, source of food, shade, 
medication and for preparation of implement and household utensils. 
135 In the household questionnaire there were single and multiple response questions where sampled households 
have single and multiple responses accordingly. In case of latter, the percentage of responses (respondents) will 
be greater than 100%.  
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have dried up. In the past good days, some Derras especially those found along 
permanent rivers were used to last up to eight months. 
4. Booy (small pit/hole along river banks): Booy is made by excavating sandy soil along 
banks of intermittent rivers. In recent decades water supply from Booy has been 
unreliable due to decline of water in the intermittent rivers. It lasts only for two-three 
months after the rainy seasons. In the past it lasted up to five months due to the 
reliability of Sugum and karma rains. 
5. Dora (natural ponds or reservoirs): These sources have been available mainly in the 
depressions/cavities, and were used to last up to six months in the past good days. 
They are naturally formed as rainwater descends from the highlands and foothills and 
is collected in the depressions or cavities. When it rains heavily in the upper 
catchments, some valleys or depressions are filled with rainwater descending from 
higher slopes. Such sources of water were very common before the 1980s. Nowadays 
they have become rare as the amount of rainfall and flooding have been reduced in the 
area. Moreover, in certain localities where Doras are available, many gullies are 
formed nowadays. Consequently whenever it rains, the rainwater or the flooding water 
easily gets outlets and thus water is not retained anymore. As a result currently Dora 
is no more source of water in many localities. 
6. Medira (artificial temporary ponds/surface water catchments): These sources are 
formed by harvesting rainwater. Herders make catchments to collect rainwater during 
rainy seasons. Medira is a temporary source that is used during the rainy seasons. 
Currently this source, however, has been unreliable due to uncertainty of rainfall and 
invasion of Merkato plant into the catchments. Water yield and period of supply from 
Medira often depends on the amount of Sugum and Karma rains.  
7. Dedaa (reservoirs along riverbeds): Large holes found on riverbeds, especially pits or 
hollows in hard rocks that hold waters of intermittent rivers or streams. These sources 
are remains of torrent on hollow rocks/pits that are found along river courses. When it 
rains at highland areas, water descends along river courses and concentrates at rocks 
hollowed by torrent. Water yield and period of supply from Dedaa depends mainly on 
the amount of rainfall at headwater areas.  
 
As the above local classification of water points indicates, during the wet season water is 
usually distributed across the community lands in ponds, surface water, and seasonal streams 
and rivers. During prolonged dry season and drought periods, the local pastoral groups rely on 
few permanent rivers (Telalak, Wata and Awash River) and on some shallow wells. The 
watering points are mainly situated along Telalak, Wata and Gewis river. Some shallow wells 
are also found along the banks of perennial streams.  
 
In general terms the informants stated that water yield from all the aforementioned sources 
declined as compared to the years before the 1984 drought. Particularly in the past fifteen 
years, some sources of water have dried up, as drought has become recurrent. As a result only 
permanent rivers and deep wells are the reliable sources for dry and drought seasons. Thus 
during the dry season the local people have to travel long distances to reach permanent 
sources. This is elabourated under section 6.3.2.  
 
iv. Farm plot: Though crop cultivation is not aggressively undertaken by the local people, it 
is carried out by some households independently or in cooperation with migrant crop-
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cultivators (Oromo, Amhara and Argoba) at a very small-scale level. Of the total sixty sample 
households, more than half of them (n=31), reported that they have adopted growing some 
food crops (e.g. maize, sorghum). Asked when they first started, 16.1% of them have started 
in the 1980s, 32.3% in the 1990s, and the rest, 51.6%, have started since 2000.   
 
On the other hand, some informants reported that growing food crop as supplementary source 
of food grain was started before the 1980s. They indicated that prior to the 1980s very few 
individuals had tried opportunistic rain-fed crop cultivation in some neighbourhoods where 
rainfall was reliable and sufficient to grow maize. In recent decades, however, opportunistic 
rain-fed crop cultivation has been rare, as rainfall has been unpredictable. And individuals and 
households have resorted to small-scale irrigation through river diversion using gravity. 
Therefore, having plots of land or (enclosures) along the banks of permanent rivers has been 
vital to grow crops as supplementary source of food. As a result individuals or households are 
striving to make enclosures and furrows along river banks, where suitable flatland can be 
available for small scale irrigation and gardening. 
 
6.1.2 Financial Capital (Livestock Assets)  
 
Financial capital consists of money or other savings in liquid form. In the study community 
context livestock, which are easily disposable asset, represent financial resources. In the local 
community livestock represent the most important form of financial capital for the pastoral 
households, both in terms of stock and flow. Livestock are the primary sources of pastoral 
income, saving, loan, gift, investments and insurance.  
 
In the study community, traditionally (i.e. four decades ago) where the local people lived 
under stable conditions, their staple diet consisted of mainly milk, butter and meat. Whenever 
they needed some grain, clothing and other consumer goods, they used to obtain them in 
exchange for butter or live animals from the neighbouring communities. At that time, as there 
were no local markets in the study community, crop cultivators and individual merchants 
from neighbouring highland areas came to the pastoral settlements and bartered their crops, 
locally-made clothes and other goods. As livestock products, which traditionally constituted 
the local people’s staple food, have dwindled over the years due to ever-shrinking pastoral 
resources and drought related factors (feed stress and high livestock mortality), purchased 
grain has gradually constituted the major portion of their diet. At the same time local people’s 
needs for manufactured goods (sugar, tea, clothing, footwear, coffee, tobacco, and spices) 
have increased. Consequently, the local people have become dependent on the market for 
selling stock, and purchasing grain and other goods and services. These economic demands 
and environmental factors have resulted in the high rate of animal marketing. In this respect 
the local people have resorted to rearing more small stock and offering small ruminants at 
local markets of nearby towns. Therefore, small stocks, especially goats are often regarded as 
sellable substitutes for cattle or camels in the light of increased pressure to purchase grain and 
manufactured goods. In reply the question of “which kind of stock they sell in times of 
financial need”, household survey respondents said “goat or sheep”. The informants also said 
that goats and sheep can be sold anywhere anytime. In this sense small ruminants represent 
financial resources as they can be easily converted into cash in times of need.    
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Most of the households own some animals from various species. Of the total 60 sample 
households surveyed for this study, all sampled households possess small stock (sheep and 
goat), 93.3% of them own cattle, 76.6% possess camels and 70% own donkeys. In terms of 
herd composition small stock make up 67.5% of the total livestock herd; cattle constitute 
15.1%; camels 14.6% and donkeys 2.8%. Over the 60 sample households, the average 
numbers of small stock, cattle, camels and donkeys are 30.8; 6.9, 6.6 and 1.3 respectively. 
 
Informants136 claimed that livestock asset holding both at household and community levels 
has been declining in recent years. Before the 1980s, when grazing resources were abundant 
in the immediate environment and in the dry season retreats, cattle were very dominant and 
important sources of food for household consumptions and exchanges. In recent decades 
pastoral households have shifted their emphasis from cattle and sheep to goats and camels as 
the former are more vulnerable to recurring drought impacts and grazing stress. A number of 
informants reported that goats and camels are becoming more important both as store of 
wealth and livelihood resources in the area, as they are well adapted to the changing and 
drought-prone environment. According to the informants, camels and goats can better survive 
feed stress through browsing trees and bushes. In this connection, a 61-year-old informant, 
Mohammed, recalled the advice of grandfathers to the local herders. He said, “Our 
grandfathers have advised us to take care of camels and goats and rely on them, not to trust 
cattle, as the former are more resistant to hardship and drought than the latter”. Another 
informant, Mamedo claimed that “the time for cattle is gone”. In relation to this, he further 
narrated as follows: 
 
Cattle are seriously affected by recurring drought and rapidly changing environment 
in our locality (i.e. loss of pasture/grass). There is no better place into which we 
move our cattle. All Afar localities are affected and have become the same. Since 
the Afar’ culture and way of life (i.e. livestock rearing) are similar everywhere, all 
pastoral communities have been affected by drought and lack of pasture (grass). 
Nowadays, we tend to choose rearing camels and goats, since they to certain extent 
resist drought and survive in the present environment as compared with cattle or 
sheep. Until now we couldn’t foresee anything other than keeping goats or camels 
when and where circumstances allow us (Individual interview, December, 2004). 
 
The informants also indicated that changing emphasis from grazers to more browsers is not 
the response only to ecological changes (loss of grass) and drought risk. It is also a response 
to increasing demand for cash for purchasing food grain and other manufactured consumer 
goods that have become the major components of diet. Currently goats are an important 
source of cash as they reproduce quickly. In this connection an informant stated that “goats 
are nowadays like ready cash kept in the pocket”. On the other hand cattle yields (i.e. milk 
and butter), previously used as sources of cash and exchange for food grain, have declined in 
recent decades. In addition a camel, which relies on browsing also, provides more milk yield 
than a cow. A summary of the focus group interview with informants presented in box 6.2 
below illustrates further how the relative importance of various animal species has shifted 
over the past decades.  
 
 
                                                 
136 In this chapter whenever it is necessary real names of informants are replaced with pseudonyms to keep 
anonymous.  
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Box 6.2: Changing Importance of Livestock Species over Time 
 
A. Before the 1980s: 
1. Cattle: From the time of Emperor Menelik II to the beginning of the Derg regime cattle were dominant 
species and were seen as sign of wealth status due to the following reasons: 
• Cattle milk production and productivity: Cattle milk has been considered by herders as having high 
value for human consumption.  
• Butter production: Milk yield was high at the time and thus butter production fetched good cash to be 
used for purchasing of food grain and other manufactured goods. Moreover, butter has demand from 
highlanders since they prefer butter churned from cattle milk. At the time butter could be stored and 
sold to purchase food grain from highland markets. On the other hand camel milk is not churned into 
butter. Thus cattle milk has been highly valued.   
• Multiple-purposes of cattle: At the time grain food was not very much known among many pastoral 
households. Thus cow milk and butter constituted the core diet of the community. Moreover, hides of 
cattle were /are used for making shoes (Kabela), mat, and other household materials and utensils. 
• Availability of excellent types of grass: At the time the environment was suitable for cattle, as the 
dominant herbaceous were grasses, especially Durfu and Melif. Thus the local people were able to 
rear more cattle that outnumbered other species.     
2. Camel: At the time the second sign or indicator of wealth status was camel. Though camel’s milk is not 
churned into butter, it is a good source of food. Camel can be milked anytime and anywhere. Camel milk 
is often shared among neighbours and to Afar and non-Afar guests to show hospitality. Moreover, camels 
provide more milk during dry season than cattle do. 
3. Sheep: Sheep constituted the third rank in measuring wealth status and in terms of fetching a good price 
in highland markets. 
4. Goat: Goats, which are sources of milk and butter, were ranked fourth before the 1980s.  
 
B. In recent decades: 
The relative value of the above species has shifted in the past two to three decades on basis of their tolerance 
of   extreme conditions (drought consequences) and ecological changes taking place in the study community. 
Accordingly the current importance or rank of animal species is as follows: 
1. Camel: Camels are tolerant of drought by relying on browsing plants or trees which are inaccessible for 
other animals.  Moreover, camels have the most varied feeds during late dry season or drought periods 
than other stocks. On the other hand cattle rely mainly on grass or pasture which has been now scarce in 
the study community. Thus camels have been preferred by the local people and then they are taking over 
the previous rank of cattle. (But this doesn’t mean in terms of stock holding size, it is rather in terms of 
preference to possess). 
2. Goat: Currently the second valued animal species are goats which also rely on browsing and have 
tolerance for drought consequences. 
3. Cattle and sheep: These species are currently ranked third, as they are less tolerant to drought, feed stress 
and scarcity of essential grasses.   
Source:  Focus Group Interview, April, 2006. 
 
Changes in relative values of types of livestock: 
In the 1980s the exchange rate was as follows: 
- 1 camel = 4 cattle 
- 1 camel = 48 sheep and/or goats. 
- 1 cattle = 12 sheep and/or goats. 
(Source, Ayele, 1986:87) 
 
In 2005 the exchange rate was as follows: 
- 1 camel = 5 - 6 head of cattle depending on size, age and sex.  
- 1 camel = 35 - 40 goats and/or sheep depending on size, age  and sex. 
- 1 cattle = 7 - 8 goats and/or sheep depending on size, age and sex. 
(Source: Individual Interview, April, 2006. 
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The shifting of herders’ preference and choice from one type of animal species to the other 
shows the adaptive responses of the pastoralists to impacts of natural events, ecological 
changes and economic demands. Therefore, herders’ drought response strategies can be 
determined in many ways. Concomitantly the social function of stock as sign of wealth status 
and prestige also shifted. For instance, the number of cattle population was used as sign of 
wealth in the past, whereas currently the number of camels is taken as sign of wealth. The 
local people also manage multiple livestock species in order to cope with drought risks and 
adapt to ecological changes.  
 
Therefore, it is because of both, ecological changes and economic demands, that the local 
people have tended to shift emphasis from more grazers to more browsers. This indicates the 
dynamic and flexibility of the local pastoral system and its adaptability to the ecological and 
socio-economic changes. In other words it shows the change and continuity of local pastoral 
system through adapting to the adverse circumstances.  However, as the survey result has 
shown above, it should be noted that the local people are still pursuing with rearing multiple 
species, though the past few decades have witnessed a continuing decrease in number of cattle 
and emphasis has shifted to browsers, especially to goats. And yet the herder’s reliance on 
small stock indicates a greater and more frequent drought risk, even though the local pastoral 
system has maintained a species mix.  
 
6.1.3 Social Capital (Social Networks and Mutual-help)  
 
All livelihood resources (natural and physical) described earlier are productive assets. These 
material resources and labour form the basic components for the sustenance of livelihoods. 
However, livelihood is more than earning incomes. And it encompasses intangible assets as 
well as social institutions (kin, family, village, social relations and property rights) that are 
required to support and sustain a living. Therefore, equally important for sustenance of 
livelihoods are forms of social capital which include social support networks, informal 
transfers, participation in social institutions and other social relations. Social capital consists 
of any assets such as rights or claims that are derived from membership of a group and it 
includes the ability to call on friends or kin for help in times of need.  
 
In the context of the study community the forms of social capital are manifested in mutual-
help and cooperation, kinship relations, clan membership, bond-friendship or association, and 
reciprocal social obligations. Particularly kinship relations, mutual-aid cooperation and bond-
friendship are crucial forms of social capital through which the local people get access to 
productive assets (stock transfers) and other supports (donations) in times of need. Any 
member of a kinship group/clan, or affiliated to non-kin through bond-association could call 
on members for support be it food, cash or labour, or security (i.e. protection against external 
threats).  
 
In the study community mutual help/cooperation among clan members is a social obligation 
that is expected of each fellow member. Moreover, establishing bond-friendship is common 
in the local community. The community members maintain strong internal ties, social 
network and mutual-aid systems that provide safety nets in times of crisis. Members of a clan 
group could get help with money, food, labour and any protection through mobilizing 
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informal transfer systems and networks. In general terms it can be said that the local people 
have strong informal safety nets to help each other in times of stress. This aspect is further 
elabourated in section 6.6.2.1. 
 
 
6.1.4 Physical Capital (Infrastructures) 
 
The physical capital refers to ownership of critical infrastructures and services for water, 
communication, movement, transportation, and access opportunities for market or urban 
centers. These community level assets increase local people’s orientation towards outside of 
the community and provide opportunities for trade, market and integration. They facilitate 
integration of remote pastoral groups to other areas which provide complementary resources 
(health care, market exchanges, cereal supplies, water) especially during critical times.  
 
As stated earlier the local community had very limited access to physical infrastructures 
during the previous governments. In recent years there has been a good investment in 
infrastructures and services. Some of the existing physical infrastructures include district 
administration centre and sector offices, local market, road access, schools, health station, 
health posts, relief food distribution centre, telephone, etc. These physical infrastructures have 
greater potential to improve opportunities for trade, market integration and drought risk 
management. The local people’s view on the current development of infrastructures and 
services will be discussed in section 6.4.3.2.  
 
6.1.5 Human Capital: Labour Availability, Literacy and Health Status 
 
In the asset-based approach human capital is a key component of livelihood resources. Health 
status and education are vital for revealing human capital which is one of the assets 
influencing livelihood activities and strategies. Pastoral strategies of migration, of keeping a 
variety of animal species as well as splitting them according to types of animal, age, sex, and 
productivity can be seen as a direct adaptive response/strategy. However, the success of such 
strategies also depends on human factors like the availability of labour to be deployed for 
various types of activities, and on availability, within household and the community, of skills 
and information upon which decisions can be made.  
 
In the context of the Aghini pastoral community, human capital refers mainly to the 
availability of adult labour (physical labour capacity) both at household and lineage levels, 
and to education (literacy) and health status that expand opportunities to pursue different 
livelihoods including non-pastoral activities (i.e. crop cultivation, migration for seasonal 
works). The three elements of human capital are elabourated below. 
 
i. Availability of Labour: A pastoral household needs adequate labour for management of 
livestock and other pastoral resources. As one strategy of adaptation, pastoral households rear 
multiple-herd species with different feeding habits. Various animal species require different 
environmental niches allowing seasonal accessibility of forage to grazers and browsers. In 
order to access and utilize the preferred fodders that vary temporarily and spatially, a certain 
number of able-bodied persons are required for the management of herds. For instance a 
household needs at least two adult able-bodied persons (e.g. husband and wife) and a working 
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child. Thus a household with less than two adults and working child may need access to 
labour from outside of the household (i.e. from kinship group, lineage/sub-clan).  
 
In the study community, households and extended families mobilize and coordinate resources, 
particularly labour in order to use available resources efficiently. They usually organize 
labour on the basis of age, sex, lineage and kinship relations and common residence. They 
also regroup stock accordingly. Children of the affiliated households, kinship groups and 
neighbourhoods herd small stock together. Adult persons often take care of large stock and 
oversee working children and the security of clan territory and community. Table 6.3 shows 
the most important activities at household level and task divisions among household 
members.   
 
Table 6.3 Important Activities at Household Level and Task Division among Household 
Members 
Type of Activity  Women Men Children 
Keeping cattle  x x 
Keeping goat x  x 
Keeping camel  x  
Taking care of kids and calves  x  x 
Marketing  x x  
Selling camel and cattle  x  
Selling small stock (goats and sheep) x   
Milking cow x x  
Milking camel  x  
Milking goat  x   
Fetching water x  x 
Collecting firewood x  x 
Preparing food x   
Fencing   x  
Constructing animal kraal   x  
Constructing hut x   
Sources: Key Informant Interviews, December, 2004 
 
In the local community close kinship groups and families often mobilize their labour forces 
and use them efficiently through regrouping stock on the basis of age and herd species. 
Informants claimed that labour shortage has not been a significant problem, as households 
with labour deficit could access it from kin, lineage group and bond-friends in times of need. 
In fact a number of  informants remarked that hadn’t labour been mobilized on the basis of 
lineage and kinship, it could have been a problem to pastoral households particularly for those 
with aged people, infirm, orphans and disabled persons. Close kin as well as clan members 
have social obligations to such groups of people and to support households with labour 
shortage. Therefore, the availability of adequate adult labour both at household, lineage and 
clan levels is crucial to the local pastoral production system and protection of the clan group 
from external threats. Labour shortage at lineage and clan levels has more implications than at 
individual household level. It is because individuals or households with labour stress could 
call on their kin, lineages, affine and clan group as far as labour is available thereof. 
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Therefore, individual households with labour shortage could mobilize their kinship relation to 
overcome the deficit.  
 
On the other hand my key informants felt that labour shortage might be a problem in the 
future if young people migrate or drop out of the pastoral system, and many households take 
up more non-pastoral activities. Currently some young people tend to take up other non-
pastoral activities (animal trading, urban business, seasonal labour, government employment, 
etc). In fact these activities can be considered as income diversification mechanisms to 
supplement pastoral livelihoods. Yet, the informants said, these may have some effects on the 
availability of and access to labour within the pastoral system which requires much labour for 
the reasons mentioned above.   
 
ii. Literacy: The options for various livelihoods and the capacity to expand opportunities rely 
not only on productive factors (assets), but also on social factors such literacy and health 
status. Therefore, addressing vulnerability and capacity requires the linkage between the 
productive (i.e. economic) and reproductive (social) factors. For instance investing in 
education services is an essential investment in the productivity and capabilities of people, 
which expands their opportunities to diversify livelihoods and spread risks. In relation to this I 
attempted to assess literacy level, the local people’s attitudes towards educating children (i.e. 
formal education) and their views on the benefit of education in expanding opportunities for 
their children. This is presented in the following paragraphs.  
  
As it is true in most pastoral communities in Ethiopia, literacy rate is very low in the Afar 
Region. According to 2005 Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) of Ethiopia (CSA, 
2006:18-19) the proportion of men and women with no education was high (i.e. 80% and 87% 
respectively). In that respect the study community is no exception. In a household survey 
carried out for this research, household heads were asked to understand the basic literacy for 
every household member with age seven and over. Out of the total population of 381 people 
with age seven and over, 12.6% (n=48) were able to read and write at the time of survey, and 
87.4% (n=333) could not. These figures indicate that literacy level is very low as it is true in 
all marginalized pastoralist societies in Ethiopia. 
 
A better indicator is the school attendance ratio (i.e. rate of children in schooling). In the Afar 
Region the net attendance ratios (NAR)137 for primary schooling and secondary schooling are 
15.3% and 5.3% respectively (CSA, 2006:20). This low enrolment might be attributed to a 
number of factors which include marginalization of local community, inadequate educational 
facilities, cost of education, parents’ ambivalent/negative attitude to educating children, low 
quality of education, etc.  
 
Government neglect of the area, lack of schools and parents’ ambivalence towards educating 
children were the possible explanations for a low literacy rate in the context of the study 
                                                 
137 The NAR indicates participation in primary schooling for the population age 7-12 and secondary schooling 
for population age 13-18. It is a total population of official school-age population that is attending primary or 
secondary schooling. The official primary school-age is 7-12 years and the secondary school-age is 13-18 years 
(CSA, 2006:20). 
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community. It is only in the past ten years that schools have been built within the Telalak 
district. Informants from the District Education Department also reported that parental 
preference for sending children to formal education was very low in the past due to preference 
of using children’s labour for livestock activities. Very recently the local people tend to show 
a more positive attitude to educating children. Parents tend to see education as an option for 
expanding opportunities for their children in the future. This is partly attributed to the current 
opportunity for educated Afar to get jobs in government offices. Therefore, some parents have 
started sending their children to formal schools in recent years.  
 
During the fieldwork the respondents were asked, “have you ever sent your children to 
school?” 38.3% (n=23) of the sample households replied in the affirmative, whereas 61.7% 
(n=37) in negative. Those household heads who replied in the positive have furnished reasons 
for sending children to school. As shown in Table 6.4 below, the reasons include “advantages 
of education in creating opportunity for jobs” and “educated children as asset for parents in 
particular and for the community” in general.   
 
Table 6.4 Respondents’ Reasons for Sending Children to School (multiple responses are 
possible)  
 Reasons for sending children to school Frequency  (n=23) Percent  
 Educated children can get job in government offices 23 100.0 
 Educated children help their parents  15 65.2 
 Educated children help their community 8 34.8 
 Education makes it easy to pursue livelihoods other 
than pastoralism  
6 26.1 
Source: Sample Household Survey, December, 2005  
 
Those respondents who responded in negative also provided their reasons. As show in Table 
6.5 below the main reasons for not sending children to school’ include, “inaccessibility of 
schools” and “the fact that children’s labour is required for livestock activities”.  
 
Table 6.5 Respondents’ Reasons for Not Sending Children to School138   
Reasons for not sending children to school  Frequency   Percent 
Inaccessibility of schools 17 46.0 
They have to keep cattle 10 27.0 
Inability to afford for school materials and other expenses 3 8.1 
Have no school age children 7 18.9 
Total 37 100.0 
Source: Sample Household Survey, December, 2005. 
 
In general the literacy level is very low in the study community. As indicated above, various 
factors could involve for such outcome. As shown in Table 6.5 above both the supply-side 
failure (inaccessibility of educational facilities) and the demand-side factors (i.e. unable to 
send children to school due to cost of education and preference of using children’s labour for 
livestock herding) have affected education outcomes in the local community. According to 
                                                 
138 Respondents were asked to identify the most relevant reason for their respective household at the time of the 
survey.   
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participants of focus group interview, problems related to education are inaccessibility and 
cost of accommodation for students who want to attend school located at the Woreda center.  
 
The implication of the low level of human capital is that members of the local community 
have less opportunity to engage themselves in non-pastoral activities as they are less-
equipped to take up reliable sources of livelihoods. For instance, as a number of informants 
indicated and household survey result has shown, out-migration for searching opportunity 
was found to be low in the study community. A number of informants attributed this to lack 
of education, exposure or experience, language barriers, and lack of skills required for 
performing activities in urban settings and in agriculture. To illustrate about ‘lack of exposure 
and experience’, an informant said, “one doesn’t opt for something which one doesn’t hear 
about or see it”.   
 
iii. Health Status: Health status of the bread earners is central in pursuing livelihood 
activities. Healthy persons can engage in livelihood activities which enable them to support 
their family. Therefore, health status influences the capacity of individuals or community to 
engage in various livelihood activities. The main health risks in the locality under 
consideration are malaria and occasional outbreak of meningitis. These types of diseases 
affect the local people seasonally. Inadequate health service is another constraint for the well-
being of the community members. At the time of the fieldwork there was no sufficient health 
service in the district. In fact health posts were constructed in some Kebeles in 2003. 
However, they did not begin functioning due to lack of health personnel and other inputs. 
Therefore, patients have been taken to the Woreda health station which is too far for many 
pastoral communities. Informants further noted that the Woreda health station had no 
adequate personnel and inputs, let alone the health posts. Health problems and inadequate 
health facilities and services compounded with seasonal food insecurity have adverse effects 
on the local people’s health status.  
 
The preceding sections have discussed important local resources/assets and offered an 
assessment of the livelihood resources from the local people’s perspective. These resources 
entail natural, social, physical, financial and human capitals needed to pursue different 
livelihood strategies and activities in the study community. Generally the local people have 
perceived that key pastoral resources (productive assets) have been depleting over several 
decades for reasons that shall be discussed at length in section 6.3. In the following section, I 
shall discuss the current livelihood activities of the local people under consideration.    
 
 
6.2 The Livelihood Activities/Strategies in the Study Community 
 
6.2.1 Livestock Production and Crop Cultivation 
 
As stated earlier, livelihood strategies/activities pursued by the local people depend on 
availability of and access to assets/capitals. Natural resources (pasture, water and farm plot), 
livestock and social capital form the crucial assets from which the local people derive their 
livelihood activities. In this connection I attempted to involve the local people in exploring 
what activities form their livelihood systems. Household survey respondents were asked to 
identify the types of activities in which they and their household members engaged 
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themselves during the twelve months before this survey. As depicted in Table 6.6 below 
livelihood activities, which most respondents reported, include livestock rearing (59 
respondents), crop cultivation (15 respondents), trading in livestock (4 respondents) and 
running small shop (4 respondents). Few respondents stated small retail trading in various 
items (cigarettes, mats, and skins or Chat /Catha edulis - a stimulant plant) or rifles.        
 
Table 6.6 Types of Livelihood Activities Pursued by Sample Households during the Twelve 
Months Preceding the Survey Period (Multiple Responses are Possible)  
  Livelihood activities    Responses Percent 
  Livestock rearing 59 66.3 
  Growing food crops  15 16.9 
  Trading in livestock 4 4.5 
  Running small shop 4 4.5 
  Trading in cigarette, mat, skin, etc. 3 3.4 
  Working as guard (forest, office) 2 2.2 
  Trading in Chat (Catha edulis)  1 1.1 
  Trading in rifles 1 1.1 
  Total 89 100 
Source: Sample Household Survey, December, 2005.  
 
During the survey the sample households were also asked to identify their primary livelihood 
(s) in their respective households. In reply to this question, the majority of the respondents 
(96.6%) reported ‘livestock production’ as prime livelihood system. One respondent said 
‘crop cultivation’ and another one reported ‘trading in goods’. These results suggest that 
livelihood in the locality is dominated by livestock production. Therefore, though about half 
of the household survey respondents (i.e. 50%) mentioned additional livelihood activities as 
shown in Table 6.6 above, they largely rely on subsistence livestock production.  
 
However, neither livestock production nor other secondary activities provides adequate food 
for the sustenance of the pastoral households in the study community. Asked whether their 
primary livelihood was enough to sustain their family all year round, only 10% of the 
respondents replied in ‘positive’, whereas most respondents (90%) said ‘insufficient’. As a 
result, households seek other sources of food to overcome deficits. These include kinship 
support, reducing consumption, selling animals for purchasing grain, crop cultivation, renting 
out oxen, relief assistance, etc. Nevertheless, a number of informants reported various 
constraints that challenge both primary livelihood and other secondary activities (crop 
cultivation, trading, etc). The following case material, based on an interview with a household 
head, reveals constraints of crop cultivation.  
 
Humedi, 42-year-old, is a resident of the pastoral community named Melo-Bedu. In 
April 2005, I held an interview with Humedi about his experience with regard to 
crop cultivation. Humedi used to practise small-scale irrigation at the Telalak 
River139 to supplement his income from livestock production. He first started 
growing food crops during the last years of the Derg time i.e. around late 1980s, 
                                                 
139 In the upper land this river is known by the name Cheleka, with headstreams Kersa, Abaha, Abonsa and 
others.  It rises roughly from the hills northwest of Bati town. Some small-scale irrigation is practiced by the 
farmers in certain communities along this river (Degefa, 2002, p.22). 
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after he has seen his fellow villagers cultivating maize. He cleared a field along the 
bank of Telalak River. After some time, however, his farm plot was wiped out by a 
flood when it rained heavily in the upper catchments. When his field was affected by 
the change of the river course and the flood, he abandoned his enclosure and stopped 
cultivation for a while. Later he resumed cultivation in cooperation with two 
neighbours. But they did not continue cultivation due to the same flood problem 
which often wipes out irrigated fields and furrows along the river banks. As a result 
Humedi and his fellow villagers hired migrant labourers and tried to make better 
channels and embankments to irrigate more fields. Still the irrigation channels did 
not last long because of high river-runoff coming from upstream (highlands). The 
irrigation channels were often washed away whenever it rained heavily in the 
highlands. Moreover, Humedi and his neighbours also tried to grow maize with rain 
water (i.e. during summer). But they were unsuccessful owing to inadequate 
rainwater which resulted in wilting of maize crop. Despite all these constraints 
Humedi and his villagers, however, did not give up. With hope, Humedi and his five 
fellow villagers again cleared other fields along the Telalak River to grow maize. 
Then they have their own farm plot to work independently. They cooperated for 
communal activities like canal construction, maintenance of furrows, and river water 
diversion. They sometimes get good harvest and other time poor or no harvest at all 
due to flood or failure of rain (Individual interview, April, 2005). 
 
The above case illustrates that individuals/households try to compensate deficits through 
growing food crops when food supply (yield) from livestock production is insufficient. They 
strive to combine livestock rearing with crop cultivation. However, constraints such as lack of 
capacity, flooding and changes in river courses, unreliable rainfall and loss of pasture have 
constrained pastoral households’ attempts to diversify livelihood.  
 
Given the current decline in subsistence livestock production, I asked Humedi how he would 
cope with this livelihood insecurity. He recognized that livestock production has been under 
extreme pressure everywhere in the Afar land. Humedi further illustrates this as follows: 
 
Livestock rearing is under threat because of the recurring drought and lack of 
pasture which often lead to loss of large number of livestock. The time is not for 
livestock, because rainfall has been uncertain; whenever it rains grass does not 
sprout. Moreover, some important grass types have disappeared at all. In fact camels 
and goats could survive better than cattle. And yet, important browsing trees/bushes, 
on which camels and goats rely, are also getting scarce. Had it not been for lack of 
skill and other inputs, cultivation could have been a good source of food grain. 
Humedi viewed irrigated cultivation as viable activity. However, lack of capacity is 
the major constraint to do it. By capacity he meant the availability of trained farm-
oxen, farm tools and skills for making stable channels and embankments for flood 
protection. Firstly, there is lack of trained oxen and of grass to feed them. Secondly, 
Humedi admitted that he lacks skill in ploughing. Hence, he uses only a hoe for 
cultivation. Humedi tried to engage in share-cropping arrangement with Oromo 
cultivators to get access to these inputs. But he did not succeed. Because the Oromo 
cultivators usually prefer sharing-crop contracts with the Afar who live close to 
them in order to secure feed for oxen and to avoid travelling long distances into Afar 
hinterland. Despite all these constraints Humedi wants to continue with animal 
rearing and crop cultivation simultaneously to sustain his family (Individual 
interview, April, 2005). 
 
The case of Humedi indicates the local people’s effort for adopting crop cultivation in order 
to supplement their income from the livestock production, and it reveals the constraints they 
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are facing in doing so. In this connection, I also interviewed experts from the Woreda 
Livestock and Agriculture Development Department about their views on local livelihood 
systems and constraints. One of my informants, Gedamu, an expert from the Department 
described crop cultivation and its constraints in the following manner: 
 
Some households rely partly on crop cultivation. They supplement their sources of 
food from livestock production through growing maize or sorghum. And yet most of 
them do not do cultivation independently. They often do cultivation either through 
sharecropping arrangement or hiring migrant workers. They give their farm plots to 
Oromos on the basis of sharecropping arrangement in which they share the 
production equally. It is because of lack of oxen, tools and skills that the local 
people enter into crop-sharing contracts. In fact those who have oxen and tools tend 
to hire migrant labourers. Our department provides seeds for free. But many 
individuals do not often request seeds once they give their land for share-cropping. 
Many individuals/households do not tend to carry out cultivation independently 
since cultivation is cumbersome and requires some skills, heavy manual labour for 
which the local people are not well-equipped. Moreover, flooding is another limiting 
factor for traditional irrigation, since it washes away the furrows constructed to 
irrigate farm plots. Indeed there is no adequate support from the government to 
enhance traditional irrigation, despite the strong need expressed by the local people 
with regard to irrigation development on the banks of the two rivers (Wata and 
Telalak). For the local people the construction and maintenance of furrows require 
special skills which most of them lack. Consequently, they need external support 
(Key informant interview, November, 2005). 
 
Generally the views of informants and Woreda experts indicate that there is a potential for 
irrigation development in some localities of the district to complement livestock 
production140. However, the local people lack the capacity to enhance their traditional small-
scale irrigation for reasons mentioned above. Moreover, high run-off originated from 
highlands affects crop cultivation, as it washes away furrows and farm plots, especially when 
it heavily rains in the upper catchments. Therefore, small-scale crop cultivation has been 
constrained by many factors. Trade and seasonal migration for work are additional non-
pastoral activities for some individuals or households. These activities are discussed in the 
following sections.   
 
 
6.2.2 Additional Livelihood Activities (Migration and Trading) 
 
As stated in Chapter 3, livestock herders in East Africa increasingly engage in non-pastoral 
activities to augment income and to overcome shocks caused by drought, animal disease, 
market failure and insecurity. Therefore, livelihood diversification has become essential risk 
management strategy among pastoralists. In this instance the Afar pastoralists are no 
exception, though the degree of their involvement in non-pastoral activities varies from one 
locality to the other. Depending on the available opportunities, individuals and households 
take up crop cultivation, trading (livestock, firewood, charcoal); wage employment (hired 
labour, guarding); retail activities (running small restaurants, canteens and shops); rental of 
property ownership and sales (renting out farm-plots, farm-oxen). However, not all pastoral 
                                                 
140 Some studies (e.g. MCE, 2001; MoA, 2000) also indicated that the Aghini locality has a potential for irrigated 
agriculture. 
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households and communities have equal access to these non-pastoral activities. With respect 
to the study community, crop cultivation, trading in livestock, petty trading and migration for 
wage employment have been reported as additional livelihood activities. Access to crop 
cultivation is already discussed in section 6.2.1 above. Therefore, here I discuss the local 
people’s involvement in trading and migration for employment.  
 
i. Migration: In the study community context ‘migration’ refers to travelling outside the 
Telalak district and temporally living elsewhere for the purpose of work. It includes seasonal 
and long-term (circular) migration. During the fieldwork, informants mentioned ‘migration 
for employment’ as one of the income generating activities. Some individuals, especially 
young and middle age people (both men and women) from the district migrate mainly to areas 
such Asayita, Dubti, Werer and Datbahari located within the Afar Region, and to the 
neighbouring countries - Djibouti and Eritrea (Assab).   
 
Initial migrants to Djibouti, Assab and Asayita were economic role models especially to 
young people who do not have local employment opportunity. Until recently migration to 
Djibouti and Assab was the most preferred strategy for searching jobs. Traditionally, young 
and middle age people (both male and female) from Telalak used to migrate to Djibouti 
without any legal entry requirements. They spent part of the year looking for a range of 
employment opportunities in Djibouti. Young boys were employed as shepherds in the rural 
areas, while others in various types of casual work (loading-unloading, in construction sites, 
or as guards in private residences, business centres and bakeries). Many of the female 
migrants are engaged as domestic workers, doing laundry, house clearing and cooking 
activities. The life history of a female informant, Fatuma, a resident of Nemelifen settlement, 
illustrates this.   
 
Fatuma was born in Awarena-Areda pastoral community. She married at very young 
age and later on she divorced her husband because of disagreement. In 1992 Fatuma 
migrated to Djibouti in search of employment. She happened to know about job 
opportunity in Djibouti from initial migrants, who went to Djibouti from her home 
village. For ten years she stayed in Djibouti where she worked as domestic worker 
(preparing food and washing cloths). At that time she was married to an Afar man 
who migrated to Djibouti and she had three children by him. Since 1998 Fatuma 
faced lack of job, as jobs became scarce in Djibouti due to influx of migrants 
following the Ethio-Eritrea border conflict. At that time she was not on good term 
with her husband. Thus she divorced her husband, and decided to stay no longer in 
Djibouti. As a result she returned to Nemelifen (district center) in 2002. Upon her 
return she brought only two of her children leaving the third child (the elder one) 
with his father living in Djibouti (Key informant interview, April, 2005). 
 
Fatuma reported that the Ethiopian Afar had often migrated to Djibouti because of drought 
consequences and for searching jobs. Fatuma felt that in recent years many Afar migrants 
returned from Djibouti to their home country. She attributed this to the scarcity of jobs in 
Djibouti and the emergence of administrative centers, local markets and towns in the Afar 
region where few job opportunities had recently become available. She related this to her own 
experience as follows: 
 
After she returned to Nemelifen (district center), she started running small petty 
trading (Gulit) by bringing some items from the Bati market. The items include 
grains (maize, chickpea, pea and bean), coffee and incense. She has a positive 
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attitude towards towns, district centers or newly emerging settlements, as they are 
becoming for the local people sources of jobs, business, services and weekly market 
centers. However, inadequate capital was the main constraint to expand her small 
business. And yet Fatuma decided to continue her trade even at its margin, as she 
had no other alternative. Her children’s father did not support her. She has relatives 
in her home (pastoral) village. But she did not get support from her relatives, as they 
lost their stock during 2002/2003 drought. Thus Fatuma depended on her petty trade 
in order to feed her children and to cover expenses for their education. Fatuma also 
observed that very few young Afar women (girls) have started trading and Chat 
selling by learning from their neighbouring Oromo women. She attributed low 
participation of Afar women in trading to the lack of skills, capital and low exposure 
to town (urban) life (key informant interview, April, 2005).  
   
Another important place for the Afar migrants was the town of Assab in Eritrea. Before the 
Ethio- Eritrea border conflict, many people used to migrate to Assab in search of a better 
livelihood or as strategy to survive crisis time or to accumulate assets (e.g. livestock). In 
recent years, however, migration for employment either into Djibouti or Assab has been 
constrained by the border conflicts and the policy of the Djibouti Government towards 
migrants. After the independence of Eritrea and the Ethio-Eritrea war in 1998-2000, migration 
to Assab has been difficult for Ethiopian Afar who look for jobs in Assab. In addition, 
following the recent decree released by the Government of Djibouti that prohibits aliens 
without work permit to live in Djibouti, many people were forced to leave the country. 
Afterwards it has been difficult for those Afar seeking to migrate to Djibouti for job 
opportunities. Moreover, informants claimed that job opportunities for the Afar migrants who 
managed to arrive in those receiving areas, have been scarce and unavailable nowadays. The 
following case illustrates this.  
 
Lubak, a resident of Bedu pastoral community, said that some people had been 
migrating to Djibouti in search of employment during bad and good times. During 
the 1984/85 famine Lubak himself migrated to Djibouti and worked there for 
seventeen months. In the first eight months he worked as gardener and for the 
remaining nine months as a goatherd.  At that time he left his wife and children with 
his brother in the home village, and he remitted some money to his family and 
relatives. After seventeen months he returned to his home village. Upon his arrival 
the situation in his home village has improved. Then he bought cattle and camels 
with the money he saved in Djibouti. However, his stock died during the subsequent 
droughts. He left with some camels which survived the drought. He didn’t go back 
to Djibouti during the latter drought periods, as he realized the lack of opportunities 
in Djibouti. Nowadays, Lubak said, migration to Djibouti in search of jobs has been 
decreased. Firstly, job opportunities for migrants have become scarce in Djibouti. 
Secondly, the treatment of Djibouti Government to migrants has become hostile in 
recent years, because of high numbers of foreigners in the country (Individual 
interview, April, 2005). 
 
The above case shows that the political processes (border conflict), the policy of the 
neighbouring countries and scarcity of jobs in receiving areas have constrained cross-border 
labour migration to Assab and Djibouti. Therefore, the local Afar migrate to large-scale 
plantation areas (Asayita, Dubti, Datbahari, Werer) and to other urban centres located within 
the Afar Region. They engage in loading and unloading; daily labour in construction sites, 
plantations; guarding governmental buildings and offices, etc. However, as both key 
informants and the household survey indicated, labour migration from the study community is 
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in general very low. For instance, out of the total 60 sample households interviewed, 
households with one or more members who migrated for seeking jobs during the twelve 
months preceding this survey were only four. This seems low given the recurrent food crisis 
in the locality, and it could be partly attributed to the food distribution in the district, and 
scarcity of jobs and lack of opportunities in the receiving areas. Moreover, it seems that 
individuals who engage in labour migration are not yet well-equipped to access non-pastoral 
employments with high returns in urban settings. And this might be one of the reasons that a 
number of labour migrants are employed in guarding. It was also observed that most of the 
seasonal jobs with high return have been taken up by non-Afar highland labour migrants as 
they are better-equipped to compete and take such advantages in urban settings. 
 
Generally according to the qualitative information and the household survey result, labour 
migration as strategy of income earning/diversification was found to be low among the local 
people. And yet some individuals still go to various places for seasonal work to augment 
income deficits or to survive food crisis.  
 
ii. Trading in livestock, goods and services: Non-pastoral employments in the study 
community are very limited. Yet some individuals and households engage in livestock 
trading, retail trade and small businesses. As shown already in Table 6.6 above, some 
individuals engage in livestock trading, and petty trading (selling Chat, tobacco, mats, skins). 
There are also households which run small shops, restaurants and tearooms in the Nemelifen 
settlement (district centre). But it was clearly observed that most of the businesses and retail 
trade activities in the district centre were controlled by non-Afar highland migrants (Amharas, 
Argobas and Oromos). For instance as of December 2005, there were 25 small shops, 21 
restaurants and tearooms and 5 grinding mills in the Woreda centre (Nemelifen). As depicted 
in Table 6.7 below, most of these businesses are run by non-Afars who migrated from 
neighbouring communities into the district centre.  
 
Table 6.7 Distribution of Business Owners (Afar and Non-Afars) in the Woreda Centre 
Owners* Type of business  
Afar Non-Afars Total 
Small shops 5 (20.0) 20 (80.0) 25 
Restaurants and tearooms  3 (14.3) 18 (85.7) 21 
Grinding mills  2 (40.0) 3 (60.0) 5 
Total  10 (19.6) 41 (80.4) 51 
Source: Based on the survey of business in the Nemelifen, December, 2005. 
* Figures in the bracket are percentages. 
 
Informants claimed that most of the individuals (both Afar and non-Afars) who run small 
businesses belong to relatively wealthy groups. On the other hand, according to some 
informants, the poor might participate in petty trading. However, they often lack initial capital 
and skill to undertake viable businesses and to compete with non-Afar business men (traders). 
In this connection, an informant from Nemelifen, explained the situation as follows: 
 
… Mohammed lost his cattle due to recurring droughts since 1992. He has been a 
recipient of food aid since 1999/2000. Mohammed remarked that community 
members lack the capacity to pursue non-pastoral activities. This has led to seeking 
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government assistance in times food crisis. In order to take up alternative livelihood 
strategies, for instance petty trading or other business, it requires a certain capacity 
(i.e. start-up capital and skill). In this respect Mohammed said: “The poor has no 
alternative.”  “If you are destitute, what can you do?” “I have a labour, but there is 
no project to work or even to sell my manual labour” (Individual interview, 
December, 2005). 
 
In contrast, the better-off individuals invest their own initial capital (in cash or kind) in order 
to take up more viable activities or to make more profit, or to accumulate assets (livestock) as 
a strategy of buffering risks. Therefore, entry into secondary activities such as trading and 
small businesses is not equally open to individuals/households. Thus the poor need social 
networks to access informal cash transfer (informal loan) or support from kinship groups to 
engage in trading or other businesses. On the other hand, individuals/households with better 
initial assets (e.g. cash, skills and labour) have more opportunities to diversify their income 
sources or to accumulate wealth for risk reduction. The following case illustrates this:  
 
Ali, a resident of Adalil village takes up three livelihood activities in combination as 
relying on one activity alone is no more viable to sustain his family. These include 
livestock rearing, crop cultivation and trading in livestock. He pursues trading in 
livestock whenever conditions (i.e. good returns or price at markets, animal health) 
allow him. Beginning 1992, Ali has undertaken trading in livestock (camels, or bulls 
or goats) depending on the demand for these animals in the terminal markets. 
Initially he began in camel trading by selling his he-camel to have initial capital. He 
sold his camel for 2000 Birr at Bati market and bought four young camels for prices 
ranged from 400-500 Birr per head. Having raised the young camels for two years, 
he sold them for prices ranging between 900-1100 Birr per head. In this way he 
made some profits. Then he bought bulls for the prices that ranged from 200-300 
Birr per head. He sold them for prices ranging from 800-900Birr per head after 
raising them for three years. As of 2004, he interrupted trading in camels and bulls. 
He switched to trading in goats, because of the following reasons: (i) camels have 
been very expensive and the profit that could be made per camel has been too 
marginal. The price difference between various markets has been minimal. (ii) At 
that time a camel disease broke out and killed many camels. (iii) Bulls are becoming 
more vulnerable to drought effects and feed stress along market routes and in the 
pastoral localities. Therefore, Ali has switched to trading in goats which have wider 
browsing range and can easily be moved to the market. He sometimes buys goats 
from Dalifagie and sells them at Harawa market located in the Oromo community. 
He buys a goat for a price of 80-100 birr at Dalifagie and sells at 120-130 birr at 
Harawa market (Individual interview, December, 2005). 
 
Ali has also engaged in growing food crops. He started it nineteen years ago. He has a farm 
plot adjacent to the border between Afar and Oromo communities. He grows maize and 
sorghum (Mashila) and produces 7-10 quintals per harvest. He further narrated how he carries 
out crop cultivation as follows: 
   
Ali carries out either irrigated or rainfed cultivation depending on seasons and 
availability of river water and rainfall. During Karma (main rainy season) he grows 
maize or sorghum using rainwater. Another time, especially during the dry season 
he uses river water for growing crop. Ali has a shortage of adult labour with the 
necessary skills in his household for crop cultivation. Thus he gets access to outside 
labour through two types of arrangements with neighbouring Oromos or Argobas: 
(i) he hires labourer at 500 Birr per year. In this arrangement he also provides hired 
labourer with food, or (ii) Ali allots farm plot to his ally in exchange for his service. 
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The choice between these two arrangements often depends on the preference of his 
ally (i.e. cash or allotment).   
 
Ali lives in the same homestead with his father and four brothers. He has three 
wives and seven children. I asked him why he got married more than one wife. He 
replied that having many children and wives has economic advantage. Ali felt that 
“had it not been for more wives and children, he couldn’t have taken up more 
livelihood activities”. His Oromo wife lives in the Oromo community and engages 
in crop cultivation. One of his Afar wives lives in the Nemelifen and engages in 
selling food, tea and cigarettes. His third wife lives in a pastoral camp and engages 
in livestock rearing. Ali also considered “living in one corral compound with his 
extended family and kin” as an advantage, as it has helped him to mobilize more 
labour from his kin. Ali also receives support and advice from his father and 
brothers. Ali uses his household labour efficiently: (i) children often tend livestock, 
(ii) hired labourer works on farms and, (iii) Ali takes care of trading activity and 
oversees crop cultivation. In addition to these livelihood activities Ali has a plan to 
construct a house in the Woreda center (i.e. Nemelifen) either for running shop or 
for renting it out to earn additional income (Individual interview, December, 2005). 
 
All the above case materials have demonstrated that livestock production is unable to provide 
sufficient subsistence for the pastoral households. As a result, pastoral households strive to 
diversify their livelihood strategies by engaging in non-pastoral activities. Nevertheless, as the 
above case also illustrates, the option for income diversification relies on some initial 
endowments (assets) in the form of cash, or skills or social networking and as well as on other 
opportunities like access to markets, infrastructures and urban centers. These conditions for 
entry into non-pastoral activities are inaccessible to many pastoral households. Livelihood 
diversification is still at a very low level in the study community, though some 
individuals/households engage themselves in crop cultivation, trading and labour migration 
whenever situations allow them to do so. Therefore, most pastoral households rely primarily 
on subsistence livestock production even at its marginality.  
 
As stated earlier the relative success of livelihood activities and strategies can be influenced 
by contextual conditions at the local level and beyond. The contextual factors broadly 
embrace ecological, environmental and social processes. The following sections present the 
local people’s perspective on some of these contextual factors that influence livelihood 
activities and strategies in the study community. 
 
6.3 Ecological/Environmental and Social Changes from the Local People’s 
Perspective 
 
As indicated in section 6.1.2 the Aghini pastoral community live in semi-arid climate where 
options for rain-fed agriculture other than livestock rearing are very limited. Low rainfall and 
high temperature are the major constraints in the locality. Thus for many decades the Aghini 
community has relied on a pastoral production system. In recent decades, however, this long-
standing pastoral system has been challenged by ecological/environmental changes which 
include (i) degradation of range resources, (ii) loss of water points, (iii) increased cycle of 
drought and changes in pattern and amount of rainfall (unreliability of rainfall), and (iv) loss 
of dry and drought retreats due to conflicts and resource use changes. These factors are 
elabourated in more detail below.  
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6.3.1 Degradation of Range Resources  
 
Natural forage vegetation is the key resource for the livestock production. According to the 
informants some four decades ago both fodder trees and grasses were abundant in the study 
community. However, since the 1980s forage resources have gradually diminished due to 
impacts of drought, bush encroachment, deforestation and overgrazing. A number of 
informants reported that important browsing trees, palatable bushes, and grasses have become 
scarce in recent decades. They attributed this to the invasion of undesirable woody plants and 
bushes, drought consequences and cutting of trees for various purposes (timber, fuel-wood, 
charcoal, crop cultivation). This view of local people is consistent with a study report (MCE, 
2001) that classified the eastern side of the Telalak district as highly degraded, and the 
western part as moderately degraded (see map 10 ). It is appropriate here to discuss the views 
of the local people on factors contributing to the degradation of natural forage vegetations in 
their community. The causes of the degradation from the perspective of the local people are 
explained in more detail below.  
 
i. Bush encroachment and loss of palatable tree species: A number of informants claimed 
that bush encroachment began after the prolonged drought of the 1984/85. Since then 
unpalatable plants and bushes with less forage value have gradually become dominant and 
invaded pasturelands. Indigenous species such as Merkato (acacia mellifera), Tikibleita 
(acacia senegal) and Adedoyta have invaded pasturelands and depressed the growth of 
important perennial grasses. The local people felt that this has led to the deterioration and 
shrinkage of local grazing areas. Simultaneously some important types of grasses and 
palatable trees have become scarce over time. In relation to this I tried to identify indigenous 
trees which are important feed sources, but are getting scarce in the study community. These 
are given in Table 6.8 below.  
 
Table 6.8 Some Fodder Trees and their Availability as Identified on the Basis of Knowledge 
of Informants  
Afar 
vernacular  
Scientific name  Parts browsed Current 
status/availability  
Adayto Salvadora persica (L) leaves and fruit (for camel) scarce 
Adeganto Acacia seyal.Del. leaves/foliage - 
Bunket Tribulus terrestiris (L) leaves scarce 
Eibeto Acacia tortillis leaves and pods  only at  river banks  
Gerento  Acacia oerfota/A.nubica leaves scarce  
Gersa  Dobera glabra  leaves  scarce  
Hidaito Grewia ferruginea (Hochst.) leaves  scarce  
Humraito  Tamarindus indica leaves    scarce  
Kaselto  Acacia nilotica  leaves and pods   scarce  
Kusraito  Ziziphus spina Christi (L) leaves  and fruit   scarce  
Ledo * leaves (for dry season feed)   scarce 
Segento Tamarix aphylla (L)  leaves  scarce 
Subula  Ficus sycomorus L. leaves (for dry season feed) scarce 
Tikibleita Acacia Senegal (L) willd leaves and fruit  available  
Yodikito * leaves  available  
Source: Key informant interviews, April 2006. 
* Scientific name not identified.  
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Of all plants listed in Table 6.8, Gerento (acacia oerfota), Adeganto (acacia seyal), Kaselto 
(acacia nilotica), Eibeto (acacia tortilis), Bunket (tribulus terrestiris), and Hidaito (grewia 
ferruginea) are excellent feed sources for camels. However, these plants are getting scarce in 
the study community.  
 
In addition Durfu (chrysopogon plumulosus), Mussa (echninochloa colonum) and Melif 
(andropogon greenwayii) are important grasses for cattle and sheep. However, within the past 
two to three decades these perennial grass types have also been rare in most grazing zones. A 
number of informants claimed that bush encroachment has depressed undergrowth including 
excellent grass types such as Melif and Durfu.  
 
ii. Recurrent drought impacts and overgrazing: A number of informants stated that recurring 
drought has contributed to decline of natural forage. As drought has become severe and 
frequent over the past three decades, plant species such as Habeli (grewian villosa willd), 
Hidaito (grewia ferruginea hochst), Debayto, Shirkto, Ermole, Subula/Subahi (ficus 
sycomorus L) are getting scarce, whereas those with low fodder value are expanding.  
 
As natural grazing has deteriorated over time, herders are increasingly facing shortage of 
livestock feeds. Consequently, herds concentrate in specific locations, for instance along the 
sides of water courses (rivers) and depressions/valleys where patchy forage resources can be 
available. The concentration of large stock in specific localities, in turn, has led to over 
pressure on existing plant resources and then to over-browsing and overgrazing. Moreover, 
during prolonged dry seasons and drought periods herders feed livestock with leaves, foliages 
and pods by cutting tree branches.  
 
In general, drought impacts, overgrazing and deforestation have contributed to the decline of 
fodder production in pasturelands. However, the deterioration of natural resource base in 
study community is not attributed only to these factors. Other socio-economic factors such as 
emergence of new settlements (small towns), adoption of crop cultivation, and erosion of 
traditional resource management systems have also contributed to localized degradation of 
natural forage and deforestation. Each of these factors is discussed below.  
 
iii. Emergence of new settlements and deforestation: Small towns and permanent settlements 
have emerged around administrative centres and along all weather roads followed the mid 
1990s new administrative structure and decentralization process in the Afar Region. The 
demand for timber, poles and firewood supply has increased with the emergence and 
development of small towns and administrative centres. A case in point in the study 
community is the development of Nemelifen pastoral settlement into a town and district 
administrative centre. Some of the better-off individuals, traders and government employees 
have built houses in this town either for dwelling and/or for renting out. Some individuals 
living in pastoral villages have also put huts to seize plots in the district center. Therefore, 
individuals cut trees found along the river bank for the construction of houses. Furthermore, 
along with sedentarization, some pastoral households are adopting a new type of house that 
was not traditionally common in the community. Besides Afar men who married non-Afar 
wives have to construct this new type of house as their wives do not like to live in the 
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traditional Afar hut (Ari)141.  The new type of house is adopted from highland areas and urban 
centers. Unlike the traditional mobile hut (Ari) that requires tree sticks/branches to construct 
it, the new type of house requires more materials, timbers and poles for construction. 
Consequently, this has led to the cutting of more trees. 
 
In addition, the demand for fire-wood and the practice of charcoal making have increased 
with the development of permanent settlements and small towns. Traditionally the local 
people mainly collect dead trees or branches for fuel-wood supply in their pastoral 
villages/camps. Currently, individuals have resorted to cutting large trees for the purposes of 
charcoal, firewood and construction. Mainly non-Afar immigrants and neighbouring 
highlanders engage in charcoal making and firewood selling. As a result, the cutting of trees 
is intensified mainly along the river banks where most important forage tree species are 
found. This has contributed to the loss of trees that have fodder value for livestock. 
 
iv. Adoption of crop cultivation and clearing land: In section 6.2.1, it is stated that 
individuals or households are adopting food crop cultivation in the study community. As 
response to recurring food shortage, pastoral households grow food crops (e.g. maize, 
sorghum) along the river banks by clearing lands where important browsing trees and bushes 
occur. Trees and bushes found on river banks are cleared mainly for small-scale irrigation, as 
rain-fed maize/sorghum growing has been unreliable. As a result, traditional rules that 
prohibited cutting trees have been violated, as individuals/households are increasingly 
involved in developing farm plots close to river banks. Trees such as Segento (tamarix 
aphylla), Gerento (acacia nubica), Ledo, and Kusraito/Kusra (ziziphus spina) have been 
affected while clearing land for cultivation.  
 
Some informants claimed that violation of traditional rules began at the mid of the 1970s 
when the Third Livestock Development Project (TLDP) attempted to develop irrigated farm 
by clearing forest. At the time the TLDP cleared forests along the Telalak River for irrigated 
cultivation. Later on many individuals/households have continued clearing more fields for 
growing food crops. Consequently, traditional rules aiming at preserving forest have been 
gradually relaxed, as more individuals are involved in crop cultivation and in clearing more 
fields along river banks. 
 
v. Pressure on natural resources and erosion of traditional resource management systems: 
Population increase (human and livestock), consequences of recurring drought, and 
overgrazing have exerted pressure on readily available natural resources in the immediate 
environment. This pressure has resulted in a widespread exploitation of rangelands and forage 
vegetation. Simultaneously mobility which underlines pastoral range management and 
conservation system is constrained by land use changes, loss of grazing lands to non-pastoral 
uses, conflict, and political instability. Therefore, scarcity and subsequent competition for 
rangeland resources have strained the traditional resource management systems such as 
pasture rotation, deterrent; grazing reserves, herd splitting to adjust to available fodders.  
                                                 
141 In addition to this the non-Afar women are not accustomed to some activities which are traditional women’s 
tasks in the Afar community. These include backing Ga’amo; constructing the Afar traditional hut (Ari); loading 
and unloading items on camels; making various household utensils from skins and hides that are used by the 
pastoral group.  
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In the past good days, the local people utilized fodder resources in rotating not to deplete one 
resource or the other. Rotating use of resources is guided by traditional rules which every 
member has to observe. Thus, community members have had a shared consensus on the use, 
control and management of communal resources. However, traditional rules that govern 
access, control and use of resources have been ineffective in recent years. This is partly due to 
degradation and scarcity of resources that have brought stiff competition over the use of 
meager or poor fodder resources in order to sustain herds. As natural forage vegetation away 
from river banks is getting very scarce due to drought impacts, herders rely heavily on certain 
river valleys or localities for feeding their stock. Therefore, rules governing the use of 
common resources are no longer applied during extreme events as they were used to be in the 
past. 
 
Indeed the local people have the tradition of protecting important indigenous trees that 
provide shading, famine food, and feed for livestock. If someone cuts trees that provide such 
uses, he is first warned by traditional authorities. In case of a repetition, he faces severe fine. 
If the culprit owns animals, he is fined at a rate of goat or cow per tree destroyed. The animal 
is slaughtered for feast. If the culprit doesn’t own any animals, he is taken to a river with his 
hands tied behind his back. Then he is dipped in the river and whipped. However, in recent 
years traditional rules governing access to and use of common resources are undermined by 
land use/ecological changes, emergence of new settlements, resource scarcity and severe 
competition over resources. These factors and recurrent droughts make it difficult to preserve 
forests in the traditional way.  
 
In general the above descriptions indicate the deterioration of key ecological resources 
(natural pasture and vegetation) in the study community. Forage resources are getting very 
scarce owing to population increase, drought impacts, deforestation and heavy pressure on 
existing resource for grazing, construction and fuel-wood collection. Woody plants found 
near settlements, towns and road sides, and at river banks are being cut for various purposes at 
alarming rate. Moreover, the local people do not plant or replace lost trees apart from 
protecting the existing indigenous useful trees. Land use changes, scarcity and competition 
over existing resources have also strained the traditional resource management systems. 
Therefore, drought consequences, overgrazing, deforestation and erosion of traditional 
resource management systems have led to the depletion of natural resources. This has 
severely affected the local livestock production in the study community.  
 
6.3.2 Loss of Water Points  
A number of informants reported that water points have either dried up or their water yield 
has decreased as drought cycle has increased in the past three decades. Some of these water 
points are presented in Table 6.9 below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 218
Table 6.9 Water wells dried up or their water yield has declined since the mid 1980s  
Water points/wells   Location of wells in the district    Current Status 
Kabuy and Megilel Odelena-Asbole Kebele water yield declined 
Omo-Deraytu Waydolelena Ye-alu Kebele dried up 
Bedu “ “ 
Erkebtu “ “ 
Beholy Awarena-Areda Kebele “ 
Deraytu “ water yield  declined 
Source: Key informant interview with elders and clan leaders (December, 2005) 
 
Some three decades ago, four of the aforementioned wells were used as sources of water for 
both livestock and human consumption. Since the 1984-85 prolonged drought these sources 
gradually dried up. For instance my informants mentioned that about forty households used to 
live close to Beholy well before the 1984-85 drought. After Beholy well dried up, villagers 
dispersed and changed the location of their settlements to get access to other water points. 
While some households which used the above source gradually moved their camps close to 
banks of permanent rivers, others shifted their location and dug another shallow well. 
 
During my fieldwork, I also interviewed informants from the district (Woreda) government 
offices with regard to water resources. They reported that surface water and rainfall are 
declining overtime. In the district there are only three perennial rivers that flow year round. 
But the volume of water fluctuates and depends on the amount of rain water that descends 
from the upper catchments. 
 
A number of informants reported the scarcity of safe drinking water in the study community. 
Many people use river water for human consumption. Moreover, permanent rivers are 
inaccessible for a number of pastoral villages/settlements. It takes hours for herders for 
collecting drinking water and for watering stock. This is particularly a burden for women and 
children, since fetching water is mainly their task.  
 
Generally speaking it seems that under normal conditions the existing permanent sources 
yield enough water at least in terms of quantity.142  While some informants claimed that there 
is no problem related to quantity of water, other informants indicated that the water is not 
clean (judged subjectively). Even then, as presented in box 6.3 below, herders have to travel 
long distances for fetching drinking water and for watering their herds. This is partly because 
some grazing and browsing are far away from the permanent water sources143. Inaccessibility 
worsens during prolonged dry season and drought periods. Neighbourhoods/villages with a 
problem of inaccessibility to water points are given in box 6.3 below.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
142 The informants felt that the river water is the main source of human diseases as is is not safe for human 
consumption.  
143 During the wet season (Karma), herders may not venture distant migration, since ponds may be available 
whenever there is enough rain in their locality. 
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The distribution and types of water points influence the frequency with which animals are 
watered. The further the pastoral settlement and grazing area from the water sources, the more 
likely herders will be forced to practise alternative day watering of their animals. This is 
particularly the main problem for herders during the dry season where they will be forced to 
travel for longer hours to reach watering points. This, therefore, has a substantial demand on 
the labour to water animals, with loss of energy both to herders and animals.  
 
6.3.3 Increased Cycle of Drought and Erratic Rainfall 
 
The productivity of rangelands is determined by rainfall. In other words the productivity of 
pasture and browsing trees depends to a great extent on the amount and pattern of rainfall. 
The local people reported that the failure of major and minor rains that has been frequent in 
recent decades often leads to feed stress and then to high livestock mortality. As stated earlier, 
a number of informants perceived that loss of palatable trees and annual grasses has come 
with the increased cycle of drought since the 1980s. Many episodes of drought have affected 
the study community. A number of informants claimed that the frequency and severity of 
droughts has increased in recent decades. Accordingly they have identified drought (i.e. total 
failure of main and minor rainy seasons) as number one constraint to their subsistence 
livestock production.   
 
Moreover, unreliability of rain from year to year is also another characteristic of the rainfall in 
the local community. Most of the informants reported that rainfall has become extremely 
erratic in recent decades and its pattern has changed. In normal times the area receives two 
main rainfalls: Karma that occurs in the period July-September and Sugum in the March-
April. There is also a shower of rain in January-February which is called Dedaa. In recent 
decades, informants said, Karma rain comes late and ceases shortly while Sugum rain comes 
Box 6.3 Some selected neighbourhoods with the problem of accessible water points: 
 
1. Ay-ulidaba: From this locality herders have to travel to Telalak River to get water.  
2. Odele: In this locality herders use a hand-dug well. As water supply from the well is not enough to the 
villagers, herders travel for about 7-8 hours to reach other watering points in round trip.   
3. Seblel and Degoro Konta. These localities are found in the Waydolelena-Yealu KA. In round trip, 
herders travel for about 5-6 hours to reach the nearest animal watering points.    
4.  Ye-alu. This locality is found in Waydolelena-Yealu KA. Gewis River does not reach to this 
neighbourhood. Thus the herders have to travel for some distances to get water from permanent 
sources.  
5. Sagantole and Eya-eya. It is located in Odelena-Asbole KA. From this locality herders have to drive 
stocks for about 5-7 hours in round trip to reach watering points. 
6. Arebite: It is found in Kulilina-Deta Kelaytu KA. The residents of this locality use hand dug wells for 
drinking water. And it takes about 7-8 hours in round trip for watering of livestock from other water 
sources.  
7. Awidi-melina Rassa, Alala-Sahinan, and Hadeluna-Bolelisa. These localities are found in Hebertuna-
Rassa KA. Herders from the first village move animals for about 6-7 hours in round trip to reach water 
points; and herders from the second and third villages for about 5-6 hours.   
8. Ferona-Megenta KA. This kebele most often faces water shortage.  
 
Source: Key informant Interview, November, 2005 
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rarely. Moreover, the local people claimed that the amount of rain in both seasons has 
declined. The local people hold such impression because they felt that both the main and 
minor rainy seasons have shortened beginning the mid 1980s. According to the informants the 
study area received good rain in July-September (Karma) as well as in March-April (Sugum) 
before the 1980s. In the recent decade rain during these seasons has been more erratic as 
compared to the years before the 1980s. And yet, as shall be described below, the amount of 
annual rainfall might not decline in the study community. Rather the duration of rainfall has 
been reduced, while its intensity is higher during certain days or within a month.        
 
Moreover the analysis of long-term rainfall data does not support the local people’s 
perception of decline in amount of rainfall. Although, there is no rainfall station in the study 
community, data from nearby stations (Bati and Eliwaha) were used to analyze rainfall trends 
in the area. As it can be seen from figures 6.1 and 6.2 below, rainfall data from these two 
stations did not show a declining trend over the years for which rainfall data is available. On 
the other hand national level trend analysis of annual rainfall shows that rainfall remained 
more or less constant when averaged over the whole country, while the declining trend has 
been observed over northern half of the country where Bati and Eliwaha stations and the 
study area are also found (NMSA, 2001:71-72). In this case the local peoples’ perception of 
rainfall trend goes with results of trend analysis done for the northern half of the country. This 
suggests that rainfall shows large spatial and temporal variation. Therefore, variability and 
changes in rainfall distribution have more impacts on the seasonal and spatial availability, and 
productivity of range resources in the study community.  
 
As can be observed from Figure 6.1, the three extreme dry years in the Bati station were in 
1973, 1980 and 1984. Three of these dry years coincided with three known famine years (i.e. 
1973-74, 1980 and 1984-85). Since the 1990s, drought occurred every 3-5 years. 
 
 
 Figure 6.1 Amount of annual rainfall in Bati Rainfall Station (1963-1997) 
Bati Rainfall Station
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Source: Author’s construction based on NMSA data  
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Figure 6.2 Amount of annual rainfall in Eliwaha Rainfall Station (1962-1987)* 
Eliwaha Rainfall Station
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Source: Author’s construction based on NMSA data  
* Data for 1963, 1964, 1974 and 1983 are not available.  
 
In general terms significant changes in rainfall distribution in space and time, including an 
increased frequency of drought have contributed to local livelihood insecurity or 
vulnerability. However, such vulnerability is not caused by climatic extreme events (drought) 
and erratic rainfall alone. In other words the impact of drought on pastoral groups is 
determined by many socio-economic, political and institutional factors. Accordingly, as stated 
in the literature review, it can be argued that drought and rainfall variability are parts of the 
natural cycle in semi-arid areas. Furthermore, local livelihoods are sensitively adapted to the 
certainty that drought will come. Most importantly pastoral households can move from areas 
of drought to areas of better rainfall, when drought occurs. Nevertheless, mobility can still be 
constrained by many other factors such as land tenure systems, administrative actions, 
conflict and political instability, etc.  
 
And yet the impact of drought is multi-dimensional in the study community. The direct 
impact on the pastoral groups is the loss of livestock which are the main sources of food, 
cash, wealth and social capital/relation144. Drought also affects terms of trade as livestock 
price falls while food price rises. Therefore, extreme drought consequences undermine 
pastoralists’ access to food and challenge their risk reduction strategies including mobility. In 
addition, as stated above, under the condition of degradation/loss of key resource owing to 
both external and internal forces, local communities are less able to cope with effects of 
extreme events (recurring droughts). If vulnerability to drought consequences is increasing as 
it does in the study community, the reasons therefore, have to do with declining ability to 
cope rather than increasingly frequent drought events. Then the question is why the local 
people’s capacity to cope with drought consequences has declined. 
 
                                                 
144 A multitude of ritual and social functions of livestock are characteristics of the traditional livestock 
production systems. 
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In general terms, the perceived sources of vulnerability from local people’s perspective are 
what we call “the normal constraints” and disaster risks (drought, animal diseases). The 
“normal constraints” are like seasonal, annual and spatial variations of rainfall and thus 
variability in quantity and quality of the available forages. These constraints are always parts 
of the local pastoral system and ecology, and adaptive strategies have been developed to 
counteract their effects. However, the progressive losses of pastoral resources to non-pastoral 
uses, and external pressures combined with frequent drought and high mortality of livestock 
have gradually eroded the local people’s capacity and challenged their long-lived adaptive 
strategies. Therefore, the underlying causes include the loss of key resources due to land use 
changes, restriction of mobility, conflict, political instability, and other market forces. In fact 
the pastoral households are still striving to cope with these constraints through their 
traditional adaptive and coping strategies. But the impacts of internal factors, external 
pressures and climatic extreme events have strained the effectiveness of adaptive responses. 
The local people’s perceptions of risks and their adaptive and coping strategies will be 
discussed later in section 6.6. The following sections discuss the loss of key grazing areas 
(drought and dry season retreats), restriction of mobility and conflicts over resources.  
 
6.3.4 Loss of Dry Season/drought Retreats and Restriction of Mobility  
 
The local people traditionally move their herds to various dry season and drought retreats 
within the Afar land and beyond, according to where and when fodder is available. The most 
important dry season reserves include Bekeri, Awash, Abuware, and the foothills (see map 9 
for the location of these places). Drought retreats included Megenta, Ba’adu, Jeldi, Gewis, 
and Cheffa (see map 9 for the location of these places). In recent years, however, most of 
these key resource areas have been unavailable to the Aghini pastoral groups due to 
degradation of grazing resources, land use changes and conflicts over the use of remaining 
scarce resources. A number of informants stressed the progressive scarcity of fodder in these 
dry season and drought retreats. In addition to the deterioration of rangelands, important 
migration areas such as Magenta, Ba’adu and Alledeghi plain have been unavailable to the 
study community, mainly due to large-scale farm development in the Middle Awash Valley 
and the progressive incursion of Issa-Somali. Most of my informants mentioned that these 
areas were previously the main dry season and drought period retreats for their community.    
 
As indicated earlier mobility is a key strategy for the pastoral systems in the arid and semi-
arid zones, so as to seize the variable forge opportunity. Ecologically livestock feeds are 
unevenly distributed in the Afar arid and semi-arid environment. The pastoral ecology, the 
socio-economic and political contexts, in which the pastoral groups and their neighbours 
interact have been changed in recent decades. Livestock feeds are largely concentrated along 
the permanent streams, flooded plains, and banks of the Awash River. Moreover, the 
availability of natural forage in these areas varies seasonally. As a response to this variation in 
feed availability, pastoral groups follow seasonal patterns of mobility to exploit the advantage 
of feed availability in certain locations. When herders face scarcity or stress within traditional 
grazing zones, they drive their herds into areas inhabited by crop cultivators and into dry 
season grazing reserves. Nowadays such key pastoral resources, however, have been reduced 
by encroachments from commercial farms and national parks and they suffer from drought 
consequences. At the same time distant pastoral resources in the neighbouring communities 
have become unavailable during stress or drought time due to conflicts and resource scarcity. 
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As a result, seasonal mobility patterns in their territory and beyond have been constrained. In 
other words herders are facing environmental scarcity both in their locality, and beyond where 
they previously moved their herds to survive drought or feed stress. One of my informants, 
Mohammed, an elder from the study community explained the dilemma of herders in the 
following manner:  
 
During severe drought we can move livestock to various places found within the 
Afar land. Nothing hinders us. However, there is no better area where we can get 
grass for our livestock. Every corner has been the same. Currently we are in 
dilemma and mostly we stay where we are. Our livestock are perishing right before 
our eyes, when drought occurs. This is the situation in which we find ourselves 
(Individual Interview, 2005). 
 
The environmental scarcity (ecological change), apart from its impact on livestock 
production, has contributed to inter-group and enter-ethnic competitions over the remaining 
scarce resources. The point in case is the conflict between the local Afar and highland 
cultivators (Oromo and Amhara groups) over the use and control of scarce resources along the 
common border and in Borkena/Cheffa wetland. The highland peasants contest herders and 
herd movements into their locality and settlements claiming that herds would damage crops, 
enclosures, plantations, gardens, etc. The mobility of livestock into neighbouring highland 
areas during the dry season has also suffered from the regionalization based on ethnicity. 
Conflict, closed area development programmes in neighbouring communities, and 
privatization of shared grazing land at Borkena wetland have greatly reduced accessibility to 
grazing zones. Similarly the local Afar on their part have begun to contest the highland 
peasants moving down into foothills and in Afar localities in the belief that farmers would 
expand farm plots and cut important browsing trees. Moreover, the local Afar resist the 
expansion of peasant settlements across the territorial frontiers. The following section further 
elabourates on this issue.  
 
6.3.5 Resource Conflicts with Neighbouring Groups  
 
The relation between the Afar and their neighbours has been characterized by a mixture of 
cooperation, competition, and conflict over access to economic resources and power. 
Sometimes it has been characterized by mutually beneficial cooperation, and other times by 
competition and conflict. The Afar relation with their neighbours is dynamic and has been 
changing over time depending on socio-economic and political contexts in which natural 
resource competition occurs. Accordingly nowadays the Afar relationship with their 
neighbours is taking on new and dangerous characteristics that pose threats to the viability of 
their pastoral livelihood system and to the effectiveness of external development 
interventions.  
 
These days, herders and neighbouring peasants are both facing scarcity of natural resources 
that are critical to their respective livelihoods. While the subsistence agricultural production is 
affected by recurrent drought, repeated crop failure, farmland scarcity and population 
pressure, the Afar subsistence livestock production is affected by the degradation of pastoral 
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resources145 (pasture, browsing trees, and water points), animal disease and impacts of 
recurring drought.  
 
For several decades herders and their neighbouring crop cultivators have strived to cope with 
such livelihood constraints through mutual cooperation and sharing natural resource found 
either at the buffer zones or in the hinterlands of each community. Households from both 
groups establish stock-alliance, bond-friendship and other resource sharing arrangements 
whereby they could reciprocate resources (oxen, labour, skill, livestock, grain, grazing right).  
However, in recent decades such exchanges of resources have been constrained by 
degradation of assets and natural resources, consequences of recurring drought and socio-
political processes. Consequently pastoral and sedentary groups are less able to cope with 
environmental stresses, and natural and economic shocks.  
 
As the critical resources of their livelihoods have been eroded over the past several decades, 
many herders and the neighbouring peasants could not get sufficient food for their 
households’ consumption. Moreover, drought has become frequent in both communities and 
has led to catastrophes manifested in loss of livestock and crop failure resulting in chronic 
food crisis. Subsequently the scope of mutual cooperation between herders and peasants has 
been diminishing over time. All these processes have led to livelihood insecurity. Besides, as 
land resources, pasture land, water and vegetation which are critical to rural livelihoods have 
become scarce, herders and cultivators enter into intensive competitions over the control and 
ownership of the remaining scarce resources that are found at common borders or buffer 
zones. Thus traditional conflicts over natural resources have been further intensified.  
 
The increased conflict over scarce resources between herders and neighbouring crop 
cultivators manifests itself in many ways. The following observations from the study area 
illustrate some of these manifestations.  
 
• The neighbouring peasants covet to clear lands and to expand farm plots, particularly 
along the rivers and streams that flow into the Afar territory. On the other hand the 
local Afar need such localities to remain as open access for grazing, browsing and 
sources of water for their herds. These competing claims and counter-claims along the 
border have developed into clashes and violent conflicts in recent years. 
 
• As some pastoral households have already started crop cultivation as a supplementary 
source of food, they want to divert rivers and streams for small-scale irrigation along 
the banks of the rivers. Similarly the neighbouring peasants desire to use river water at 
upstream for crop cultivation or horticulture. This again leads to competition over the 
control and use of water, particularly over lands found alongside rivers and close to 
common borders.  
 
• Individual cultivators from the highlands occasionally descend down to Afar 
territories for collecting fire-wood and for cutting trees for poles, timbers and for 
                                                 
145 Reduction of livestock feed has resulted from encroachment of grazing from agriculture, wildlife reserves, 
parks; invasion of inedible bush and thorny weeds (prosopis juliflora); increased human population and 
livestock, recurrent drought consequences, etc.  
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charcoal-making. As some trees are sources of fodder for browsers, the local Afar 
compete with fuel-wood collectors and charcoal makers. 
 
• The neighbouring peasants make land enclosures close to escarpments and foothills 
for hay making or for grazing reserves. Whenever herders face shortage of feed for 
their stock, they move herds into these enclosures. This gain leads to a confrontation 
between herders and highlanders.  
 
• During drought herders move their herds into settled highland areas and encroach on 
farm fields, plantations, enclosures and gardens. This often results in clashes between 
farmers and herders. This encroachment has increased in recent years, as the drought 
cycle became shorter in pastoral areas. In the past decades, the Cheffa wetland has 
been the main drought escaping zone for both herders, and the highland peasants who 
rear livestock too. However, in recent decades this key grazing area has been 
unavailable for drought period, as most of the communal grazing land has been 
privatized and converted into commercial farm and individual private holdings. 
Whenever the Afar pastoral groups move their herds to Cheffa in times of drought, 
they clash with farm owners and the surrounding peasants as the remaining pasture 
land could not accommodate all the traditional users of the wetland.   
 
• The current political context has also exacerbated the traditional competition over 
access and use of resources (pasture and water) and territorial disputes. Claims and 
counter-claims over the control and ownership of resources found at the frontiers 
between pastoral and sedentary areas have escalated after the introduction of ethnic 
federalism. The nature of competition over land and natural resources is changing 
from access and use to permanent claim to own land and exclusive control of critical 
natural resources found at the frontiers.  
 
Nevertheless, it can not be concluded that conflict between the two parties resulted only from 
competition over scarce resources. Although pasture resources are now scarce, the local Afar 
have interacted with neighbouring cultivators for several decades through establishing trade 
relations, stock-alliance, resource sharing, and bond-friendship and other social relations. And 
yet the current political processes have overwhelmed these areas of cooperation and relation. 
Let us look closely how the macro and local political processes have contributed to the 
conflicts between ethnic groups. 
 
With the change of government in Ethiopia in 1991, the country has pursued an ‘ethnic 
federalism’ approach to governance whereby administrative boundaries (Regions) were 
redrawn along broad ethnic lines. Before this period the study community belonged to the 
highland government administrative provinces (Wello and Shewa). Followed the ethnic 
federal system, the Ethiopian Afar are consolidated into one regional state with five Zones 
and 29 districts aimed at ensuring self-administration. Accordingly the Aghini pastoral 
community was structured in one district administration. Likewise the neighbouring 
highlanders (i.e. the Oromos, Amharas and Argobas) who formerly shared the same provinces 
with local Afar, established their own districts on the basis of ethnicity. In the regionalization 
process, boundaries between regions and districts were to be drawn. However, the creation of 
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district boundaries is not without problems, since it involves a risk of conflicts between 
various ethnic groups over the lands found at the buffer zones and territorial frontiers. 
Therefore, regional and district boundaries are not still officially demarcated. Attempts made 
to create district boundaries along some frontiers have led to clashes between the local Afar 
and their neighbours. As these attempts to create boundaries were made without due regard to 
the local system of resource use, they led to claims and counter-claims over control of land 
and resources such as grazing areas, water points and forests. It seems that previously the 
local Afar did not tend to own land and landed resources along the buffer zones, as usufruct 
rights over grass, trees and water were respected, and agricultural encroachment was minimal. 
Nowadays, the redrawing of administrative boundaries along ethnic lines and the increased 
expansion of agriculture from highland areas have, however, brought insecurity with regard to 
traditional usufruct rights over landed resources. As a result, the local system of resource use 
has been transformed from use of the resources to the control of land. In the study area there 
are many contested localities at the territorial frontiers where local Afar are running into 
conflicts with Oromos, Amharas and Argobas. For instance some specific localities over 
which the local Afar and Oromos often clash are described in box 6.4 below. 
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In general the macro and local political processes have affected the traditional conflict 
management systems. Traditionally resource conflicts, animal raiding and theft between Afar 
and their neighbouring groups were resolved through assembly of elders drawn from both 
sides. Nowadays however, working arrangements and alliances, which have helped for 
generations, have become ineffective. This in turn led to a regular intervening of the third 
actor (the government and its agencies) when conflicts erupt between the local Afar and their 
neighbouring groups. Accordingly, the government has initiated the establishment of joint 
peace committees at several administrative levels (Region, Zone, District and Kebele) in order 
to manage and resolve local conflicts. However, these committees were less effective in 
monitoring and deterring conflicts at the local level due to a number of factors. Some of these 
factors are described below. 
Box 6.4 Some Localities contested by the local Afars and Neighbouring Oromos 
  
1. Digdiga/Sifi: This locality is found along bank of the Sifi River and is used for grazing by the local Afars. 
Equally the neighbouring Oromos seek to clear this area for farming. Therefore, conflicts over control and 
use of this area have been frequent. For instance in a conflict that erupted in 2000, three Afars and two 
Oromos were killed, and another two Afars were severely wounded. 
  
2. Ali-Dora-Bururu. This locality is found in Waydolalina Ye-alu Kebele Administration (KA). It is 
situated along the tributary of Gewis River and is covered with important trees and bushes which provide 
forage for livestock during the dry season. Important tree species whose leaves are excellent feed include 
Eibto (acacia tortilis), Kusra (Zizpphus spinna christi), Humura (Tamarindus indica) and Subula (Ficus 
syscomorus).  Herders shear tree leaves and feed camels and cattle during feed stress. The local Afars 
claim that they are the traditional users of Ali-Dora-Bururu since the reign of Emperor Menelik II. 
Currently they desire to maintain the existing trees and bushes in this locality for the dry season feed. 
Thus they strongly oppose the neighbouring Oromos who seek this land for crop cultivation. 
 
3. Kersa-Afa. This area is found in the Waydolalina Ye-alu KA and is located in the confluence of the two 
Kersa Rivers. Previously the neighbouring Oromos grew food crops at Kersa-Afa. Nowadays they are 
forced to give up their farm plots due to conflict with the local Afars who also lay claim to this land. 
 
4. Ta’a river bank. This area is located along Ta’a River and is found in the Telalakena Abaro KA. The 
Oromos sometimes used this locality for crop cultivation. In recent year it is abandoned due to a conflict 
that occurred in 2001 where two people from each group were killed. During the operation of Oromo 
Liberation Front (OLF) in the neighbouring Oromo community (i.e. 1991-1994), the local Oromos 
claimed that their territory historically reached to Sagatole (i.e. a locality found in the study community). 
This claim is strongly resisted by the local Afars.  
 
5. Aware river bank. This area is suitable for crop cultivation either through irrigation or rainfall. Thus the 
neighbouring Oromos strongly covet to expand agriculture into the locality called Umuna or Abomsa. It is 
a place where a clash between the local Afars and Oromos first occurred in 1998. The informants alleged 
that the OLF fighters were available in this area and they trained and armed some Oromo youngsters. At 
that time the neighbouring Oromos constructed a house in this contested area and they claimed that the 
house was constructed for a mosque.  But according to the informants, the local Afars later found out that 
the house was used by OLF sympathisers. When the Afars learned this, they destroyed the house during 
night time considering that the house has been put to grab the land and to expand agriculture into their 
territory. As a result a conflict broke out and an Afar was killed in that incidence. This locality still 
remains an area of contention between the local Afars and the neighbouring Oromo crop cultivators.  
 
Source: Focus Group Interview, April 2005 
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i. Ambiguity of boundaries between ethnic regions and districts: The government is still 
reluctant to officially delimit boundaries between districts. The local Afar and the 
neighbouring Oromos claim territories along the borders. Each of them put their territorial 
boundary into another’s territory. In this case, the committees at all levels face difficulty to 
monitor and control conflict instigators.  
 
ii. Group and/or tribal favourism and patronage: The informants from both sides accused 
each other of failing to notify transgressors and to respect joint-decisions passed during 
sessions of conflict resolution, and of hiding or siding with culprits. In this case the 
committees face difficulty to identify instigators of conflict. 
 
iii. Poor governance at the local level: The local government institutions such as Woreda and 
Kebele Administrations, police and judiciary are responsible for local good governance. 
However, there are inadequate responses by local officials to deter tensions and reconcile 
differences between communities. The local people, both Oromos and Afar accused of local 
officials for their inability to contain conflicts and to render legal solutions. Moreover, the 
informants from Oromos community accused the Afar local authorities of siding totally with 
their clan members, and even some of them were involved in instigating territorial claims. 
 
iv. Scarcity of resources and drought consequences: The livelihood systems of both herders 
and peasants are based largely on the environmental natural resources. Nowadays both groups 
are facing environmental scarcities, frequent droughts and livelihood insecurity. While 
herders covet to move their herds into the foothills and escarpments, the highland peasants 
seek to expand agricultural fields into these same areas. Consequently, competition over the 
scarce resources has been intensified. Moreover, herds are moved into the highland areas 
during severe droughts. The neighbouring crop cultivators saw this movement as a high 
pressure on their environment, as its frequency has increased in recent decades owing to the 
recurrent drought consequences146. Therefore, drought-induced herd migration contributed to 
the exacerbation of conflicts between the local Afar and the sedentary crop cultivators.   
 
As stated above herder-peasant traditional skirmishes often triggered by resource 
competitions have been exacerbated by the processes of regionalization which brought new 
administrative boundaries defined along the ethnic lines147. Consequently, resources hitherto 
shared between ethnic groups via various reciprocal arrangements have been the areas of 
contention in attempts by each party to gain control on resources at buffer zones. As a result, 
traditional conflicts over the use and access of resources have been transformed into control 
and ownership of resources and then into political confrontation between the local Afar and 
the neighbouring ethnic groups. In fact, in most cases symbiotic relationships have evolved 
between the local Afar and the highlanders, marked by trade and exchanges, cemented by 
intermarriage and stock-alliances. However, once conflict breaks out, ethnicity or clan 
                                                 
146 In 2004 an estimated of 80,000 heads of cattle were moved into the neighbouring communities (Cheffa) from 
the Afar districts (Telalak, Dewe and Semu-robi, etc). 
147 While addressing group rights, Ethnic federalism in Ethiopia has overemphasized differences and fuelled 
inter-ethnic conflicts in different parts of the country in attempt to redraw artificial boundaries between two or 
more ethnic groups whose action spaces overlap formerly by consent involving reciprocal arrangements with 
regard to usufruct rights over the resources at the territorial frontiers.  
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membership can become a significant factor around which forces can be mobilized. This has 
currently created frustration, tension and suspicion between Afar and their immediate 
highland neighbours. Therefore, such changing context of resource claims and counter claims 
combined with the current political processes have impacts on long-standing relations and 
cooperation between herders and highland peasants. 
 
6.3.6 Local People’s Perception of Risks and Livelihood Trends  
 
i. Perceived risks: In the preceding sections I have attempted to delineate the local livelihood 
resources and their trends; livelihood activities and strategies; and ecological and social 
changes in the study community. This section presents the perception of local people on risk 
factors, and how the local people perceive the trend of their wellbeing or livelihood within the 
past three to four decades. 
 
In Afar pastoral system or elsewhere the constraints to livestock production can be broadly 
categorized into, (i) “normal constraints” - like seasonal, annual, spatial variations of rainfall 
and thus variability in quantity and quality of the available forages; (ii) “disasters” (for 
instance rainfall variability can turn into drought; endemic diseases into epidemics; and stock 
theft/traditional animal raiding into violent conflict) where individual stock owners or all 
pastoral groups face catastrophic stock losses; (iii) “irreversible changes” - such as population 
pressure and constant loss of pastoral lands or key pastoral resources to non-pastoral activities 
(Cossins, 1983:4).  
 
In recent decades subsistence livestock production has been severely challenged by 
population increase, extreme climatic events, animal diseases, land use changes and loss of 
land to non-pastoral uses (cash economy and conservation area). The livelihood analysis 
made in section 6.2 above has also revealed that livestock production forms the prime activity 
of the pastoral households in the study community. However, it is less able to provide 
livelihood security for herders. A number of informants blamed for this challenge the 
deterioration of pasture land resulting in grazing shortage, decline of yield, and mortality of 
livestock during severe feed stress.  
 
During my fieldwork I attempted to explore what the local people are considering as main 
constraints to their livestock production. A number of informants have identified a mix of 
constraints stated above. These include recurrent drought, erratic rainfall, depletion of pasture 
land, loss of dry season/drought grazing areas and incursion of the Issa. In section 6.3 earlier, 
some of these constraints and the trends of forage resources (quantity and availability) have 
been already discussed. Therefore, in the following section, I will discuss risk factors 
perceived by sample survey households and the self-assessed trends in the well-being of 
pastoral households. 
 
The local people’s perceptions of risks are based on their local and indigenous understanding 
of reality in their given geographical settings. Therefore, the local people’s understanding and 
perceptions need to be read in association with their given environmental niches as well as 
with the cultural settings in which they live. During the field study sample households were 
asked to identify the risk factors for their livelihood. Their responses are presented in Table 
6.10 below.  
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Table 6.10 Risks Perceived by Sample Households (Multiple Responses are Possible)148 
Perceived Risks Responses  (n=60)  Percentage 
Recurrent drought  60 100% 
Loss of dry season/drought  grazing areas 58 97% 
Livestock disease  56 93.3 
Animal raiding by Issa 17 28.3 
Water shortage  3 5% 
Source: Sample Household Survey, December, 2005.  
 
As shown in Table 6.10, the most common risk factors reported by the sixty sample 
households are related to drought. The local people perceived that the frequency and severity 
of droughts have increased in the past two decades. Based on their experience with previous 
drought episodes and change in rainfall pattern in their locality, most of my informants 
perceived that the period of drought occurrence has shortened in recent years, and both the 
main and minor rains have become unreliable. As can be seen in Table 6.11 drought cycle has 
shortened since 1990s. Moreover it can be noted that each drought resulted in loss of 
livestock and in food crisis or catastrophic famine. And the local people relied on external 
food aid to survive the crisis periods. In relation to this an informant said, “If Allah does not 
give us rain or the government stops food distribution, we would die from hunger.”     
                                                 
148 In the household questionnaire there were single and multiple response questions where sampled households 
have single and multiple responses accordingly. In case of latter, the percentage of responses  will be greater 
than 100%. 
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Table 6.11 Major Drought Episodes and their consequences in the Study Community 
Drought 
year   
Reported causes  Consequences  Internal responses to food crisis/famine  External responses to food 
crisis/famine   
1957-1958 Failure of Karma 
rain  
Food crisis/hunger  
Loss of livestock 
Moving livestock to Awash 
Collecting wild foods 
Mobilizing informal mutual support 
No external response 
1973-1974 Failure of Karma 
and Sugum rains  
Famine/hunger 
Loss of human life 
Loss of livestock. 
Displacement of the local 
people 
Moving livestock to highland areas (Cheffa), 
Ba’adu, Megenta, Gura-alie, Asayita 
Mobilizing informal mutual support 
Collecting wild foods/fruits 
No external response from the 
central government. 
Sultan Ali Mirah distributed maize 
to those herders who migrated to 
Asayita. 
1980-1981 Failure of Karma 
rain 
Food shortage  
Loss of livestock 
Moving livestock to highland areas (Cheffa), 
Ba’adu, Megenta, Gura-alie, Asayita 
Mobilizing informal mutual support 
No external response 
 
1984-85 Failure of Karma 
and Sugum rains  
Famine 
Loss of human life 
Displacement of the local 
people 
Lack of feed and water. 
Loss of livestock 
Moving livestock to Cheffa, Bati, Mile, 
Megenta 
Mobilizing informal mutual support 
Collecting wild foods/fruits 
Emergency food aid by the 
Government and NGOs 
Irrigation development by 
Livestock and Meat Board (MLB)  
1992-1993 Failure of Karma 
and Sugum rains 
Severe food crisis 
Displacement of the local 
people 
Feed stress 
Loss of livestock 
Moving livestock to other places (Cheffa, 
Bati, Mile) 
Mobilizing informal mutual support  
Relief food distribution by the 
Government   
1996-1997 Failure of Karma 
rain and poor 
Sugum rain 
Severe food crisis 
Feed stress 
Loss of livestock 
Moving livestock to Ewa, Wama (zone 1) and 
Cheffa 
Mobilizing informal mutual support   
Relief food distribution by the Red 
Cross Society 
1999-2000 Failure of Karma 
and Sugum rains 
Severe food crisis 
Feed stress 
Loss of livestock 
Moving livestock to Ewa and Cheffa 
Mobilizing informal mutual support    
 
Relief food distribution by the 
Government  
2003-2004 Failure of Karma 
rain  
Severe food crisis 
Feed stress 
Loss of Livestock 
Moving livestock to Ewa and Cheffa 
Mobilizing informal mutual support  
Relief food distribution by the 
Government 
Source: Group Interview, December 2005. 
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A number of informants felt that drought is likely to come and its consequences on their 
livestock production would be severe. This is because they are less able to cope with drought 
consequences due to feed stress, loss of drought retreat zones, restriction of mobility, and 
insecurity or conflict in previous migration areas. Therefore, livestock producers’ 
vulnerability to drought is increasing, and thus its consequences are worsening as herders’ are 
less able to cope with the next drought. In general the local people perceived drought as 
number one risk followed by loss of dry season/drought escaping grazing areas due to either 
depletion of key resources thereof or loss of land to non-pastoral uses. In this connection, a 
number of informants mentioned such areas as Megenta and Ba’adu that have become 
unavailable to them due to land use changes, depletion of resources and insecurity/conflict.        
 
As it can be seen in Table 6.12, livestock disease is the third most important risk in the study 
community. During my field study I attempted to record the types of animal diseases through 
interviewing key informants.  These are described in Table 6.12 below. 
 
Table 6.12 Common Diseases Affecting Livestock in the Study area149  
Local name  Scientific name  Species affected  
Agala Mange Camel, sheep, goat, cattle,  
Duleli Bottle jaw Sheep 
Geramole  * Camel  
Gosso * Camel 
Gubulo/Sangite CBPP150 and pasteurellosis Cattle 
Habib/Abib FMD151 Cattle 
Haraite/Harayti Blackleg Cattle  
Inkata Lice  Sheep, goat, cattle 
Kiribi Faciolasis Cattle, sheep 
Sole Traypanosomiasis  Cattle  
Source: Key informant interview, December 2005.   
* Scientific name not identified.  
 
A number of informants reported that most of these debilitating and endemic diseases are 
widespread mainly due to livestock movements. The transmission of animal diseases is also 
exacerbated by drought-induced long distance migration, when herders are compelled to 
move their stock into remote areas in search of pasture and water. The local Afar and 
highlanders move their herds into the Cheffa valley during severe drought periods. Every 
drought period, up to 80,000 animals may concentrate in the swampy areas with high risk of 
diseases. Moving livestock to Cheffa constitutes a high risk of disease transmission, as 
various herds from different areas come closer due to shrinkage of grazing lands. This 
increases the chance of introducing alien diseases or the spread of existing endemic diseases. 
Moreover, there is no regular disease diagnosis and monitoring to control animal diseases in 
the study community. Informants stated that it is only when a disease becomes epidemic that 
                                                 
149 Local names of diseases and types of animals affected are identified by local people. Scientific names are 
identified from secondary sources.  
150 Contagious Bovine  Pleuro Pneumonia 
151 Foot and Mouth Disease 
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the government departments try to reach some pastoral camps. Therefore, the local people 
perceived the spread of animal diseases or outbreak of epidemic diseases as risks to their 
subsistence livestock production. 
 
As shown in Table 6.10 water shortage is reported by few respondents (5%). This is because 
of the presence of two small perennial rivers (Telalak and Wata) that cross the district from 
the west to the east, and the Awash River. The key informants also indicated that water 
shortage is mild in terms of quantity. Rather their concern is about the quality of water 
(subjectively judged) and accessibility, as there is a lack of safe drinking water for human 
consumption and distance factor in some communities for watering livestock. This later point 
is already discussed in section 6.3.2 earlier.  
 
In general the household survey results have shown that the major risks perceived by the 
sample households are drought risk, loss of key resource areas and livestock diseases. 
Likewise key informants identified additional risks such as scarcity of pasture, conflict with 
Issa and livestock raiding, increase in price of grain and fall of livestock price during drought.  
 
ii. Livelihood Trends/well-being: In the household survey respondents were asked to assess 
their relative well-being at the time of the survey and in the past (i.e. last year, during the 
present government and the previous Derg regime). As it can be seen in figure 6.3 below, the 
respondents’ well-being has deteriorated within the past three decades. Currently most of the 
households are struggling to meet household needs through depleting (selling) their assets and 
receiving support from government during severe crisis time. This suggests the increasing 
vulnerability of households to chronic food insecurity. As depicted in figure 6.3 below for 
earlier years, these same households were able to meet their needs from own livestock 
production.  
 
  Figure 6.3 Self-assessed trends in the well-being of households in the past three to four 
decades  
Self-assessed Households' Well-being Trend  Over the Past Three Decades
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Given the local livestock production system is under stress for the reasons mentioned earlier, 
the sample households were asked to provide their views on the viability of pastoralism in the 
future. The majority of the respondents (91.7%) reported that pastoralism would be less viable 
and they attributed this to stresses such as drought, increased shortage of forage and livestock 
disease. On the other hand 5% of the sample households said pastoralism will always be 
there. Only two respondents reported difficulty to predicate about the future of pastoralism.  
Similarly the sample households were also asked to identify which livelihoods would be 
viable for their respective households in the future. 68.3% (n=41) of the respondents reported 
“combining animal production with crop cultivation” as viable activity, and 21.7% (n=13) 
said “combining livestock rearing with trading in animals and goods”. Whereas 6.7% (n=4) 
said only crop cultivation, 3.3% (n=2) said livestock rearing only.  
 
In general some four decades ago, the local livestock production system was more resilient 
and could provide livelihood security for herders. Currently, however, this subsistence 
livestock production is less able to provide livelihood security due to multiple constraints 
mentioned earlier. The local actors (pastoral groups) have realized that their livelihood system 
is under stress and is less able to cope with severe food crisis. Therefore, the logical questions 
that should be raised include, (i) How do the local people forecast and communicate risks 
within the community and to external actors? (ii) How do they respond to livelihood stresses?  
(iii) What are the previous and present external interventions to mitigate problems of 
pastoralists? Do the external interventions consider what the local people perceive as 
problems? These and other issues are critical to explore the relation between the local actors 
and external actors, and to understand the current adaptive responses.   
 
As discussed earlier in Chapter 3, the present formal EWS monitors food and food-related 
factors and market behaviour mainly for emergency responses during food crisis. It focuses 
on monitoring food situations rather than livelihood systems and local responses (traditional 
early warning systems, adaptive and coping strategies). Incorporation of local responses into 
formal EWS helps redress the food-biased approach in designing external responses.  
 
In the study community there have been, from time to time, attempts made by external actors 
to mitigate the problems of pastoral households. These external interventions include 
livestock sector development projects, irrigation development, provision of infrastructures 
and service, and famine disaster responses. The subsequent sections discuss the views of local 
people on external interventions and responses; traditional early warning systems; and 
adaptive/coping strategies pursued by the local people.   
 
6.4 Views of Local People towards External Actors and Interventions  
 
6.4.1 Local People’s Relations with External Actors (State and their Neighbours): Past 
and Present 
 
The previous regimes (i.e. the Emperor and the Derg) introduced modern administrative 
structures and bureaucracies in order to change the traditional authorities and to control social 
organizations. The Imperial Government promoted some clan chiefs to the position of 
Balabat to incorporate traditional authority into the government structure. At the time the 
Balabats were used as intermediaries between the local people and the State. They acted 
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between the State and local community particularly in representing their clan to outsiders, 
maintaining peace and order and collecting taxes. In doing so the Imperial Government 
favoured certain chiefs (clan and lineage heads) who were involved in tax collection and 
controlling local security. In relation to this Gamaledin (1993:53) noted that “the Ethiopian 
Government had little knowledge of the structure of authority among the Afar, and at times 
this meant the appointment of minor Makaban (chiefs) to the position of Balabat, while 
senior Makaban were made Chika-shum, a lowly rank normally given in the highland 
Ethiopia to a village head”. 
 
The introduction of Balabats affected the traditional political authority. The local Balabats 
used the government office to promote their personal and their lineages’ status. Previous 
studies confirmed this view of the local people. In relation to this Cossins (cited in 
Gamaledin, 1993:53) recorded that “the introduction of Balabats caused political havoc, 
because some Afar Kidho Abba (lineage heads), with aspirations to power, began to use the 
government to promote their personal and their lineages’ rise in status, by petitioning either to 
the Sultan of Aussa or district and provincial government for official positions” 
 
A number of informants reported that the Imperial Government did not bring development 
work into their locality. Development activities undertaken by the Regime were concentrated 
in the settled highland areas to which the local community was annexed only for the purpose 
of administration. It is true that many local communities were annexed to highland areas 
mainly for administrative control from the highland through the introduction of the Balabat 
system into traditional political structure. Therefore, the local people stated that their 
community was marginalized by the Imperial Regime in terms of development, 
infrastructures and social services. Manifestation of marginalization included lack of 
participation in making decisions on matters affecting the local people’s interests; exclusion 
from national political affairs and lack of representation in the center; loss of economic 
benefits and pastoralists’ retreats to peripheries as a result of agricultural expansion, 
promotion of commercial farms, and shrinkage of grazing lands. 
 
In addition, the local people’s relation with neighbouring highlanders was characterized by an 
increase of conflicts during the Emperor’s time. The informants reported that conflicts among 
clans and with neighbouring sedentary cultivators were rampant. In this connection one of my 
informants stated as follows: 
 
Livestock feed was abundant during the Emperor’s time. But various conflicts with 
raiders (Oromos and Waggirats) were the main threats at the time. Particularly the 
Waggirats repeatedly invaded our area, killed persons, and raided large number of 
livestock. After the Emperor’s time, there was not invasion from neighbours except 
animal theft, boundary disputes and sporadic skirmishes at the border areas. But the 
current relation with our neighbours still needs proper handling. “If we shake river 
water, it becomes dirty, and thus we should avoid this to get it clean” (Individual 
Interview, December, 2004). 
 
A number of informants reported that conflicts between neighbouring sedentary communities, 
especially with Oromo crop cultivators and agro-pastoralists, and the Waggirats were violent 
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during the Emperor Haile Silassie time152. As a result, killings and livestock raiding were 
rampant at the time. Informants attributed this to some cultural factors such as cultural 
conception of masculinity, traditional animal raiding, and killing for trophy.153 Historically 
and as well as recently, the neighbouring ethnic groups have raided various settlements in the 
study community. During my field study I attempted to record some of those incidents by 
asking key informants. These are given in Table 6.13 below.  
 
Table 6.13 Series of Incursions/raids by Oromos, Waggirats and Amharas      
No. Locations/settleme
nts  attacked 
Raiders   Afar 
killed 
Livestock   
raiding?  
Period of incursion 
(approximate year) 
1 Arumeda/Sebilele Amhara from 
Shewa 
40 no Emperor Menelik II time154  
2 Nemelifen Amhara from 
Shewa 
25 yes  “ 
3 Odele Waggirat from 
Tigray 
10 yes Emperor Haile Silassie time 
(about in 1934/35) 
4 Aware war Waggirat 60 yes Emperor Haile Silassie time 
(about in 1942 ) 
5 Aware Waggirat 20 yes Emperor Haile Silassie time 
(about in 1943) 
6 Kelkelti-Aware Oromo 14 no Emperor Haile Silassie time 
7 Rokaa-Aware Oromo 4 no “ 
8 Endeldina-rokaa Oromo 1 yes “ 
9 Ay-uli and Gawto Oromo 4 yes Emperor Haile Silassie time 
(Keda Deben)155  
10 Amno-dora Oromo 4 no  “ 
11 At different 
localities at the 
border 
Bandits from 
Oromo area 
- yes Various times during 
Imperial  Period  (1930-
1974) 
12 Gewis Oromo 5 no  1992 
13 Endeldi-Aware Oromo 1 yes 1997 
14  Abaro Oromo 2 no 2002 
Source: key informants (elders, clan leaders, Woreda officials), December, 2006. 
 
As shown in Table 6.13 these series of raids by neighbouring groups indicated that 
historically the local Afar relation with their immediate neighbours was very hostile. Animal 
raiding, killing and looting were rampant some three decades ago. Consequently, the study 
community has suffered a lot from insecurity, loss of livestock and human life. 
 
During the Derg regime, administrative reforms were made following the 1975 land reform. 
Like in the highlands of Ethiopia, the Balabats system in the local community was considered 
as corrupt, backward and exploitative by the Derg Government. In some agro-pastoral and 
                                                 
152 Though most of the informants are reluctant to share information whether their community was involved in 
counter-raiding and revenge, I was able to understand that revenge was also a driving force of the raiding chain, 
once an incidence occurred. 
153 Killing for trophy is not practiced nowadays.  
154 Menelik II, Emperor of Ethiopia from 1889-1913.  
155 Famine that occurred in 1973-74 is locally named Keda Deben which is literally meant “great famine”.   
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semi-settled areas pastoralists’ associations were introduced to replace Balabats and to 
abolish their privileges. However, though the Balabat’s office was abolished, the 
establishment of pastoralists’ associations did not take place in the study community under 
consideration. Instead hand-picked individuals named as clan representatives (Yegosa-Teteri) 
were assigned to act between the Derg Government and the local community. How this was 
undertaken in Afar communities is already discussed in Chapter 4, and it applies to the study 
community too.  
 
The relation between Afar and the state deteriorated after the abolishment of the Aussa 
Sultanate in 1974. A number of informants held the view that the Derg Government was even 
more hostile to the Afar than the Imperial Government. My informants stated that the Derg 
army harassed the local people and killed many Afar particularly in Asayita (Zone one) and in 
Zone three, while they were moving in search of grazing land and water. Some informants 
claimed that the Derg army killed more people than the traditional rivals the Issa did. At the 
time the army labeled the young Afars carrying rifles as sympathizers to the rebel groups of 
ALF and TPLF156. The Afar often carry rifles. But it is not to fight the government army, but 
to protect their stock from wild animals and raiders.  
 
These days some informants claim that the incumbent Government is better than the previous 
two regimes in some instances. It established some schools and health station and constructed 
road access in the district. In times of food crises it also distributed relief food in the district. 
Some informants felt that the current Government is less hostile in its pursuit when inter and 
intra-clan conflicts break out. It tries to handle conflicts through approaching conflicting clans 
and their leaders, and to discuss and solve their own problems at the community level.  
 
Traditional dispute resolution institutions and decisions with regard to disputes are backed by 
the state authorities. Nowadays, the local Afar who possess rifles have been formally 
registered. Thus they have no fear of confiscation of rifles, except in some towns where rifles 
are prohibited157. Informants from government institutions stated that the Woreda 
administration tries to mediate conflicting groups through involving their clan leaders. 
However, though the local people have a rather positive attitude towards the current 
Government, they state that it has done little with regard to constraints of their livelihood 
system and involvement of traditional authorities in development activities and decision 
making processes. The issue of local governance from the perspective of the local people will 
be further discussed in section 6.4.3.1 below. 
 
Generally speaking, the Derg regime and incumbent Government have provided few support 
services to the local community, including livestock development support services, 
infrastructure and relief food distribution during severe food crisis. The following section 
presents the local people’s experience with the previous and current development 
interventions undertaken in the study community. 
 
 
                                                 
156 Afar Liberation Front (ALF) and Tigray People Liberation Front (TPLF). 
157 Individuals are not allowed to carry a rifle in some towns (e.g. Werer, Bati) except if they are elected leaders 
or if they have a permission paper from their respective Woreda administrations.  
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6.4.2 Local People’s View on External Interventions and Local Governance 
 
6.4.2.1 Development Interventions and Responses to Livelihood Shocks/Famine 
 
As indicated above the local people stated that they have always been neglected by the 
successive Ethiopian governments. First and foremost their pastoral territory was partitioned 
into two provinces (Shewa and Wello), and was administered by non-Afar people from 
distant urban centres located in the highland. Secondly their locality has been long denied of 
infrastructures and social services (road, transport, markets, and administrative centres, health 
and education facilities). Until only ten years ago such facilities were nearly absent in the 
district and the local people had to travel to the settled highland areas and distant urban 
centres (Bati and Kombolcha) to get such services and facilities.  
 
Generally speaking external support and development interventions in the study community 
have been very limited. Efforts to strengthen local capacity and to respond to local economic 
shocks have remained marginal in the past several decades. As stated earlier, external 
responses to the previous famine crises (e.g. 1957-1958, 1973-1974 and 1984-85 famines) 
were either absent or late. Moreover external development initiatives like the livestock 
support services, infrastructure and irrigation development introduced by the Third Livestock 
Development Project (TLDP) did not sustain longer.  
 
The TLDP was operational in the rangelands of the country. It was initiated in 1975 with the 
first large-scale pastoral livestock development programme through three development units. 
One of the units was the North-East Rangelands Development Unit (NERDU) which included 
the current Telalak district (for TLDP area in the Afar region see map 9). NERDU’s 
objectives were (i) restoring traditional grazing system, (ii) intensifying the use of land and 
water resources and, (iii) increasing the value of livestock marketed. Major activities 
implemented in the Unit were range management; veterinary services; access road 
construction; supplies and services; trials and studies; training and information. Of these 
activities, it was reported that NERDU achieved some improvements in range development 
(i.e. demarcating seasonal grazing reserves and designing  irrigation for forage development), 
veterinary services, access roads, etc. (Bonger, 2002:3). The local people I interviewed also 
recognized some of these improvements, especially veterinary services and road access at the 
time. However, the services did not continue any more. Once the project terminated due to 
security reasons, the services were interrupted in the Aghini community. 
 
6.4.2.2 Local People’s Views on Livestock Development Programme and Irrigation 
Development  
 
The first large-scale livestock development intervention in the study community was that of 
North-East Rangelands Development Unit (NERDU) which was one of the project units of 
Third Livestock Development Project (TLDP)158. It aimed at providing technical support to 
livestock production, and provision of infrastructures and introducing irrigated crop-
                                                 
158 Most of the local people call this project by the name “Siga Board” which means Livestock and Meat Board 
(LMB) established in 1964 to assist the livestock sector development. After this institution a series of livestock 
development projects like SLDP, TLDP, NERDU, and SORDU were initiated.   
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cultivation in the Aghini pastoral community. Hussein, a 60-year-old informant recounted 
how the TLDP/NERDU started operating in the Aghini pastoral community:  
 
Keda Deben (great famine) occurred in 1973-74 in the community. It occurred due 
to the failure of the main rain (Karma). Some people migrated to Asayita. During 
the next Karma there was a shower of rain. Then Hida and Hebele trees provided 
fruits and the local people relied on these wild foods. Thus, we called this period 
Hida-Karma, as Hida provided food fruit and we relied very much on wild foods to 
survive the crisis. At that time government officials came and observed the local 
people eating wild fruits. Thus food-for-work (FFW) was introduced in our locality 
by the TLDP. Following this famine the TLDP/NERDU also developed irrigated 
farms along the Telalak river bank for crop cultivation. We participated in 
construction of the irrigation scheme through FFW, and received grain in exchange 
for our labour. The produce from the irrigated farm was also distributed to the local 
people. Thenceforth some individuals and households began to adopt irrigated crop 
cultivation along the banks of Telalak and Wata Rivers (Individual Interview, April, 
2006).  
 
Most of my informants recalled the TLDP/NERDU with a mix of feelings regarding its 
benefits for the local people. A number of informants saw the TLDP/NERDU as beneficial to 
the local community in terms of animal health, disease control, road access and irrigation 
development. However, these services and infrastructures did not sustain in the community. 
In relation to this a 70-year-old informant, Abdela recounted as follows:  
 
I remembered that the TLDP operated in many clan territories (communities) that 
are now located in zones 1, 4 and 5 of the current Afar Region. One of these clan 
territories was ours (i.e. Aghini community). The TLDP’s camp sites were attacked 
during the civil war between the Derg regime, and TPLF and ALF. At that time 
many Afar were also injured. As the war intensified into the south and the 
Government Bank at Bati town was looted by insurgents, the project staff stationed 
in our locality began to have fears about their security. As a result, they closed their 
camp sites and left our area. Before they left, the TLDP staff gathered our clan 
leaders and handed over infrastructures (veterinary clinics, cooperative shops) and 
the farm oxen to the community. However, after the withdrawal of the TLDP’s staff, 
the services and infrastructures stopped functioning in our community due to lack of 
inputs and supplies (medicines, budget and transport) and absence of local level 
governmental organization (Individual Interview, April, 2006). 
 
On the other hand very few informants perceived the programme as one that contributed to 
deforestation along the Telalak River banks and to the erosion of traditional rules governing 
access to and use of forests. In relation to this, participants of a focus group interview stated 
the situation in the following manner:  
 
Since the TLDP had started clearing trees and bushes along the Telalak River banks 
for irrigated cultivation, the local people continued clearing land for growing food 
crop. Then individuals began to transgress traditional rules aiming at preserving 
forests found along the river banks. Those who engaged themselves in irrigated 
crop-cultivation had begun to violate traditional rules mainly during the Derg regime 
(i.e. in the 1980s). After the 1984-85 famine some households have continued with 
clearing more forests for crop cultivation (Focus Group Interview, December, 
2006).  
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With regard to the involvement of local people in the TLDP and coordination of activities, 
Abdela and other informants claimed that the TLDP was well-coordinated and it provided 
relevant services and supports to the local people. Abdela added:   
 
The TLDP was able to mobilize the local people through clan leaders to implement 
its activities. Clan leaders were involved in mobilizing clan members to participate 
in the project works. The project staff/experts showed a high commitment and 
worked hard with the local people. The TLDP also worked according to our 
preference of activities. Its activities included provision of livestock vaccination, 
establishment of infrastructures (e.g. dips at Gewis and Hujuba localities) and 
irrigation development. Important development works were undertaken at the time 
as compared to the current ones. Currently there is more rhetoric about Limat Sira 
(development work) from the government and others. But nothing is observed on the 
ground. We do not know about other regions. Currently there is a lack of 
coordination of activities and people’s participation in our community. Obviously 
our local leaders (district authorities) know that we have many problems. But they 
don’t involve us while planning and implementing activities (water points, health 
post, schools, ponds, and the current construction of an irrigation dam at Telalak 
River) (Individual Interview, April, 2006). 
  
As the above case shows, the local people had the impression that there was a good 
coordination and communication among the TLDP staff, clan leaders and local people. The 
local people held this impression because central places and infrastructures with easy access 
to pastoral villagers were established for vaccination of livestock and provision of other 
veterinary services. As stated above, though the programme activities were better coordinated 
and contributed to animal health, disease control and the introduction of irrigation, the service 
did not sustain any longer in the local community. As war and conflict between the Derg 
government and the then rebel groups (ALF and TPLF)159 intensified during the mid 1980s, 
TLDP terminated its activities in the locality. The infrastructures and services, which were put 
in place, stopped functioning due to lack of budgets, technical know-how and local 
organizational set-up to take over the activities.  
 
In general terms the local people’s perception of the TLDP happened to be positive, as it 
provided them with livestock health services and infrastructures, though they were 
unsustainable due to both external and internal factors already mentioned earlier. Even though 
a number of informants did not stress it, the TLDP had also some negative consequences on 
the local pastoral resources. The TLDP brought an increase of livestock population, 
overgrazing and deforestation along the river banks. Erosion of traditional rules governing the 
use of natural resources had also ensued after individuals/households began to clear forests 
and make enclosures along the sides of rivers for growing food crop.  
 
The project also demarcated tribal grazing areas or reserves, and developed watering points. 
This led to the concentration of herds in certain localities. Moreover, the project encouraged 
livestock accumulation without considering its impacts on the available pastoral resources. 
For instance a study undertaken at the time recorded that the density of the cattle population 
increased by 6% from May 1973 to 1978 and small stock increased by 10% during the same 
period, because of the livestock disease control programme of the TLDP/NERDU (Ayele, 
                                                 
159 Afar Liberation Front (ALF) and Tigray People Liberation Front (TPLF).  
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1986:90). This led to an increased herd size in the area as it was not accompanied by efficient 
animal off-take due to the lack of a stock route system and an accessible market. All these 
factors led to the degradation of natural resources and overgrazing. Therefore, the current 
ecological crisis (decline of forage resources) that herders have been facing has its root in this 
externally imposed development intervention. In fact a number of informants tended to 
attribute the current ecological crisis mainly to impacts of recurring drought and bush 
encroachment. And yet the overall observation of the qualitative information suggested that 
degradation of forage resources can be attributed to the interplay of both internal and external 
factors including population increase (both livestock and human), disruption of traditional 
resource management systems, loss of distant grazing areas to non-pastoral uses, agricultural 
encroachments, consequences of recurrent drought, inappropriate external interventions, etc.   
 
6.4.2.3 Local People’s Views on the Previous Disaster Responses  
 
The other intervention in the study community is relief food assistance in times of famine 
crises. A number of informants claimed that external emergency relief assistance was nearly 
absent during the Imperial Government. They attributed this to inaccessibility of their locality 
to government agencies and NGOs; failure of local officials residing in highland towns to 
assess local economic shocks; and to overall neglect of their community by the previous 
governments. For instance during the 1973-1974 famine, the local people relied on wild foods 
and on their mutual-aid support systems (i.e. sharing the available food among relatives, 
kinship groups). In relation to external support, an elder informant, Mohammed, narrated as 
follows:  
 
During the 1973-74 famine (which is locally called Keda Deben) clan leaders were 
called to the Bati town and asked by the local governors about the situation of 
famine crisis. Clan leader Muhaita from Telalak, and Seko from Burka (Kassa-Gita) 
were asked to explain about the magnitude of the famine crisis and to declare 
according to the principles of the Qu’ran that all their community members had 
nothing to eat so as to get assistance from the government. The clan leader from 
Telalak refused to declare that everybody had lost livestock, while the clan leader 
from Burka community declared and received some assistance. Mohammed said, 
“Muhaita’s argument was that he couldn’t declare that every member had nothing, 
because some might have and others might not. Therefore, the clan leader from 
Telalak refused to make an appeal according to the principles of the Qu’ran”. He 
rather requested the governors to extend the assistance to those who were most 
affected. But the governors disagreed with his suggestion, and assistance wasn’t 
given to the victims of the 1973-74 famine in the Telalak area. Therefore, the local 
people were left to cope with the famine with their own mechanisms (Individual 
Interview, December, 2004). 
 
A decade later another severe famine occurred in 1984-85. Among the local community this 
famine is also known by the name Keda Deben which literally means “great famine”. A 
number of informants recalled the mass displacement of local people to distant relief camps 
and mass deaths both in relief centres and on the way to relief camps and urban centres. At 
that time the Derg Government did not respond timely to the crisis. Thus local people had to 
migrate to distant relief distribution centres (shelters) established at Bati, Mile and Elidar 
towns which are located along the main road that connects Afar land with highland areas. 
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Many informants claimed that the human death toll on the way to and in the relief camps was 
very high.  
 
Let us have a story in the words of an informant, Haiso, who migrated to a relief camp, and 
lost his sisters, finally went to Djibouti during 1984-85 famine and retuned to his home 
village in 1993. At that time Haiso was a 17-year-old boy attending Qu’ran School in Oromo 
community at the initial phase of the 1984-85 famine. He narrated his experience in the 
following manner: 
 
….when I came back from Qu’ran school located in Gerfa, nearly all the cattle had 
perished in my home village. Some emaciated goats and camels were staggering in 
the village. The local people were dispersing to different directions in search of 
food. I and my mother took one camel to the market and sold it for 90 Birr. Such 
size of camel could be sold for 3,000 Birr nowadays. We bought some grain with 
that money and returned home. My father planted maize along the river bank and the 
maize crop was in green. As time went on, we ran out of food and had to move as 
our neighbours did. In the meantime we heard that the Afar and Oromos from 
various drought-stricken localities migrated to Bati town, and grain assistance was 
distributed by the government. Having left my father to take care of emaciated goats 
and camels, to wait and harvest the maize, my mother and my sisters went to Bati 
town. It took us two days to reach Bati town. As soon as we arrived we met one 
person whom we knew. He was a chief of the Afar. He told us that the Oromos 
displaced from their villages were taken to resettlement sites in southern Ethiopia, 
while the Afar were moved to Mile and Asayita. He advised us (i.e. Haiso’s kin and 
other villagers) to move to Mile, and relief food would be given there. Therefore, we 
were taken to Mile by truck, and other groups of people to Asayita. A huge number 
of Afar displaced from various localities was concentrated in an emergency relief 
center at Mile town. The famine victims took a shelter in a plastic tent and it was 
congested. They were starved and weak. Initially there was neither enough food nor 
water or medical treatment. As a result cholera epidemics broke out and many 
people, especially children died from the epidemics. I remembered that 30-40 
persons died per day and 3-5 persons were buried in one pit (grave).  In a week time 
I myself lost my six sisters, of whom four died in one day and the remaining two in 
another day. In the beginning it was really horrible in the relief camp, as a large 
number of people died each day. After that tragedy, “Red Cross”160 arrived and 
provided the victims with adequate food (milk powder, Fafa, cooking oil, grain) and 
medical treatment. More doctors and nurses arrived and rescued those who were 
lucky to survive from cholera and hunger (Individual Interview, April, 2005). 
 
The above description concurs with the political-economy argument that considers 
‘government inaction’ as famine causation. As the case material has shown, there was no 
timely response from the government to the 1984-85 famine crisis in the study community, as 
it was true in other parts of the country. It was after the drought-victims had already left their 
locality and gathered in urban centres and relief camps that the government and NGOs tried to 
distribute emergence relief food. Consequently, in addition to deaths from hunger, the starved 
people were exposed to epidemics which took many lives in the relief camps161.  
                                                 
160 International Red Cross Society.  
161 During the initial phase of 1984 famine camps or shelters were found to be breeding grounds for diseases, and 
later on government and foreign agencies became aware of that and discouraged people from going to shelters 
and provided food for people to take back to their villages (Alula, 1992). 
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At the time it was not only drought related-famine and epidemics that had affected the local 
community. The informants reported that the age-old enemy group, the Issa-Somali raided the 
Afar pastoral villages and killed villagers during the 1984-85 famine. Haiso narrated the 
situation as follows:  
 
….. my father and other villagers were killed by Issas during the 1984-85 famine 
year.  At that time my father and a few villagers were striving to stay at their home 
village when we (i.e. Haiso, his mother and sisters) and other villagers left our 
locality.  Haiso said, “At the time the Issas were not hit as much by the 1984-85 
drought related famine”. The Issas were able to raid the remaining animals and 
attacked those Afar who stayed behind in our locality. Since the Afar were heavily 
hit and weakened by the famine, the Issas were able to invade the Afar localities. 
They were able to reach even to the Oromo territory by crossing all the Afar land. It 
was during that invasion that my father and other fifteen Afar from my home village 
were killed by Issas. In addition to famine, we also faced severe attack from the 
Issas…. (Individual Interview, April, 2005). 
 
As indicated above the two severe famines that the local people recall very well are the 1973-
1974 and 1984-85 famines. The local people perceived these famines as the most severe ones 
that led to loss of many human lives and livestock population162. A number of informants 
stated that the previous governments did not respond timely to avoid these drought-related 
famines in the local community.  
 
The above case reveals the failure of previous governments to respond timely for saving 
human life. After the 1991 political change in the country, severe food crises also occurred in 
the study community. These included the 1997, 1999/2000 and 2003 severe food crises. In the 
following section I seek to present local people’s views on current development interventions 
and how the current government has responded to these food crises.  
 
6.4.3 Views of Local People towards Current Development Interventions and Disaster 
Responses 
 
The local people perceive the current Woreda administrative structure as a positive measure, 
as they have established their own self-administration on the basis of traditional territorial 
incumbency. As stated earlier, their clan territory was previously partitioned into different 
districts and they were administrated from distant centers mainly located in settled highland 
areas. Currently the local people have their own district centers where they get access to 
administrative, social, judiciary and political services. Moreover, political and managerial 
positions in the district are held by the indigenous people. Nevertheless, the local people are 
not satisfied with local governance, appointment of authorities (representatives) and 
approaches to development activities. A number of informants stated that development 
activities are not well-coordinated and traditional leaders and community members are not 
involved in process of planning and prioritization of development works and decision making 
processes. Besides, the informants rated the commitment of local leaders as low. These and 
                                                 
162 Ironically during the 1984-85 famine the meat industry expanded; restaurants and consumers in urban centers 
and a meat canning factory at Kombolcha obtained livestock at extremely low prices. Cattle were exported from 
the area to other regions and across borders through the port of Assab (Alula, 1992:34). 
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other dissatisfactions of the local people with respect to development activities are discussed 
in the following section.    
 
6.4.3.1 Externally Initiated Development Activities and Local People’s Participation  
 
Nowadays there are two leaderships or overlapping authorities at the local level. The formal 
leadership authority (Woreda and Kebele administrations) established by the government, and 
traditional authorities (elders and clan leaders). The general assumption is that a formal 
leadership is established with the ‘participation of the local people’, while the clan/elders 
leadership is a long-standing traditional authority’ which is still significant in the local 
pastoral community. In the same way we can assume that the two authorities overlap mainly 
at the grassroots level. And the formal leadership is expected to involve the traditional 
authorities in all local affairs. The degree of the involvement of the local people may vary 
from one locality to another. The view of the local people with regard to local people’s 
participation is elabourated as follows.   
 
i. Representation and community involvement: During the field work my informants raised 
very crucial issues regarding the role of local formal leadership in development activities. 
These issues include representation, commitment of local leaders to and coordination of 
development activities, and participation of community members in the planning process and 
prioritization of development activities.  
 
The informants questioned the representativeness of the current formal leaders to the interests 
and concerns of the local people compared to traditional leaders. The community members 
and their traditional authorities were and are very close to each other, and have mutual 
interests and concerns within the community and beyond. Traditionally the Makaban (clan 
chiefs) seek legitimacy from their people before they claim that they are representatives of 
their community to the government and take actions which may affect the local people. 
During the previous regimes certain Makaban drawn from traditional leaders, worked on 
behalf of the local people to link the community with the State or external actors. This has 
been already discussed in section 6.4.1 above.  
 
Obviously there is currently a physical proximity between the State elites and the local people 
via local formal leadership established by the State. Formal governmental institutions and 
departments are also physically close to the local people. However, the formal leaders and the 
local people lack a common understanding with regard to local problems. Moreover 
government institutions/departments in the Woreda lack insights into the concerns and 
problems of the people, and they are restrained by lack of commitment, capacity and skilled 
human resource. The formal authorities and line departments do not entertain the local 
people’s priorities while providing services for which they are established. The local state 
elites are much younger than traditional leaders. They are political appointees with different 
interests. In this connection participants of a focus group interview narrated as follows: 
 
Nowadays there is more rhetoric than action with regard to local problems. The 
current authorities are submissive and receive whatever comes from the above 
without consulting whether the local people accept it. The fact that the current 
leaders are opportunistic individuals who aspire promotion in their official position, 
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they do not consider the local people’s concern and priorities. Thus they passively 
accept everything as it flows from above, even if the community members do not 
want it (Focus Group Interview, April, 2006). 
 
It is true that traditionally the local people listen more to their clan leaders than to State elites 
and formal leaders. Likewise traditional leaders on their part consult and involve their clan 
members before they accept and decide about anything that emerges within the clan or comes 
from outside. This is the tradition among the Afar. On the other hand, most informants 
claimed, the State elites do not involve the traditional authorities and the community members 
during planning of development activities (i.e. irrigation, water points, schools, health posts). 
The local elites have more contacts with higher level officials than with traditional authorities. 
Therefore, there is a communication gap between the local elites and the community members 
with regard to selection and planning of development activities. Most of my informants felt 
that the local people haven’t been involved in deciding the types of interventions. In this 
connection, participants of a focus group interview stated as follows:   
 
We do not know about other Regions, but in our district the plans often come from 
the above (i.e. from the Region or the Federal government). For instance we have 
health posts constructed in various localities of our district. Had we been involved 
before construction, the government would have not put such health posts in the 
forests where nobody is using them. Had the choice been given to the local people, 
they would have preferred to have river diversion, or water supply, or growing 
fodder (Focus Group Interview, April, 2006). 
 
Though the local elites do have some knowledge about the problems of the community, they 
are not able to plan and implement development activities in consultation with local people. 
Rather they try to implement what is given from the above. Thus the development approach is 
still top-down.  
 
It seems that the previous pastoral development project has influenced the perception of the 
local people with respect to the current development approach. A 65-year-old informant 
(Kefina) narrated his assessment of the local leadership and development activities by 
comparing his experience of the TLDP with the current approach as follows: 
 
External support like that of the Third Livestock Development Project (TLDP) has 
not yet come again to our locality. Since recent past there is no development activity 
which could mobilize the local people (men and women). Empty rhetoric is 
pervasive. There has just been a lot of talk about Limat (development) from the 
Woreda authorities and from above (i.e. from Region and Federal). At the time of 
the TLDP empty rhetoric had no place. By then anyone who talked a lot was not 
looked for. Nowadays the local leaders have been too many in our community and 
in Amhara locality too. In the past local leaders were few and they were committed 
to work and to make people work hard. For instance during the TLDP there were 
two key leaders (foremen): one from the above (i.e. from the TLDP) and the other 
from our clan. The local community members nominated their leaders. First our clan 
members were introduced to the foreman who was assigned by the TLDP. Then we 
were asked to nominate our own leaders who worked with the foreman. Whenever 
work-group or clan leaders made mistakes, we could appeal to those key leaders. 
Nowadays, it is quite different. Firstly local leaders are too many from both sides. 
Moreover, responsibilities and roles are not sorted out and tasks are mixed up. Local 
leaders are made too many only to get salary, not to work for the people. Moreover, 
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they do not consult us about our problems and kinds of support we need. In fact 
relief assistance just comes into the community when there is famine (drought). 
Nobody understands the real problem of our community. Everyone wants to become 
a leader (office holder) in one way or another without commitment to work for us. 
During the TLDP we were consulted through our clan leaders about what was better 
for us and about what should we do on our part. Then the agreed upon activities 
were pursued together according to our Ada (customary law) (Individual Interview, 
April, 2006). 
 
Kefina further added that coordination of activities and commitment of foremen and work 
groups were high during the TLDP. He stated the work principles and ethics of the TLDP as 
follows:  
 
At the time when the TLDP was operating in our locality, the foremen worked 
equally with us at field level. They worked with us and simultaneously controlled 
tasks and activities. Nowadays leaders in any position talk a lot but work less with 
the villagers. They are unable to be exemplary to the community members. The 
TLDP tasks were also assigned to each work group and each worked hard to 
accomplish those tasks. At the time even work quota were assigned to aged persons 
based on the assumption that their kin groups should perform their work quota. It 
was the responsibility of the able-bodied kin to carry out the work quota of aged-
people and others. Nowadays everybody wants to be a leader (office holder) only. 
Nobody wants to simultaneously work and guide activities. This was not the case 
during the TLDP (Individual Interview, April, 2006). 
 
A number of informants also considered the current consultation with community members as 
“endless public meetings on empty rhetoric and promises about Limat” (development work). 
In the past whenever an external body wanted to consult the local community, it was Edola 
(elders’ council) which was first consulted. Nowadays, the youth are consulted since they 
have assumed the current political positions in many Kebele administrations. And very few 
hand-picked individual elders are also involved. If local authorities/external bodies involve 
elders at all, they usually invite only those whom they know or whom they have prior 
relations, since there is allowance for those invited for meetings or consultation forums. Thus 
elders’ councils (Edola) are rarely involved only when the authorities need them. This 
suggests the communication gap between local people and external actors regarding 
development problems, priorities and approaches.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 3 (in sections 3.3.4.2 and 3.3.4.3), the present government has 
prescribed various kinds of pastoral development interventions in its rural development 
programme. However, except few efforts in the provision of social services and 
infrastructures (e.g. health, education, road access), other interventions (irrigation, drought 
mitigation, rangeland development, water supply, etc) are not yet available to the pastoral 
community. According to the informants these kinds of interventions constitute the priorities 
of the local people.   
 
ii. Development support services: The informants claimed that there is not significant 
development support for enhancing livelihoods of the pastoral households. Though there are 
some improvements in the area of social services and infrastructure, there is not adequate 
support for enhancing livestock production, and crop cultivation which the local people want 
to pursue as additional source of food. Many pastoral households use only traditional hand 
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tools like hoes for subsistence crop cultivation. The capacity of the local people to construct 
viable channels for river diversion is very limited. Moreover, as most individuals/households 
are new beginners who lack farming skills, trained farm-oxen, and tools, they often arrange 
share-cropping contracts with neighbouring crop cultivators. Thus the local people seek 
external support to pursue growing food crop independently. However, such kind of support 
so far is not available to the local people.   
 
The above descriptions suggest that the local formal leadership is less committed to people’s 
participation, preferences and development priorities. The informants felt that the community 
members and their traditional authorities are not involved in the local development planning 
and decision making process. Contrary to the present vow made by the Regional and Federal 
governments with regard to grassroots’ participation and local development priorities, the 
informants claimed that the previous external intervention (e.g. TLDP) was more 
participatory than the current ones. They stated that the TLDP made prior consultation with 
clan leaders and local people during its intervention in the community. The traditional 
authorities were involved in the selection of irrigation sites, vaccination and veterinary sites 
(e.g. dips), and development of access roads, etc. Vaccination centres such as Humena-asu 
(located at Gewis) and Kebmi (located in Aware and Hujuba localities) were established with 
local people’s consent concerning the centrality of sites for all pastoral villagers. A number of 
informants have a good impression of the TLDP, primarily because of the bigger benefits it 
renders to the local people. Animal diseases were curtailed, and the livestock population had 
increased during the TLDP period. At that time most of the local people had no difficulty to 
get access to livestock development services. 
 
Nowadays, however such facilities and services are unavailable to most pastoral villagers. In 
fact livestock health technicians from the responsible government department try to reach 
some neighbourhoods for monitoring livestock diseases and for providing vaccinations. But 
they could not reach all pastoral villages due to inaccessibility, problems of coordination and 
lack of central locations to conduct vaccinations. Some informants reported that the 
technicians and their guides tried to go around very few villages just to extend their stay in the 
field in order to gain more allowances. The Kebele chairpersons often took the technicians 
first to vaccinate their stock and that of their kin. On the other hand the Woreda livestock 
experts stated that they provided services to the extent that their capacity allows. Thus they 
mentioned lack of capacity to reach all pastoral villages due to shortage of supplies, late 
arrival of veterinary drugs, lack of transport, and mobility of herds, drought-induced 
migration, and inaccessibility. In general both the views of the local people and of the experts 
indicate that the existing livestock health services in the district are insufficient and poorly 
coordinated due to shortage of supplies and transport, neglect and biases of Kebele 
authorities, dispersal of herders into various locations and inaccessibility of pastoral villages. 
This suggests a low level of capacity to manage livestock disease risks which the local people 
have identified as one constraint to their livestock production.    
 
iii. Pastoral Community Development Project (PCDP): PCDP has three main components 
(MoFA, 2003, 6).  They are: 
 
a. Sustainable livelihoods: This component is aimed at establishing decentralized and 
participatory planning procedures at the community/kebele and Woreda levels. This 
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subcomponent includes staff and community capacity building; a community investment fund 
(CIF); and strengthening technical and social support services. 
 
b. Pastoral Risk Management. Increasing community awareness of disaster risk163, improve 
the accuracy of risk assessment and support strategies for risk management. This 
subcomponent includes the development of a community-based early warning system; 
disaster contingency planning; and the establishment of a disaster preparedness and 
contingency fund (DPCF).  
 
c. Project Support and Policy Reform. This component provides operational support to PCDP 
management and Government policy formation. It includes support project coordination and 
monitoring and evaluation; address policy and institutional reforms to strengthen pastoral 
livelihoods and reduce risk; and build knowledge of pastoral systems and society. 
 
In the study community PCDP has been started by the end of 2005. It launched community 
development activities which include construction of infrastructure and social services 
(school, health posts, etc) and capacity building aimed at strengthening the Woreda EWS 
through staff training, and providing materials.   
 
PCDP has started its activities first with establishing health post and schools. The local 
people, however, did not consider these infrastructures as first priority, since there are already 
health posts and schools which either don’t function or are not furnished with the necessary 
facilities and personnel. Rather the local people see livestock health services, growing fodder 
and irrigation development as their first priorities. They need external support first in the 
areas of crop cultivation and planting fodder plants. In fact these priorities are also the 
components of the PCDP, but they are among future activities. Therefore, PCDP’s plan is to 
start first with provision of social services and then to carry on other support programmes in 
the future.   
 
I asked my informants whether PCDP first started its activities in consultation with the 
community so as to consider local concerns and priorities. The informants reported that it first 
consulted the elected leaders of Kebele Administrations. The PCDP staff called the Kebele 
authorities and informed them about predetermined project activities (i.e. health post and 
school construction and training). As my informants indicated, some individuals reacted to 
the PCDP staff at the time of consultation as follows: 
 
Your project activities are like that of the government. It seems that you are not 
from non-government organization164. Because you have brought the same activities 
that the government is doing in our district. We need a type of development work 
and support that can help us to curb problems such as drought and shortage of 
livestock feed (Individual Interview, April, 2006). 
 
                                                 
163 The PCDP project document envisaged that pastoral communities are unaware of disasters risks. However, 
this is not true with regard to my study community. The local people are aware of risks that affect their 
livelihoods.  
164 At the beginning some people perceived PCDP as non-government organization.  
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The implication of the above reaction is that there was a gap between PCDP and the 
community members in priority setting with regard to local problems and development 
activities. Whereas the local people stated that the existing health posts and schools are non-
functional and thus no need to add more, PCDP said its first priority is to construct such 
facilities and to proceed with others at another time. On the other hand, the local people’s 
priority is to tackle fodder shortage and to develop irrigation for growing food crops. 
Therefore, there is a gap between the external interventions and the local people’s 
development priority and concerns.  
 
The current government has frequently expressed its willingness to give more importance to 
grassroots’ participation in its decentralization process and decision making. Moreover, the 
premise behind the design of PCDP is to establish decentralized and participatory planning 
procedures at the community and Woreda levels, enabling men and women in pastoral 
communities to identify, prioritize and design and implement micro projects and programmes 
(MoFA, 2003:5). Therefore, the main question that needs explanation is why it was not 
possible to involve the local community members in setting activity priority. It is stated that 
PCDP has consulted the Kebele and Woreda authorities that represent formal government 
institutions/authorities. On the other hand, at the community level there are traditional 
authorities that the local people keep in high regard for their advice and decisions. Clan 
members consider traditional authorities as true representatives of their interests and concerns. 
As stated above, however, neither these authorities nor community members did take part in 
the decision of PCDP’s activity priorities that were implemented during my field study. 
Therefore, the level of participation was limited to information sharing with ‘elected leaders’ 
of the Kebele and Woreda administration. Consequently, local people’s concerns and 
priorities were not considered by external actors. This indicates that the local people’s 
perception of local problems and priorities differs from those of external actors.    
 
6.4.3.2 Local People’s Views on the External Responses to Famine (Food Crisis) 
 
The Government policy and approaches to disaster management have been discussed in 
Chapter 3. This section presents local people’s view on the external response to food crisis. A 
number of informants felt that currently some improvements are witnessed with regard to 
institutional response to food crisis compared to the previous times. The perceived 
improvements are manifested in risk assessment; relief food distribution and beneficiary 
selection; and other social services that may contribute to enhance local capacity. Each of 
these perceived improvements are described in the following paragraphs.  
 
i. Early warning system (emergency need assessment): In the district assessment of drought 
risk has been started by the Government in recent years. Though it is hasty and superficial, 
EW teams (assessment missions) drawn from the Afar Region, Federal agencies and NGOs 
occasionally visit the district offices in order to assess the conditions of pasture, livestock and 
food shortage. This kind of assessment was absent before ten years ago. However, some 
informants remarked that assessment teams didn’t so far involve the local people and their 
clan leaders. Assessment missions overlooked traditional leaders (authorities). They often met 
the Zonal or district authorities and some selected government institutions. The Woreda 
officials occasionally send their assessment reports to the Zonal office which in turn passes 
reports to the Region. Apart from these there is no, however, direct communication between 
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drought risk assessment teams, and the local community and their traditional authorities. 
Therefore, risk communication between affected people and external actors is not adequately 
considered by the national early warning system. Moreover, the periodic risk assessment is 
oriented almost exclusively to calculating food aid to the needy people (i.e. emergence need 
assessment).   
 
ii. Establishment of relief food distribution centre in the district: During the 1984-85 famine 
food aid was distributed after the affected people gathered in relief distribution or urban 
centres such as Bati, Eliwaha, Mile and Asayita. In recent years there is comparatively timely 
food aid distribution, though the amount is small to reach all the needy165. Unlike the previous 
governments, food aid nowadays arrives before the needy people are dislocated from their 
pastoral villages. The federal Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Agency (DPPA) has 
established emergency relief food outlet in the district and distributes grain to the affected 
Kebeles. During the 2003 severe food crisis there was a monthly distribution of wheat and 
cooking oil to the drought victims. Though local people were not satisfied with the size of the 
rations and sometimes with late arrival of food, they saw the establishment of food 
distribution centre within their district as improvement in external disaster responses. There 
has been a problem of food transporting and a mass displacement during severe food crisis. 
Thus the food distribution centre in the district has avoided travelling to distant food 
distribution centres.  
 
iii. Food aid targeting (beneficiary selection): The process of selecting beneficiaries of food 
aid involves three steps: (i) selecting drought affected kebeles, (ii) identifying sub-clans 
within each Kebele, and (iii) selecting needy households/individuals within sub-clans. The 
criteria for selecting beneficiaries are mainly related to asset status of households and social 
status of individuals. Precedence is given mainly to (i) orphans, (ii) aged and infirm persons, 
(iii) households with only small animals (goats), and (iv) households with few cattle. 
Households or individuals with camels and many cattle do not get food aid.  
 
Food aid beneficiary targeting, especially the selection of affected Kebeles is undertaken by 
the Woreda Disaster Prevention Committee (WDPC) in consultation with elected Kebele 
leaders. Once the Kebele is targeted, the selection of beneficiary households or individuals 
within clans/sub-clans is carried out by clan leaders and elders through general assembly of 
clan/sub-clan members. This targeting process is mainly undertaken in order to comply with 
the government procedure of beneficiary targeting. However, once households or individuals 
receive their food rations, they may redistribute a portion of their rations to their kin group 
through informal transfer mechanisms (i.e. reciprocal arrangements, sharing food). Therefore, 
the current beneficiary targeting opens room for involvement of clan leaders and elders in 
selecting more vulnerable groups. In relation to this a number of informants remarked that 
involvement of representative traditional leaders in beneficiary targeting and in food 
distribution avoids favourism and nepotism.  
 
                                                 
165 The official minimum size of ration is 15kg of grain per month per person. The local people claimed that 
they often received less than this size (i.e. about 10-12.5kg). Reducing the size of rations to individuals in order 
to accommodate a greater number of beneficiaries overall pertains in other regions of Ethiopia as well (Lind and 
Jalleta, 2005).  
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iv. Development of infrastructures, social services and administrative centres: Nemelifen, a 
small rural settlement growing into a small-town, has been the administrative centre of the 
Telalak district since 1994. Before this year it was a very small pastoral settlement with 
scattered traditional Afar huts (Ari). At the time the Government employees of the district 
were stationed in Eliwaha town and they used to come occasionally for working in Telalak. 
The informants reported that Nemelifen and other settlements are emerging and growing due 
to: 
 
• regionalization process and the establishment of Afar regional administration after the 
change of Government in 1991, 
• establishment of Woreda administrations and their respective centres and sector 
offices, 
• establishment of local markets,  
• construction of access roads, especially the road from Kassa-Gita to Dalifagie, 
• construction of schools, health station, health post, relief food distribution centre,  
• construction of the water points, and other service like telephone, shops, mosques, 
police station, etc.   
 
The development of these services and infrastructures has created opportunities for small 
businesses, trade, and access to information, transport, etc. These developments have also 
increased the orientation of community members to the larger society. Therefore, a number of 
informants perceived these services and infrastructure as enhancing their capacity for risk 
management, as they can create access to markets, and create opportunities for taking up non-
pastoral activities.  
 
iv. Other development supports: These included supports provided by NGOs. At the time of 
my field study WFP and Farm-Africa were providing supports to the local people in the areas 
of education and livestock health respectively. School children feeding programme was 
supported by WFP/UNICEF. This included provision of food to school children. Special 
support or incentive (food and cooking oil) was given to girls for attracting them to school. 
 
Farm-Africa provided goat loans to poor women and supported livestock health services. It 
provided support to poor women. Up to 60 poor women were provided with goat loans for 
rearing, each with four female goats. Each beneficiary was expected to give offspring to other 
poor women in the neighbourhood. In addition to this, Farm-Africa provided training for 
animal health workers drawn from pastoral villages. These community workers would be 
organized into veterinary drug vendors’ association in order to supply drugs to the community 
on cheaper prices.  
 
Farm-Africa also tried to support irrigation development through providing tools and seeds to 
pastoral households engaged in growing food crop. However, it has stopped supporting 
irrigation due to the following reasons:  
 
• Lack of follow-up by the pertinent government office to facilitate this type of 
intervention. 
• The impact of 2002 drought crisis. 
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• Conflict between Afar and Oromo over the use of the irrigable land, 
• Changes in type of support by the Farm-African.  It shifted to provision of goat loan 
for poor women. 
• Shortage of budget for supporting irrigation.  
 
Some informants also complained about the Farm-Africa intervention. Firstly, they said that it 
scaled down its activity, whereas it initially promised to support many pastoral villages. 
Secondly, it did not proceed with supporting irrigation development. Thirdly, some 
informants did not appreciate the scheme of goat loan. They felt that it was not a preferred 
intervention. In relation to this, participants of a focus group interview stated as follows: 
 
Our problem is not lack of goat as such. Our goats are perishing before our eyes due 
to recurrent drought. The threats are animal disease and drought that decimate stock, 
goats or cattle. Otherwise poor women could get such goats from their kin 
group/clan. To our knowledge the appropriate support for poor women could be to 
provide capital to run business like trading, running tearooms, shop, and grinding 
mill (Group Interview, 2006) 
 
Generally local people’s experience with previous external development interventions has 
shown that most infrastructure and services put in the locality were not sustainable, though 
they provided short-term benefits, especially for livestock development. A case in point is the 
TLDP. Moreover the current development interventions pursued by the Government (e.g. 
PCDP) and NGOs (e.g. Farm-Africa) did not consider what the local people have considered 
as their development priorities and concerns. The implication is that there has been a gap 
between local people’s perception of problems and their solutions and that of external actors 
while planning and implementing development activities. In general it can be said that the 
local people seek external support to curb problems which they consider as major constraints 
to enhance their capacity in reducing risks such as drought, feed stress, livestock diseases and 
famine. Though the local people saw the public transfer (i.e. food aid) as critical to survive 
the crisis periods, they expect more support from government and NGOs for mitigating these 
risks. In relation to this, after a lengthy group interview during the field work, one of the 
participants asked me to pass the following message to the government. He remarked in 
following manner:  
 
I guess you might be one among officials or the government proxy (Yemengist 
Tewokay). I do think that you wouldn’t have spent with us all this time without any 
purpose or mission. In our community we had seen that livestock rearing was viable 
in the past. Nowadays it is not as it was in the past good days. As we all told you, 
livestock rearing is now in a crisis. The government is supporting us with food 
knowing that we are facing food crisis. The government is like a father and mother 
who take care of their children. What I want you to communicate to the government 
is that we need also its support to us and our children to enhance crop cultivation 
and pursue it rigorously in the future (Focus Group interview, August 2005).     
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6.5 Traditional Early Warning Systems and Risk Communication  
 
The formal EWS has been discussed in Chapter 3, and it is stated that its coverage for pastoral 
areas has been limited and certain indicators are used for monitoring famine/drought risks. It 
focuses on highland, crop-producing areas, and has no effective presence in lowland pastoral 
areas where a substantial part of national food insecurity is located. Except some attempts by 
NGOs there is not adequate livelihood monitoring to understand context-specific 
vulnerability. Moreover the national EWS has not yet integrated traditional early warning 
systems. These gaps explain partly the inappropriateness of previous approaches to disaster 
(famine) prevention. And yet, as stated in section 6.4.3.2 formal EWS shows some 
improvements in disaster responses in recent years as perceived by some informants.  
 
In this section I present the traditional early warning systems and ways of communication that 
the local people utilize for disaster prediction and warning against it. I also attempt to explore 
the extent to which the formal EWS involves the local people during monitoring and 
assessment of risks. The sources of data used in this section are mainly from interviews with 
elders and local officials.  
 
The Aghini pastoral system is close to transhumance which relies mainly on key resources 
that can vary between seasons within a year. Thus the local people routinely monitor these 
key resources as their availability varies spatially and temporally. As their ecology is highly 
variable herders are always keen to monitor their natural environment as well as social 
settings so as to seize opportunities and to get prepared for coping with natural and livelihood 
shocks and environmental changes as well. For herders no rain means no pasture. In that case 
monitoring routinely the behaviour of weather (i.e. rainfall), performance of natural 
vegetation in the locality and beyond, and relations with neighbouring ethnic groups is crucial 
for herders’ mobility. Therefore, it is on the basis of these prior assessments that the local 
herders predict and react to events that affect their livelihood system. Let us look closely how 
the local people gather information, articulate their problems and take actions/decision to 
survive stresses or shocks.      
 
6.5.1 Predicting Weather Conditions (Drought and Rainfall)  
 
Having mentioned that “only almighty Allah knows what would happen”, informants 
mentioned some signs and indicators of drought that they have experienced in their life.  They 
often recall signs of previous drought years and try to use them for predicting about the 
future. A number of informants have identified three ways to forecast rainfall. These include 
observing: (i) the behaviour of domestic animals, (ii) weather changes and, (iii) the 
appearance of stars. Each of these is briefly presented as follows.  
 
i. Watching the behaviour of livestock: My informants stated that “the Afar are homogenous 
groups who keep cattle, camels, goats and sheep”. Therefore, they routinely scrutinize 
changes in the behaviour of their domestic animals in order to predict events. The local people 
believe that livestock show certain behaviours with the coming of certain events. As shown in 
box 6.5 below my key informants identified certain behaviours of livestock that the local 
people use them to predicate about rainfall.  
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ii. Observation of weather behaviour: The local people observe changes in weather (i.e. wind 
and temperature). Wind and temperature are signs of good rain or drought. If heavy wind is 
missing before the start of rainy season, it indicates drought/poor rain. The informants believe 
that cold wind indicates poor rain.  
 
iii. Watching the appearance of stars: The appearance of “star with long tail” from the north 
direction is used as an indicator of drought. When this star appears before dawn is breaking, it 
indicates the imminent of drought. The informants associated some of the previous droughts 
to the appearance of such star. These droughts included: (i) the 1973-74 drought that is locally 
called Gere-alie, (ii) the 1984-85 drought and, (iii) the 1991-1992 drought. The informants 
reported that before the occurrence of each of these three droughts, “a star with long tail” was 
seen. 
 
There are individuals who watch stars (i.e. “star counting”).  Persons with this expertise are 
called “Hutuk Beya”. They predicate whether there would be good or poor rain. This is 
basically to watch “stars expected to appear in the east direction”. The type of star used for 
prediction is called Kayma (i.e. a 6-star group). When Kayma appears in east, camels see it 
first and then all camels are seen facing to the star. It is believed that this indicates the coming 
of good rain.  
 
iv. Observing the behaviour of birds, bees and wild animals as indicator of drought. Some 
of these are presented in box 6.6 below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 6.5 Some behaviours of livestock that are used as indicator of coming rain:  
 
• With the rain coming goats are observed playful (gamboling).  
• Goats make a sound of “boof… boof…” indicating the coming of rain. 
• Goats bleat when the coming season is good. 
• Goats begin mating when the coming season is good, or with coming of rainfall. 
• Cattle begin mating with coming of rainfall. 
• Cattle produce “Arefa” (lather) in their mouth with coming of rainfall. 
• Cattle shake their legs, as if in anticipation of mud removed. 
• Cattle refuse to come out of kraal with coming of rain. They refuse to move to grazing area (field). 
• Camels face north and shake their head with coming of rain. 
• Camel facing east indicating the appearance of six-grouped starts which indicate the coming of 
rainfall. 
Source: Key informant interview, December, 2004 
 255
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.5.2 Scouting and Assessment of Fodder and Water Situation  
 
The local Afar have traditional grazing areas for the dry and wet seasons. These areas are 
already described in section 6.1.1 (see also map 9). The local people manage rangeland 
resources to make sure that there is enough water and pasture during the dry season and 
drought. They do this by moving their herds to areas where the resources are available. 
Therefore, surveillance/assessment of the availability of grazing and water is routinely 
conducted by herders. A team of range scouts called Eddo/Addo assesses the state of 
rangeland and water. Scouting groups, which mainly entail young men, undertake the 
surveillance and assessment responsibilities. Persons elected for Eddo should be reliable, 
well-respected, gentle and calm and capable of walking long distances. A team of range 
scouts (Eddo) has several specific tasks when assessing rangelands. Some of the tasks are 
given in box 6.7 below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The scout team also uses Dagu (traditional information exchange network) and the advice of 
the knowledgeable and traditional experts who forecast the upcoming rain. Therefore, Dagu 
adds to the information collected by the Eddo. Finally the scouting team reports back to the 
Box 6.6 Some behaviours of birds, bees and wild animals that are used as indicator of imminent 
drought:  
• Bees desert their hives from hill sides and migrate to river sides.  
• A bird, locally known as “Andula” produces a noise that resembles a noise of baby camel. 
• Birds often come very close to homesteads/yard searching feed and water. 
• Hyenas and foxes give little whimper (barking few times, i.e. less than three times). 
• Many weakened apes will be seen everywhere. 
• Monkeys and apes often come close to homesteads/yard. 
• Warthog starts attacking goats. 
• Wild animals (carnivorous ones) start eating tree leaves, barks and roots. 
• Wild fowl often comes close to the homestead. 
Source: Key informant interview, December, 2004 
Box 6.7 Specific tasks of Eddo/Addo:  
 
• Assess if an area have recently received rainfall, for how long and how much.  
• Check how much fodder and water are available, and whether the quality is good enough for different 
livestock types. 
• Estimate how long animals can graze on a particular site. 
• Check whether there are rival groups or diseased animals in the area. 
• Discuss the information gathered with elders and clan leaders, and add more information through Dagu. 
 
Source: IIRR, 2004:42 
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community elders and clan leaders about the situation on the availability of feed, water, and 
estimates for how long feeds and water can sustain the existing stock.  
 
Once the rain situation is forecasted, and information is gathered on water and pasture 
availability and security situation, the clan leaders, elders and the scout team plan how to 
utilize the existing resources. The number of livestock and length of time to stay on a 
particular site is determined. In general the main preparatory steps for livestock movement 
include:  
 
• Gathering information on the availability of grass and water in order to move herds to 
areas where these resources can be available. 
• Selecting appropriate route and area to drive  livestock safely, 
• Regrouping (splitting) herds according to their types (i.e. cattle, camels and goats in 
separate groups; dry cows and camels, etc) and determine range of distance from 
home villages or localities, and between herding groups. 
• Selecting and assigning leaders for each migrating or herding group.  
 
Leaders of herd movement should have prior knowledge about receiving areas. They are 
expected to be well-informed to lead and manage the livestock movement, and to negotiate 
with the neighbouring clans in order to avoid risk of conflict. The leaders can punish 
individuals who may misbehave or violate rules of herd movement.  
 
The local herders use the selected rangeland for two-three months. If herd movement is to 
distant areas (i.e. beyond 100 kms or 8-10 days travel), huts may be dismantled and movable 
household utensils are taken while other heavy ones are put on big trees found in the base 
camp. If mobility is within 100 kms radius, base camp and huts can be moved to the new 
camp site. But nowadays long distance movement has been constrained by scarcity of pasture, 
loss of key migrating areas and conflicts166. Therefore, under normal conditions herd mobility 
is ventured mainly within short distances, and sometimes, especially during severe dry 
season/drought to distant neighbouring highland areas (e.g. to Cheffa wetland for shorter 
period). 
 
6.5.3 Traditional Communication System (Dagu)  
 
i. Dagu as information gathering and exchange system: The Afar traditional verbal 
communication system is called Dagu. It is the main information gathering and exchanging 
system among the Afar. When two or more persons (be they know each other or strangers) 
from different areas meet on the road or elsewhere, they sit down and spend sometime on 
exchanging information about conditions of grazing, water, livestock, market and price, 
disease outbreak, conflict and casualties, local politics, etc. Dagu is a two-way 
communication about problems of family, community, and local as well as regional issues. Its 
main purpose is to exchange information about availability of resources, well-being/security 
of pastoral villages, and socio-political events in various places.  
                                                 
166 At different times the Afar scouting teams clashed with Issa-Somalis. This often happens when the scouting 
teams from local community cross the Awash River to reach Megenta, Ba’adu and Alledeghi plain. For instance 
the Issas killed five members of a scouting team in 1995. 
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In Afar society any passerby is expected to share information at least on the abovementioned 
issues whenever he/she meets any member from his/her own clan or other clans. Dagu can 
take place between people of any age and sex. Elders and clan leaders can speak first. 
Informants stated that in Afar culture any newcomer is welcome and is first provided with 
seat, food and water. Then the host would ask the guest to narrate about the situation of 
his/her locality and what he/she has observed on his/her way. The host on his/her part would 
do the same. Box 6.8 depicts issues that are often addressed through Dagu when two persons 
meet anywhere.   
 
 
 
 
 
It can be said that the Afar regularly exchange and communicate information about new 
developments, events and phenomenon among themselves through the institution of Dagu. 
Members of the community also consult elders about problems and get advice for decision-
making. Generally speaking, through regular verbal exchange of information (Dagu), 
community members get access to advice, and information needed to undertake both 
individual and collective actions. Dagu is also used to pass information that people have 
heard over radio.  
 
ii. Dagu as risk communication and warning: Many informants mentioned that “begging is a 
shameful act in their culture”167.  According to the informants the community members help 
each other, and one is not expected to beg. Instead he/she can call on his/her kinship or clan 
groups for support in times of need. Therefore, information sharing through Dagu is also a 
common communication system in order to solicit and get support from clan members; to 
exchange information about opportunities; and to take collective action against any threat to 
the individual member or to the group. Moreover, Dagu enables people to find pasture and 
water during drought, and warn others of threats such as drought, insecurity and disease 
outbreak. The local Afar also use firing and shouting (Eei Eei) to alert people for emergency 
and support from neighbours and other clans.  
                                                 
167 In the study community the term ‘begging’ is not used to explain the act of asking support, as it has 
derogatory meaning. Claiming support is a right for the disadvantaged.  Providing support is a social obligation 
for the donor, as he often considers it as investment.  
Box 6.8 Some Issues often addressed while conducting Dagu among the Afars: 
 
• How are your family and neighbours? 
• Where are you from? Which clan do you belong? 
• Where did you spend last night? With whom? 
• Whom do you know here? 
• Where are you going?  
• What have you seen on the way?  
• What is happening along the way?  
• What is the situation of grass/pasture, water, and livestock? 
• What about disease outbreak? etc. 
• What about clan conflict and causalities? etc. 
Source Key informant interviews, December, 2004 
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In general sharing information and ensuring collective security have been highly valued 
among the Afar. Withholding information from the community or clan group is unacceptable 
in the Afar Ada (customary law), and any deviation involves punishment. Every member is 
expected of passing and sharing information on what he/she observes and hears about. 
Therefore, the local Afar often use Dagu to get information about key resources/grazing areas 
which are located in far away areas (e.g. Yangudi-Rassa, Megenta, Gedamaytu, Adi-ferewo 
and Cheffa wetland). The Afar also get information on security situation of distant places, 
communities, and markets through Dagu. In this way community members and neighbours 
keep on informing each other about opportunities and threats.  
 
On the other hand some informants felt that the practice of Dagu is decreasing nowadays. 
They attributed this to the following factors:  
 
• Development of towns and permanent settlements. 
• Some people, particularly the youth are becoming reluctant to divulge information, 
as individualism, suspicion and distrust are increasing among young generation. 
• The young generations do not tend to spend much time to hold Dagu. 
• Individuals currently have begun to use transport and thus have fewer opportunities 
to observe various environments, to meet others and exchange information about 
various localities and events. 
• Individuals nowadays have no adequate resources or capacity to host guests and 
conduct Dagu. 
 
These factors may suggest that the advent of modern transportation, increased 
mistrust/anonymity among new generations, and resource scarcity have effects on the 
traditional information network. And yet a number of informants have acknowledged that 
Dagu is still an important information communication system among the pastoral Afar. This 
system is very efficient and useful in the Afar pastoral areas where communication facilities 
are almost non-existent. Moreover, if Dagu is integrated into the formal early warning 
system, it can enhance risk communication between the local people and external actors. 
 
6.5.4 Views of the Local People on Risk Communication to External Actors and 
Responses 
 
During the Imperial time, the informants said, there was no formal communication system 
between the state and the local people with regard to famines and responses. At the time only 
clan leaders attempted to report about different crises (e.g. drought, disease epidemics and 
invasions by Issas and Waggirats) to the local officials (governors). However, there was no 
response from Imperial Government and the local governors.  
 
Limited external response, especially in the form of relief food distribution was started during 
the Derg Regime. Nevertheless, it was not efficient intervention as food assistance did not 
arrive timely. This was particularly witnessed during the 1984-1985 catastrophic famine 
where most pastoralists were forced to leave home villages and migrate into relief distribution 
camps and nearby urban centers due to failure of the Derg Government to respond early. 
 259
 
Some informants felt that drought risk communication to external actors (Government 
agencies and NGOs) and drought relief intervention (food aid) have witnessed some 
improvements in recent years compared to the periods of previous regimes. Nowadays 
assessment teams occasionally come to the district to assess drought situation and food crisis. 
The clan leaders also report on drought and livestock disease to the Woreda officials. Usually 
the Kebele authorities or leaders communicate about events (food crisis, disease outbreak, 
conflict) to the Woreda administration which in turn passes reports to the Regional pertinent 
offices through Zonal administration.  
 
However, the views of informants were mixed with regard to effectiveness of current external 
responses. Some informants remarked that external responses to food crisis were not as 
expected. These groups of informants claimed that relief food arrived late and stopped early 
(i.e. without warning recipients and before the situation is fully improved). Sometimes food 
distribution is curtailed as soon as rain starts. This, for instance, occurred in the month of 
August 2005 when immediately rain began. Consequently, the local people had to sell some 
of the remaining stock to survive this critical period. Since the local people continued with 
appealing for assistance, food redistribution was resumed in the month of December, 2005.  
This view of the local people with regard to delay and early cessation of food distribution has 
much truth and concur with results of some crisis assessments (Lautze et al., 2003; 219; 
USAID, 2004:2). This is partly attributed to inadequate risk assessment and weak early 
warning systems in the pastoral areas. Both Government agencies and NGOs mostly rely on 
“emergency need assessment” and “ad hoc assessment” than on regular monitoring of pastoral 
livelihood systems while designing their responses. Moreover, assessment missions cover 
limited part of the pastoral areas due to inaccessibility, conflict and other logistic and resource 
constraints. Therefore, these factors affect the phasing out and the coverage of external 
interventions.  
 
Other informants felt that the government did what it could, given that: (i) drought has been a 
recurring event in recent decades, (ii) livestock production has been under stress, (iii) 
increased number of affected people, and (iv) wild foods, which were once important sources 
of food during food crisis, have become scarce. Therefore, these later groups of informants 
have realized that their livelihood system has been under stress due to recurring drought 
consequences. More people are vulnerable to drought as they are less able to cope with food 
crisis triggered by drought consequences. As a result, they are forced to rely on relief food 
assistance. Therefore, for these informants it seems that government’s intervention to avoid 
famine is modest given the recurring food crisis and the mounting of needy people in recent 
years. These informants could hold such perception of the current government response as 
they compared it with that of the previous regimes.   
 
It is true that some evaluations of government response have reported that the Ethiopian 
government has avoided the recurring food crisis from developing into types of famine that 
historically plagued the country (Lautze et al., 2003; Lind and Jalleta, 2005). However, the 
government’s intervention is still emergence-oriented without addressing the structural 
problem of food crisis in the pastoral community. In relation to this, I interviewed a number 
of informants to share their views about “what should be done to tackle recurring food crisis 
in their community?” Having acknowledged that “rainfall has been unpredictable and it is in 
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the will of Allah”, most of them have suggested some adaptive responses. These include (i) 
pursuing rearing more goats and camels as they are less vulnerable than other species, (ii) 
irrigation development for crop cultivation, if external support is provided for river diversion, 
(iii) taking up other non-pastoral activities (e.g. trading, wage labour). These suggestions to 
overcome food crisis are consistent with activities (e.g. enhancing existing livelihoods, 
livelihood diversification) that are proposed by the current discourse on risk reduction.  
 
In the preceding sections I have attempted to assess the external interventions and crisis 
responses from the perspective of the local people. The next section deals with local 
responses to livelihood shocks and environmental changes. It attempts to discuss what the 
local people are actually doing to adapt or cope with livelihood shocks. In that case three key 
questions will be addressed. They are (i) how far have pastoral strategies (pattern of mobility, 
herd structure and livelihood activities) of the local people changed, (ii) to which extent have 
individuals or households altered their coping strategies, (iii) how effective are the existing 
coping strategies given the mounting crisis in the study community. These and other related 
issues will be the focuses of the next discussions. 
 
6.6 Adaptive Responses and Coping Strategies in the Study Community 
 
In section 6.3.6 above, attempt is made to identify the major risks from the perspective of the 
local people. The following paragraphs discuss how the local people are currently responding 
to environmental stresses and livelihood shocks (food crisis). As stated in Chapter 3, adaptive 
responses/risk management strategies and coping mechanisms may overlap. One’s 
adaptive/risk management strategy may be other’s coping strategy. Therefore, the way in 
which these strategies are presented in the following paragraphs is for the convenience of 
presentation rather than a watertight distinction between categories of strategies. 
 
6.6.1 Adaptive Strategies  
 
As stated earlier, the local people have faced deteriorating ecological situation which has 
severe consequences on their subsistence. In this connection the survey households and 
informants were asked to identify adaptive strategies currently used by the local people to 
cope with the ecological/environmental stress and livelihood insecurity. The household 
survey respondents (Table 6.14) and key informants identified various adaptive strategies. 
The major ones are described in the following paragraphs.  
 
Table 6.14 Adaptive Strategies Reported by the Sample Households (Multiple Responses are 
Possible) 
Adaptive strategies  responses 
(n=60)  
percentage
Combining herding with non-pastoral activities (trading, cultivation) 59 98.3 
Changing the composition of herds 56 93.3 
Herd splitting and mobility to areas where fodder can be available  26 43.3 
Leaving livestock under the care of bond-friend/kin  18 30.0 
Seeking daily labour  2 3.3 
Source: Sample Household Survey, December, 2005. 
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i. Combining animal rearing with non-pastoral activities: As it can be seen in Table 6.14, 
the local people employ various adaptive responses to environmental stress, drought and 
decline of livestock production. Combining crop cultivation with livestock rearing is one of 
the adaptive responses to the decline of livestock production. As yield from livestock has 
dwindled over time, some pastoral households have begun growing food crops along the 
banks of perennial rivers. In this connection Mohammed, an elder from Gewis village stated 
that households which practise irrigation are relatively better-off nowadays. He illustrated this 
by using a saying from Afar. “Additional is always good, even an ocean needs tributary”. 
Therefore, according to Mohammed, combining livestock production with cultivation is better 
than having only one, as one supplements the other. Moreover, participants of a focus group 
interview also reinforced Mohammed’s idea by illustrating risks associated with taking up 
one activity alone: 
 
A total shift to crop cultivation has also risk. If all people take up crop cultivation, it 
will involve a risk of losing animals which provide many advantages. Livestock 
provide food, cash, savings and raw materials for making household materials and 
utensils. Practicing irrigation on river banks also involves a risk of flash flood due to 
high run-off from highland areas or change of river course. In that case nothing will 
be left on farm plots. An animal may die from effects of drought; at least its skin can 
be sold. Moreover, irrigation requires good tract of plain land like that of Asayita 
area (Awash delta). In Asayita there are cotton plantation and food crop cultivation 
because of the availability of good irrigable flat land and the Awash River. 
Developers use tractors to plough, and grow cotton or food crops whose residue can 
also be used for animal feed. In such area irrigation practice has more advantage 
than livestock production. But in an area like that of ours where the topography is 
hilly, and river water or rain is unpredictable, a complete shift to crop cultivation is 
not possible (Focus group interview, December, 2004). 
 
This case material suggests that the tendency is not to view cultivation as alternative to 
livestock, but as complementary. The local people strive to combine livestock rearing with 
crop cultivation instead of shift from one activity to the other in order to avoid risks 
associated with pursuing only one activity. Currently small-scale crop cultivation occurs on 
riverbanks, as rainfall is inadequate for rain-fed agriculture. It is undertaken mainly along the 
banks of perennial rivers (e.g. Telalak and Wata) by diverting river water. Out of the total 60 
sample households, 48.3 % (n=29) possessed farm plots (enclosures) along the riverbanks. Of 
these households who had plots of land, 76% of them owned less than 0.5ha and 7% between 
0.5 and 0.75ha. The rest 17% owned 1-1.5ha.   
 
Generally in the Aghini pastoral community context crop cultivation takes mainly a form of 
small-scale irrigation system. Cultivators use low input methods including hand-tools, manual 
labour and traditional irrigation methods such as furrows and channels. Few individuals, who 
are usually relatively wealthy, hire migrant cultivators for growing food crop. Thus, the 
wealthy have access to labour and farm-oxen from highlanders to work on larger farm plots. 
Others often enter into crop-sharing arrangements with highlanders, whereby they divide the 
produce equally.  
 
ii. Changing herd composition and herd diversity: Changing herd composition and 
diversification are the second adaptive responses to environmental changes and risks of 
drought. The local Afar reported that traditionally their original herd composition included 
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cattle, camel, sheep, goat, donkey, horse and mule. Nowadays, mule and horse are no more in 
the composition of herds. Cattle population was dominant in the herd prior to the 1980s, as 
pasture was abundant in the locale and as well as in areas away from the district. In recent 
decades following the degradation of pasture in the immediate environment and traditional 
resource base in distant migration areas, the local people place much emphasis on keeping 
camel and goat than on cattle. It is because the former are relatively tolerant to drought 
consequences and can survive on existing patchy, browsing trees and bushes during feed 
stress. Special grass types have been increasingly scarce owing to shrinkages of pastureland, 
bush encroachment and recurring drought. Therefore, adjusting herd composition is used by 
the local people as a strategy to adapt to changes in natural forage vegetation and to cope with 
drought effects. Simultaneously, the local people still continue with keeping multiple-species 
in order to reduce risks and exploit various environmental niches. In general, depending on 
the situations, the local people employ the strategies of adjusting herd composition and 
keeping of multiple species as insurance against drought risks and environmental stresses.  
 
iii. Herd mobility/tracking environmental resources: The third strategy employed by the 
local pastoral groups is tracking their variable environment. This strategy involves the 
matching of available feed supply with animal numbers at a particular site. It involves seizing 
opportunities when and where feeds are best available. During the wet season the eastern side 
of the Telalak district (i.e. Asbole) is flooded by rain water descending from highlands and it 
receives some rain. At this period, grasses quickly sprout and some dwarf bushes give fresh 
leaves. Unless the local people quickly seize this opportunity, flash grasses and leaves will 
quickly wilt and disappear. Therefore, the local people move their herds to such area in order 
to seize this opportunity. Moreover Asbole locality is endowed with salt-lick which livestock 
feed. At the same time the foothills and the escarpments are left fallow during the wet season 
and reserved for the dry season. When dry season sets in the local people gradually drive back 
their herds from Asbole to such reserves (see map 9). If dry season becomes severe and 
prolong, they will disperse their herds deep into Awash River banks and flood plains or into 
the Cheffa wetland located in highlands. Therefore, herd mobility or tracking the environment 
is an important strategy used by the local pastoral groups to exploit variable natural grazing.  
 
iv. Herd splitting/dispersion: Among the pastoral households it is common to establish bond-
friendship, stock-alliances and other networks of support on which individuals and 
households rely in times of need. In times of feed stress, households which have such 
relations split their herds and give out part of stock to their partners to survive drought period 
or feed stress. This strategy is a reciprocal arrangement between the local Afar and the Oromo 
agro-pastoralists in order to cope with feed stress. As all areas are not equally affected by 
drought or other disasters, the local Afar send part of their stock to their kin or bond-friends to 
prevent some core animals (e.g. female stock). Yesuf’s case illustrates such kind of relation 
established between the local Afar and their neighbouring Oromos.  
 
Yesuf is a resident of Nemelifen. He attended Koran school in the early 1980s at 
Gerfa village situated in Bati Woreda. He has maintained his relation with sons of 
his Koran teacher (Sheikh) who died some ten years ago. Yesuf and such Oromo 
family support each other in times of need. The Sheikh is survived by his wife and 
two sons: the elder son migrated to Djibouti and the younger one is a breadwinner 
for the household. The elder son didn’t remit money to his kin. When the younger 
son faces food shortage/crisis, he visits Yesuf’s family and requests some support. 
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In 2003 he came to Yesuf’s mother and received two quintals of wheat and one goat 
(Mukit). In January 2005 the younger son also came to Yesuf and asked assistance. 
Yesuf gave him 270 Birr to buy food grain. Likewise Yesuf sends his livestock to 
his bond-friend in Gerfa when there is drought or shortage of animal feed in his 
community.  Depending on the seasonal availability of grain food, grass and fodder 
in their respective localities, Yesuf and his bond-friend support each other through 
such reciprocal arrangements and by dispersing livestock to overcome feed stress 
and consequences of recurrent drought (Individual Interview, December 2005). 
 
v. Drought feeding strategies: The local people also employ different drought feeding 
strategies to survive their key stock during severe drought. These involve extensive lopping of 
trees, collection of tree pods, barks, stems and other green plants. In times of feed stress, the 
local people collect pods of acacia and transport them to feed emaciated animals which are 
unable to move to distant places. Trees, whose fruits and pods are essential to livestock 
feeding, include Keselto (acacia nilotica) and Eibeto (acacia tortilis) that are found mainly 
along the banks of Wata, Telalak and Gewis rivers (see also table 6.1 for other palatable 
plants). Herders also move their stock to such areas and feed them by chopping down tree 
leaves. However, in recent years trees are getting scarce due to deforestation, charcoal making 
and expansion of farm plots along river banks.  
 
Traditionally hay making is not practised in the study community. Very recently some 
individuals, who live close to highland areas, have started preparing hay and storing for dry 
season. Besides, the neighbouring Oromos and Amharas harvest grass and make hay. Thus 
some better-off individuals or households from Afar locality also purchase hay and stalks or 
grazing rights from these neighbouring groups to feed emaciated animals.    
 
vi. Developing water points: In order to cope with water scarcity in the study community, the 
local people dig shallow holes, build small surface water catchments or excavate rain-water 
retaining trough. The practice of retaining water in natural water storage along water course 
or canals is also practised in some localities. On the other hand installation of hand pumps, 
deep wells and development of water catchments are among the government-supported 
responses to water scarcity.   
 
6.6.2 Risk Management Strategies and Coping Mechanisms 
 
In section 6.6.1, I have discussed the local people’s main adaptive responses to environmental 
stresses, feed shortage and drought consequences. The local responses that are presented in 
the preceding section are adaptive strategies. In response to recurring food crisis, the local 
people also employ various coping mechanisms. Individuals and households in the study 
community utilize a variety of strategies to manage risks and to cope with food crises. While 
some of the strategies aim at reducing risks, other strategies are employed for coping with 
effects of crisis. These strategies are discussed in the following sections.  
 
6.6.2.1 Risk Mitigation/Reduction Strategies 
 
All actions that are taken up before a shock occurs can be considered as risk reduction 
strategies. As indicated above the most important risk mitigation strategies in the study 
community include the combination of livestock production with crop cultivation and trading, 
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and informal insurances (stock transfers, stock alliances and social networking). Livelihood 
diversification strategies, which help minimize risks in the study community, have been 
discussed in section 6.2. The present section focuses on (i) resource transfer/sharing systems 
and mutual aid institution among kinship groups, (ii) forging bond-friendship and stock-
alliance, and (iii) renting out oxen to crop cultivators.  Based on the local people’s 
perspective, these risk reduction strategies are elabourated below.  
 
i. Mutual-support and resource transfer/sharing systems: The pastoral households do not 
rely only on herd and resource management strategies to survive drought consequences and 
livelihood shocks. They also rely on mutual-aid associations and resource sharing 
mechanisms in times of need. The social and economic organizations of the Aghini pastoral 
community are based on clan and kinship systems whereby members call on their kinship 
group in times of crisis. Mutual-support is often based on lineage, kinship relations, bond-
friendship and neighbourhood. In this connection the study community has a number of 
mutual-aid and stock-transfer mechanisms that enable different members to build up their 
own herds and to recover from crisis. Individuals/households linked by decent or affinal 
relationship also exchange gifts (in kind or cash) at birth, marriage and during other 
ceremonies (circumcision, funeral, religious feasts).  
 
The fact of being pastoralist coincides with the fact of being owner and herder of livestock. 
Therefore, it is through the possession of animals that the full personality of human being, 
from birth to death, is realized. The following case material from the study community 
illustrates how an individual acquires herd from birth through to the later life. 
 
A child receives different gifts from his parents, kin groups and relatives. Upon birth 
a child acquires a gift of a cow or a female-camel from its mother’s father and his 
father too. Upon birth umbilical cord of a baby is cut and tied onto the neck of an 
animal which is intended to be given to the child. While cutting the umbilical cord 
during delivery a midwife asks the baby’s mother “in whose name could she cut the 
cord?” If the mother’s father is alive, the mother would say, “in the name of her 
father” and the new born baby is called by the name of its mother’s father. A piece 
of cut from the umbilical cord will be taken first by mother’s father. Then the 
umbilical cord is sewn onto a small pouch and tied round the neck of cow or camel 
for two to three days. This signifies that this animal is given to the child. This gift is 
called Muga’ata. The same piece of umbilical cord, if it is not lost in those two to 
three days, will be returned to the child’s father who is also expected to do the same, 
i.e. hanging the pieces on cow or camel. This again means his father provides the 
new born baby with an animal. This gift from the baby’s father is called 
Hundu’beta. As the boy grows older, he could receive more gifts from his other 
kinsmen (his aunt, uncle, etc). These animal gifts are kept in his name and could 
form the core herd by the time he gets married and establishes his independent 
household. When his father passes away, he will have a share from his father’s stock 
too. The inheritance of stock after the death of a father is usually made according to 
Sharia law. Birth gifts are obligations according to the Afar Ada (customary law). In 
addition to the gifts mentioned above, a boy could also acquire gifts of stock during 
circumcision and marriage. But these later gifts are not obligations. They are often 
provided on the basis of one’s choice and willingness. In one’s later life, gifts are 
also received if one faces misfortunes and loss stock due to disasters, diseases, 
raiding, theft, etc. These gifts and supports are exchanged mainly among close 
relatives or kinship groups. These transfers aim at tackling shortage of food and 
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breeding stock to the recipient. For the donor it shows the solidarity and goodwill to 
the recipient (Focus group interview, March, 2005).  
 
The above case illustrates how individuals or households build up herds and reciprocate stock 
all along their life cycles. In general the Aghini pastoral community has strong informal 
safety nets to support their members in time of stress and to build up stock. My informants 
identified a number of traditional mutual-aid and stock-transfer mechanisms practiced by 
pastoral households and kinship groups. Some of these are presented in box 6.9 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All these redistributive mechanisms and stock-transfers enable the pastoral households and 
individuals to establish their own herds; recover from crisis; meet social obligations and to 
perform various social ceremonies. The reciprocal arrangements and gifts also reinforce social 
ties and establish networks of support on which individuals and households rely in times of 
need. Nowadays, however, a number of informants noted that most of the traditional mutual-
aid institutions have been undermined by deepening poverty in the one hand and the gradual 
development of individualism especially among the youth, and changes in attitude towards 
property on the other hand. Though the ethos of mutual-help is largely still there, the amount 
contributed to compensate loss is far less than what it is used to be in the past. Therefore, 
traditional ways of crisis/risk management mechanisms have been constrained by mounting 
Box 6. 9 Traditional Mutual-Aid and Stock-transfer Mechanisms: 
 
1. Heraya: A support to a destitute is called Heraya. 
2. Hantita: Free loan of lactating animals to a destitute household.  
3. Erbonta/Irbu: If a herder faces misfortune or loses his livestock due to disease, drought, raiding, etc, 
he calls on help from the community members, and such assistance is locally called Erbonta. 
Assistance can be camel, goat and cattle. The basis of assistance is kinship relation, clan membership 
or neighbourhood. This kind of assistance is often facilitated by Fe-entu (a leader of Fimaa). 
4. Ala: When a bond-friend (Takaysa) comes from a distant place seeking assistance, his partner 
provides him with a stock from his herd and requests also contribution from his neighbours. Such 
type of assistance is called Ala. 
5. Muga’ata and Hundu’beta: Animal gifts given to a child upon birth. These gifts serve as seed 
animals to establish independent household at the later life. 
6. Ari-orba (Bara-Orobi): When an individual first marries or establishes household, relatives/kinship 
groups give a gift which is locally called Ari-orba or Bara-Orobi. 
7. Haray: Kind of support given for financing wedding. 
8. Digbi-Hara: A small stock requested to slaughter during wedding. 
9. Harata: Contribution made to somebody who lacks enough money to buy rifle.  
10. Ebini-Hada: When one household receives many guests, its neighbours contribute food to serve the 
guests. This kind of support to a neighbour is called Ebini-Hada.  
11. Ula-Haraya/Hula-korro: It is a gift or assistance given to an individual whose wife gives birth. 
12. Medili Hara/Haraya: animals begged for wounded/injured or sick person consumption. 
13. Rebey Hara/Haraya: Assistance or support provided to a person whose family member died. It can 
be in kind (grain, animal) or cash. 
14. Zakhat:  It is a compulsory form of stock distribution. Religious leaders impose a form of “animal 
tax” on rich, and number of animals contributed is proportional to the herd size.   
15. Eesiy: An individual who is less fortunate can ‘steal’ animals from the herd of a rich local community 
member or his kin group. However, he has to inform first the clan leader about his intention.   
 
Source: Key informant interviews, April, 2006 
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poverty at household and community level and resulted in the decline of amount of support. 
On the other hand because of mounting poverty and inequality among pastoral households 
over the past decades, it has been a pressure for those who have assets, as they have social 
obligation to share to and support their kin groups.  
 
ii. Establishing bond-friendship/association: The pastoral households and individuals 
establish supportive social relationships both within and beyond the community. The Aghini 
Afar living close to the Oromo and Argoba communities interact intensively and forge close 
friendship. This relation binds together families or individuals from these ethnic groups, and 
thus mutual support is common in such relations. The Afar call their bond-friends Takaysa. In 
principle an individual has to have a friend (Takaysa) within his clan group or from other 
ethnic group(s).  
 
Bond-friendship between individuals can be established in many ways. Some may inherit 
from their parents. For instance if an Oromo and an Afar have bond-friendship, such relation 
is handed down from them to their sons. Bond-friendship can also be established when 
individuals know each other while working or keeping cattle together, interacting through 
market, moving herds from one area to the other. For instance during dry season the Afar 
move their livestock into Oromo locality. Similarly the Oromos move their livestock into the 
Afar locality during summer. During such movements and contacts individuals come to know 
each other and later become good friends (Takaysa). However, the formation of bond-
friendship between individuals has to be sanctioned by elders, as it involves admission of 
someone into one’s clan group or community. After two individuals agree and decide to be 
friends, their relation has to be formalized in the presence of elders. First the potential friends 
declare their bond-friendship in the presence of elders by presenting their justification. 
Having heard their reason, the elders give their blessing to the friends and advise them to keep 
their promise, to stay as close friends, and help each other during bad and good times. Their 
relation is expected to last long and to be inherited by their children. 
 
According to informants, establishing bond-friendship has many advantages for both partners 
and their respective kin groups/communities as well. This relation helps individuals or 
partners to: 
 
• get access to rights for pasture (free access to grass) and farmlands, 
• practice irrigated farming along riverbanks independently or in cooperation with 
sedentary cultivators (Oromos and Amharas), 
• lease farm plots to neighbouring crop  cultivators, 
• leave livestock at friends care when drought occurs, 
• obtain support when one loses animals or sources of livelihood due to crisis,  
• ease mobility barriers, and secure information on forage availability,  
• gather information with regard animals looted or lost. The Afar make markings on 
their stock. Herders use such markings to trace their animals via bond-friends,  
• maintain solidarity, 
• reduce tension and mediate conflicts between groups,  
• facilitate inter-marriage arrangement.      
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Some informants perceived that new practices also came along with forging friendship and 
intermarriages with the neighbouring communities. These include new dressing and hair style, 
adoption of cultivation and new food habit. The pastoral people have begun wearing long 
skirt, trouser and shirt which were unknown in the past. Nowadays the local people also cut 
their hair short. Grain food becomes an important component of the local people’s diet.   
 
iii. Renting out farm-oxen to neighbouring crop cultivators: Renting out oxen to lowland 
Oromo crop-cultivators has been an important strategy of obtaining food grains (maize and 
sorghum). It has been also used as risk reduction strategy, as it enables ox-owners to store 
some grains for a stress time and to disperse bulls during drought. This reciprocal 
arrangement has been an age-old source of food grain to the Afar living close to the farming 
community. Many informants have traced the commencement of this practice back to some 
four decades ago. In those days the Oromos had large landholdings where they needed more 
farm oxen for ploughing. In the same way, the local Afar had many oxen/bulls at the time. 
Therefore, the Afar have seized this opportunity by renting out oxen to crop cultivators in 
exchange for grains. Recently this practice is, however, being reduced due to decline of oxen 
population in the pastoral community, and recurring drought, and decline of landholding and 
repeated crop failure in the farming community. Moreover, in recent years the highland 
cultivators have began receiving cash credit from the government to buy farm-oxen. 
Consequently, the demand for oxen from cultivators has declined in recent decades. 
Informants reported that in the past good days a wealthy individual could rent out as many as 
15 farm oxen to neighbouring crop cultivators. Currently the number, however, has gone 
down to three to six oxen. Some pastoral households/individuals still rent out oxen to crop 
cultivators. The following case material illustrates how various reciprocal arrangements are 
practiced between the local Afar and neighbouring crop cultivators:    
 
Hassen, a 45-year-old, is the resident of Gawto village, and rents out six oxen to 
neighbouring Oromos. Hassen inherited four oxen from his father. The other two 
oxen are from own investment. Hassen’s father used to rent out oxen to his Oromo 
allies for past four decades. Thus Hassen has taken over the practice from his father 
and has continued renting out oxen to his father’s allies (Takaysa) to receive 
agricultural produce depending on mutual agreement. The rental for a well-trained 
ox is three quintals of grain per one harvest. Therefore, Hassen receives three 
quintals of maize or Mashila (white sorghum) per ox. In December 2005 he 
collected the rental of two oxen (i.e. 6 quintals of sorghum) for his household 
immediate consumption. Hassen has also stored the payment of four oxen (i.e. 12 
quintals) with his partner for future use. As he expected some food shortage in 2006, 
he stored the grain to collect by then. If there would be no food shortage, he would 
sell his reserve to convert it into cash. Hassen said that he would continue renting 
out his oxen until they become too old, after which he would sell them and buy 
young bulls for renting out again. Hassen also seeks support from his ally for 
training young bulls. In most cases Hassen rents out oxen to his father’s Takaysa. 
Hassen has maintained this relation with his father’s Takaysa not only to rent out 
oxen, but also to inherit his father’s bond-friendship, mutual support and gift 
exchange networks. Moreover, Hassen’s Takaysa acts as middleman whenever 
Hassen needs to rent out oxen to other crop cultivators. Hassen and his Takaysa 
support each other by exchanging gifts too. For instance at different times Hassen 
gave two oxen, three goats and one camel to his Takaysa. Likewise Hassen has 
received grains from his Takaysa at various times. For instance in 1996, when there 
was severe food shortage in the Afar locality, Hassen obtained grain from his 
Takaysa (Individual Interview, December, 2005).  
 268
The above case material illustrates the complexity and various forms of reciprocal 
arrangements between Afar pastoral households and neighbouring crop cultivators. The case 
also reveals that reciprocal arrangements are inherited or inter-generational in which one type 
of relation is further forged into different forms of cooperation and networking in order to 
meet various needs, to reduce risks and to cope with resource shortages and crises. Therefore, 
pastoralists, such as Hassen, who have farm oxen, still use various reciprocal arrangements 
with neighbouring crop cultivators to obtain grain food and to survive crises periods by 
dispersing stock to their allies.  
 
6.6.2.2 Households’ Coping Strategies to Seasonal Food Shortage (Crisis) 
 
A number of informants reported that their community has experienced recurring food crises 
over the past decades. In this connection the survey households were also asked whether 
‘food supply from their primary livelihood system is enough to sustain their families 
throughout the year’. In reply to the question, most of the respondents (90%) said 
‘insufficient’. And they had to find other sources to supplement income from the livestock 
production. Consequently, individuals and households have employed a variety of strategies 
to cope with food deficits/crisis. According to the key informants, important coping 
mechanisms include reducing consumption, collecting famine foods, calling on kin for 
support, relief assistance, etc. Likewise, as depicted in Table 6.15 below, the sample 
households also reported similar types of coping strategies that are derived from various 
livelihood strategies. 
 
Table 6.15 Households’ Coping Strategies for Food Crisis (Multiple Responses are Possible) 
Coping strategy  Respondents (n=60) Percent 
 Relief food assistance 51 85.0 
 Support from kin and bond-friends 28 46.7 
 Reducing consumption 25 41.7 
 Selling animals and purchasing grain 20 33.3 
 Growing food crops  10 16.7 
 Trading (livestock, Chat, etc) 7 11.7 
 Renting out room 4 6.7 
 Renting out oxen to crop cultivators  4 6.7 
 Remittance 3 5.0 
 Borrowing cash from traders 2 3.3 
 Daily labour wage 2 3.3 
 Tending livestock 1 1.7 
 Zakhat 1 1.7 
Source: Sample Household Survey, December, 2005 
 
Households’ coping mechanisms presented in Table 6.15 can be classified under four 
categories. These are formal and informal transfer systems (relief food distribution, 
remittance, kinship support, informal loan); consumption based (reducing consumption); 
exchange and market based (trading/retailing, food grain purchase through livestock selling, 
renting out assets); and production based (crop cultivation). Accordingly the majority of the 
food deficit households (85%) overcame food crisis through formal transfer (i.e. external food 
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assistance). Mutual-support networks (46.7%), reducing consumption (41.7%), selling of 
livestock (33.3%) and growing crop (16.7%) were also reported to be important ways of 
deficit management strategies. The household survey results suggest that the local people 
mainly rely on external food assistance and on their informal-support systems to cope with 
recurrent food crisis. As shown in Table 6.15 individuals and households use various ways of 
coping mechanisms in times of severe food crisis. The following section elabourates the most 
common coping mechanisms in the study community.   
 
i. Reducing food consumption and adjusting food composition: In times of food crisis, the 
pastoral households cut back the number of daily meals, and change the types and 
composition of diets in order to survive crisis time. Asked how many times a day did adults 
and children eat during the worst month of food stress, 33.3% of the households said one 
meal a day, 63.4% two meals and only 3.3% reported three means a day. With regard to 
children, 93.3% of the respondents said that children ate two meals a day and 6.7% said three 
meals. As Table 6.16 below shows, in both cases (i.e. adults and children), most of them ate 
twice a day during food stress. In fact most of the key informants indicated that the local 
people usually eat twice a day. Therefore, cutting back the number of daily meals from two to 
one is an indicator of severe food stress from informants’ perspective. 
 
Table 6.16 Number of Meals per Day during Severe Food Crisis 
Adults  Children   Number of daily meals 
Frequency  % Frequency  % 
 Once a day  20 33.3 - - 
 Twice a day  38 63.4 56 93.3 
 Three times a day 2 3.3 4 6.7 
 Total 60 100.0 60 100.0 
Source: Sample Household Survey, December, 2005 
 
Pastoral households resort not only to reducing the number of daily meals, but also to 
changing the types and composition of foods to survive the crisis period. Accordingly, the 
simple crisis diets in the study community include Muki (soup) and Niffro (boiled grain). 
Households with food deficit also balance the available food with demand by mixing foods 
(e.g. milk with salt and water) and eating simple and cheap foods like boiled or roasted grain.  
 
ii. Preserving and storing food: This involves slaughtering animals to preserve as dried meat. 
The local people process and preserve some dried meat for crisis time. These foods can be 
prepared from cattle, sheep and goat meats. Foods are also prepared from grains and 
preserved to overcome crisis period. The following are among foods prepared from meat and 
grain for crisis time and long journeys: 
 
• Tobno: It is a camel meat boiled, cooled and stored in a Kora (wooden container). 
It can be kept for three months. It is served mainly for sick or wounded person to 
recover quickly. 
• Dubele: It is a camel meat sliced into long thin strips and dried on racks or ropes. 
When completely dry, the meat is pounded and mixed with salt and stored in 
moisture-tight container for a year. 
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• Alok-halo: Roasted barley or sorghum. Dried dates are added and can be taken on 
long journeys. It can stay for one year.  
• Birkuta: It is thin dry bread prepared from grain (corn flour). It is baked on a round 
stone set on firewood. It is shredded and dried. If it is made with butter it can be 
kept for a long time.  
• Muffae(Ga’amo): It is made from corn or sorghum flour. It is baked in specially-
designed oven. It can be eaten fresh. If it is kept for future use, it is dried and 
pounded into rough flour.  
 
iii. Selling animals and purchasing food grain: Selling livestock is a normal phenomenon 
among pastoral households to meet household needs which require cash. During food crisis 
the sale of live animals is adopted by a number of individuals/households as animal products 
(milk and butter) are insufficient to meet household consumption. They begin with selling 
small stock like kid/lamb (Bakal), sheep and goats. Then they move on to selling young 
cattle, and then cows and finally selling camel as a crisis escalates. During the household 
survey asked “why they sold livestock before the survey year”, most of the households 
(93.3%) sold live animals mainly for purchasing food grain. This figure indicates the 
dependence of local people on grain for household consumption. As depicted in Table 6.17 
below the second and third strong responses to the same question were for buying ‘clothing’ 
(78.3%) and ‘consumer goods’ (35%) respectively. 18.3% of the respondents sold live 
animals to save money for future which implies destocking.  
  
Table 6.17 Reason for Selling Animals before the Survey Period (Multiple Responses are 
Possible) 
 Reasons for selling live animals   Respondents (n=60) Percent 
 Purchase of food grain 56 93.3 
 Buying cloth 47 78.3 
 Purchasing consumer goods (tea, sugar, coffee, tobacco) 21 35.0 
 Saving some money for the future 11 18.3 
 For medical expense 3 5.0 
 Purchasing grass or enclosure from neighbouring Oromos 2 3.3 
 Building house in Nemelifen (district center)  1 1.7 
 Hiring labour for cultivation 1 1.7 
 For school expense 1 1.7 
 Settling loan 1 1.7 
Source: Sample Household Survey, December, 2005 
 
iv. Collecting wild foods: Individuals and households resort to consuming ‘famine foods’ 
such as leafy plants and plants with seed, berries and fruit, and roots in times of severe food 
crisis. During my field study I attempted to record some famine foods through interviewing 
knowledgeable elders. The most important fruit-producing plants are presented in Table 6.18 
below.  
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Table 6.18 Wild Fruits, Leaves and Roots Used as Famine Foods 
Local name  Scientific name  Parts eaten How is it prepared? Is it available 
currently? 
Who collects?  
Adayto  Salvadora persica. L Fruit (Omili) - Fruit  can be  eaten fresh, or juice 
can be prepared  from the fruit 
Available  Children  
Adedoyta   Gum (Hamuka) Gum (Hamuka) can be  eaten Available Children and women  
Busunkuley   Root The root can be  eaten Not available  Children  
Jejebaytu  Berchemia discolour Fruit (Jejeba) The  fruit can be  eaten  Available  Children and women  
Gersa  Dobera glabra Fruit: 
. Cover (Mudu’a) 
. Seed (Gersa)  
 
- Outer cover can be eaten 
- Seed is boiled and eaten 
 Available only in 
certain localities 
Women  
Habeleyta Grewia villosa willd Fruit (Habele) The outer cover is removed and its 
inner part can be eaten  
Available  Children and women  
Hidayito Grewia ferruginea hochst. Fruit (Hida)  The fruit can be  eaten  Available Children and women  
Humra (Roka) Tamarindus indica (L) Fruit (Humura) Row or roasted fruit  can be  eaten   Available Children  
Kusra Zizipphus spinna Christi (L) Fruit (Kusura) The  fruit is eaten  Available Children and women 
Mederto Cordia sinensis Lam Fruit (Medera) The fruit is eaten  Available along 
river banks 
Children and women  
Muka  Root The root is eaten  Not available Children  
Semery   Root The root is eaten   Available Children  
Sunkehayu  Fruit  The fruit is collected and eaten  Available Children  
Urayto  Fruit (Ura) Outer cover of the fruit is eaten  Available  Children  
Uda Balanittes aegyptica (L) Del - Fruit (Uda-
korkor)   
- Gum (mucha)   
- The fruit is eaten  
- Its gum chewed 
Available  Children  
Source: Interviews with Key informants (elders and clan leaders), December, 2005 
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As it can be seen in Table 6.18, the local people use a variety of fruits, seeds and roots as 
sources of food in times of food stress. However, the informants remarked that wild foods 
have become scarce in recent decades due to deforestation, bush encroachment, and drought 
consequences.  
 
v. Mobilizing social networks and kinship relations: As stated earlier sharing food and cash 
among kin and relatives is a common practice in the study community. Clan members have 
strong social obligation to share resources in times of crisis. The “your pocket is my pocket” 
mentality is deeply entrenched. Someone who sells animals may be obliged to share the 
income with lineage or sub-clan members. Particularly in times of extreme stress better-off 
individuals have an obligation to share what is available at their disposal to the needy kin and 
relatives. Individuals and households with food shortage can call on their kin for support and 
receive donations which can be in the form of grain or cash. 
 
In the household survey, respondents were asked “whether their community members help 
each other during bad and good times”. And all the respondents replied in the affirmative. 
They stated that “if they have a problem and need cash or food, they can get donations from 
relatives, clan members, bond-friends”. “Asked about how many people could they request 
for assistance”, the respondents mentioned many potential donors ranging from four to fifty 
as shown in Table 6.19 below.  
 
Table 6.19 How many people you could ask for help if you face problem? 
Number of potential donors   Frequency  Percent 
4 2 3.3 
5 3 5.0 
6 2 3.3 
10 15 25.0 
15 7 11.7 
20 16 26.7 
25 4 6.7 
30 6 10.0 
40 3 5.0 
50 2 3.3 
    Total 60 100.0 
Source: Sample Household Survey, December, 2005.  
 
The sample household heads were also asked “whether they had ever received assistance from 
their kin”. 90% (n=54) of the sample households replied in positive and only 10% (n=6) had 
never asked for assistance in the past. As Table 6.20 below depicts, the kind of assistances 
reported by many respondents were livestock (74.2%), cash (15.1%) and labour (4.5%). Very 
few respondents mentioned grain, rifle, oxen loan and remittance.  
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Table 6.20 Types of Assistances Received by Sample Households in the Past (Multiple 
Responses are possible) 
  Types of assistance Responses (n=54)  Percent 
  Livestock 49 74.3 
  Cash 10 15.2 
  Labour contribution 3 4.5 
  Rifle  1 1.5 
  Free use of oxen 1 1.5 
  Grain  1 1.5 
  Remittance  1 1.5 
  Total 66 100.0 
Source: Sample Household Survey, December, 2005. 
 
Similarly the survey respondents were asked “if they received any assistance/support from 
anyone outside of their household in the last 12 months before the household survey”. In 
reply to this question they stated various types of assistances that they received during one 
year period. These are presented in Table 6.21 below.  
 
Table 6.21 Distribution of Responses by Types of Assistances Received during the 12 Months 
before the Survey (Multiple Responses are Possible)  
  Types of assistance/supports  Responses (n=54)  Percent 
  Livestock gift 24 30.4 
  Free labour 23 29.1 
  Cash gift 14 17.7 
  Cash loan 6 7.6 
  Food or grain gift 6 7.6 
  Hantilla/Hantita (milk  animal) 2 2.5 
  Free use of camel 2 2.5 
  Free use of oxen 1 1.3 
  Grass hay 1 1.3 
  Total 79 100.0 
Source: Sample Household Survey, December, 2005. 
 
As shown in Tables 6.20 and 6.21, the common types of assistance received by the needy 
households in the past and now are mainly livestock, labour, cash and food. These donations 
are extended mainly from kin, clan members and from non-Afar bond-friends. 
 
In recent years, following the administrative decentralization process and the establishment of 
district administrations and offices in the Afar Region, some individuals have got 
employment in government offices, departments and projects. Thus salaried persons, who live 
outside of the community, have a social obligation to share some cash to their relatives or kin 
living in the pastoral settlements. This suggests that kinship relations, clan affiliation and 
bond-association are crucial informal safety nets for individuals/households to help each other 
in times of crisis. Therefore, individual or household level crisis could be managed through 
mobilizing such social networks and mutual support systems.  
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However, in recent decades the efficiency of such safety nets is limited, when a crisis strikes 
the larger community. Moreover, given the scarcity of assets and resources in recent years, 
the amount of support/assistance has been declining. This point is reflected by both, key 
informants and household respondents. A number of informants claimed that the extent of 
support in their community has decreased in recent years, as asset holdings and capacity have 
been eroded due to impacts of recurring drought and shortage of forage resources that have 
led either to sale of stock and mortality of livestock or decline of milk production. The 
household respondents also supported the view of informants, and they also identified two 
major reasons for decline in the amount of support. They include losses of resources 
(livestock assets) both, at household and community levels, and severe reduction of milk 
yield. Consequently, local informal transfers of livestock, cash and food among pastoral 
households are less able to provide safety nets in times of severe crisis. This in turn has led to 
increased dependence of the local people on external food assistance in times of severe food 
crisis.  
 
vi. Seeking relief food: In times of famines/severe food crises, the local people rely on relief 
food distribution. As indicated earlier, the local community has been stricken repeatedly by 
famines/food crises within the past decades. The most crippling crises in the local community 
were the 1973-1974 and 1984-1985 famines, and the 1999/2000 and 2003/2004 severe food 
crisis. During the latter two catastrophes the local people relied mainly on emergency relief 
food distribution from the government and NGOs. Therefore, relief food distribution saved 
the lives of thousands of hungry people during the previous famines. A number of informants 
have fervent evidence to this fact. An informant from the pastoral village said, “Had it not 
been for relief food distribution in 1999 and 2003 food crises, thousands would have perished 
just like that occurred in 1984-1985 famine.”168  
 
As indicated in Table 6.15 most of the sampled households (85%) mentioned ‘relief food 
assistance’ as one mechanism of survival in time of severe food crisis. Therefore, the local 
people’s dependency on relief food has been increased in recent decades, as pastoral 
households are less able to cope with severe food crisis through their indigenous coping 
mechanisms.   
 
In the preceding sections I discussed the main adaptive responses and coping strategies 
adopted by individuals and households in the case study community. In this connection, it 
should be noted that not all individuals or households have equal access to each strategy 
owing to varying access to initial assets and opportunities. Moreover, coping mechanisms and 
adaptive responses may overlap, and one’s coping mechanism can be other’s adaptive 
strategies. Therefore, it is important to explore the reason for taking one or the other 
strategies. Accordingly during field work I attempted to make a matrix of adaptive/coping 
strategies adopted by wealth groups, as sources from which coping strategies derived vary 
mainly according to initial assets that an individual or a household possesses. The matrixes 
were done through focus group interviews with knowledgeable elders. These matrixes are 
presented in Tables 6.22 and 6.23. 
 
 
 
                                                 
168 All over the country the total number of population affected by the 1999 and 2003 famines was about 10 and 
14 million respectively.  
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Table 6.22 Matrix of Coping Strategies and Wealth Groups169  
wealth groups Types of coping mechanisms 
very poor poor middle rich 
Disposal of animals and save some money for 
future  
  x x 
Eating cheap foods (boiled or roasted grain)  x x   
Eating wild foods (fruits, roots)  x x   
Selling hand craft x x   
Migration for seasonal labour   x x   
Mutual-aid  support/cooperation  x x x x 
Reducing the number of meals and amount of 
food  
x x   
Renting out oxen in exchange for grain    x x 
Selling livestock for purchasing food grain x x x x 
Splitting family members and put under the 
care of relatives  
x x   
Source: Focus Group Interview (elders and clan leaders), December, 2005 
 
Table 6.23 Matrix of Adaptation/Risk Reduction Strategies and Wealth Groups  
wealth groups Types of adaptation/risk reduction strategies 
very poor poor middle rich 
Crop cultivation    x x 
Formation of bond-friendship and mutual-aid 
association  
x x x x 
Movement of livestock to other places x x x x 
Renting out oxen in exchange for grain,   x x 
Splitting livestock and leave them under care 
of others  
 x x x 
Trading in livestock, and in other items (chat, 
tobacco) 
 x x x 
Source: Focus Group Interviews (elders and clan leaders), December, 2005 
 
As it can be seen in the above tables, some adaptive and coping strategies overlap across the 
wealth groups. On the other hand, some kinds of strategies show some variation in terms of 
wealth groups. For instance as depicted in Table 6.22 (see rows 6&8) mutual-aid/cooperation 
is fairly accessible to all wealth groups, whereas renting out oxen is more open to wealthy 
households. Therefore, the deferential opportunities to various strategies are influenced by the 
initial endowment i.e. prerequisite resources (animals, labour, skills, cash, and social 
networks) from which strategies are derived. For instance, the possibility of selling animals in 
order to meet food deficit or renting out oxen to access food grain, is dependent on the 
availability of extra animals or farm-oxen respectively. Likewise the possibility of earning 
                                                 
169 Regarding livestock wealth, there are no figures on exact number owned by households. My informants, 
however, distinguished between wealth groups on the bases of herd size and its composition.  Accordingly (i) 
households with 25-30 camels, 30 cattle and 100 or more goats and sheep are considered as rich, (ii) households 
with 15 camels, 10-15 cattle and 40-50 goats and sheep as middle, (iii) household with 4-5 camels, 6-10 cattle 
and 20-25 goats and sheep as poor; (iv) households with 2-3 cattle and  15-20 goats and sheep very poor (Focus 
group Interview, April, 2005).   
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additional income for a household from non-pastoral activities or seasonal work is influenced 
by the availability of skilled labour in a household.  
 
Generally pastoral households’ decision making about the kinds of adaptive/coping strategies 
is influenced by many factors namely prerequisite resources, economic status, severity of 
food/cash shortages, as well as by possibilities, options and constraints offered by the 
ecological and socio-economic systems at a given time and space. Therefore, a complete 
understanding of the pastoral households’ decision with regard coping mechanisms requires 
considering all these factors. Moreover, in recent decades the local people tend to adopt 
various coping strategies which were not in the traditional livelihood activities/strategies. This 
suggests that the primary livelihood system (livestock production) has become structurally 
vulnerable. Therefore, some of the coping mechanisms are being incorporated into the local 
economic activities and are becoming adaptive responses to pastoral households. In this 
connection typical examples are crop cultivation and seasonal migration for work. Though 
these secondary activities have constraints, they are now becoming adaptive responses in the 
local community, as traditional subsistence livestock production is less able to provide 
livelihood security. Some three to four decades ago they were undertaken mainly as coping 
mechanisms for certain periods or seasons. Currently a number of individuals and households 
are taking them as their secondary activities. 
 
 
6.6.2.3 Concluding Summary  
 
The case study on the Aghini pastoral community has revealed that the local peoples’ 
livelihood system relies heavily on the utilization of natural resources and on strong social 
capitals (mutual-help and social networks). Natural resources such as pasture, vegetation and 
water are very crucial to the local pastoral system. The local peoples’ livelihood does not rely 
only on the natural and physical resources, but also on social capitals and social institutions.  
 
Clan and its segments are responsible for deciding and distribution of livestock over the 
resources of grazing and division of labour necessary for the management of various herds. 
Clan system ensures members’ equal access to communal pastoral resources, and controls the 
management and use of communal resources. The local people have appropriate social 
organization (kinship/clanship) and customary laws to manage and utilize the varying 
resources. The local environment does not have sufficient pasture in a given area. Therefore, 
herders adopt suitable strategies (mobility, herd splitting, herd diversity, etc) to seize the 
varying resources. This is an appropriate type of resource management. 
 
Kinship/clanship is also the basis of mutual support and cooperation in times of need.  Asset 
transfers and resource redistribution among the local people are made according to 
kinship/clanship and other relations. Livestock and other resources are often considered as 
collective property to kinship groups. Therefore, kinship system discourages individuals from 
depleting resources; and even excludes those members who do not adhere to the customary 
laws. The kinship system often encourages accumulation of stocks by members or kin during 
normal time and redistribution when members face shortages of productive stocks. Therefore, 
informal safety net arrangements such as kinship relation, stock alliance, social networking, 
mutual cooperation and resource sharing play greater roles in maintaining pastoral practices in 
an uncertain environment that involves various risks (raiding, animal epidemics, conflicts, 
vagaries of nature, etc). Individuals/households and social groups can mobilize informal 
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safety nets to get access to resources and to cope with shocks or stresses. Kinship groups have 
a shared claim and right in each other’s stocks. In times of need, sharing resources is a social 
obligation among members. The “your pocket is my pocket” mentality is deeply entrenched 
among the local people. 
 
The indigenous adaptive strategies, mutual support systems and suitable social organizations 
have maintained the resilience of the local people. In recent decades, however, these 
mechanisms of resilience have been challenged by multiple internal and external factors. 
Firstly, the natural resource base has been eroded over time. This is attributed mainly to 
environmental degradation, bush encroachment, recurring droughts and loss of dry/drought 
retreats owing to external interventions and mounting conflicts with neighbouring groups. 
Depletion of key pastoral resources (pasture, vegetation and water) within the immediate 
environment and in dry season/drought retreats has been the main predicament for the local 
pastoral production. This is further exacerbated by cyclic droughts. Secondly, the traditional 
social organizations have been affected by external interventions (imposition of centralized 
administration and alien institutions; inappropriate land policy and livestock development 
projects; expropriation of land; conflicts, etc). Thirdly, the failure of external actors for 
providing suitable infrastructure and services to pastoral groups. The complex interplay of 
these factors has made livestock production difficult for the local people. As a result, 
traditional adaptive strategies and informal safety net arrangements are less able to buffer 
herders against stresses. This in turn has led to livelihood insecurity. Drought-related food 
shortage, which could previously be managed by informal safety net arrangements, has now 
become beyond the capacity of the local people. Consequently, many pastoral households rely 
on external food assistance when drought strikes the local community. When the whole 
community is stricken by drought, mutual support networks are less able to provide a buffer 
against shocks. The cumulative effects of frequent droughts have resulted in further erosion of 
assets at household and community levels. Thus recovery takes longer time. 
 
In fact, as discussed in the preceding sections, individuals and households are adopting 
additional activities (crop cultivation, trading and labour migration). However, these activities 
also have risks. For instance crop cultivation has a risk, as it is equally affected by drought 
and shortage of rainfall. Livestock trading is affected by market uncertainty, disease outbreak, 
lack of feed, etc. Labour migration requires the availability of extra labour, and the necessary 
skills to succeed in urban and agricultural based activities. 
 
In recent years more vulnerable groups have emerged, as the local resource base and informal 
safety nets are less able to support community members who lost assets. These included asset-
poor households; small stock owners; families without working members; widows; aged 
persons; households with limited access to social networks; etc. Indeed the local people have 
claimed that they are all at risk, as a single year drought is sufficient to trigger severe food 
crisis in their locality. And yet the above-mentioned groups of people are more vulnerable, as 
the traditional informal safety nets are less able to support them.  
 
Generally the case study has revealed that pastoral households have become more vulnerable 
to drought-related food crisis over time. Moreover, transfer of food, stocks and cash among 
pastoralists through informal safety nets is very limited during drought. In conclusion it can 
be said that the local peoples’ resilience is mainly based on their resource base, appropriate 
type of communal resource management and utilization, suitable social organization, and 
strong social safety net arrangements based on kinship. Therefore, as the literature review in 
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Chapter 2 (section 2.6.3) has shown, resilience is related to social capitals of the communities 
and integrating features of their social organizations. This suggests the need to consider these 
properties of communities and societies in external interventions intended to enhance local 
people’s capacity.   
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Chapter Seven 
Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
7.1 Focus of the Study and Summary of the Research Arguments 
 
This research has attempted to investigate the underlying causes of vulnerability to famine 
/food crisis among the Afar pastoralists in north-east Ethiopia. Accordingly it seeks to make 
an assessment of historical socio-political processes, ecological changes and extreme weather 
events, and of their consequences on the local people’s livelihood systems. In that respect an 
attempt is made specifically to examine livelihood resources and their trends; ecological 
degradation; external encroachments and to assess indigenous adaptive responses and external 
interventions adopted to cope with various stresses.       
 
As shown in Chapter 1, this study is designed to address three principal research questions. 
The first deals with the investigation of underlying causes of pastoralists’ vulnerability to 
famine/food crisis. In relation to this it is argued that pastoralists’ vulnerability to famine has 
increased as a result of both internal and external factors. In addressing this question an 
assessment of factors both, at macro (regional/national) and micro (community) levels, is 
made on the basis of secondary and primary data respectively. Accordingly, factors related to 
ecological degradation, socio-political processes and recurrent droughts, etc. are examined 
(Chapters 3, 5 & 6).  The extent of these problems at the macro level is assessed mainly based 
on secondary data (Chapters 3 & 5), while the magnitude of these problems at micro 
(community) level is assessed on the basis of primary data gathered through a household 
survey, and individual and focus group interviews (Chapter 6). The main focus of the analysis 
at the community level is on the local people’s perception about livelihood resources, well-
being trends and risk factors which affect their traditional subsistence. 
 
The second question deals with examination of traditional early warning systems, indigenous 
responses, and risk communication among pastoralists and to external actors (government 
agencies and NGOs). In this respect an attempt is made to identify indigenous early warning 
systems and to assess external interventions and disaster responses with emphasis on the local 
people’s view on institutional (public) responses in times of food crisis (Chapter 6).  
 
The third question deals with the assessment of the local people’s adaptive and coping 
strategies to the ecological changes and recurring food crisis. In addressing this question 
attempt is made to show how the local people have reshaped their adaptive responses and 
coping mechanisms in the face of mounting external pressures and crises. In this respect, 
analyses of traditional adaptive responses to the variable environment and ecological changes 
and of coping mechanisms to recurrent food crisis are made using mainly the primary data 
gathered from the local pastoral community (Chapter 6).    
 
Generally speaking the central argument of this study is that pastoralists’ vulnerability to 
famine and food crisis has increased overtime because of the complex interplay of multiple 
factors such as environmental or ecological degradation, socio-economic destabilization, 
political processes, severe droughts, etc. This research highlights how these factors have led 
to an increased vulnerability and livelihood insecurity among the Afar pastoralists. It is stated 
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that despite efforts of internal and external actors, vulnerability of the pastoral groups to 
famine has increased over time. Specifically three arguments are addressed through analyzing 
both secondary and primary data. These are: 
  
i. The Afar pastoralists’ vulnerability to famine crisis has increased over the past 
decades because of the combined effects of drought, ecological crisis and external 
pressures (encroachments, loss of key pastoral resources, violent conflict and 
political instability). 
ii. Pastoral households/communities are currently less able to cope with stresses 
through their traditional coping and adaptive strategies. 
iii. Consequently, pastoral households/communities have become more dependent on 
public transfer (food aid) to cope with recurring food crisis.         
 
7.2 Some Reflections on Theoretical Arguments and Approaches on Disaster 
Causation  
 
As noted in the preceding Chapters, the outline of this research has been structured to suit an 
approach of presenting discussions at macro and micro levels. Chapter 2 discusses the 
relevant concepts, theories and disciplinary perspectives in disaster research. The main aim of 
the literature review in Chapter 2 is to orient the present research approach by drawing on the 
current theoretical arguments and approaches concerning disaster causation or vulnerability to 
specific disaster (e.g. famine). Accordingly, the review of the literature on disaster and its 
causation has revealed that the causes of a disaster are to be seen primarily in the context of 
socio-political processes and not in natural factors. Therefore, the search for causal factors has 
to focus on understanding these processes rather than on natural hazards whose damaging 
effects vary according to individuals’ or social groups’ positions in a given socio-political and 
economic arrangement. This suggests the socially differentiated vulnerability to disaster  in a 
given community/society.  
 
As elabourated in Chapter 2, the current tone of the literature is that disasters are the outcome 
of socio-political and economic processes; and the appropriate approach for disaster 
prevention is to manage risks and reduce vulnerability by tackling root causes rather than 
focusing on natural events. Natural hazards (i.e. drought, flood) are events which are often 
beyond individuals’ or social groups’ control. And yet, better social, political and economic 
arrangements are able to cope with the damaging consequences of such events. Therefore, the 
level of individuals’ and social groups’ vulnerability to varying risks depends on their status 
and relations in social and economic arrangements to predict, manage and reduce risks or to 
cope with consequences.  
 
Individuals and social groups are more or less able to cope with disasters depending on the 
degree of exposure to natural hazards/risks, and the social, political and economic factors that 
either enhance or constrain their capacity for reducing risks or coping with effects. In this 
respect the concept of vulnerability represents this situation and it contains three elements - 
the present status of individuals and social groups, the extent of external stress and the 
capability to cope with and adapt to external stresses. Therefore, the analysis of social 
vulnerability better captures why people/social groups in a specific context are more or less 
capable to cope with risks. As noted in Chapter 2, the perspective of social vulnerability has 
gained a substantial attention in the literature and is used as one perspective/organizing 
framework in disaster research. 
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Social vulnerability perspective emphasizes the importance to focus not on natural events, but 
to take the social systems and power relations. In that case vulnerability is determined by 
social systems and power, not by natural forces; and it needs to be understood in the context 
of political and economic systems (Blaikie et al., 2004). This indicates the need to look at the 
wider societal components. This in turn suggests the political economy approach, which 
considers both an individual human action and broader societal contexts (i.e. political and 
economic systems). Therefore, adopting a broad perspective/theoretical orientation, which 
focuses on the social, political and economic processes, captures better the underlying cause 
of a specific disaster.  
 
In general terms the theoretical argument is that natural events, such as drought and flood 
hazards, don’t necessarily lead to a disaster. Therefore, whether a drought leads to famine 
disaster depends on other factors. For instance the droughts of 1984 in Ethiopia and Sudan 
showed that a protracted drought resulted in famine disaster, as the cumulative impacts of 
preceding rain shortfall eroded livelihood assets and capacity of households to cope with 
effects and to recover from successive shocks. At that time the droughts were preceded by at 
least two years of below-average rainfall and thus households’ vulnerability to famine had 
already increased through depletion of food stock and capital assets (Webb, 1994:174).   
 
Each famine, therefore, has its own specific causes in each context and this requires exploring 
the causal factors thereof. In the East African context, a prolonged drought appears to be a 
primary agent of famine. In Ethiopia the main disaster that has repeatedly stricken the country 
is drought-linked famine. Famines, which have plagued the country within the past several 
decades, have been blamed principally on the drought episodes. Since the early 1980s 
drought-related famines/food crises have become frequent. As depicted in figure 3.2 (Chapter 
3) there was no single year, where there was no food crisis in the last two decades. Every year 
about 5-6 million people have been in need of food assistance. This indicates the structural 
vulnerability of rural households to food crisis. 
   
And yet successive Ethiopian governments have every time attributed famines mainly to 
drought and/or failure of rainfall that have led to crop failure and livestock mortality. 
Therefore, famine disaster has usually been theorized mainly as failure of food availability 
because of natural events (drought, pest). Accordingly the government and NGOs response to 
the famines has been emergency response (food aid) to save the lives of victims. Therefore, 
the recovery and development aspects, and livelihood protection are missing. In relation to 
this a previous study has put it clearly in this manner. “At best, relief food aid has simply kept 
people in a holding pattern. It has not built assets nor has it secured livelihoods” (USAID, 
2004:13).  
 
In this connection, some authors and critics (e.g. Mesfin, 1986, 1991; Dessalegn, 1991, 
Degefa, 2005) have challenged the position of successive Ethiopian regimes with regard to 
causes of famine and responses arguing that socio-political and economic processes, and 
institutional and policy failures have played a primary role in creating vulnerability to famine 
more than the natural factors. These processes have led to a loss of peoples’ livelihoods that 
in turn made producers vulnerable to the consequences of slow-onset natural events (drought, 
disease, crop pests) or shocks. This suggests that the genesis of food crisis (famine) must be 
understood as an interaction of institutional, economic and political variables. Likewise it is 
argued that the inappropriate theorization of famine causation has resulted in ineffective 
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external interventions or responses which focus on emergency food aid without considering 
livelihood protection.    
 
Therefore, the conclusion is that natural events like droughts don’t necessarily lead to famine 
in all contexts. It is only when livelihood assets are eroded, opportunities are constrained and 
people are not well-prepared that the consequences of natural events develop into famine or 
food crisis. This suggests that production or yield failures caused by drought do not become 
famines unless other conditions are propitious. Here comes the issue of vulnerability to risks 
(i.e. the degree of exposure) and the capacity of households/communities to reduce risks 
and/or cope with shocks. Therefore, the current approach in social sciences research with 
regard to disaster causation is to look at the interrelationship between natural risks and 
vulnerability. Vulnerability and natural risks are two factors which reinforce each other, and 
lead to disasters through their cumulative effects (Blaikie et al., 2004). The Sustainable 
Livelihoods Approach states that households/communities access a specific set of assets 
(capitals) and livelihood strategies are mediated by transforming structures and processes. In 
this approach the connection between access to resources (assets) and vulnerability context 
(shocks, trends) is emphasized. According to the political economy approach, the current 
pastoralists’ predicaments and vulnerability to famine disaster can be better explained in 
terms of social, economic and political factors than natural factors.  
 
From the above description of perspectives, it can be concluded that vulnerability to a specific 
disaster can be better captured by examining broader societal contexts (social, political, 
institutional, economic arrangements) as well as ecological/environmental factors, as it is 
difficult to separate human and natural systems in practice. Accordingly, the present research 
has adopted a broader theoretical orientation which emphasizes the socio-political processes 
as well as ecological/environmental factors in its arguments pertaining to vulnerability of 
social groups under consideration.  
 
The preceding paragraphs present a brief restatement of the research questions, a general 
description on basic arguments, and some reflections on the perspectives adopted in 
addressing the research questions. The general conclusions of this research are given in the 
following sections. 
 
7.3 Conclusions  
 
7.3.1 The Research Problem in Context 
 
In addressing the basic research arguments, I have first attempted to look at the general 
situation of pastoralism and pastoralists’ predicaments in selected East African countries by 
making an extensive review of the secondary information (Chapter 3). The analyses of the 
secondary data showed that pastoral groups in East African countries have been marginalized 
in many aspects. 
 
In the past, pastoralists have proved their efficient and adaptive livelihood systems in making 
use of arid and semi-arid environment, which could not be used for conventional agriculture 
without huge investment and technology. However, in attempts to utilize the pastoral areas for 
national development goals and for commercial farms (export markets), pastoralists in East 
Africa have been gradually deprived of their key pastoral resources as communal lands are 
lost to various non-pastoral uses. Key resource areas have been taken over for the purposes of 
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large commercial farms, ranches, national parks, conservation areas, game reserves, etc., 
dictated by macro policies (national and/or international). Encroachments from the 
neighbouring crop cultivators upon pastoral areas have also intensified over the past decades. 
Moreover, conflicts and political instabilities (both internal and external origin) have been 
pervasive in the pastoral areas of East Africa. The combined effects of these external 
pressures and encroachments have led to environmental scarcity and ecological 
marginalization of pastoralists. Pastoral groups have gradually been pushed into risky 
environments and into the marginal areas with poor fodder resources.  
 
Furthermore, the national states in East Africa have usually adopted agriculture-biased 
policies and development approaches which have affected pastoral production systems. In 
most cases pastoral areas were largely excluded from development and infrastructure 
investments. Thus they are poorly served with social and economic services.  The analyses of 
the national policies, programmes and projects have also revealed that pastoral groups were 
not involved in the design and implementation of externally-initiated interventions. The 
national development programmes were mainly geared to the extraction of pastoral resources 
for the national economic goals and export markets without considering the livelihood bases 
of the pastoral communities, and their social and political structures. Moreover, the pastoral 
groups have not been represented in the national political and economic spheres. All these 
deprivations designate the economic and political marginalization of pastoralists in East 
Africa.   
 
As noted in Chapter 3, pastoralists in East Africa have been subjected to multiple 
marginalizations (ecological, economic and political). These marginalizations combined with 
ecological crisis have brought far-reaching consequences on pastoralists’ traditional 
subsistence. Natural resources, traditional organizations, institutions and traditional 
authorities vital for pastoral production practices have been undermined by external 
encroachments and conflicts. Pastoral communities’ traditional coping and adaptive strategies 
to their variable environment, economic shocks and environmental stresses have also been 
challenged. Consequently, pastoral communities are less able to continue with their traditional 
livelihood systems which are benign to their fragile and varying environment. Moreover in 
recent years, extreme climatic events, epidemic diseases, flood, conflicts and political 
instability have become frequent in the pastoral areas. These factors within the context of 
multiple marginalizations have eroded the capacity (resilience) of pastoralists.   
 
In general the macro level analysis of secondary data has clearly revealed that pastoralists at 
the Horn of Africa have become more vulnerable to multiple risks (drought, flood, epidemic 
diseases, market exclusion and violent conflicts) than they were in the past. The overlapping 
of these and other external factors on pastoralists’ action spaces at the local level have put 
pastoralists at  risk of severe food crisis/famine which they are less able to overcome without 
public transfers. Consequently, the majority of the pastoral households have increasingly 
become dependent on humanitarian food aid to survive famine and to recover from drought 
consequences. In that respect the Afar pastoralists in Ethiopia are no exception. On the basis 
of field study results, the following sections have highlighted the underlying factors for the 
Afar pastoralists’ vulnerability to famine/food crisis, and the external and indigenous 
responses.  
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7.3.2 Frequent Drought and Vulnerability to Famine 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, within the past three decades drought frequency and severity have 
increased in the pastoral areas of Ethiopia. The cycle of drought that was once in every ten 
years before three decades has shortened, and drought occurs in three - five years in the recent 
years. With an increased frequency and severity, drought impacts have become cumulative 
where pastoral communities and households are less able to cope with subsequent droughts. 
 
Like in other pastoral areas of Ethiopia, cyclical droughts affect the pastoral and agro-pastoral 
systems in the Afar region, especially by reducing forage availability thereby leading to a 
high mortality of livestock. Drought also increases livestock vulnerability to a range of 
diseases by weakening the animals. A number of things happen when drought occurs in the 
pastoral communities. The major ones include: 
 
• Pastoral households lose their stock through increased mortality. 
• Stocks are emaciated and fetch low prices. 
• Pastoral households/communities are forced to sell more stocks, and livestock prices 
decline sharply. This results in a further erosion of assets (e.g. livestock). 
• Grain prices soar, as the neighbouring grain supply communities are also affected by 
drought.  
 
In addition to these direct impacts on livestock production and purchasing power, drought 
also contributes to conflicts between the Afar pastoral groups and their neighbours, as herders 
are compelled to drive their stock into the settled highland areas during drought periods.  In 
general, it seems that pastoralists can still move from areas of drought to areas with better 
rainfall and feed availability. However, herd mobility to drought retreats is currently 
constrained by the loss of distant grazing areas, land use changes, violent conflicts and 
political instability. Thus drought impacts on pastoralists are determined by its severity and 
by many other factors such as mobility restriction, market forces, conflict/insecurity, and 
political instability as well ecological factors. Therefore, as noted in Chapter 5, it can be 
concluded that drought impacts on Afar pastoralists have become severe, and vulnerability to 
drought-related famine has increased.  
 
Likewise the community level analysis made from the local people’s perspective has also 
strengthened this conclusion. As it is discussed at length in Chapter 6, drought is perceived as 
a prime risk by the local people under consideration. The local people claimed that drought 
frequency and severity have increased since the mid 1980s. Repeated failures of Karma and 
Sugum rainfalls have disastrous effects on the seasonal availability of forage vegetation, grass 
and water. Therefore, recurring drought, failure of the two main rainfalls or erratic rainfall 
have become the main constraints to the local subsistence livestock production. These events 
often lead to a high mortality of livestock and decline of yields. In addition to these direct 
impacts on livestock assets, drought also contributes to a fall of livestock price, as many 
herders are compelled to sell many stocks for purchasing food grain, which nowadays 
constitutes the major portion of diet. While livestock prices fall, grain prices rise. This 
reduces the purchasing power of the pastoralists. Consequently, market forces operate against 
the local pastoral groups. All these factors constrain the capacity of herders to cope with 
drought consequences, as their ability to purchase food sharply declines.  
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In the future, as part of the global climate change, drought is likely to become more frequent 
and more severe. Such an increase in the frequency of drought will go hand in hand with a 
continued increase in vulnerability to famine or severe food crisis in the arid and semi-arid 
areas where pastoral groups are living (see map 1 for drought probability in pastoral areas of 
Ethiopia). This suggests the need to take drought and drought management seriously in 
policies and development programmes towards the dry lands and their inhabitants.   
 
It has been argued that drought, rainfall variability and thus fodder variability are parts of the 
pastoral ecology. And herders have adapted to these phenomena and make use of most of the 
arid and semi-arid environments. This suggests people - environment interactions through 
adaptive processes in order to cope with “normal constraints”. However, pastoral ecology is 
not a discrete and bounded system. It transcends the micro environment and interacts with a 
wider society which lies beyond a locality. Hence, external factors have an influence on 
micro-environment dynamics and processes. Here comes the importance of political 
economy. The broader socio-political and economic processes influence the actions/strategies 
of the local actors and their environment. State - society relations, government policies and 
political processes can influence access, use and management of resources. As noted in 
Chapters 5 & 6, within the past five decades the Afar pastoralists are progressively losing 
their key resource areas because of external encroachments, land use changes and the 
resultant ecological collapses. Within the past four decades, the complex interplay of these 
factors at different levels within the context of political and economic marginalization of the 
pastoral groups has destabilized the Afar traditional pastoral livelihood systems. In that 
respect, some conclusions are given in the following sections.  
 
7.3.3 Environmental/Ecological Degradation 
 
Environmental crises facing the Afar pastoralists are results of the interplay of both internal 
and external factors. These include prolonged drought, unreliable rainfall, bush encroachment, 
human and livestock population increase and external interferences (i.e. state-sponsored 
livestock development interventions, resettlement and large-scale irrigation). According to the 
present study these factors are found to be the main reasons for the deterioration of 
rangelands/pastoral ecology.  
 
Recurring droughts and shortages of rainfall have led to the decline of grazing and browse. As 
noted in Chapter 6, the loss of excellent grass types and palatable tree species is attributed to 
recurrent drought impacts, overgrazing and over-browsing. Recurrent droughts have 
undermined the growth of herbaceous and palatable plants, and this is gradually followed by 
bush encroachment resulting in the deterioration of rangelands. Therefore, drought 
consequences and bush encroachment have contributed to the degradation of rangelands.  
 
The earlier livestock development programmes introduced the delineation of tribal grazing 
zones, development of water points and provision of veterinary services. These external 
interventions have brought changes in the patterns of mobility, land use and traditional 
resource management systems. The programmes also contributed to an increase of livestock 
population and concentration in certain localities resulting in an overuse of forage resources. 
Moreover, the external interventions have attracted the neighbouring non-Afar groups into the 
pastoral territories. This was witnessed during the operation of the Third Livestock 
Development Project (TLDP) in the study community, as the Oromo agro-pastoralists 
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encroached upon the Afar tribal grazing reserves. Therefore, inappropriate external 
interventions contributed to the degradation of rangelands.  
  
As noted in Chapter 5 the Awash River Valley, the life-belt of the Afar pastoralists, has been 
subjected to various state-sponsored encroachments since the 1960s. Key pastoral resource 
areas have been affected by large-scale-irrigated agriculture, crop cultivation and increased 
sedentarization and resettlement. Most of the large-scale development schemes were 
established on the fertile flood-fed lands and dry season/drought fallbacks which were 
frequented by mobile pastoral groups. Thus external encroachments have brought far-
reaching impacts on natural forge and the ecology as a whole. Particularly the advent of large-
scale commercial farms in the Middle and Lower Awash Valley has brought adverse 
repercussions for the Afar pastoralists. Generally the following consequences were observed:  
 
• Loss of key pastoral resources (dry season and drought retreats, flood-fed grazing 
areas and water points). 
• Deforestation and loss of desirable plant species used as livestock feed. 
• Expansion of alien tree species and undesirable indigenous woody plants. 
• Reduction in the flow of the Awash River. 
• Change of the Awash River course resulting in a flood hazard.  
• Disruption of traditional mobility and resource management systems. 
• Sedentarization and privatization of communal lands which are coveted by 
pastoralists.  
• Human and livestock health problems emanated from chemicals used in the 
commercial farms.  
• Conflict and resource competition among Afar clans, and violent conflicts with 
neighbouring pastoralists (Issa, Karrayu), and with park and state authorities.  
 
All these consequences have resulted in an increase of environmental scarcity and 
marginalization of the Afar pastoralists. Significant pastoral resources have gradually become 
scarce and unavailable to large parts of the pastoral population. On the one hand both human 
and livestock populations are increasing, on the other hand forage resources are depleting and 
pastoral lands are increasingly used for non-pastoral uses. Consequently, herders are 
gradually pushed into resource poor and marginal areas where they cannot get adequate 
pasture and water during dry season and drought periods.  
 
Though the local people have time-tested adaptive strategies to cope with seasonally and 
temporally variable environment, the traditional strategies are overwhelmed and constrained 
by the external pressures. Therefore, herders are currently less able to cope with 
environmental crisis and extreme weather events through their traditional resource 
management strategies. Moreover, traditional resource management systems and rules 
regulating resource use and control are undermined by the external encroachments. This has 
many implications for natural forage production. Firstly, though local people have a reverence 
for indigenous trees, they often do not replant trees. Secondly, at community level so far no 
natural resource management activities are undertaken by the government. Thirdly, new 
settlements and small towns are emerging and expanding in the Afar Region. Consequently, 
cutting trees for construction, firewood and charcoal is intensified along the road sides, and 
near the rural settlements and towns.  
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Generally speaking the results of this study have shown that the natural resource-based 
economy of the Afar pastoralists is destabilized by environmental/ecological crisis and 
mounting external interferences. As it is clearly illustrated in Chapter 6, the local people 
observed a downward trend in their livelihood resources and a disruption of traditional 
strategies within the past thirty years. These processes have directly affected the local 
livestock production systems and represent high risks for food crisis for the Afar pastoralists.     
 
7.3.4 Socio-political Processes: State-Society Relation and Government Policies   
 
In addition to natural extreme events (drought) and ecological collapses, the Afar pastoralists 
have been marginalized from the centre in terms of economic benefits and representation in 
the national politics. This economic and political marginalization has put the pastoralists’ 
livelihoods and interests at a margin. Thus the local people are less able to protect their 
subsistence base and interests.  
 
As it is summarized in the preceding paragraphs, extreme weather events, and resource 
degradation (environmental crisis) have posed serious threats to the local pastoral systems. 
And yet my argument is that the Afar pastoralists’ livelihood insecurity and/or their increased 
vulnerability to famine disaster are better explained by broader socio-political processes that 
have taken place within the past five decades. These processes included political 
incorporation to control traditional social organizations; lack of respect for communal land 
rights; biased government policies and inappropriate livestock development programmes; 
conflict and political instability; unavailability of infrastructures, services and opportunities. 
These external socio-political, institutional and economic processes are largely beyond the 
local people’s control. Thus pastoral groups are unable to protect their traditional institutions, 
land possession rights and their livelihood systems.  
 
i. Political incorporation and loss of independence (self-administration): As noted in 
Chapter 5, during the past hundred years the Afar people have lost their relative independence 
and resource base due to historical political processes emanated from the center. Especially 
within the past five decades the Afar have gradually lost part of the fertile lands of the Awash 
River valley and their independence (traditional self-administration) because of excessive 
state interventions. Because of the fact that the Afar land occupies a strategic position for the 
country’s economy and politics, the central state has increased its presence (i.e. militarization 
and modern bureaucratic structures) in the region to avert external threats and to control the 
former Addis Ababa-Assab road and the Addis Ababa-Djibouti highway. 
 
Successive Ethiopian governments attempted fully to incorporate the indigenous political 
structure and authorities into the modern bureaucracy and administrative structures. The 
introduction of centralized governmental administration has undermined traditional socio-
political organizations. Some appointed clan leaders took advantage of the new power 
relationships to ascend to higher political positions in order to enhance their influence and 
power and that of their respective clan groups. At different times the local elites collabourated 
with state authorities and have often become unable to represent and express the interest of 
the larger pastoral population. This has weakened clan cohesion, and disrupted traditional 
mutual support systems and rules governing the management and use of communal resources.  
 
In particular pastoralists were not represented in the national political and economic arena 
during the previous regimes. Policy decisions and externally-initiated development 
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interventions in the pastoral areas were pursued in favour of politically dominant groups both 
at national and local levels (i.e. highlanders and selected clan leaders respectively). 
Consequently, the local people have been unable to protect their customary rights over their 
communal lands and livelihood systems from external encroachments. This is one 
manifestation of political marginalization of large parts of the Afar pastoral population. 
Therefore, the state - society relation remained rather hostile, especially after the advent of 
large-scale commercial farms in the Middle and Lower Awash Valley. The political decision 
of the central state for the appropriation of communal lands and their allocation for large-scale 
commercial farms effectively denied the local Afar access to the most fertile pasture lands, 
weakened reciprocal arrangements among clans and fuelled inter-clan conflicts. The 
allocation of lands for state-sponsored large-scale schemes has still continued. The current 
government launched two big projects (Tendaho and Kessem- Kebena) aimed at establishing 
sugarcane plantation and two sugar factories in the Middle and Lower Awash River Valleys 
by developing 100,000 hectares of land. Some sources indicated that the project would 
displace pastoralists, menace their livelihood systems and affect flora and fauna170.  
 
The current government claimed that the new policy of ethnic federalism opens opportunity to 
the Afar people to leave behind instability, economic stagnation and marginalization that have 
characterized the region’s past. Indeed the Ethiopian Afar are consolidated within one region 
with powers of self-administration. And yet change that benefits the majority of the Afar is far 
from assured. The imposition of the top-down formal administrative system has continued at 
the grassroots level. State formal institutions resorted to earlier, inappropriate models.  
Currently the consolidation of modern administrative structures has continued in the name of 
“elected Kebele and Woreda administrations”. In relation to this an earlier study report 
recounted as follows: 
 
The state system now in Ethiopia is that of federation among ethnic-based regional 
governments. The federal arrangement gives exclusive powers to regional governments 
on matters of internal affairs, including development planning. However, this has 
exacerbated the political marginalization of pastoralists, as the plight of pastoral 
communities is entirely left to “their” governments. The regionalization of the state 
system, i.e. the federal arrangement was decided with a complete exclusion of civil 
society at large. Civil society had no role in electing its own leaders, as elections in 
Africa are normally foregone conclusions. Those who rule pastoral areas today are not 
elected in the proper sense of the term (Melaku, 2000:80-81) 
 
The same author further noted that appointment in Ethiopia is not on the grounds of merit but 
on grounds of political loyalty to the ruling party (Melaku, 2000:81). Likewise the local 
people observed that community members and traditional authorities are not involved in 
decision-making processes and in asserting their representation. They reported that 
participation is limited to only information sharing with some handpicked individuals or clan 
leaders. In particular, loyalty rather than qualification rationale for appointment, and poor 
governance, favourism and embezzlement have become pervasive in the local formal 
government. Therefore, although the government has claimed the full participation of 
traditional authorities and the devolution of power in its pursuits of decentralization process, 
it is not yet evidenced at the grassroots level. Consequently regional development and 
utilization of regional resources are no longer controlled by the Afar people, but by state 
elites.  
 
                                                 
170 The Afar Human Rights Organizations (AHRO), July, 2007 (press statement by the organization).  
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ii. Inappropriate government policies toward pastoral lands and pastoralism: The policies 
of the previous regimes were based on wrong assumptions on pastoralism and on pastoral 
land, and biased against the needs of pastoral groups. Firstly, the pastoral way of life 
(particularly mobility) was perceived by state authorities and planners as backward and 
constraint to development, provision of services and security. Secondly, large tracts of 
pastoral land were considered as vacant, unutilized resource to be used for national 
development. Thirdly, development programmes and policies were designed mainly to extract 
resources of pastoral areas for the purpose of national economic development goals without 
considering pastoralists subsistence. The establishment of commercial farms and delineation 
of conservation areas have deprived pastoralists of their key pastureland, watering points and 
migration routes. Furthermore some attempts (e.g. resettlement and irrigated pasture) 
undertaken by the previous governments to compensate displaced pastoral groups were 
unsuccessful, as the interventions did not consider pastoral way of life. Land expropriation for 
non-pastoral purposes has also exacerbated resource use conflicts, intra and inter-clan clashes 
and violent conflicts with neighbouring ethnic groups (Issa, Karrayu), as groups compete over 
the use of the remaining resources. The state intervention and its policies also exacerbated 
drought consequences, as mobility and traditional common resource management systems 
have been disrupted. All these processes of land alienation have led to ecological and 
economic marginalization of the mobile pastoral groups. Therefore, the objective of resource 
use does no longer serve the interests and needs of the Afar people, but either “national” 
interest and/or the interest of government officials and affiliated clan leaders.    
 
iii. Inappropriate livestock development intervention: Livestock support services (e.g. 
market routes, veterinary services) envisaged by the previous governments favoured the 
commercial value of livestock for export market and livestock off-take for meeting the 
demand of meat canning industries established in the highland urban centers. At that time the 
subsistence economy of the pastoral groups was not appreciated. As a result, the previous 
development interventions were of the resource-extractive nature rather than enhancing 
pastoral livelihood systems. Besides the extension services in semi-settled areas favoured 
crop cultivation within valuable grazing areas, and blocked herd movement which is one of 
the key strategies for the mobile pastoral system. Therefore, inappropriate external 
interventions disturbed traditional strategies developed by pastoral groups to maintain the 
fragile balance between humans and livestock, and the natural environment. Especially 
increased livestock population accelerated by the interventions brought about overgrazing and 
land degradation in many pastoral localities.  
 
Currently there is a policy emphasis on sedentarization of pastoralists and crop-cultivation 
along the banks of rivers. Sedentarization, however, is not an option for vast majority of the 
Afar population. Like other pastoral communities in East Africa or elsewhere, the Afar 
pastoral system has evolved in response to hostile environmental conditions and the fragile 
ecosystem which renders other models of existence impracticable, since they may disturb the 
fragile arid and semi-arid ecosystem. Overdevelopment of one aspect of the system may 
encourage depletion of others. For instance expansion of water resources typically encourages 
overgrazing; inappropriate cultivation techniques can lead to rapid soil salinization and 
infertility. Such consequences have been witnessed during the previous livestock 
development projects, and at the irrigation schemes. Therefore, the fragility of the arid and 
semi-arid ecosystem of the Afar region dictates a culturally and ecologically adapted 
approach to development. This suggests the need to focus on promotion of various pastoral 
modes of life and reconciliation of pastoralism with needs of other developments. 
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iv. Lack of infrastructures and social services: During the previous governments, even now 
the Afar pastoralists are marginalized in terms of the provision of infrastructures and social 
services. At that time infrastructures and social services were established in towns which 
emerged with the advent of commercial farms and sedentarization in the Awash River Valley. 
Facilities were established mainly to serve non-Afar migrants and employees of large-scale 
plantations. Educational and health services, road access, transportation and communication 
were nearly absent in many pastoral communities. This is the main reason that the Afar region 
is now characterized by the lowest educational and health status and by lack of trained 
manpower. Currently, although the situation of infrastructures and social services has 
improved as compared to previous times, the Afar pastoral areas are still poorly served and 
deprived of basic social services. These inequalities and the exclusion from participation in 
the national politics and development processes have made the local people’s livelihood 
susceptible to natural and economic shocks.  
 
Currently, as noted in Chapter 6, the local people consider infrastructures and social services 
as enhancing their capacity to cope with drought, as they have greater potential to open 
opportunities for trade, market, and livestock diseases control. Therefore, community 
infrastructures and economic services have a major role in enhancing local people’s capacity 
for risk management.    
 
v. Political instabilities and conflicts: Historically as well as currently the Afar region has 
been exposed to various adverse historical circumstances and political instabilities. Firstly, 
due to colonial consequences the Afar were partitioned into three states, Ethiopia, Djibouti, 
and Eritrea (the then colony of Italy). Secondly, within Ethiopia the Afar localities were 
annexed to different provincial administrations (Wello, Tigray, Shewa, Hararghe, and 
Eritrea). These historical political processes have resulted into two circumstances.  
 
The first is the partition of the Afar land among three states and strict control by respective 
governments on the Afar contacts with their kin groups across borders, whereas the pastoral 
groups do not recognize the colonial boundaries. While neighbouring states put strict control 
on their borders and on the economic and political activities of the Afar within their 
boundaries, the pastoral groups continue their close contact with their kin groups across the 
borders. Therefore, during border conflicts and wars between states, pastoral groups were 
accused of smuggling weapons and of collabourating with other forces (i.e. internal insurgent 
groups and foreign forces). This has led to unfavourable state-society relations where the local 
Afar were at different times affected by militarization, civil unrest and harassment and killing 
by the armed groups.   
 
Secondly, the aspiration of the Afar for unity (i.e. independent Afar state in the Horn) is also 
one of the causes for civil unrest in the Afar region. As a result, the Afar region has been 
affected by the consequences of civil strife and border conflicts within the past four decades. 
During the civil war the Afar region, especially the northern part was a war zone for many 
years. During the war between the Derg Government and separatist insurgents (TPLF, EPLF, 
ALF), the Afar pastoralists were severely affected by militarization, landmines, displacement 
and violent clashes between civilians and armed groups. At the time of civil war pastoral 
mobility, traditional resource management, livestock support services and cross-border 
livestock trade were adversely affected. In recent border conflict/war between Ethiopia and 
Eritrea, many Afar localities have been affected by landmines, displacement and loss of 
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grazing areas. Moreover, the border conflict disrupted cross-border livestock trade, labour 
migration, contraband trade which the local Afar use as strategies to cope with natural and 
economic shocks.  
 
Furthermore, in recent years conflicts between Afar and their neighbours have become more 
violent within the context of resource scarcity and national political processes. Traditional 
conflicts over use and access to natural resources at territorial frontiers have been transformed 
into control and ownership of resources and then into political confrontation. Therefore, 
recurring conflicts have become impediments to local livelihood strategies and external 
development interventions.   
 
In general the historical socio-political processes, ecological collapses and external 
encroachments have led to entitlement failures and livelihood insecurity among the Afar. 
These include, among others: 
 
• Depletion of forage resources which are vital for local pastoral systems.  
• Inability to produce sufficient food from the livestock production. 
• Decline of purchasing power due to loss of livestock assets and price falls, and rising 
price of food grain. 
• Decline of entitlement on calling (i.e. weakening of informal support systems, 
inadequate formal transfer or delay in external support). 
• Disturbance of traditional adaptive responses to seasonally and temporally variable 
environment.  
• Unfavourable state-society relations because of inappropriate land tenure policies, lack 
of respect for customary land rights and expropriation of local resources. 
• Lack of trust in the government formal administration due to lack of commitment, 
non-participatory, patron-clientele system, clan favourism, and corruption. 
• Persistence of political marginalization of pastoral groups due to lack of effective local 
representation and participation in the national political processes. 
 
The conclusion is that famine and increase of vulnerability are not primarily the consequences 
of drought, but of external domination and uneven development. As a result, pastoral 
households/communities are increasingly dependent on public transfers (traditionally known 
as emergency food aid) in order to survive crisis periods. On the other hand, the basic interest 
of the Afar lies in managing the integrity of their resource bases and maintaining the social 
and political institutions underlying their traditional pastoral systems. However, the combined 
impacts of external encroachments, various violent conflicts and ecological collapse within 
the context of the political and economic marginalization have resulted in pastoralists’ 
livelihood insecurity and vulnerability to famine.  
 
Although the country has avoided mass mortality linked to famine, there are continuing 
threats to food security and nutrition, and an upward trend in the needy population requiring 
food aid. This indicates that external interventions have not addressed the structural 
vulnerability of the pastoral households to famine. Therefore, within the context of decreased 
resilience and chronic food insecurity, famine is still imminent in many pastoral areas. There 
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is strong evidence that severe food crisis persists in many pastoral communities since the 
1990s171. And it can develop into famine, if the state and/or aid agencies fail to respond. 
 
 
7.4 Recommendations 
 
The previous sections highlight the findings of this research and it is stated that pastoralists 
are increasingly vulnerable to famine, as their livelihood resources and strategies have been 
destabilized by the internal and external factors. In this section I recommend some ideas for 
consideration in risk reduction and in enhancing pastoralists’ resilience.  
 
i. (Drought) risk management: Recurring droughts have become the number one risk for the 
study community. Pastoralists face a natural risk of drought. As this study has indicated, the 
likelihood of drought is high. And yet drought is manageable, although it is difficult to avoid 
it. The current experience suggests the need to devise risk mitigation strategies for pastoral 
areas. Therefore, government as well as NGOs need to visualize workable strategies in order 
to mitigate impacts associated with drought. For this to happen, effective disaster 
management systems should be put in place. The current decentralization should serve as the 
ideal way to collect and compile context specific information and design interventions 
appropriate to local agro-ecological environments and livelihood systems. For this to be 
achieved: 
 
• The effective presence of formal early warning system (EWS) at the local level and 
incorporation of traditional early warning systems for risk communication among 
local actors and to external actors. This helps design context specific responses.  
• Broadening the objective of the current EWS. The current information systems are 
geared towards servicing the needs of food-aid oriented disaster relief organizations. 
Information needed mainly for emergency food assistance is gathered by government 
agencies and NGOs. This is mostly dictated by Food Availability Decline Approach. 
This approach should be augmented by context-specific models (entitlement failure, 
livelihoods crisis, and health crisis). Therefore, a greater range of information on 
livelihood patterns, ecological zones, institutions, historical trends and processes could 
be gathered, analyzed and utilized for designing context-specific risk management 
strategies.     
• Building up the capacity of local government institutions and traditional institutions 
through staffing, materials, training and communication systems. 
 
ii. Strengthening the provision of health and educational services and infrastructures: As 
noted from the study community, health and education institutions are ill-equipped in terms of 
personnel, materials and other inputs. While most of the health posts were not functioning, 
schools lacked teachers, water supply and school materials. The regional and federal 
governments should allocate an adequate budget to furnish health and school facilities. Road 
access, local markets and transport are also equally important to facilitate the development of 
                                                 
171 For instance, some sources (e.g. Devereux et al., 2002:53) labelled the 1999-2000 food crisis as famine. 
Given the number of people affected, the damages to livelihoods and human development, and the loss of human 
life, there is no question about whether the 1999-2000 crisis was a famine. On the other hand the state authorities 
did not agree with it saying that the crisis did not reach to the level of famine.    
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alternative income-generating activities. These community level assets help enhance the 
capacity of the pastoralists to cope with risks.     
 
iii. Livelihood diversification: Communities which rely on single economic activity are more 
vulnerable to economic shocks than communities with diversified livelihoods or income 
sources. Communities with diversified livelihoods can better cope with shocks. The Afar 
pastoralists rely mainly on livestock production, though some households are currently taking 
up additional activities. Generally speaking livelihood diversification both, at household and 
community levels, is very low in the study community and in many other Afar communities. 
And yet individual households are striving to take up complementary income-generating 
activities. This effort has to be supported by external actors. Therefore, government and aid 
organizations should focus on enhancing alternative income-generating activities and adaptive 
responses that are already taken up by pastoral households. Depending on the local context, 
external interventions may include: 
 
• Enhancing growing food crops by diverting streams and rivers (i.e. small-scale 
irrigations). 
• Provision of credit for livestock trading or petty trading, and for fattening goats 
when forage conditions are good. 
• Establishing livestock market associations and protecting pastoralists from effects of 
rising grain prices and of falling of livestock prices.  
• Provision of non-formal education and skill training for adults aimed at creating an 
enabling environment for job opportunities.   
• Expanding formal education for school-age children to create opportunities for the 
youth in the future.     
 
iv. Protection of livelihood (resources): The importance of livestock production both, as a 
livelihood system and as food source for pastoralists is apparent. However, past and present 
experiences in Ethiopia have shown that external interventions focus on saving human lives 
ignoring livelihoods. The existing early warning systems are entirely focused on food needs. 
They failed to link warnings with livestock-related pre-planned intervention actions at various 
stages of the drought cycle. Early warning systems often report the general situations of 
humans, livestock, water, and pasture without any reference to the course of action to be taken 
for saving livelihoods. In deed the saving of livelihoods, in the pastoral context, is of 
paramount importance as saving human lives. This becomes apparent in view of the 
decreasing wealth status of pastoralists caused by drought and complex socio-political and 
economic processes. As noted in Chapter 6, livelihood resources and strategies of pastoral 
households/communities are increasingly declining. Therefore, enhancing or protection of 
livelihoods should be recognized as being as important as saving human lives. Livelihood 
support interventions must be based on an analysis and understanding of the characteristics 
and dynamics of local context-specific livelihood systems. They should be oriented towards 
household/community assets and activities considered important to enhance survival and to 
build resilience. According to the perspective of the local people considered in this study, 
livelihood interventions should focus on: 
 
• Natural assets (forage development, pastureland, water development, developing 
cultivation plots). 
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• Social assets (collective action, conflict resolution institutions, mutual support 
institutions, traditional authorities, participation in local decision-making processes). 
• Human capital (educating children, school children feeding, health services, food aid). 
• Physical assets (livestock disease surveillance, road access, river diversions, irrigation 
channels, water points, markets, tools, seeds, etc). 
 
v. Conservation of natural resources and rehabilitation of pasturelands: Preserving and 
protecting environment/ecosystem is crucial for supporting pastoralists’ livelihoods. The 
structure of the formal early warning system does not adequately capture the long-term 
processes that generate a slow-onset emergency. As indicated in Chapter 6, environmental 
scarcity has been a threat in the Afar region. Environmental degradation and eco-system 
disruption is intensified due to population pressure, sedentarization and lack of control over 
land use management. Existing farmlands are intensively cultivated and new lands are 
brought under cultivation or lost to other non-pastoral uses. Loss of grazing land in many 
localities has contributed to further overgrazing. Charcoal and firewood production have 
continued in an unregulated manner. Uncontrolled off-take of main rivers and tributaries also 
continues in the headwaters. Loss of control over the upstream affects tributaries of the main 
rivers flowing into the Afar land. Changing courses of main rivers in Afar has also affected 
the flood-fed dry season grazing areas. All these environmental stresses have direct impacts 
on the pastoralists’ livelihood bases. Therefore, the federal and regional governments should 
consider natural resource conservation and watershed management as emergency issues. 
Designing and implementing appropriate conservation measures such as dams, water run-off 
catchments, bunding, and afforestation can be feasible for protecting natural resources. 
 
Furthermore, in some places of Middle Awash Valley lands formerly used for state farms 
(e.g. Meteka farm in Gewane) are returned to the local communities. These lands can be 
rehabilitated through irrigation or flooding, and can be used for dry season/drought period 
grazing. If the returned farms and other pasture lands are rehabilitated by the government and 
NGOs through participation of traditional users, they can accommodate large number of 
pastoral population.  
 
vi. Conflict management and resolution: It is repeatedly stated that conflicts among clans 
and with neighbouring groups have increasingly become violent. Moreover, the existing 
traditional conflict management institutions are overwhelmed by external political processes 
and are weakened over the past decades. Government-initiated peace committees at different 
levels are also unable to bring durable peace. In most cases joint-decisions are not respected 
by conflicting parties due to poor local governance, clan or group favourism, lack of 
commitment and trust, and the government reluctance to demarcate official boundaries of 
district administrations. The long-established reciprocal arrangements between herders and 
crop cultivators are increasingly constrained by the political processes, and mounting scarcity 
of resources at the buffer zones. Therefore, government and other external actors should 
search for mechanisms to maintain good relations between herders and the neighbouring 
groups. The following may be some ways to achieve this: 
 
• Revitalizing the traditional conflict resolution institutions through bringing together 
elders and religious leaders from both parties and providing training and other 
supports.  
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• Enhancing contact points and relations between competing groups through 
organizing meetings/discussion forums and by establishing social and economic 
services (religious centers/mosques, schools, health centers, local market services, 
etc).  
• Strengthening the existing reciprocal arrangements (crop-sharing arrangements, 
oxen-renting, farmland renting, bond-friendships, market relations, inter-marriage, 
exchanging Qu’ran teachers, etc.).  
• Ensuring traditional rights of the local people to communal lands and water points 
on the territorial frontiers. 
• Developing joint-development projects which involve both herders and their 
neighbours (e.g. water points, irrigation schemes, etc). 
• Enhancing cooperation and developing confidence/trust between formal government 
authorities and traditional authorities. 
• Building up the capacity of local governance (Kebele and Woreda administrations) 
and peace committees to resolve conflicts and to tackle partisanship of local 
authorities to their respective groups. 
• Ensuring the enforcement of the joint-decisions, and hold accountable those who fail 
to respect decisions of the peace committees.  
• Avoiding as much as possible development projects that may lead to local resource 
scarcity and conflicts. 
• Mapping and officially delimiting administrative boundaries through involving all 
claimants of the border lands or other resources.  
• Avoiding the current overemphasis by local state elites on differences and ethnic 
politics, as it adversely jeopardizes the existing social and economic relations 
between ethnic groups.  
 
vii. Ensuring land tenure security and controlling privatization of communal lands:  The 
land policies of previous and current governments have not brought land tenure security both 
in sedentary and pastoral areas. In Ethiopia land is “public property” under which farmers and 
pastoralists have usufruct right on land. Under this system (i.e. state ownership of all land), 
tenure security is unpredictable.  The state or its surrogate can exclude others from access to 
land or evict others with a short notice, if it wishes. On the other hand, among the Afar, land 
is communal property of clan groups. In the communal property regime, however, 
individual/group rights to pasture, cultivable land, wells, and residential sites are recognized, 
clearly defined, and could be inherited without power to alienate clan ownership of land.   
 
The Afar pastoral groups have a strong attachment to clan territory. The clan institution 
regulates land ownership and ensures the entitlement of the entire members of a clan to 
productive resources on which pastoral life relies, namely land, water and pasture. This 
communal property regime is flexible and environmental responsive institution that has made 
possible pastoral movements to seize opportunities within varying environment.  Access to 
and use of land and other related natural resources are governed by the Afar customary law 
(Maada) that ensures tenure security for members. Thus the right to exclude rests with the 
group and this is backed by the customary law.  
 
However, the introduction of modern commercial farms, agriculture and development of 
settlements in the Middle and Lower Awash Valley has affected the customary tenure system. 
These developments have brought land use changes and led to privatization of important 
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lands along the banks of the Awash River. Better-off Afar, clan leaders and non-Afars have 
owned individual holdings in such areas and expanded farm fields for food and cash crop 
cultivations. Land privatization and land use changes have led to economic differentiation 
among the Afar where some wealthy Afar and clan leaders have benefited more from these 
land use changes. Nowadays various stakeholders compete over formerly irrigated lands and 
returned to the pastoral community, and over the new potential lands in the Middle and Lower 
Awash Valley. These include: 
 
• Local pastoral groups (the traditional users/claimants) who seek mainly to maintain 
their communal lands for grazing or to lease them to developers depending on the 
land use type. These groups also include agro-pastoralists who dispute against 
investors and clan leaders to have access for land at their convenience. On the 
contrary most pastoralists seek either to keep lands for grazing or to lease it to 
investors.   
• Absentee herders who own small-scale irrigation and seek to expand their land 
holding as well as to rear animals.  
• Individual non-Afar investors who seek to invest in large-scale commercial farms. 
These investors often deal with clan leaders to rent in farmlands, as most clan 
leaders and elders want to lease lands to investors.  
• Federal and regional governments which seek either to establish large-scale 
farms/plantations or lease out lands to developers.  
 
In absence of land use policy, the poor have become the losers. Investors and wealthy groups 
seek to grab areas adjacent to the river banks. These competitions among various stakeholders 
for lands in the Awash River Valley will further lead to shrinkage of pastureland, decrease of 
water from the Awash River, and resource conflicts among various clans. This in turn will 
further jeopardize the environment, the local pastoral systems and small-scale crop 
cultivations already pursued by pastoral households along the Awash River.  
 
In general the Afar are nowadays gripped by four main stresses: recurrent severe drought; 
environmental scarcity; external pressures from Issa, investors and highlanders; and violent 
conflicts and political instability. In all these cases the losers are the Afar. Given these crises, 
access to pastureland, (river) water and vegetation is now crucial to the Afar subsistence. 
Therefore, the government has firstly to protect traditional communal land rights of the 
indigenous people from external encroachments, and secondly to design appropriate land use 
management policy and plan in order to accommodate the interests of the diverse 
stakeholders. Failing to do so would inevitably lead to perpetual poverty of the Afar 
pastoralists, destitution and in turn to permanent dependence on outside aid.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Location of Some Settlements in the Study Area   
 
 
 
Appendix 2: Number of Sample Villages and Households for household Survey  
Clan 
Group  
Fimaa group  Sub-clan   Name of the KAs/settlement   Sample 
Households 
Odelena-Asbole KA/Asbole 
 
5 Dofeyay Häränunto  
Egahilela 
Näsär 
Dumayto  
Waydolälena-Ye’alu KA/Yealu  
10 
Telalakina-Abaro KA/Abaro 
 
5 
 
Bahiri- 
Aghini  
Bärakabsuma Afnado-sära 
Seka 
Arkeka 
Modayto 
Awarena-Areda KA/Aware 10 
Megenta 
Aghini  
 Ayta-assosa 
Tämiti 
Näsär  
 
Geysuna-Däwe KA/Adalil 
 
10 
Mix  Mix Mix Nemelifen settlement 
(district center)  
20 
Total 6 60 
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Appendix 3: List of Sub-Clans and Lineages of the Aghini Clan  
Clan  Sub-clans   Lineages  
  Afinaro-sara 
 
  Haisto 
  Obakarto 
  Alisara   Momito 
  Arkera 
 
 
 
  Hamoma 
  Ositie 
  Salinto 
  Salinto-Hamoma 
  Asmela 
 
  Data-Alitie 
  Dawido 
  Ayta-Asos   Yayigitie 
  Dofeyay 
 
 
  Dabale-Hamado 
  Haran-nunto 
  Ut-bento 
  Dumayto 
 
  Dabale-Hamado 
  Deda-dumayto 
  Egahilela 
 
 
 
 
  Hawasesa 
  Hermitie 
  Salinto 
  Sene-Hagayto 
  Ydigite 
  Hamada   Haran-nunto 
  Modayto   Hawasesa 
  Nasir 
 
 
 
 
 
  Haistamadanto 
  Harakalu 
  Hawasesa 
  Korafto 
  Leko-Hamado 
  Suginina 
  Nasir-Maganta Agini   Haistamadanto 
  Seka 
 
 
  Alibagido 
  Aliseka 
  Namagali 
  Tamiti 
 
 
  Geas 
  Haistamadanto 
  Harakalu 
Aghini 
  Wagab   La-adoda 
Sources: Focus Group Interview with elders and clan leaders, December 2005. 
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Appendix 4: DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENTS  
 
4.1. Checklist for Qualitative Data Collection in the Study Community. 
Broader topics /issues  Study units/sites    Sources of information  Methods of data collection  
1. Disaster and natural events (recurrent drought 
risk, uneven rainfall) and their effects on the 
livelihoods of local people 
The Aghini pastoral community/district Elders, clan and religious leaders. 
Local authorities/leaders 
Key informant interview 
Focus group interview  
2. Ecological changes (loss of vegetation, 
pasture, grass), change in migration patterns and 
routs and their consequences on livelihood 
systems 
Pastoral key resource areas and their 
status  
Clan leaders 
Users of key resource areas. 
Local government personnel 
Key informant interview 
Focus group interview 
Observation 
2. Trends in pasture availability  and livestock 
movement 
The previous and the current key 
resource areas 
The previous and the current migration 
routs.   
Clan leaders 
Users of key resource areas 
Local government personnel 
Key informant interview 
Focus group interview 
Observation  
3. Trend in livestock population (depletion of 
household and community assets, changes in 
number and composition of livestock 
The Aghini pastoral community level  Clan leaders 
Users of key resource areas 
Local government personnel 
Case history of asset status 
Recording current asset status 
4. Change in social structure and institutions 
(lineage, homestead, household, conflict 
resolution institutions like Fimaa) 
 
 Clan and lineage groups 
Traditional authorities and institutions 
Customary laws  
Elders, clan and religious leaders 
 
 Caste study of selected social 
institutions 
Key informant interview 
Focus group interview 
5. New developments (social services and 
infrastructures, emergence of new settlements, 
shops, markets, business, trade) and their role in 
creating other livelihood opportunities 
District centre (Nemelifen) 
Pastoral settlement 
 
Afar and Non-Afars traders 
Individual residents in the Woreda 
centers and in pastoral settlements  
Key informant interview 
Focus group interview 
 
6. Historical and current account of community 
and state relation  
The Aghini pastoral community and 
local formal governance 
Elders 
Clan leaders 
Local government personnel   
Key informant interview 
Focus group interview 
7. Intra-clan and inter-ethnic conflicts - conflicts 
over resources or borders with neighboring 
communities (Issa, Oromo, Amhara, etc) 
Key resources areas where conflict is 
prevalent 
Pastoral groups and highlanders  
  
Conflict cases 
Elders, clan and religious leaders  
Groups who were/are involved in 
conflicts 
Conflict resolution meetings 
Local government authorities   
Case history of the selected 
conflict cases 
Key informant interview 
Focus group interview   
8. Intra and Inter-ethnic cooperation, economic 
and social relation, social net working and 
mutual support 
Neighboring communities 
Market places 
Bond association   
Elders, clan leaders and religious 
leaders 
Non-Afar immigrants, traders 
Key informant interview 
Focus group interview  
 
 9. Traditional early warning systems (Dagu -
traditional information communication), coping 
mechanism and livelihood strategies adopted by 
the local communities 
 The Aghini pastoral 
community/district 
Elders, clan and religious leaders 
 
Key informants interview 
Focus group interview 
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4.2 Questionnaire for household survey  
 
 
A1.  Household Profile 
1  2 4 5 6 7 8 9 
ID # 01 
for the 
head 
Name of household 
members 
Relationship to 
household head 
(write code) 
Age  Sex:  
male =1; 
female =2 
Labour capacity  
(write code) 
Literate 
(yes=1; 
no=2) 
Grade completed 
 (0 if none)    
Attending 
school now  
Yes=1; no=2 
01         
02         
03         
04         
05         
06         
07         
08         
09         
 Codes: relation to household head  
01=household head  
02=wife  
03=son 
04=daughter 
05=son-in-law 
06=daughter-in-law 
07=brother 
08=sister   
09= friend (Takaysa) 
10=  other 
(specify)__________________________ 
 
Codes: labour capacity  
1=child (too young to work) 
2=working child (herding livestock, doing domestic chores) 
3= adult (able to do full adult work) 
4=elderly (not able to do full adult workload) 
5=permanently disabled  
6=chronically ill (unable to work for the past three months)  
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A2. Homestead and Household Structure  
13. In your community do the local people have permanent camps/settlements? If yes, why? 
1. Because of limits imposed on the livestock mobility 
2. Because of limits imposed on grazing land 
3. other (specify) ___________________________________ 
14. Did you live in this village all the year? 
1. Yes all the year 
2. Only part of my family 
3. Other (specify)  __________________________________ 
15. Do you move corral compound?  
1. Yes  
2. No  
16. If yes, why? 
1. When the huts become old and fall down 
2. In search of grass and water 
3. To avoid animals disease  
4. Other (specify)  ___________________________________ 
17. How far is the corral compound moved? 
1. Not very far 
2. Very far 
3. Five kms away from my former place 
4. Other (specify)  ___________________________________ 
18. Why are several sub-divisions in your corral compound? (multiple responses are possible). 
1. I own many cattle and one sub-division is not enough for them 
2. I usually have a separate sub-division for each kind of livestock so they do not harm each other 
3. Separate sub-divisions are needed when some cattle are affected by disease 
4. I can’t get milk if cows and calves are kept together 
5. Other (specify)  ____________________________________    
19.  Are there two or more huts in your compound? If yes, why? 
1. I need more than one hut for the family because I need an extra one for guests 
2. I have two wives, and each wife needs a separate hut with her children 
3. My married son is living in compound 
4. Other (specify)  _____________________________________ 
20.  Is there more than one household living in your compound? If yes, why? 
1. We are brothers 
2. We help each other and live together  
3. We are members of the extended family 
4. We are afraid of the Issa 
5. Our cattle are together 
6. Other (specify) _____________________________________   
21. Where do you have residence? 
1. Only in the pastoral village   
2. Only in the town.  
3. In both 
22. Do you split your family into pastoral villages and towns /Nemelifen? 
1. yes  
2. No 
23. If yes how do you manage the relation between these homes?  
1. Assign children to pastoral village activities 
2. Assign one wife to the pastoral village and the other to the town 
3. Put livestock under the care of kin groups or relatives 
4. Other (specify)   _____________________________________ 
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         B1: Household livelihoods /activities/ 
In last 12 months what types of activities the members of your household carried out in order to earn food or income?  
24 25 26 
Activity Code Who does the work or activity? 
Livestock rearing 01 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 77 
Crop cultivation  02 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 77 
Non-pastoral activities              
Sale of wood or charcoal  03 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 77 
Sale of poles  04 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 77 
Trading in chat  05 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 77 
Trading in livestock 06 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 77 
Trading in grain 07 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 77 
Food preparation and sales  08 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 77 
Running shop  09 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 77 
Renting out oxen  10 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 77 
Renting out camel  11 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 77 
Renting out land  12 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 77 
Food aid  13 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 77 
Migration for daily labour  14 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 77 
Other (specify)             
 15 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 77 
 16 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 77 
 17 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 77 
  Codes 01-09 in the rows refer to the ID # of HH members 
Code 00 stands for non-household members who contributed in the work 
Code 77 stands for one who was dead, but now not listed in the household profile 
 
 
26. Currently which is the primary livelihood system for your household? 
1. Livestock production  
2. Crop cultivation 
3. Trading in livestock 
4. Trading in other marketable goods 
5. Other _________________________________________________   
27. Is the income from the primary livelihood system enough for your family round the year?   
1. Yes  
2. No 
28. If no, how do you overcome the deficit? (multiple responses are possible) 
1. Borrowing from traders  
2. Kinship support  
3. Support from Takaysa 
4. Relief assistance 
5. Reducing consumption 
6. Eating wild foods 
7. Other (specify) _______________________________ 
29. Which are your sources of cash income in the past 12 months? 
1. Sale of cattle    
2. Sale of sheep and goat    
3. Sale of camel 
4. Sale of fuel wood   
5. Sale of handicrafts 
6. Trading in livestock 
7. Other (specify) _________________________________________  
 
30. For what purpose did your use the cash? (multiple responses are possible)  
1. To buy food grain 
2. To buy other consumer goods (coffee, salt, sugar, etc) 
3. To buy cloth 
4. To buy chat  
5. Other (specify) _________________________________________ 
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B2: Adaptive responses (additional activities)  
 
31. Which activities does your household resort to other than primary livelihood system?   
1. Rain-fed crop cultivation 
2. Small scale irrigated farming 
3. Trading in livestock  
4. Trading in Chat 
5. Running shops or small restaurants 
6. Migrating into other places in search of job 
7. Other specify ___________________________________________ 
32. What are the reasons that led your household to resort to one or more of the above activities?  
1. Loss of livestock due to drought  
2. The difficulty to rely on livestock production alone  
3. As additional source of cash income  
4. Shrinking or lack of pasture for livestock rearing  
5. Other specify ____________________________________________ 
33. If you are engaged in trading for what purpose do you spend your profit? 
1. Capital development 
2. Restocking 
3. Buying food 
4. For medical expenses 
5. Sharing to kin group 
6. To run other business 
34. In your community who are mostly involved in trading livestock? 
1. Mostly the poor households 
2. Mostly wealthy households 
3. Both  
4. Other (specify) __________________________________________ 
35. How do you evaluate viability of animal rearing for future?   
1. Less viable 
2. Remain the same 
3. More viable 
4. It is difficult to predict 
36. If less viable, why? 
1. Recurrent drought risk 
2. Further lack of pasture  
3. Lack of water 
4. Animal disease risk 
5. Animal raiding by Issa 
6. Other ( specify) ___________________________________________ 
37. Which livelihood system (s) will be viable for your family in the future? 
1. Rearing livestock  
2. Cultivation of crops 
3. Combining animal production with crop cultivation 
4. Combining animal production with trading 
5. Trading in animal and other marketable goods 
6. Other  (specify) _________________________________________________ 
38. What strategies do you practice to deal with environmental stress (loss of pasture and vegetation)? 
1. Herd splitting and mobility to areas where fodder can be available 
2. Change in the composition of the herds 
3. Mutual help and stock transfer 
4. Market strategy (livestock disposal) 
5. Shift to other activities  
39. During the last 12 months did any one from your household travel outside the Woreda to look for work?  
1. Yes  
2. No 
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 If yes, fill the following table 
39 40 41 42 43 44 45 
Who 
went 
 
ID # 
from 
table 1  
Destination: 
1= Bati town  
2=Oromia zone  
3=Asayita 
4= Dubti 
5=Djibouti  
6=Eli-waha 
7= Mile 
8=Afdera  
9=other (specify) ___ 
Season:  
 
1=Hagay 
2 = Sugum 
3 = Gilal 
4 = Dedaa 
5 = Karma 
Period of 
absence:  
(no. of 
months)  
What did he 
bring to the 
household:  
1=cash 
2=food  
3=cloth  
4= nothing  
5 =other 
(specify) 
 
What is that 
income used 
for: 
1=food 
2=clothing  
3=livestock 
purchase 
4 = support to 
relatives  
5=other 
(specify)______ 
How was the 
migration funded: 
1= own saving  
2= borrowing from 
relatives 
3=other (specify)  
 
 1 2   3   4 5   6   7   8   9 1  2   3  4  5  1  2   3   4    5 1  2   3   4    5 1   2   3   4 
 1 2   3   4 5   6   7   8   9 1  2   3  4  5  1  2   3   4    5 1  2   3   4    5 1   2   3   4 
 1 2   3   4 5   6   7   8   9 1  2   3  4  5  1  2   3   4    5 1  2   3   4    5 1   2   3   4 
 1 2   3   4 5   6   7   8   9 1  2   3  4  5  1  2   3   4    5 1  2   3   4    5 1   2   3   4 
 1 2   3   4 5   6   7   8   9 1  2   3  4  5  1  2   3   4    5 1  2   3   4    5 1   2   3   4 
 1 2   3   4 5   6   7   8   9 1  2   3  4  5  1  2   3   4    5 1  2   3   4    5 1   2   3   4 
 1 2   3   4 5   6   7   8   9 1  2   3  4  5  1  2   3   4    5 1  2   3   4    5 1   2   3   4 
 
46. Do you think that there are poor, middle and rich people in your community?  
1. Yes 
2. No  
47. If yes, what criteria are often used to differentiate these groups of people?  
1. Number of livestock 
2. Cash 
3. Owning gun  
4. Being a clan leader 
5. Other (specify) ____________________________________________ 
48. To which group does your household belong? _____________________________ 
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C: ASSETS  
C1: Livestock holding and access  
46 47 48 49 50 51 52 
Type of 
livestock  
Number 
owned 
(including 
those which 
are looked 
after and those 
which are 
partly owned)   
 
Number 
held (total 
number held 
in a 
household) 
 
  
In the past 12 
months have you 
borrowed livestock? 
If yes,  
1 = for free (hatilla) 
2 = in return for 
labour  
3 =in return for cash 
4 = other _________ 
99 =NA 
In the past 12 
months have you 
lent out livestock? if 
yes,  
1 = free (hantilla) 
2 = in return for 
labour  
3 =in return for cash 
4 = other_______ 
99=NA 
What are the sources 
of fodder in wet 
season?  
1=grazing  
2= trees and leaves   
3=crop residues  
4 = other (specify) 
____________ 
What are the sources of fodder 
in dry season?  
1=grazing  
2= trees and leaves   
3=crop residues  
4 = cut and carry (grass, leaves and 
tees) 
5= hay 
6 = other (specify) ____________ 
A.  Oxen    1  2   3   4    99 1  2   3   4    99 1  2   3   4    1   2   3   4   5   6   
B. Heifer    1  2   3   4    99 1  2   3   4    99 1  2   3   4     1   2   3   4   5   6   
C. Cow    1  2   3   4    99 1  2   3   4    99 1  2   3   4    1   2   3   4   5   6  
D. Bull   1  2   3   4    99 1  2   3   4    99 1  2   3   4     1   2   3   4   5   6   
E. Calf   1  2   3   4    99 1  2   3   4    99 1  2   3   4     1   2   3   4   5   6   
F. Goat   1  2   3   4    99 1  2   3   4    99 1  2   3   4    1   2   3   4   5   6    
G. Sheep   1  2   3   4    99 1  2   3   4    99 1  2   3   4     1   2   3   4   5   6    
H. Camel    1  2   3   4    99 1  2   3   4    99 1  2   3   4    1   2   3   4   5   6   
I. Donkey    1  2   3   4    99 1  2   3   4    99 1  2   3   4    1   2   3   4   5   6  
J. Other    1  2   3   4    99 1  2   3   4    99 1  2   3   4   1   2   3   4   5   6   
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C2: Changes in livestock numbers in the last 12 months  
53 54 55 56 57 58 59 
Type of 
livestock  
Total 
number 
that have 
died: 
0= if none  
 
Total number 
slaughtered: 
 
0=if none  
99 =NA  
   
Total 
number 
bought in 
cash: 
0= if none 
Total  
number  
sold:  
 
0= if none 
Total 
number  
given 
away as 
gift: 
0= if none  
 
What was the cause for 
those animals who died or 
disappeared:    
1 = age 
2 =diseases 
3 = lack of fodder due to 
drought 
4 = Raided by Issa 
5 = Theft 
6 = attacked by wild animal 
7= other (specify)________ 
 
A.  Oxen       1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
B. Heifer       1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
C. Cow       1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
D. Bull      1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
E. Calf      1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
F. Goat      1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
G. Sheep      1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
H. Camel       1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
I. Donkey       1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
J. Other       1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
 
60. Why did you sell livestock this year (refer column 57 in the above table)  
1. To avoid drought risk /disposal of animal 
2. For purchasing food 
3. For buying cloth 
4. Purchasing other consumer goods 
5. Other (specify) ______________________________________ 
 
61. Which factors have affected your animal husbandry? (Multiple responses are possible). 
1. Loss of grazing due to bush encroachment 
2. Recurrent severe drought 
3. Livestock diseases 
4. Scarcity of water 
5. Raiding by Issa 
6. Other (specify) ______________________________________    
 
62. Where do people from this village go to buy or sell livestock, or other commodities?  
Use of the market (Tick all that apply)  Average travelling time from 
the centre to village  
Market 
or town  
Buy grain Sell 
livestock 
Buy livestock Buy other  commodities On foot By vehicle 
A.        
B.       
C.        
D.        
E       
 
 
63. How many livestock did you have before the 1984/85 famine? 
1. Camel________ 
2. Cattle ________ 
3. Goat _________ 
4. Sheep ________ 
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5. Donkey ______ 
6. Other ________ 
7. I did have livestock by the time 
64. Was the livestock production adequate to provide food for your family before 1984 famine? 
1. Yes  
2. No 
65. Is current livestock production less viable than it was before the 1984 drought?  
1. yes 
2. No  
66. If yes, why is the traditional livelihood strategy (livestock production) less viable now? 
1. Environmental changes/degradation of pasture  
2. Prolonged drought or severe recurrent drought  
3. Population increase  
4. animal epidemics 
5. Other (specify) _____________________ 
 
C3: Grazing land and herd movement  
 
67. Have you lost your traditional grazing land/dry season grazing area? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
68. If yes, why?  
1. Grazing land is converted into other uses  
2. Conflict with neighboring groups 
3. Agricultural expansion from highland areas 
4. Depletion of pasture 
5. other (specify) ___________________________ 
69. What happened to your household when you lost grazing land?  
1. I lost my livestock 
2. I started crop cultivation 
3. I had to move my livestock to distant  places  
4. I had to confine livestock close to my village  
5. Other (specify)  _________________________ 
70. Did you move livestock as you did it before 20 to 30 years? 
1. Yes  
2. No  
71. If no, which factors have led to further reduction of livestock mobility? 
1. Risk of Conflict with Issa 
2. Risk of animal disease 
3. Risk of animal raiding 
4. Other (specify) __________________ 
 
C3: Land  
 
72. Does your household own farming plot?  
1. Yes 
2. No  
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If yes,   
73 74 75 76 77 
Plot type When did you 
start having 
your plot? 
 (Year) 
Plot size 
(owned) 
Types of crop planted: 
1= maize  
2= sorghum 
3= vegetables  
4=onion or potato  
5= fruits  
6=other  
How the land is cultivated: 
1=myself  
2= renting out  
3=sharecropping  
4= support from friend 
(Takaysa) 
5= hiring labour  
6 other___________  
Irrigated land    1   2   3   4    5     6 1   2   3   4    5   6 
Rain fed located near 
homestead 
  1   2   3   4    5     6 1   2   3   4    5   6 
Bush field far from home    1   2   3   4    5     6 1   2   3   4    5   6 
Other    1   2   3   4    5     6 1   2   3   4    5   6 
 
78. Why have you started cultivation? 
1. For additional sources of food or income  
2. Since animal rearing alone  has been  less viable 
3. Since I saw my village fellows 
4. Since I saw neighboring Oromo groups 
5. Other  (specify) _______________________________________________ 
79. If you use sharecropping to work your farmland, how do you share the produce? (Questions 79-82 are 
based on the column 5 in the above table)  
1. Sharing the produce equally 
2. I give one third of the produce to sharecropper 
3. Other  arrangement ( specify) _________________________________________  
80. If you use hired labour, how much money did you pay?  __________ Birr per day 
 
81. What is the source of money for hiring labour? 
1. Sale of livestock 
2. Sale of crop 
3. Sale of milk 
4. Other (specify)  _________________________________________________  
82. Why did you use sharecropping arrangement or hiring labour to carry out cultivation?  
1. Lack of skill to carry out cultivation 
2. Shortage of labour 
3. Lack of tools 
4. Lack of traction power 
5. Other  (specify) __________________________________________________ 
 
C4. Human and Social Capital  
C4.1 Human  
83. Do you send your children to school? 
1. Yes  
2. No  
84.  If no why? (Provide the most relevant reason to your household)  
1. They have to keep cattle 
2. Inaccessibility of schools  
3. Other (specify) __________________________________________________ 
85. Why is it important to educate children? (Multiple responses are possible). 
1. Educated children help their parents   
2. Educated children can get jobs in government offices  
3. Brings skills for farming  
4. Makes it easy for them to pursue livelihoods other than pastoralism  
5. Educated children help their community  
6. Other (specify) ____________________________________________________________ 
 
 323
86. Do the community members support each other during bad and good times? 
1. Yes 
2. No  
87. If your household had a problem and needed money or food urgently, would you be able to get it from 
your community or from relatives? 
1. Yes 
2. No  
88. How many people could you ask for this kind of help?   Number _____________________________ 
 
C4.2 Informal Transfers  
 
89. Have you ever received assistance from your kin? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
90. If yes, what was it  
1. Livestock 
2. Cash 
3. Gun  
4. Other (specify) ____________________________________ 
In the last 12 months has your household receive any of the following types of assistance from anyone 
outside the household?  
Item From whom Why  Where do they live 
91 91 93 94 95 
Hantilla (lending 
milk animal)   
Yes    No  
1           2 
 
1   2   3   4   5  
 
1   2   3   4  5  6      
 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7    
Livestock  1           2 1   2   3   4   5    1   2   3   4  5  6      1   2   3   4   5   6   7    
Cash  1           2 1   2   3   4   5    1   2   3   4  5  6      1   2   3   4   5   6   7    
Cash loan  1           2 1   2   3   4   5    1   2   3   4  5  6      1   2   3   4   5   6   7    
Food or grain   1           2 1   2   3   4   5    1   2   3   4  5  6      1   2   3   4   5   6   7    
Free labour  1           2 1   2   3   4   5    1   2   3   4  5  6      1   2   3   4   5   6   7    
Free use of oxen  1           2 1   2   3   4   5    1   2   3   4  5  6      1   2   3   4   5   6   7    
Free use of camel  1           2 1   2   3   4   5    1   2   3   4  5  6      1   2   3   4   5   6   7   
Other  1           2 1   2   3   4   5    1   2   3   4  5  6      1   2   3   4   5   6   7  
  Code: 
1= relatives/kin  
2= own clan 
members 
3= other clan 
members 
4= non-Afar 
friends  (Takaysa) 
5= other specify 
___ 
Code: 
1= food shortage  
2= to buy consumer 
goods 
3=for marriage  
ceremony  
4= funeral ceremony  
5=  loss of stock  
6= other (specify)___ 
Code: 
1= same Village  
2 = Nemelifen   
3= Oromiya /south Wello 
zone  
4 = Dubti  
5 = Asayita  
6 = Djibouti  
7 = other her (specify) __ 
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C4.3 Formal Transfers 
In past 12 months which of these types of assistance did your household receive from government or aid 
agencies? 
FFW FFC Free food aid  Faffa (supplementary 
food)  
Free cash Tools  Livestock  
96 97 98 99 100 101 102 
1=Yes  
  2 = no  
1=Yes  
  2 = no 
1=Yes   
2 = no 
1=Yes    
2 = no 
1=Yes    
2 = no 
1=Yes    
2 = no 
1=Yes    
2 = no 
 
103. What is the reason that your household was the beneficiary of above assistance?  
1. Severe food shortage  
2. Loss of  livestock  
3. It is a  free distribution  
4. Other (specify) __________________________________________________________ 
D: Current Food Security and Consumption  
 
104. During the last rain season, did your household suffer any shortage of food? 
1. Yes  
2. No 
105. If yes, in which months was food shortage most acute for your household? Write the month ________ 
106. During that worst month, how many times a day did the adults and children in your household eat? 
 Number of meals per day 
A. Adults  0    1    2     3    4 
B. Children (school-age and working 
children)  
0    1    2     3    4 
 Code:  0=sometimes passed a whole day without eating 
anything 
 
107. In your household, how many months did the food shortage last? Write the Number of months._______ 
108. Yesterday (if it is non-fasting day) did any adults or children in your household eat the following types of   
food?  
Types of food  Adults ate Children ate 
109 110 111 
 Yes  =1                  No=2 Yes=1                     No=2 
A. Milk        1                             2 1                               2 
B. Meat        1                             2 1                               2 
C. Mufae (locally made bread)       1                             2 1                               2 
D. Boiled or roasted grain        1                             2 1                               2 
F. Muki        1                             2 1                               2 
G. Injera        1                             2 1                               2 
H. Potatoes        1                             2 1                               2 
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I. Pasta        1                             2 1                               2 
J. Wild roots and fruits        1                             2 1                               2 
K. Other (specify)       1                             2 1                               2 
L       1                             2 1                               2 
 
E. Self Assessment  
112. In the periods given below is or was your household situation better, the same or worse?   
Categories  Now Last 
year 
In the last 15 
year (EPRDF) 
15 years ago during 
Derg regime 
A. Household not formed at that time   0 0 0 
B. Doing well:   
• Able meet household needs by your own 
effort, making some extra for stores, 
saving and investment (e.g. buying 
livestock, or other assets) 
1 1 1 1 
C. Doing just okay: 
• Able to meet household needs but with 
nothing extra to save or invest  
2 2 2 2 
D. Struggling:  
• Managing to meet household needs, but 
by depleting productive assets, or 
sometimes receiving support from 
community or government   
3 3 3 3 
E: Unable to meet household needs: 
• Dependent on support from the 
community or government  
4 4 4 4 
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